meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-common/tests, branch 0.1

feat: Phase 10b — Self-service UI (group create/join, upload, IndexedDB, search)

2026-08-11T12:55:52Z

Six self-service features for the web SPA: - Group creation UI with GEK auto-generation (AES-256-GCM ECIES) - Member management + invite by username (GEK wrapping for invitee) - Open group self-join flow (POST /v1/groups/{id}/join) - File upload client→node (FILE_UPLOAD MNP type, .uploads/ staging) - IndexedDB caching of group file indexes (instant display on revisit) - Cross-group file search (SearchPage, pure client-side on cached indexes) 11 new tests (166 total): 8 group self-service + 3 AES GEK wrap/unwrap. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat: Phase 7 — Node v2 (multi-group, Sender Keys, 0-RTT, chat, denylist)

2026-08-10T01:07:56Z

Implements all 8 milestones (7.0-7.7): - 7.0: JWT carries `groups` claim; node verifies group membership at MNP handshake (QUIC + TCP+TLS). Resolves security review C2. - 7.1: QUIC 0-RTT session resumption via stored session tickets (17-21ms reconnect vs 47ms cold). - 7.2: Hub→node WebSocket signaling for NAT punch coordination (`client_incoming`/`punch_ready`) + jti denylist push. Denylist class blocks revoked users/jtis at handshake. - 7.3: Multi-group daemon — one QUIC port serves N groups with per-group GEK, shared_root, and index routing. - 7.4: HLS streaming via QUIC (STREAM_SEGMENT message type, ffmpeg segment extraction). - 7.5: Sender Keys protocol for group chat (Signal Groups approach). Each member has own sending chain key, HKDF chain ratchet, AES-256-GCM encryption, Ed25519 signing. Resolves security review C1. - 7.6: Chat store (SQLite via aiosqlite), CHAT_MESSAGE MNP wire type with peer broadcast, web UI with WebSocket push. - 7.7: Argon2id calibration CLI. First security review included (first-review.md). 109 tests, demo-v3 validated against meshbay.org production hub. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat: password-based key derivation + operational QUICKSTART

2026-08-09T12:50:22Z

keyderive.py: derive Ed25519+X25519 from username+password via Argon2id. Same credentials → same keys on any device. Encrypt/decrypt keypair bundle (AES-256-GCM) for hub storage (web clients). 7/7 tests. Full suite: 81/81. keyderive.js: browser counterpart using PBKDF2-SHA512 + random keypairs encrypted for hub storage. Avoids algorithm mismatch with Python. hub/models.py + users.py: keypair_bundle field added to User, stored on registration, returned in login response for web client key recovery. QUICKSTART.md: fully rewritten. 3 operational scripts in QE/demo-v1/: setup_demo.py — create accounts, group, distribute GEK run_node.py — start HTTP node (watches shared/ directory) download.py — bob login → GEK fetch → decrypt → save All tested locally end-to-end. No invented URLs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context)

feat: Phase 6 complete — chat, multi-group, federation, replication, webcrypto

2026-08-09T03:31:05Z

6.1 Double Ratchet (meshbay_common/ratchet.py): Forward secrecy, break-in recovery, out-of-order delivery. Signal-spec KDF_RK/KDF_CK via HKDF-SHA256. 11/11 tests. 6.2 Multi-group node (config.py): [[groups]] TOML array, per-group ports, back-compat [group]. 6.3 MHP federation persistence (db/models.py FederatedGroup + SwarmSource): receive_directory() now persists to federated_groups table. list_public_groups() includes federated results with source attribution. 6.4 Content replication (node/replication.py + hub SwarmSource): ContentReplicator: fetch-index, download, hash-verify, register-swarm. Hub: POST /v1/swarm/register, GET /v1/swarm/{hash} for multi-source. 6.5 Browser private group (webcrypto.py + static/crypto.js): AES-256-GCM variant of GEK for WebCrypto-compatible groups. crypto.js: SubtleCrypto importGEK + deriveChunkKey + decryptChunk. Keys distinct from ChaCha20 via :aes HKDF info suffix. 4/4 tests. 74/74 tests total. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context)

feat(common): add Double Ratchet algorithm — 6.1

2026-08-09T03:27:16Z

RatchetState: full Signal-spec Double Ratchet (DH ratchet + symmetric ratchet). KDF_RK/KDF_CK via HKDF-SHA256. AES-256-GCM message encryption. MKSKIP for out-of-order delivery (max 1000 skipped keys). ChatMessage dataclass with to_dict/from_dict for wire serialisation. Properties validated by tests: ✓ Forward secrecy (consumed keys unreplayable) ✓ Out-of-order delivery ✓ Associated data binding ✓ Break-in recovery (post-ratchet keys independent) ✓ 100-message stress test 11/11 tests in 0.06s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context)