meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/admin.py, branch 0.15

style: the 98 ruff could not fix, so the linter is a signal again

2026-09-19T12:39:38Z

The pass before this applied ruff's own fixes. These are the ones needing a decision, and the point of doing them is that `ruff check .` now passes: a linter reporting 98 known-acceptable findings reports nothing, because the next real one arrives invisible. **Lines over 100 (70).** Mostly wrapped where they stood. Two exceptions: the aligned trailing comments in `protocol.py`'s message table were shortened rather than wrapped, because wrapping one row of a table breaks the table; and in `models.py` the column comments moved above their columns for the same reason. **Imports below the first statement (14).** `csam.py` kept its FastAPI imports under a section header halfway down the file; two node tests had a constant and a `pytestmark` wedged between two import blocks. Moved, not suppressed. **Bindings nothing reads (4).** Three in tests, where the call stays and only the name goes — `_user(client, "listener")` is there to create the user, not to return one. The fourth was in `revocation.py` and was not a lint finding at all: `_connect_and_listen` opened an httpx stream to the WebSocket URL, did `pass`, and then opened the real connection through the `websockets` library. One pointless request per connect, left over from before that library was used directly. Removed, and `httpx` with it. **`l` as a name (4)**, **semicolons (6)** in the POC spikes, and the rest. 2893 passed, the same count as the two commits before it. `meshbay_node/revocation.py` is worth a decision separately: 154 lines that nothing imports, superseded by `hub_client.maintain_ws`'s `on_revocation`. This commit only stopped it failing the linter. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

style: ruff's own fixes, mechanically applied

2026-09-19T12:24:13Z

`ruff check .` had gone unrun long enough to report 568 errors, which is the same as having no linter: the next real finding would have been invisible in the noise. This is the 521 it fixes by itself, in 173 files, and nothing else — the 98 it cannot fix are the next commit. What actually changed: import sorting (225), imports nobody used (87, none of them a re-export — no `__init__.py` is touched, which was the one way this could have broken an import elsewhere), `datetime.timezone.utc` to `datetime.UTC` (69) and `asyncio.TimeoutError` to `TimeoutError` (18), both plain aliases on the 3.12 this project requires, `Optional[X]` to `X | None` (24), and f-strings with nothing to interpolate (19). Checked rather than assumed: every module in the three packages still imports, and the suite is 2893 passed — the same count, test for test, as the merge before it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

feat(hub): session lifetime is an admin setting, and a browser signs out when idle

2026-09-15T00:21:01Z

Browser idle sign-out (media playback counts as activity; not the desktop app), refresh idle window and maximum session length, in hours. Sign-out now revokes on the hub, and the profile has "sign out everywhere". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XuNrwLf5EFWCMHzfoEvnpm

fix(hub): a per-account sign-in lockout, and a reviewed unauthenticated surface

2026-09-13T23:53:04Z

Passphrase sign-in locks per username: after `login.max_failures` wrong passphrases (default 4) the name is refused with `429 account_locked` and a `Retry-After` for `login.lockout_minutes` (default 60), without the passphrase being checked. Both numbers are instance policy an admin sets from the panel; zero failures turns it off. The per-IP limit bounds one address, and IPv6 gives every subscriber a /64 of them — an online guess targets an account, so the account is what is counted. - Counted by the name as typed, existing or not, so `login` stays uniform (M1). The key is a hash: people type passphrases into the username field. - The attempt is taken before the check in one `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE … WHERE … RETURNING`, so a concurrent burst gets no more than the limit. - Sign-in, passphrase change and account deletion count on the same row; the last had no rate limit at all. - A lockout refuses passphrase sign-in and nothing else: sessions, renewal and device sign-in continue, and a reset code clears it (AV26). A session learns its own lockout from `/v1/users/me`, and the passphrase change checks it before re-wrapping any node's bundle — the hub accepts the new passphrase only after the nodes have it. The SPA now shows what the hub said. `loginAndRecover` threw "Login failed: {json}", so `email_verification_required` never matched and was never shown; the passphrase-change form rendered no error at all in its first phase. The unauthenticated surface, reviewed route by route: - No `/docs`, `/redoc` or `/openapi.json`, in the code. The Caddyfile hid them on meshbay.org only; a packaged hub behind any other proxy published all three. - The node socket's first message must arrive within ten seconds. It is accepted before anyone is known, and an unbounded read is a connection any stranger holds for free. - `/v1/relays` answers 503 behind `relay.RELAYS_ENABLED`, as federation does: nothing in the tree calls it and two of its routes take no account. - `test_unauthenticated_surface.py` walks every route and fails on one without an authentication dependency that is not listed with its reason. Verified in Chrome against a local hub: the lockout and wrong-passphrase messages, the admin section saving both lockout and mail limits, and the passphrase change refused while locked. Not verified in Firefox (a running instance blocks the headless one), nor the upsert's concurrency on PostgreSQL. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt

feat(hub): the mail bounds are settings, with a panel to change them

2026-09-12T14:36:54Z

They were constants in two modules, so an operator could not touch them without editing code and redeploying — and the hour a budget runs out is not when anyone wants to do that. `[mail]` in hub.toml carries the defaults; the live values live in `hub_settings`, read at each use. A missing row falls back to what the configuration file says, so an instance that never opens the panel behaves as its file describes. The panel sends only what changed, the hub clamps each value to a stated range and refuses a key it does not know, and the response is what gets rendered — so a clamped value is never shown as stored. `GET /v1/admin/mail` is the other half. There was no way to see any of this: a refusal was a line in the journal, so an instance that had stopped sending sign-up codes looked, from the panel, exactly like one with no sign-ups. It reports the hour's use, what is left for sign-ups, and what is left for recovery — the difference between those two being the reserved share made visible. Labels in all ten catalogues. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT

fix(hub): an administrator can erase an account that owns groups

2026-09-11T17:27:27Z

An administrator's deletion answered 409 for any account owning a group, so an erasure ordered by an authority had to wait on the person it was about. It now deletes the account's groups with it, then pushes a signed revocation for the account and for each group to every connected node: an access token already issued stays valid on a node until it expires, and the revocation is what makes the nodes refuse the account and close the groups' sessions now. The action is written to the IP log, and the confirmation dialog says the groups go too, in all ten catalogues. The owner's own deletion is unchanged: refused while they own groups, which they can hand over first (CGU 3.4, privacy statement). Deleting a group had three partial cascades. The owner's route left email_verifications behind, and the cleanup of unhosted groups left notifications, invitations and reports - each an IntegrityError on PostgreSQL, invisible on SQLite, which does not enforce foreign keys by default. db/purge.py is now the one implementation: it finds every table referencing groups.id from the schema, deletes the group's rows and detaches content reports, which are evidence and outlive the group. test_group_purge.py turns foreign-key enforcement on for its connection, seeds every referencing table, and fails without the fix on all three routes. MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 7.7 states the rule, and now lists the device keys and swarm sources that e3c68b3 erases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy

fix(hub): moderator can no longer grant admin or hard-revoke accounts

2026-09-01T15:48:56Z

admin_patch_user was gated by require_moderator but wrote `role` and `status` with no further check. A moderator could promote any account (an accomplice) to admin, demote an existing admin, or set status="revoked" — a straight path from the moderation role to full instance control. Split authorization by field: status between active/suspended stays at require_moderator (reversible content moderation); role changes, status="revoked", and touching an admin's account at all now require user_is_admin(current_user) (new helper in deps.py, alongside the existing require_admin/require_moderator). Regression test: test_moderator_cannot_change_roles_or_revoke. Third security review, finding H1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pG75yGK3NthNfyjH74omG

feat(hub): group names unique per owner, shown as name@owner

2026-08-28T08:09:38Z

A group's identity stays its UUID. What changes is that "the name is unique" — until now an unenforced expectation — becomes real, scoped to the owner account, and the owner's username is surfaced so two groups called "photos" on different nodes can be told apart. Hub: - `groups` gains a functional unique index `uq_groups_owner_name` on `(admin_id, lower(name))` (model + migration c3d4e5f6a7b8). The migration pre-flights: if the data already clashes it aborts and lists the offending (admin_id, name) pairs rather than renaming anyone's group. meshbay.org checked clean. - `create_group` trims the name, rejects blank (422) and an owner-scoped case-insensitive clash (409), with an IntegrityError backstop for the race, and returns `owner_username`. - `owner_username` added to `/v1/groups/mine`, `GET /v1/groups` (local rows), `POST /v1/groups/{id}/join`, `GET /v1/admin/groups`. SPA: - new `static/group-name.js` — `` renders the name with the `@owner` handle on a smaller grey line under it. - used in the sidebar, the group-page header, Explore cards, the Admin groups table, and cross-group Search (via a widened `cacheGroupIndex` carrying the owner). Delete/leave confirmations show `name@owner` inline. - federated Explore rows show `@` instead of an account. Design record and the locked decisions: ~/next/groupnames.md (out of repo). MNP unchanged. Tests: test_group_name_unique.py, test_group_name_migration.py. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018gKJ85aZyvEwarXMFzFEwi

feat(hub): let a hub admin disable public groups instance-wide

2026-08-28T00:51:00Z

A new General tab in Administration carries one switch, allow_public_groups, stored in a hub_settings key/value table (runtime-editable, unlike hub.toml). Default is on; an absent row means on, so an upgrade changes nothing. Enforcement is server-side on every hub-mediated path, not just the SPA: - create_group refuses visibility=public (403), staff included - list_public_groups the directory returns nothing (local + federated) - join_group open-joining a public group is refused - group_online_nodes a non-member of a public group is handed no node - signaling.webrtc_offer drops the "node hosts an open group" fallback - federation.export_directory advertises nothing to peer hubs The switch is read live, so flipping it back restores every path. Existing members of a group that predates the switch keep their membership row and their access — this is plan A, not a purge. GET /v1/hub/info exposes the flag (unauthenticated) so the create-group form and the sidebar's "Public groups" link render correctly. Also in the admin Groups tab: a Revoke action beside Suspend. Suspend is the reversible hub flag; Revoke calls POST /v1/admin/revoke, which sets status=revoked and broadcasts a signed revocation every node enforces (denylist + dropped live sessions). It is confirm-guarded and names the group. And a message fix the revoke work surfaced: group_online_nodes, join_group and webrtc_offer answered "Group is suspended" for any non-active status. They now report the real state, so a member of a revoked group is told "Group is revoked" rather than something reversible-sounding. Tests: test_public_groups_toggle.py (10) covers the switch end to end and the five enforcement paths; test_revocation.py gains the status-message assertion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018gKJ85aZyvEwarXMFzFEwi

fix: stop a stream on close, count only real users, record where a node is

2026-08-15T17:01:08Z

**Closing the viewer left the node working.** Nothing told it to stop: the player dropped its handlers, which only made the browser deaf. ffmpeg kept running and held one of the node's two transcode slots until the credit timeout expired two minutes later — which is why the next video answered "server busy". `stream_stop` ends it at once, and the viewer also drops its queue, ends the MediaSource and revokes the object URL on the way out, any of which could be holding megabytes of decrypted video. While there: `file_chunk` replies were matched to their requests by arrival order, which was true by luck rather than by construction. The reply now names the file it belongs to and is matched on that and the chunk index; a chunk nobody is waiting for is dropped instead of being handed to whatever request happens to be oldest. **The administration panel counted its own history.** A deleted account is tombstoned so the connection log stays readable, and every count and list treated that row as a user — including a group's member count, and the member list of the group itself. They do not any more. **Where a node is.** `endpoint_hint` is what a node believes its address to be, learned from a STUN server and sent to us: useful for reaching it, and a claim. The announcement that carries it is signed with the node key over a fresh timestamp, so the address that request *arrives from* is the address of whoever holds that key — that is now recorded on the node row and shown in a Nodes tab, next to the hint, with the difference spelled out. Clients get the same treatment: `webrtc_offer` is logged with the address the hub saw when a browser starts a peer connection. Verified against the live deployment: the node's row reads 90.112.206.172 after a restart, and in e2e a stopped stream goes quiet in one message and the next one starts immediately instead of being refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5