meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/nodes.py, branch v0.9.0

fix: stop a stream on close, count only real users, record where a node is

2026-08-15T17:01:08Z

**Closing the viewer left the node working.** Nothing told it to stop: the player dropped its handlers, which only made the browser deaf. ffmpeg kept running and held one of the node's two transcode slots until the credit timeout expired two minutes later — which is why the next video answered "server busy". `stream_stop` ends it at once, and the viewer also drops its queue, ends the MediaSource and revokes the object URL on the way out, any of which could be holding megabytes of decrypted video. While there: `file_chunk` replies were matched to their requests by arrival order, which was true by luck rather than by construction. The reply now names the file it belongs to and is matched on that and the chunk index; a chunk nobody is waiting for is dropped instead of being handed to whatever request happens to be oldest. **The administration panel counted its own history.** A deleted account is tombstoned so the connection log stays readable, and every count and list treated that row as a user — including a group's member count, and the member list of the group itself. They do not any more. **Where a node is.** `endpoint_hint` is what a node believes its address to be, learned from a STUN server and sent to us: useful for reaching it, and a claim. The announcement that carries it is signed with the node key over a fresh timestamp, so the address that request *arrives from* is the address of whoever holds that key — that is now recorded on the node row and shown in a Nodes tab, next to the hint, with the difference spelled out. Clients get the same treatment: `webrtc_offer` is logged with the address the hub saw when a browser starts a peer connection. Verified against the live deployment: the node's row reads 90.112.206.172 after a restart, and in e2e a stopped stream goes quiet in one message and the next one starts immediately instead of being refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

feat!: identity keys per node — C4's blast radius drops to one operator

2026-08-14T15:51:48Z

One keypair was copied to every node its owner joined, so cracking the bundle on any single node yielded the identity used on all of them: their content on other operators' machines, and the ability to sign as them anywhere. That lateral reach was the part of C4 worth attacking. Each node now gets its own keypair, generated the first time its owner joins it and left with that node alone. An operator who cracks what sits on their own disk holds a key that is a stranger to every other node — and on their own node, one that unlocks nothing they did not already hold: they serve the content, the index and every byte of it by design. Nothing changes for the user. A first contact with a node already needed that operator's code, and the key is created in the same step; a second browser still recovers it from the node with the passphrase alone. Two operators can also no longer tell they host the same person by comparing keys. BREAKING, and deliberately without a compatibility path — the deployment is wiped for the next demo: - users.pk_ed25519 / pk_x25519 dropped (migration a7c31f9e40b2) - registration no longer sends or stores a key - PUT /v1/users/me/keys and regenerateKeys() gone; rotation is now `member unpin` plus a fresh code, decided on the machine that pinned it - /pubkeys returns an account id and a node's linking key. It was the directory H3 read, and nothing wraps for it any more - the pk_user JWT claim is gone That last one closed a live defect the inventory turned up: the node recorded pk_user as the uploader's identity and authorized deletion against it, so a hub issuing a token naming its own key could delete anyone's uploads on any node. Attribution now uses the key the node itself pinned. A simplification falls out. Registration generates nothing, so a scripted signup is a real account: `demo.py bootstrap` takes a wiped hub and node to a working demo with no browser, which was impossible while keys were born in one. Also fixes, found by running it on a wiped deployment: the key handed back on a join now belongs to the group the connection is for, not the group named in the invitation — an operator pairs node-wide but redeems the code while opening a group, and expects to read it. Tests: 343, including the two that state the property — a key pinned by one node is refused at another, and someone else's code does not admit it. Verified end to end against a wiped hub and node: bootstrap, pair, invite, join, download, stream, second browser, revoke. Design: docs/per-node-identity-v1.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

fix(hub): require proof of possession on node announce — closes M8

2026-08-13T12:30:51Z

Phase 11.5.10. POST /v1/nodes/announce accepted any pk_node with no proof the announcer held the matching private key, so a user could register a node record carrying someone else's node key, and records accumulated without limit. The announcer now signs a domain-separated message binding the key to their account — meshbay:node_announce:{user_id}:{pk_node}:{timestamp} — reusing the shape already proven by /v1/nodes/auth, so a signature for one can never satisfy the other. Same 60-second window. Re-announcing the same key now updates the existing record in place instead of creating a new row. Three test helpers had to be taught to sign, which is the useful part: nothing in the suite had ever exercised announce with an attacker's key. The new tests cover the missing proof, a foreign key, a stale timestamp, and idempotence. Note for the record: the node key is independent of the user's identity key. Two hub tests asserted the announced pk_node equalled the user's pk_ed, which happened to be true only because the daemon announces its keystore key. They now assert against the announced key itself. Tests: 157 hub+common, node suite green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

fix: swarm privacy, revocation persistence, keystore KDF, audit integrity

2026-08-13T09:00:39Z

Phase 11.5 hardening batch — H7, H4, M2, M6, M7, L1, L3, L6. H7 — private content hashes leaked to the hub. The daemon registered blake3 hashes for every group it hosted, private ones included, giving the hub a content fingerprint of every private file and letting anyone confirm whether a known file exists in the network. The leak was dormant only because the routes were declared on the groups router with a full path and mounted at /v1/groups/v1/swarm/* — the node's calls 404'd into a swallowed exception. Fixing the path alone would have activated the leak, so both land together: registration is gated on group visibility, the routes moved to a real /v1/swarm router, and the lookup now requires authentication. H4 — revocation was advisory. Group revocations were signed and broadcast by the hub and then dropped by the node, whose handler understood only "user" and "jti", so "suspend a group" enforced nothing. The denylist was also in-memory only, so a restart silently un-revoked everyone. Now persisted to data_dir/denylist.json, group targets honoured on both transports, and live sessions for a revoked group are closed. M2 — the node keystore, which protects the node's Ed25519 and X25519 private keys, was still deriving at 64 MB long after the hub's password verifier moved to 256 MB; the docs recorded the bump as done, true for the hub only. Raising the constant alone would have made every existing keystore permanently undecryptable, so envelopes now record the parameters they were written with and pre-M2 files continue to open under the legacy profile. M6 — registration inserted its audit row with a NULL user_id and then ran UPDATE ip_logs SET user_id= WHERE user_id IS NULL, claiming every unattributed row in the table: failed logins for other usernames, concurrent registrations. In logs retained a year for legal requests, that attributed other people's connections to the wrong account. M7 — X-Forwarded-For was trusted unconditionally at four call sites, so anyone could forge the IP written to the compliance log and evade per-IP rate limits. New netutil.client_ip honours the header only from a trusted proxy and takes the rightmost hop (the one our proxy appended); no direct header reads remain. L1 dead GEK_REQUEST/GEK_RESPONSE constants removed; L3 peer errors no longer echo exception text (paths, internal state); L6 email sanity-checked instead of accepting any string — deliberately not RFC 5322, to avoid a new dependency. test_daemon_index_change_pushes_to_peers asserted that a PRIVATE group's hashes are registered with the hub. Split: private asserts not-called (index push to members still asserted), and a new test proves public groups still register. That is the fourth pre-existing test found asserting a vulnerability as intended behaviour, after gek auto-activation, the transport-wide chat_store and the blind admin challenge. Tests: 116 node, 132 hub+common. Regression suite now 43. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

feat: Phase 12 — P2P crypto material, password split, node Ed25519 auth

2026-08-13T01:56:30Z

Baseline commit capturing in-progress Phase 12 work that was already present in the working tree (uncommitted) before the Phase 11.5 security remediation begins. Committed as-is, without review or modification, so that remediation changes arrive as a separable diff. Contents: BundleStore (P2P GEK + keypair bundles), password split (auth_key / bundle_key), node Ed25519 auth (POST /v1/nodes/auth, node-scoped JWT), GEK-HMAC handshake proof with DTLS channel binding, Ed25519 admin challenge-response, node local admin UI rewrite, browser key persistence. Not authored in this session — captured to establish a baseline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

feat(hub): add production hub — config, auth, API routers, tests

2026-08-09T02:39:34Z

config.py: TOML + env var priority. auth.py: Argon2id passwords, JWT EdDSA with jti, refresh token hashed (blake3). Routers: hub (info/pubkey), users (register/login/refresh/pubkeys), nodes (announce/get), groups (create/gek-bundle/gek-retrieve). Rate limiting via slowapi. app.py factory with lifespan. All 40 tests pass (SQLite in-memory, no PostgreSQL required). Fix: remove tests/__init__.py to resolve namespace conflicts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context)