meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/revocation.py, branch 0.2

fix: resource limits, signaling authz, node admin UI token

2026-08-13T09:18:24Z

Phase 11.5 — findings H6, C4 (partial), and milestone 11.5.3. H6 — resource exhaustion. Several paths let one peer degrade or stall a node: * the DataChannel frame limit was a flat 64 MB applied BEFORE authentication, so an unauthenticated peer could announce a huge frame and dribble bytes into it. Unauthenticated peers now get 64 KB; the large budget is granted only after the GEK proof, where it is needed for uploads. * _do_stream_segment ran subprocess.run(..., timeout=30) directly in the event loop, stalling the entire daemon — every peer, every group — for up to thirty seconds per request. Now async, with a timeout and process kill. * ffmpeg was spawned per stream request with no cap. Both streaming paths now share a transport-wide semaphore. * POST /v1/nodes/{id}/webrtc/offer was reachable by any authenticated user for any node, with no membership check and no rate limit, making the target node allocate an aiortc PeerConnection and gather ICE on demand — remote resource exhaustion against a third party's machine. Now rate limited, capped per user, SDP size bounded, and the caller must share an active group with the node. That also closes the H4 gap where signaling ignored group status. * POST /v1/nodes/{id}/incoming took peer_ip verbatim, so any user could make an arbitrary node emit UDP packets to an address of their choosing. The probe target must now match the caller's own source address. C4 (partial) — the pre-proof bundle window. GEK and keypair bundle fetches are served before the GEK proof by necessity: the client needs its wrapped bundle in order to compute the proof. That window is a disclosure surface a hub can reach by forging a JWT. Bounded to 4 fetches per session and audited as "pre_proof_fetch". The real fix is removing remote keypair bundles entirely, which belongs to the native client (Phase 13.3). 11.5.3 — the node admin UI was unauthenticated because it binds loopback. But any local process can reach it, and so can a page in the operator's browser via DNS rebinding — and this API re-initialises group keys and reads the audit log. H2 showed script execution there equals full control. Now gated by a per-run token, printed at startup, accepted as ?t= or X-MeshBay-Token. One test needed rewriting rather than adding: the first version asserted "subprocess.run(" was absent from the source, which also matched the comment documenting the old behaviour. It now parses the AST and checks the property. Tests: 121 node, 142 hub+common. Regression suite 47 node + 10 hub. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

fix(hub): authenticate node WebSocket registration

2026-08-13T08:43:40Z

Phase 11.5 — finding C2 (see second-review.md). /v1/nodes/ws took node_id and group_ids straight from the client's first message with no ownership check: node_id = msg.get("node_id") or decoded.get("sub", "unknown") _connected_nodes[node_id] = ws Any registered user could connect with an ordinary browser token, claim a victim node's id and overwrite its entry. Every WebRTC offer for that node was then relayed to the attacker, who answered with their own SDP — full node impersonation. The DTLS channel binding does not help, because the attacker is the endpoint rather than a relay: the browser sends its GEK proof to the attacker, who ignores it and replies handshake_ack. The attacker received the victim's encrypted keypair bundle, chat and uploads, and could serve a forged index. Registration now requires scope == "node", verifies Node.user_id against the token subject, checks the account is active, and refuses to displace a live registration instead of silently overwriting it. group_ids are intersected with the operator's actual membership: a node may narrow the set to what it hosts but cannot widen it, so it cannot advertise itself as an online source for arbitrary groups. Authorization uses a short-lived session rather than Depends(get_db): a node WebSocket lives for hours and a request-scoped dependency would pin a PostgreSQL connection for its whole lifetime. BEHAVIOUR: a node hosting a group whose hub membership was never recorded for the operator's account will stop appearing in GET /v1/groups/{id}/nodes. Adds tests/test_node_ws_auth.py (7 tests). The node WebSocket had no test coverage at all, which is why this went unnoticed. Tests: 109 node, 139 hub+common. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

fix(hub): move _handle_chat_notify before @router.websocket decorator

2026-08-11T14:19:40Z

The function was placed between the decorator and node_websocket, breaking the WebSocket endpoint registration (403 on all WS connects). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat: chat notifications via hub, file delete, upload fix, cached display, inline thumbnails

2026-08-11T14:16:32Z

Backend: - Chat store persists sender_name (SQLite migration, no more UUID display) - FILE_DELETE / FILE_DELETE_ACK MNP types — node admin can delete files - Node sends chat_notify to hub WS — hub creates notifications for offline members - Hub revocation.py handles chat_notify, creates per-member notifications Frontend: - Upload chunk size 64KB (was 1MB) — fixes WebRTC DataChannel max-message-size - Show cached files immediately while WebRTC connects - ChatImage component — inline image thumbnails in chat (download+decrypt) - File delete action in menu (group admin, with confirm dialog) - Member panel: "Owner" label instead of confusing "Group admin" - Create group page: hint about needing a node - Refresh index after chat attachment upload Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat: Phase 9 — Web client SPA with WebRTC P2P transport

2026-08-11T02:13:53Z

Complete browser-based client: Preact SPA with login, group file browser, encrypted download, video playback, group chat, i18n, and dark/light theme. Browser connects P2P to nodes behind residential NAT via WebRTC DataChannel (aiortc). Hub handles signaling only — all data flows E2E. Performance: pipelined downloads (8-chunk sliding window), binary msgpack wire format (no base64), redundant I/O elimination. Large file downloads stream to disk via File System Access API (showSaveFilePicker). Validated on SFR + Orange residential NATs, Chrome + Firefox, IPv4/IPv6. 132 tests passing. Deployed to meshbay.org + Orange node. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat: Phase 9.1–9.5 — WebRTC DataChannel transport for browser P2P

2026-08-10T20:12:59Z

Browser clients can now connect P2P to nodes behind residential NAT via WebRTC DataChannel with ICE/STUN. Validated on SFR Port-Restricted Cone NAT + 4G CGNAT across three scenarios (WiFi LAN, 4G IPv6, 4G IPv4 STUN). No TURN relay needed. Hub serves only as signaling relay (<1 KB). New files: - webrtc_server.py: aiortc-based WebRTC transport (node side) - signaling.py: SDP/ICE relay endpoint (hub side) - transport.js: browser WebRTC client with msgpack framing - webrtc-test.html: spike test page for browser→NAT→node validation - test_webrtc_transport.py: 4 tests (handshake, file transfer, auth, guard) - meshbay-draft-v4.md: architecture spec updated for web client Modified: - hub_client.py: WebRTC offer handling via hub WebSocket - revocation.py: node_id from WS auth + webrtc_answer routing - pyproject.toml: aiortc>=1.9 dependency 123 tests passing (117 existing + 6 new). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat(hub): Phase 8 — Hub v2 security hardening + production readiness

2026-08-10T01:57:55Z

8.1 Config-based admin authz (require_admin on all admin endpoints) 8.2 Email encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM, HKDF from hub Ed25519 key) 8.3 Refresh token rotation with family-based reuse detection 8.4 Federation persistence (HubPeer model replaces in-memory dict) 8.5 Federation token verification now async (DB-backed) 8.6 CSAM hash check wired into swarm registration flow 8.7 Rate limiting on auth endpoints (5/10/20 per minute) 8.8 Healthcheck endpoint (GET /v1/health, no auth) 8.9 IP log cleanup background task (365-day retention) 8.10 Argon2id params bumped to 256 MB (pw_version, rehash on login) Deployed to meshbay.org — schema migrated, existing emails encrypted. 117 tests pass (29 hub, 88 common+node). Resolves security review items S1, S2, S5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat: Phase 7 — Node v2 (multi-group, Sender Keys, 0-RTT, chat, denylist)

2026-08-10T01:07:56Z

Implements all 8 milestones (7.0-7.7): - 7.0: JWT carries `groups` claim; node verifies group membership at MNP handshake (QUIC + TCP+TLS). Resolves security review C2. - 7.1: QUIC 0-RTT session resumption via stored session tickets (17-21ms reconnect vs 47ms cold). - 7.2: Hub→node WebSocket signaling for NAT punch coordination (`client_incoming`/`punch_ready`) + jti denylist push. Denylist class blocks revoked users/jtis at handshake. - 7.3: Multi-group daemon — one QUIC port serves N groups with per-group GEK, shared_root, and index routing. - 7.4: HLS streaming via QUIC (STREAM_SEGMENT message type, ffmpeg segment extraction). - 7.5: Sender Keys protocol for group chat (Signal Groups approach). Each member has own sending chain key, HKDF chain ratchet, AES-256-GCM encryption, Ed25519 signing. Resolves security review C1. - 7.6: Chat store (SQLite via aiosqlite), CHAT_MESSAGE MNP wire type with peer broadcast, web UI with WebSocket push. - 7.7: Argon2id calibration CLI. First security review included (first-review.md). 109 tests, demo-v3 validated against meshbay.org production hub. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat: add revocation push (WebSocket hub→node) — 5.7

2026-08-09T03:15:57Z

Hub: /v1/nodes/ws WebSocket endpoint for persistent node connections. /v1/admin/revoke marks user/group revoked in DB, signs JWT revocation token (EdDSA), broadcasts to all connected nodes. Node: RevocationSubscriber maintains WS connection, verifies incoming revocation tokens offline (hub Ed25519 PK), adds to local blocklist (_revoked_users/_revoked_groups sets). 53/53 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context)