meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/auth.py, branch 0.10

feat: email verification for registration, email change, and invitations

2026-08-31T15:19:17Z

Registration now creates a pending account and sends a 6-digit code via email; the account activates only after verification. Email changes on the profile page follow the same flow. Group invitations send a notification email to the invitee (without revealing their address to the inviter) containing the invite code and hub link. Backend: blind HMAC-SHA256 email index for uniqueness without decryption, mail.py for localhost Postfix delivery, verification endpoints, cleanup of expired codes and stale pending accounts, startup backfill of email_hash for existing users. Frontend: 3-phase register page, inline email change verification on profile, invite-notify call with status display. All 10 locales updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat!: identity keys per node — C4's blast radius drops to one operator

2026-08-14T15:51:48Z

One keypair was copied to every node its owner joined, so cracking the bundle on any single node yielded the identity used on all of them: their content on other operators' machines, and the ability to sign as them anywhere. That lateral reach was the part of C4 worth attacking. Each node now gets its own keypair, generated the first time its owner joins it and left with that node alone. An operator who cracks what sits on their own disk holds a key that is a stranger to every other node — and on their own node, one that unlocks nothing they did not already hold: they serve the content, the index and every byte of it by design. Nothing changes for the user. A first contact with a node already needed that operator's code, and the key is created in the same step; a second browser still recovers it from the node with the passphrase alone. Two operators can also no longer tell they host the same person by comparing keys. BREAKING, and deliberately without a compatibility path — the deployment is wiped for the next demo: - users.pk_ed25519 / pk_x25519 dropped (migration a7c31f9e40b2) - registration no longer sends or stores a key - PUT /v1/users/me/keys and regenerateKeys() gone; rotation is now `member unpin` plus a fresh code, decided on the machine that pinned it - /pubkeys returns an account id and a node's linking key. It was the directory H3 read, and nothing wraps for it any more - the pk_user JWT claim is gone That last one closed a live defect the inventory turned up: the node recorded pk_user as the uploader's identity and authorized deletion against it, so a hub issuing a token naming its own key could delete anyone's uploads on any node. Attribution now uses the key the node itself pinned. A simplification falls out. Registration generates nothing, so a scripted signup is a real account: `demo.py bootstrap` takes a wiped hub and node to a working demo with no browser, which was impossible while keys were born in one. Also fixes, found by running it on a wiped deployment: the key handed back on a join now belongs to the group the connection is for, not the group named in the invitation — an operator pairs node-wide but redeems the code while opening a group, and expects to read it. Tests: 343, including the two that state the property — a key pinned by one node is refused at another, and someone else's code does not admit it. Verified end to end against a wiped hub and node: bootstrap, pair, invite, join, download, stream, second browser, revoke. Design: docs/per-node-identity-v1.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

feat: Phase 12 — P2P crypto material, password split, node Ed25519 auth

2026-08-13T01:56:30Z

Baseline commit capturing in-progress Phase 12 work that was already present in the working tree (uncommitted) before the Phase 11.5 security remediation begins. Committed as-is, without review or modification, so that remediation changes arrive as a separable diff. Contents: BundleStore (P2P GEK + keypair bundles), password split (auth_key / bundle_key), node Ed25519 auth (POST /v1/nodes/auth, node-scoped JWT), GEK-HMAC handshake proof with DTLS channel binding, Ed25519 admin challenge-response, node local admin UI rewrite, browser key persistence. Not authored in this session — captured to establish a baseline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

feat(hub): Phase 8 — Hub v2 security hardening + production readiness

2026-08-10T01:57:55Z

8.1 Config-based admin authz (require_admin on all admin endpoints) 8.2 Email encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM, HKDF from hub Ed25519 key) 8.3 Refresh token rotation with family-based reuse detection 8.4 Federation persistence (HubPeer model replaces in-memory dict) 8.5 Federation token verification now async (DB-backed) 8.6 CSAM hash check wired into swarm registration flow 8.7 Rate limiting on auth endpoints (5/10/20 per minute) 8.8 Healthcheck endpoint (GET /v1/health, no auth) 8.9 IP log cleanup background task (365-day retention) 8.10 Argon2id params bumped to 256 MB (pw_version, rehash on login) Deployed to meshbay.org — schema migrated, existing emails encrypted. 117 tests pass (29 hub, 88 common+node). Resolves security review items S1, S2, S5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat: Phase 7 — Node v2 (multi-group, Sender Keys, 0-RTT, chat, denylist)

2026-08-10T01:07:56Z

Implements all 8 milestones (7.0-7.7): - 7.0: JWT carries `groups` claim; node verifies group membership at MNP handshake (QUIC + TCP+TLS). Resolves security review C2. - 7.1: QUIC 0-RTT session resumption via stored session tickets (17-21ms reconnect vs 47ms cold). - 7.2: Hub→node WebSocket signaling for NAT punch coordination (`client_incoming`/`punch_ready`) + jti denylist push. Denylist class blocks revoked users/jtis at handshake. - 7.3: Multi-group daemon — one QUIC port serves N groups with per-group GEK, shared_root, and index routing. - 7.4: HLS streaming via QUIC (STREAM_SEGMENT message type, ffmpeg segment extraction). - 7.5: Sender Keys protocol for group chat (Signal Groups approach). Each member has own sending chain key, HKDF chain ratchet, AES-256-GCM encryption, Ed25519 signing. Resolves security review C1. - 7.6: Chat store (SQLite via aiosqlite), CHAT_MESSAGE MNP wire type with peer broadcast, web UI with WebSocket push. - 7.7: Argon2id calibration CLI. First security review included (first-review.md). 109 tests, demo-v3 validated against meshbay.org production hub. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat(hub): add production hub — config, auth, API routers, tests

2026-08-09T02:39:34Z

config.py: TOML + env var priority. auth.py: Argon2id passwords, JWT EdDSA with jti, refresh token hashed (blake3). Routers: hub (info/pubkey), users (register/login/refresh/pubkeys), nodes (announce/get), groups (create/gek-bundle/gek-retrieve). Rate limiting via slowapi. app.py factory with lifespan. All 40 tests pass (SQLite in-memory, no PostgreSQL required). Fix: remove tests/__init__.py to resolve namespace conflicts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context)