meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/config.py, branch 0.11

fix(hub): a desktop solve reports no hostname at all, not "meshbay"

2026-09-02T09:54:22Z

Registering from the native client failed with `captcha_failed` while the checkbox was green — a worse symptom than the one being fixed, because the widget now looked fine and only the hub's own log said otherwise: captcha solved on an unexpected host ''; allowed: ['localhost', 'meshbay', 'meshbay.org'] The previous commit assumed Google would report the host component of the origin, so `app://meshbay` would come back as `meshbay` and could sit in `allowed_hosts`. It does not. A solve Google cannot attribute to a domain reports an **empty** hostname, and no allowlist entry can match that. An empty entry is not the answer either: a blank in a TOML list is a typo far more often than an intention, and `load_config` drops blanks for that reason — `captcha.allow_unattributed_host` is a named flag instead, so the trade is stated where it is made. What it admits, plainly: every non-web client, not only ours. A file:// page or somebody else's Electron application look identical from here. That is the same bar the client's own origin would have been — main.js already records that `app://meshbay` is not a credential — and it is a bar: the captcha still has to be solved, per token, in something that can render it. What is given up is the origin restriction for non-web clients, not the captcha. Off by default, and a hub without the desktop client should leave it off. The refusal now names which of the two it is, since they need different answers: an unexpected host names the host, an unattributed one says to set the flag. docs/captcha.md §6 said `meshbay` was the value and told operators to add it; it now records what was measured and why the guess was wrong. The packaged example config carries the flag with the same warning. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014UtzVrzM7e2tG9fSpkR9ML

fix(hub): check the captcha's origin here, so the desktop client can pass one

2026-09-02T08:35:17Z

Reported from the native client: the reCAPTCHA box renders "ERROR for site owner: Invalid domain for site key". The web browser is fine. It is not a client restriction, and the CSP was never what refused — the script loads, which is why the widget appears at all to say so. reCAPTCHA validates the hostname of the page the widget is rendered in against the domain list on the site key, and the desktop client's interface ships inside the package and is served from `app://meshbay` (main.js: `win.loadURL`). Not a preference: file:// breaks ES modules and IndexedDB, and the hub must never become the document origin. So the hostname Google sees is `meshbay`, it is not on the key's list, and it never can be — the check runs on Google's servers and nothing client-side reaches it. The fix turns that check off on the key and does it on the hub instead: [captcha] allowed_hosts = ["meshbay.org", "localhost", "meshbay"] `verify_captcha` refuses a solve whose hostname is not in the list. The hostname comes from `siteverify` — what Google observed, not what the caller asserts — so it is a real check against what turning the console setting off opens, which is a bot rendering the public site key on a page of its own. Empty (the default) skips it, so an existing hub upgrades unchanged with reCAPTCHA still doing the origin check. The two settings go together, and docs/captcha.md §6 says so. The `meshbay` entry is the weak one and the doc says that too: any Electron application can claim the same scheme and host, as main.js already records. What it still costs is a captcha solve per token inside a real Chromium instead of a token farmed from any web page. docs/captcha.md §6 replaced. It documented a design that was superseded twice — an `auth_key`-keyed carve-out that turned out to disable the gate for everyone, and "works in the Electron client too, both run Chromium", which is the assumption this bug is made of: reCAPTCHA validates the domain, not the rendering engine. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014UtzVrzM7e2tG9fSpkR9ML

feat(hub): reCAPTCHA v2 on Register and Password Reset pages

2026-09-01T09:06:47Z

Server-side verification module, CaptchaConfig in hub.toml, captcha_site_key exposed via /v1/hub/info, useCaptcha() hook in the SPA with stable DOM rendering (strength bar always present to avoid Preact re-ordering the captcha widget). Native clients (auth_key path) skip captcha. All 10 locales updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

fix(hub): a session that renews itself

2026-08-17T15:38:00Z

Reported: after an hour of watching a film, every action answers "token expired or invalid", with signing out and back in as the only way on. Reopening the tab the next day did the same. The access token lasts an hour and the refresh token thirty days, and nothing used the second one. `hubFetch` reported a 401 like any other error, and watching a film is precisely an hour in which the hub hears nothing at all, because the video travels over WebRTC. So the token aged out with no request to notice, and a tab reopened the next morning presented a stale token with a perfectly good refresh token sitting beside it in localStorage. Underneath was the reason it could not be recovered from. The hub *rotates*: the refresh endpoint revokes the token presented, returns a replacement, and treats a revoked one presented again as theft, revoking the whole family. The client kept only the access token out of that response. So the refresh token was spent on first use and the second attempt did not merely fail — it destroyed the family. Which is exactly the reported symptom. Renewal now happens on a margin, on returning to the tab, on mount, and on a 401 with the request replayed. Concurrent renewals share one request: two 401s racing would otherwise present the same refresh token twice, and the hub cannot tell that from theft, so the remedy would have been worse than the fault. A refusal signs out cleanly rather than leaving a session that fails every call while looking signed in. The lifetime goes to four hours, which is not what makes long sessions work — renewal is — but is what someone has to notice by if renewal itself breaks. An hour was less than a feature film. Twelve was considered and declined: it widens the window in which a leaked token cannot be turned off, and it lets the renewal path go a whole day between uses, which is how it came to be broken here without anyone noticing. Production sets this in its own hub.toml, so both moved. The tests run the shipped code against a hub that enforces rotation, because a stub that accepted the same refresh token twice would have passed against the broken client. Checked that dropping the rotated token reproduces the revoked family, so the guard is guarding something. Also widens the orphan-setter rule to ignore `setX` functions declared in the module: `setAuth` is not a hook setter, and a rule that cries wolf is one somebody eventually silences. Verified it still catches a real orphan.

feat(hub): Phase 8 — Hub v2 security hardening + production readiness

2026-08-10T01:57:55Z

8.1 Config-based admin authz (require_admin on all admin endpoints) 8.2 Email encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM, HKDF from hub Ed25519 key) 8.3 Refresh token rotation with family-based reuse detection 8.4 Federation persistence (HubPeer model replaces in-memory dict) 8.5 Federation token verification now async (DB-backed) 8.6 CSAM hash check wired into swarm registration flow 8.7 Rate limiting on auth endpoints (5/10/20 per minute) 8.8 Healthcheck endpoint (GET /v1/health, no auth) 8.9 IP log cleanup background task (365-day retention) 8.10 Argon2id params bumped to 256 MB (pw_version, rehash on login) Deployed to meshbay.org — schema migrated, existing emails encrypted. 117 tests pass (29 hub, 88 common+node). Resolves security review items S1, S2, S5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat(hub): add production hub — config, auth, API routers, tests

2026-08-09T02:39:34Z

config.py: TOML + env var priority. auth.py: Argon2id passwords, JWT EdDSA with jti, refresh token hashed (blake3). Routers: hub (info/pubkey), users (register/login/refresh/pubkeys), nodes (announce/get), groups (create/gek-bundle/gek-retrieve). Rate limiting via slowapi. app.py factory with lifespan. All 40 tests pass (SQLite in-memory, no PostgreSQL required). Fix: remove tests/__init__.py to resolve namespace conflicts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context)