style: ruff's own fixes, mechanically applied

2026-09-19T12:24:13Z

`ruff check .` had gone unrun long enough to report 568 errors, which is the same as having no linter: the next real finding would have been invisible in the noise. This is the 521 it fixes by itself, in 173 files, and nothing else — the 98 it cannot fix are the next commit. What actually changed: import sorting (225), imports nobody used (87, none of them a re-export — no `__init__.py` is touched, which was the one way this could have broken an import elsewhere), `datetime.timezone.utc` to `datetime.UTC` (69) and `asyncio.TimeoutError` to `TimeoutError` (18), both plain aliases on the 3.12 this project requires, `Optional[X]` to `X | None` (24), and f-strings with nothing to interpolate (19). Checked rather than assumed: every module in the three packages still imports, and the suite is 2893 passed — the same count, test for test, as the merge before it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

fix(hub): a per-account sign-in lockout, and a reviewed unauthenticated surface

2026-09-13T23:53:04Z

Passphrase sign-in locks per username: after `login.max_failures` wrong passphrases (default 4) the name is refused with `429 account_locked` and a `Retry-After` for `login.lockout_minutes` (default 60), without the passphrase being checked. Both numbers are instance policy an admin sets from the panel; zero failures turns it off. The per-IP limit bounds one address, and IPv6 gives every subscriber a /64 of them — an online guess targets an account, so the account is what is counted. - Counted by the name as typed, existing or not, so `login` stays uniform (M1). The key is a hash: people type passphrases into the username field. - The attempt is taken before the check in one `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE … WHERE … RETURNING`, so a concurrent burst gets no more than the limit. - Sign-in, passphrase change and account deletion count on the same row; the last had no rate limit at all. - A lockout refuses passphrase sign-in and nothing else: sessions, renewal and device sign-in continue, and a reset code clears it (AV26). A session learns its own lockout from `/v1/users/me`, and the passphrase change checks it before re-wrapping any node's bundle — the hub accepts the new passphrase only after the nodes have it. The SPA now shows what the hub said. `loginAndRecover` threw "Login failed: {json}", so `email_verification_required` never matched and was never shown; the passphrase-change form rendered no error at all in its first phase. The unauthenticated surface, reviewed route by route: - No `/docs`, `/redoc` or `/openapi.json`, in the code. The Caddyfile hid them on meshbay.org only; a packaged hub behind any other proxy published all three. - The node socket's first message must arrive within ten seconds. It is accepted before anyone is known, and an unbounded read is a connection any stranger holds for free. - `/v1/relays` answers 503 behind `relay.RELAYS_ENABLED`, as federation does: nothing in the tree calls it and two of its routes take no account. - `test_unauthenticated_surface.py` walks every route and fails on one without an authentication dependency that is not listed with its reason. Verified in Chrome against a local hub: the lockout and wrong-passphrase messages, the admin section saving both lockout and mail limits, and the passphrase change refused while locked. Not verified in Firefox (a running instance blocks the headless one), nor the upsert's concurrency on PostgreSQL. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt

meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/login_throttle.py, branch main

style: ruff's own fixes, mechanically applied

fix(hub): a per-account sign-in lockout, and a reviewed unauthenticated surface