meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport.js, branch 0.17

refactor(mnp): remove ten operator messages no client sent

2026-10-02T08:51:19Z

node_status, node_settings_set, roster_read, denylist_read, denylist_clear, node_reload and the signed gek_rotate, member_unpin, transfer_limits, group_detach leave MNP 6.0; the Node page and the CLI do this work over loopback. Their ops keep their tests, moved to the ops level. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5

feat(mnp): sharing a folder is decided on the node's machine only (MNP 6.0)

2026-10-02T08:20:09Z

root_add, root_update and group_attach leave MNP: adding a directory and switching writable/removable go through the loopback API (native dialog in the desktop app) or the CLI. The operator's Settings tab still lists the roots from any browser, read-only. The desktop app refuses to sign those ops; a loopback flag change now reaches open pages (publish_roots). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5

fix: an MBK2 bundle is opened once and stored again as MBK3

2026-10-01T11:06:32Z

Transitional. The Argon2 run that makes M makes A, the key MBK2 bundles were sealed under; a session keeps it as a decrypt-only key (IndexedDB in a browser, the key storage in the desktop app). A client meeting an MBK2 bundle opens it — or its recovery copy — and stores the same identity as MBK3 once connected; the desktop app reseals or withdraws it as browser access says. A session without A asks for the passphrase once. Older formats stay refused by name. Replaces the unpin-and-reinvite step the 0.17 flag day required on every node. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5

fix: an identity signs a named kind, and a device approval answers a request

2026-09-30T19:04:39Z

The desktop main process builds every transcript itself from fields (transcripts.js) and signs no raw bytes; the page's identity has the same contract (crypto.js transcriptFor). The keyring seals no bundle while browser access is off. On the node, device_add must redeem a pending request filed by the same keys, and device_revoke is signed under its own prefix (meshbay:device_revoke:v1), so a retirement signature admits nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5

feat(client): the desktop application keeps M and every node identity in its main process

2026-09-30T14:58:31Z

keyring.js derives, opens, mints, seals, signs and agrees there; the page gets public keys and a handle. Argon2 comes from the page's own WebAssembly build (Electron's crypto has none). Without OS key storage the page keeps its keys as a browser does. A node's bundle is settled after connecting, re-sealed when the key changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5

refactor(hub): the transport holds an identity, never a private key

2026-09-30T13:48:51Z

Two public keys, sign() and shared(); the apps take transport.signFn. What holds the keys (this page, or the desktop main process) is the identity's business alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5

feat: bundles sealed per node under the passphrase and the hub's pepper

2026-09-30T13:06:14Z

The session key is M = HKDF(Argon2(passphrase) || pepper, account id); each node's bundle key and the playlist key derive from it. Bundles are MBK3, bound to account and node; MBK1/MBK2 are refused by name, never replaced silently. Playlists move to key v2 and are re-sealed over unreadable node copies. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5

fix: only the owner decides who hosts a group, and nobody is made a member unasked

2026-09-30T09:49:56Z

- hub: a node may host a group only if its account owns it or the owner approved that node (new `group_hosts`). Membership was the ceiling, and every member holds the group key, so any member's node could register as a host and be the one clients kept. A node claiming a group it may not host is recorded as a request; the owner is notified once and approves or refuses it (GET/POST/DELETE /v1/groups/{id}/hosts[/{node_id}]), which takes effect on a connected node at once. - hub: an owner adding a username creates an invitation (new `group_invitations`), accepted or declined by the invitee (/v1/groups/invitations, /{id}/invitation/accept|decline). Until then the group is not listed, not dialled, not searched and not in any token. Invitation links, open joins and group creation still make members directly: they are the account's own act. - hub: the MNP token names only the group it is minted for (group_id is now required), so a node operator no longer learns a member's other groups. - SPA: invitations on the home page; invited people and host requests in the group's settings; the transport sends group_id. Ten catalogues. - Browser probes for both screens, run in Chrome and Firefox. - Design §5.2, §7.2, §7.3, AV32, AV33; protocol §6.3; user guide. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5

refactor: drop the unread transfer_limits field from the handshake ack

2026-09-28T20:38:41Z

The interface reads a member's cap from transfer_state and never read the copy on the ack. The transfer probe reads it from transfer_state too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5

fix: bound pending admin challenges and sign every value an op acts on

2026-09-28T19:14:10Z

Any member could make a node hold unbounded challenge requests; a connection now keeps at most 8, 64 KiB each. root_add, group_attach, invite_create and tmdb_config signed less than they did; their subjects are now canonical JSON of every value (the TMDB token by SHA-256). MNP 5.0, floor kept at 4.0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5