meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/tasks/cleanup.py, branch 0.15

feat(hub): invitation-link tickets bound to a verified address

2026-09-23T15:46:48Z

group_invite_links holds sha256(ticket) and the invitee's address blind index; redeeming grants membership to that account only. Owner-only create/list/cancel (a node token may create, never mail), 20 outstanding per group, optional mail written by the hub itself and capped at 10 per sender per day (mail.invite_link_daily_cap). MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §3.4 now carries the whole link design. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5

style: the 98 ruff could not fix, so the linter is a signal again

2026-09-19T12:39:38Z

The pass before this applied ruff's own fixes. These are the ones needing a decision, and the point of doing them is that `ruff check .` now passes: a linter reporting 98 known-acceptable findings reports nothing, because the next real one arrives invisible. **Lines over 100 (70).** Mostly wrapped where they stood. Two exceptions: the aligned trailing comments in `protocol.py`'s message table were shortened rather than wrapped, because wrapping one row of a table breaks the table; and in `models.py` the column comments moved above their columns for the same reason. **Imports below the first statement (14).** `csam.py` kept its FastAPI imports under a section header halfway down the file; two node tests had a constant and a `pytestmark` wedged between two import blocks. Moved, not suppressed. **Bindings nothing reads (4).** Three in tests, where the call stays and only the name goes — `_user(client, "listener")` is there to create the user, not to return one. The fourth was in `revocation.py` and was not a lint finding at all: `_connect_and_listen` opened an httpx stream to the WebSocket URL, did `pass`, and then opened the real connection through the `websockets` library. One pointless request per connect, left over from before that library was used directly. Removed, and `httpx` with it. **`l` as a name (4)**, **semicolons (6)** in the POC spikes, and the rest. 2893 passed, the same count as the two commits before it. `meshbay_node/revocation.py` is worth a decision separately: 154 lines that nothing imports, superseded by `hub_client.maintain_ws`'s `on_revocation`. This commit only stopped it failing the linter. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

style: ruff's own fixes, mechanically applied

2026-09-19T12:24:13Z

`ruff check .` had gone unrun long enough to report 568 errors, which is the same as having no linter: the next real finding would have been invisible in the noise. This is the 521 it fixes by itself, in 173 files, and nothing else — the 98 it cannot fix are the next commit. What actually changed: import sorting (225), imports nobody used (87, none of them a re-export — no `__init__.py` is touched, which was the one way this could have broken an import elsewhere), `datetime.timezone.utc` to `datetime.UTC` (69) and `asyncio.TimeoutError` to `TimeoutError` (18), both plain aliases on the 3.12 this project requires, `Optional[X]` to `X | None` (24), and f-strings with nothing to interpolate (19). Checked rather than assumed: every module in the three packages still imports, and the suite is 2893 passed — the same count, test for test, as the merge before it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

fix(hub): a per-account sign-in lockout, and a reviewed unauthenticated surface

2026-09-13T23:53:04Z

Passphrase sign-in locks per username: after `login.max_failures` wrong passphrases (default 4) the name is refused with `429 account_locked` and a `Retry-After` for `login.lockout_minutes` (default 60), without the passphrase being checked. Both numbers are instance policy an admin sets from the panel; zero failures turns it off. The per-IP limit bounds one address, and IPv6 gives every subscriber a /64 of them — an online guess targets an account, so the account is what is counted. - Counted by the name as typed, existing or not, so `login` stays uniform (M1). The key is a hash: people type passphrases into the username field. - The attempt is taken before the check in one `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE … WHERE … RETURNING`, so a concurrent burst gets no more than the limit. - Sign-in, passphrase change and account deletion count on the same row; the last had no rate limit at all. - A lockout refuses passphrase sign-in and nothing else: sessions, renewal and device sign-in continue, and a reset code clears it (AV26). A session learns its own lockout from `/v1/users/me`, and the passphrase change checks it before re-wrapping any node's bundle — the hub accepts the new passphrase only after the nodes have it. The SPA now shows what the hub said. `loginAndRecover` threw "Login failed: {json}", so `email_verification_required` never matched and was never shown; the passphrase-change form rendered no error at all in its first phase. The unauthenticated surface, reviewed route by route: - No `/docs`, `/redoc` or `/openapi.json`, in the code. The Caddyfile hid them on meshbay.org only; a packaged hub behind any other proxy published all three. - The node socket's first message must arrive within ten seconds. It is accepted before anyone is known, and an unbounded read is a connection any stranger holds for free. - `/v1/relays` answers 503 behind `relay.RELAYS_ENABLED`, as federation does: nothing in the tree calls it and two of its routes take no account. - `test_unauthenticated_surface.py` walks every route and fails on one without an authentication dependency that is not listed with its reason. Verified in Chrome against a local hub: the lockout and wrong-passphrase messages, the admin section saving both lockout and mail limits, and the passphrase change refused while locked. Not verified in Firefox (a running instance blocks the headless one), nor the upsert's concurrency on PostgreSQL. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt

fix(hub): the mail allowance is written down, and recovery keeps a share

2026-09-12T14:36:54Z

Two dicts in `mail.py` held the budget, so every deploy handed out a fresh one — and this hub is deployed several times a day. A bound a restart forgets is not a bound, for the reason the denylist is persisted rather than held in memory (S3). It is a `mail_quota` table now, one row per counter, the recipient hashed so the table does not become a list of plaintext addresses. The counting moves with it, into an async `reserve` that has a session, and `send_off_loop` is the one door it stands in. `_send` keeps the purpose allow-list: that half needs no state, and it is what stops anything which puts a message on the wire from naming a reason this hub does not send for. The caller owns the commit, so a request that fails afterwards is not charged for mail nobody received. `hourly_reserved_for_recovery` is new. A flood of sign-ups used to be able to spend the whole hour and lock out the person waiting on a passphrase reset; registration and address changes may now spend only the unreserved share. Values changed as agreed: 10 messages a day to one recipient, 300 s between two reset codes. The address-change ceiling and its cooldown were two bounds on one thing — 3 a day and 60 s apart — and collapse into one 48-hour delay. Asking again for the address already pending is exempt: it reaches no new recipient, that recipient is bounded anyway, and without the exemption a typo locked the account out of correcting it for two days. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT

fix(hub): an administrator can erase an account that owns groups

2026-09-11T17:27:27Z

An administrator's deletion answered 409 for any account owning a group, so an erasure ordered by an authority had to wait on the person it was about. It now deletes the account's groups with it, then pushes a signed revocation for the account and for each group to every connected node: an access token already issued stays valid on a node until it expires, and the revocation is what makes the nodes refuse the account and close the groups' sessions now. The action is written to the IP log, and the confirmation dialog says the groups go too, in all ten catalogues. The owner's own deletion is unchanged: refused while they own groups, which they can hand over first (CGU 3.4, privacy statement). Deleting a group had three partial cascades. The owner's route left email_verifications behind, and the cleanup of unhosted groups left notifications, invitations and reports - each an IntegrityError on PostgreSQL, invisible on SQLite, which does not enforce foreign keys by default. db/purge.py is now the one implementation: it finds every table referencing groups.id from the schema, deletes the group's rows and detaches content reports, which are evidence and outlive the group. test_group_purge.py turns foreign-key enforcement on for its connection, seeds every referencing table, and fails without the fix on all three routes. MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 7.7 states the rule, and now lists the device keys and swarm sources that e3c68b3 erases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy

feat: email verification for registration, email change, and invitations

2026-08-31T15:19:17Z

Registration now creates a pending account and sends a 6-digit code via email; the account activates only after verification. Email changes on the profile page follow the same flow. Group invitations send a notification email to the invitee (without revealing their address to the inviter) containing the invite code and hub link. Backend: blind HMAC-SHA256 email index for uniqueness without decryption, mail.py for localhost Postfix delivery, verification endpoints, cleanup of expired codes and stale pending accounts, startup backfill of email_hash for existing users. Frontend: 3-phase register page, inline email change verification on profile, invite-notify call with status display. All 10 locales updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat(hub): leaving a group, a cap on public ones, and hosting as a precondition

2026-08-16T13:28:28Z

Leaving is its own endpoint rather than a relaxation of the owner's removal check — an authorization rule with an exception in it is the one that gets read wrong later. The owner cannot leave: the group would be left with nobody able to admit, edit or delete it, which is the answer removal and account deletion already give. Public groups are capped at ten live ones per owner. They are the ones that cost other people something — listed in Discover, joinable by anyone — so a script that opens hundreds fills the directory for everybody. Private groups are invisible to non-members and are not capped. Hub staff are exempt; the cap is anti-spam, not a rule about running an instance. Creation is the only place it can be checked, and deliberately so, because PATCH refuses to change visibility at all. A group is now listed only once a node has announced that it hosts it. Before that it has no files, no key and nothing to connect to, so showing it to a member produces a name they cannot open and cannot be told why; its owner still sees it while they set the node up. `meshbay-hub prune-groups` collects the ones that never got a node, meant for cron, with --dry-run. The migration backfills hosted_at from created_at: without that the first run would have deleted every live group. Presence rides on the group list itself, read from the signaling registry the hub already keeps — no poll, no timer. It says a node is connected *to the hub*, which is not a promise that this browser can reach it and not something a dishonest hub could not fake; the client downgrades it on a connection it tried and failed, which is the evidence that concerns the reader. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

feat(hub): Phase 8 — Hub v2 security hardening + production readiness

2026-08-10T01:57:55Z

8.1 Config-based admin authz (require_admin on all admin endpoints) 8.2 Email encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM, HKDF from hub Ed25519 key) 8.3 Refresh token rotation with family-based reuse detection 8.4 Federation persistence (HubPeer model replaces in-memory dict) 8.5 Federation token verification now async (DB-backed) 8.6 CSAM hash check wired into swarm registration flow 8.7 Rate limiting on auth endpoints (5/10/20 per minute) 8.8 Healthcheck endpoint (GET /v1/health, no auth) 8.9 IP log cleanup background task (365-day retention) 8.10 Argon2id params bumped to 256 MB (pw_version, rehash on login) Deployed to meshbay.org — schema migrated, existing emails encrypted. 117 tests pass (29 hub, 88 common+node). Resolves security review items S1, S2, S5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6