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<title>meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/tasks, branch v0.9.0</title>
<subtitle>MeshBay — read-only public mirror</subtitle>
<id>https://git.meshbay.org/meshbay.git/atom?h=v0.9.0</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.meshbay.org/meshbay.git/atom?h=v0.9.0'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.meshbay.org/meshbay.git/'/>
<updated>2026-08-16T13:28:28Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>feat(hub): leaving a group, a cap on public ones, and hosting as a precondition</title>
<updated>2026-08-16T13:28:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Besson</name>
<email>cbesson@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-16T13:28:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.meshbay.org/meshbay.git/commit/?id=0bd3f805ffbd04b40b5150474336a5e5d200e72b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0bd3f805ffbd04b40b5150474336a5e5d200e72b</id>
<content type='text'>
Leaving is its own endpoint rather than a relaxation of the owner's removal
check — an authorization rule with an exception in it is the one that gets read
wrong later. The owner cannot leave: the group would be left with nobody able
to admit, edit or delete it, which is the answer removal and account deletion
already give.

Public groups are capped at ten live ones per owner. They are the ones that
cost other people something — listed in Discover, joinable by anyone — so a
script that opens hundreds fills the directory for everybody. Private groups
are invisible to non-members and are not capped. Hub staff are exempt; the cap
is anti-spam, not a rule about running an instance. Creation is the only place
it can be checked, and deliberately so, because PATCH refuses to change
visibility at all.

A group is now listed only once a node has announced that it hosts it. Before
that it has no files, no key and nothing to connect to, so showing it to a
member produces a name they cannot open and cannot be told why; its owner still
sees it while they set the node up. `meshbay-hub prune-groups` collects the
ones that never got a node, meant for cron, with --dry-run. The migration
backfills hosted_at from created_at: without that the first run would have
deleted every live group.

Presence rides on the group list itself, read from the signaling registry the
hub already keeps — no poll, no timer. It says a node is connected *to the hub*,
which is not a promise that this browser can reach it and not something a
dishonest hub could not fake; the client downgrades it on a connection it tried
and failed, which is the evidence that concerns the reader.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>feat(hub): Phase 8 — Hub v2 security hardening + production readiness</title>
<updated>2026-08-10T01:57:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Besson</name>
<email>cbesson@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-10T01:57:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.meshbay.org/meshbay.git/commit/?id=1a53eb4cc404ec94658fde0ae04cfe2ccf1810dc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1a53eb4cc404ec94658fde0ae04cfe2ccf1810dc</id>
<content type='text'>
8.1  Config-based admin authz (require_admin on all admin endpoints)
8.2  Email encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM, HKDF from hub Ed25519 key)
8.3  Refresh token rotation with family-based reuse detection
8.4  Federation persistence (HubPeer model replaces in-memory dict)
8.5  Federation token verification now async (DB-backed)
8.6  CSAM hash check wired into swarm registration flow
8.7  Rate limiting on auth endpoints (5/10/20 per minute)
8.8  Healthcheck endpoint (GET /v1/health, no auth)
8.9  IP log cleanup background task (365-day retention)
8.10 Argon2id params bumped to 256 MB (pw_version, rehash on login)

Deployed to meshbay.org — schema migrated, existing emails encrypted.
117 tests pass (29 hub, 88 common+node).

Resolves security review items S1, S2, S5.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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