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<title>meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/harness/index_seal_probe.mjs, branch main</title>
<subtitle>MeshBay — read-only public mirror</subtitle>
<id>https://git.meshbay.org/meshbay.git/atom?h=main</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.meshbay.org/meshbay.git/atom?h=main'/>
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<updated>2026-09-25T10:07:49Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>test(hub): read the transport wherever it is split</title>
<updated>2026-09-25T10:07:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Besson</name>
<email>cbesson@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-09-25T09:09:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.meshbay.org/meshbay.git/commit/?id=6348698322e5bfcb80d0ef0dcd833ba4e6179640'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6348698322e5bfcb80d0ef0dcd833ba4e6179640</id>
<content type='text'>
spa_source.transport_files() takes the classic transport*.js scripts
from the hub's shell, in load order. Every test that read transport.js
reads them all, the Node harnesses run them joined as one scope, the
chat probe loads each, and the desktop shell must load them in order.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>feat!: MNP 1.0 — seal index and handshake_ack under the group key</title>
<updated>2026-09-03T14:16:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Besson</name>
<email>cbesson@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-09-03T14:16:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.meshbay.org/meshbay.git/commit/?id=675beed6ff688733a9598f9d82d41578f48316be'/>
<id>urn:sha1:675beed6ff688733a9598f9d82d41578f48316be</id>
<content type='text'>
`index_sync`, `index_delta` and the `handshake_ack` config payload now travel
sealed under a GEK-derived subkey (`meshbay_common/groupbox.py`, mirrored by
`sealGroup`/`openGroup` in `crypto.js`). Only `type`, `v`, `group_id` and the
ack's `node_pk`/`proof`/`sig` stay in clear — a receiver must route and
authenticate before it would trust a decryption. Verify, then decrypt.

The ack line is integrity, not confidentiality: the signed handshake transcript
names no ack field, so `is_node_admin`, `enabled_apps`, `video_root` and the
rest were authenticated by the DTLS channel alone. The index line is defence in
depth against a repeat of C1/C6 — a peer served before the handshake completes
now gets ciphertext, not filenames. Nothing against an observer, the hub, or a
member; that is the whole claim. `index_progress` stays clear (D3, counters
only). Chat is out of scope.

Failure is fatal: a payload that does not open ends the session naming the
message type — never an empty index or an empty `enabled_apps`, both of which
are legitimate states.

Version negotiation ships here too (phase 15.6, brought forward): `v` + `v_min`
on `handshake` and `handshake_challenge`, refused with `version_too_old` /
`version_too_new` / `version_unreadable`. The flag day was already being paid
for; the next breaking change now costs a refusal message.

BREAKING CHANGE: breaks the WebRTC wire every deployed client speaks. Hub and
every node must deploy together; the SPA is served by the hub, so a browser
picks up the new client on reload. See MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md §11.1a, §13.1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkzbhmMmK8PqQBtGz5zCvY
</content>
</entry>
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