meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/harness, branch 0.13

refactor(spa): stop asking a node what version it is

2026-09-10T15:29:50Z

`MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` is the version this build speaks, so `check_version` refuses everything below it at the handshake. Every capability the client was gating on the node's version is therefore true of every peer it can reach: * `supportsSealedUpload` — an upload is sealed or it is not sent; * `supportsAppOps` — one `app_directories` op, and no `setVideoRoot` / `setAudioRoot` / `setPhotoRoots` wrappers behind it; * `supportsTransferSlots` and `Lease._skip()` — a lease is always real, so there is no branch where a transfer runs without one; * `legacyNode`, the read-only shared-directories table, and the two hints telling an operator their node is too old to configure an app. The version the node declares is still recorded, for diagnostics. Nothing branches on it, and the comment says so, because a field kept "just in case" is how the branches came back last time. `test_mnp_1_0_node_compat.py` goes with them: it existed to hold the fallbacks in place, and holding a fallback that cannot execute is how a suite starts lying. The two locale strings for those hints are removed from all ten catalogues. Hub suite 872 passed (test_sticky_header deselected — failing before this). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3

refactor(mnp)!: one answer to "may this member write", and it is the root

2026-09-10T15:23:40Z

The group-wide `member_upload` switch is gone: the message, the signed operation, the field on the handshake ack, the `upload` alias on every root in the index payload, and the client's fallback path to it. Whether a member may write has been a property of each root for a while, and that is the model that survives: a single flag over the group cannot express "this library is published read-only and that folder is a drop box", which is the ordinary arrangement. What was left of the switch was a handler that logged a deprecation and acted on nothing, and a client that read `ack.member_upload` whenever the roots carried no `writable` — a second source for one question, with whichever the code consulted first deciding it. `roots.describe()` drops `upload` for the same reason: it was `writable` under an older name, and two names for one boolean is one too many. The paperclip now says "nowhere to write" rather than picking a root, in a group that has none writable. That is the honest answer; the fallback picked whatever came first and failed at send time. Node suite 1215 passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3

feat(hub): pin the app controls while a library scrolls

2026-09-10T08:29:12Z

Files, Videos, Music and Photos are read by scrolling, and everything that steers that reading left with the first screenful. Three bands now pin under the navigation bar, in a group and on the Search page alike: the tab bar (the search field, on Search), the application's own toolbar, and the file table's column heads. The group's name and description still scroll — they say nothing a reader needs while walking a directory, and the height they would cost is height the list does not get. A band's offset is the heights of the bands above it, and those are not constants: the toolbar wraps to three rows on a phone, grows a field while a folder is being named, and loses its filter on Search. So each band measures itself and publishes `--chrome-h` / `--toolbar-h` (static/sticky.js) and the stylesheet does the arithmetic in calc(), rather than a number written down twice — the fault CLAUDE.md already records against this layout twice over. A band publishes height *plus its own bottom margin*, and paints that margin as a ring of page colour, so the pinned layout is pixel-identical to the flow layout and nothing shifts at the moment a band pins. Three overflow faults came out of it, all of the same class and all of them what "the header does not stay" actually meant on Android — a document wider than the screen leaves everything pinned attached to a viewport the reader can no longer see, the navigation bar included: - a directory's name cell was a bare , so an unbreakable folder name (`Rage_Against_The_Machine_Discography_1992-2000_FLAC`) set the column's minimum: a 527px table in a 390px window - Search's group column did the same at 442px with an underscored group name. It also goes entirely below 768px, where there is no room for it and the breadcrumb already names the group - the shared-directories table has four columns of controls with a combined minimum near 440px, none of it compressible. On a phone the row stops being a row: the name and its eject/remove pair on one line, the two switches — each carrying the column head's own string as a label — on the next - and, found by measuring at 360px, the tab bar itself was 19px too wide `.file-table` moves to separated borders: a collapsed border belongs to the table rather than to the cell, so the column heads lost their rule the moment they pinned. Measured, not read. tests/harness/sticky_header_probe.py drives the shipped GroupPage and SearchPage against a stub node, walks to each application, scrolls to the end and reports every rectangle — 11 views x 4 widths x 2 engines. Its fixture says what real data says: the first version used `note-007.txt` and `un groupe`, which fit any screen, and found none of the above. A fixture narrower than real data tests the fixture. Also: `test_desktop_shell` no longer looks for the CSP after the first `-->`, which made it fail on correct markup as soon as a comment was added above it, and `search-page.js` joins test_hook_ordering's file list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tx16FhyD2BUdpooGb5jcyN

test(spa): drive the composer's recovery through the real reconnect

2026-09-09T14:55:53Z

The reconnect scenario added with the fix proved the composer follows `_setDevicePk`, and it poked that method itself at both ends. That is a narrower claim than it reads as: it says nothing about whether a reconnect *reaches* it, and the harness's own `Host` stands in for group-page.js, so a green probe did not mean the page joins the two. Both halves are real now. The scenario calls `connect()` with the arguments `_reconnectLoop` calls it with; it stops at signaling, because there is no hub in the harness, and the identity has to be gone by then — connect() drops it before it touches the network. The restore is the shipped `_announceDevice`, answered by the stand-in node with a `device_hello_ack` as `_do_device_hello` answers it, and the key it settles on is the one the following send seals and signs with. Three assertions check the scenario went that way rather than through a variable set by the test. The seam the harness cannot drive gets its own check: the wiring exists, the prop is in `commonProps`, and the callback is set *before* `connect()` — after it, device_hello's answer is missed and the composer starts closed. That check first passed with the wiring deleted, on the strength of a comment naming the callback; it matches the assignment now. Two things the harness turned up. `do_POST` answered every path, so the offer connect() posts to the hub was swallowed as the measurement and put the machine's own SDP, public address included, into the probe's output — it answers `/log` and nothing else now. And a connect() that gives up before `await channelReady` left that promise rejected with nobody attached, so closing the peer connection printed "Uncaught (in promise) DataChannel closed" on every failed reconnect attempt — noise in exactly the log a freeze is read from. Checked against the unfixed source both ways: with the clear removed from connect() and the wiring removed from group-page.js, three cases fail; with them back, 15 pass. Hub and node suites 2266 passed, 4 skipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019GXmScYB1uR29YCt74si9J

fix(spa): a reconnect must give the Chat composer back

2026-09-09T14:37:23Z

The Chat tab froze about every other day — the textbox stopped taking clicks — and it never recovered on its own: no timeout ends this one, only leaving the group or restarting the client. A console dump of a session it happened in ruled out everything it could and named nothing. What that dump established was almost entirely negative, and that was the useful part. No `Response timeout`, no `unsolicited`/`unrouted`/`with nothing waiting` — so the 2026-08-30 routing defect, which produces this exact symptom for thirty seconds, had not recurred. No `PC state: disconnected|failed`, no second ICE cycle, no `Reconnected after N attempt(s)` — so the connection was alive and untouched. The freeze was in the page, and no path that logs anything had run. The composer is `disabled=${sending || cannotSend}`, and `cannotSend` was `transport.connected && !transport.devicePk`, read off a **ref** during render. `devicePk` is settled inside connect(), so every reconnect clears it and settles it again; a ref changing re-renders nothing, and nothing else announced it. So the panel went disabled on whatever unrelated re-render came next — a message arriving — long after the identity was actually lost, and had no event that would open it again. group-page.js never touches `status` after 'connected', and `onReconnected` is claimed by video-player.js, so there was no second chance. It was silent as well as sticky. `_announceDevice` had three exits that wrote `devicePk` without a word: two early returns that left the *previous* connection's value standing, and a reply that is not `device_hello_ack` — an `error` reply does not throw, so the `.catch()` at the call site never saw it. Reproduced in chat_send_probe.py, which mounts the real ChatPanel over the real transport: with the old code, identity cleared leaves the composer open, an arriving message latches it shut, and restoring the identity does not reopen it. Every write to `devicePk` now goes through `_setDevicePk(pk, why)`, which logs, traces and calls `onDeviceIdentity`; group-page holds the answer as state and ChatPanel takes it as `deviceReady`. Defaulting that prop to `true` fails open — a wiring mistake here must not be able to leave anyone with a dead textbox. Two things found on the same path and fixed with it. `_send` throwing inside _sendAndWait's executor left the pending entry and its 30s timer behind, so a request that never reached the wire still logged a "Response timeout" half a minute later. And the instrumentation this was meant to be diagnosed with (3be8bd2) writes to localStorage behind ?trace=1, not to the console, so the dump could not have carried it: the two lines that decide the composer's state are now logged unconditionally, and MeshBayTrace gains `record` so the composer writes into the same timeline as the channel events. Hub suite 2264 passed, 4 skipped. chat_send_probe.py gains a `reconnect` scenario and test_chat_send.py four cases, each checked against the unfixed source. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019GXmScYB1uR29YCt74si9J

feat: resume an interrupted upload, and pause one

2026-09-09T10:01:06Z

Stage 8 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, second half, plus the gap it exposed in stage 7. **Asking where to resume.** The node identifies an upload by (member, directory, filename), so a client resuming one has to name the file — and `transfer_open`, the obvious place to ask, travels in clear. Naming it there would undo exactly what sealing this path bought in MNP 2.0: before it, the same file was ciphertext leaving a node and plaintext arriving at one. So the question is asked inside the seal that already exists, as an ordinary `file_upload` with no bytes and `chunk_index: -1`. The node writes nothing, creates no state, reserves no name, and answers with `resume_from` in the sealed ack. A node that predates it refuses the index, which the client reads as "start from the beginning" — the behaviour it had anyway — and the wait is bounded so one that answers neither does not strand an upload. The probe is answered after every check the write path makes, so it cannot ask questions about a directory the caller may not write to, and it answers only about the member who asks: otherwise one member could measure another's progress on a file they never sent, and worse, resume it. **Pausing an upload.** Reported: no pause button on an upload, even in the desktop app. Stage 7 built pause around the download path — a target declares whether it can be stopped — and an upload has no local target to ask. It was also refused by design, since a transfer handed a lease it cannot re-create must not be offered a button that would drop its slot for good. Uploads now ask for their slot rather than being handed one, and say they are pausable outright: a File is seekable and the node keeps the position. Resuming re-probes rather than trusting the client's own memory, so it works across a reconnect too. **And the slot they hold.** `_do_file_upload` never called `slots.touch(tr)`. Chunks are not gated by the lease, so the file arrived — but the node reclaimed a grant nobody appeared to be using after thirty seconds, twice, then abandoned it, and the widget follows the lease. Measured from the journal: a 3.5 GB upload read "waiting, 0 ahead" for a minute and a half while it was transferring. The download twin of this was fixed on 2026-09-08; the same omission was still here, invisible until uploads took a real lease. `test_the_upload_itself_is_sealed` now checks every message `uploadFile` sends rather than the first. Adding the probe put a second one in front of the one it was written for, and it would have kept passing while guarding nothing. Node suite 1202 passed, hub suite 850 passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST

test(hub): stop the Chrome profile cleanup racing its own children

2026-09-08T11:21:02Z

`terminate()` signals the parent only. Chrome's zygote, renderer and gpu children outlive it by a moment and go on writing into the profile, so rmtree walked a directory that gained a file between its readdir and its rmdir and raised "Directory not empty". The probe exited non-zero, and every test in the file errored at setup — intermittently, roughly one run in three, for a reason nowhere near the chat code they were testing. TemporaryDirectory(ignore_cleanup_errors=True) in all four probes that own a profile: a few bytes left in a throwaway directory are harmless, failing the run is not. `proc.wait()` after `kill()` was also missing — a killed process still has to be reaped. layout_probe.py never cleaned up at all (mkdtemp, no removal) and never waited for Chrome; it leaked a profile into /tmp on every run. Ten consecutive runs of test_chat_send.py are clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST

Merge origin/main into the chat encryption work

2026-09-07T16:03:52Z

Both sides landed a breaking MNP change and both called it 2.0, which is right: the sealed upload, the removal of `stream_seg` and mandatory chat encryption share one flag day. They are recorded as one version in `__init__.py` rather than as a race between two. The resolutions that were decisions rather than mechanics: * **`MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` moves to "2.0".** The sealed upload alone was a *confined* break — a 1.x peer could still connect, browse, download, stream and chat, with only its uploads refused by `upload_not_sealed` — so the floor deliberately stayed at "1.0". Mandatory chat encryption ends that confinement: a 1.x peer can neither produce a sealed chat message nor read one, so it would connect, look fine, and be unable to say anything. Refusing it at the handshake is the honest form. The per-message `upload_not_sealed` path is untouched and still right if the floor is ever lowered. * **`sendChat` throws on an `error` reply**, from origin, applied to the sealed send. It matters more after this change, not less: the node now refuses a stale epoch, a malformed envelope and a device claim that is not the connection's own, so there are three new ways for a message to be rejected and none of them may look like a message that was sent. * **`req_id` supersedes the per-type routing** this branch added for `chat_keys_resp` and `device_hello_ack`. Both blocks are kept beside the existing `chat_hist_resp` one, for the same stated reason — a node too old to stamp — and their comments no longer claim to be the mechanism that closes the class. `req_id` is. * **`chat_send_probe.py` is rebuilt on origin's structure**, not beside it: two scenarios, a stub that stamps `req_id`, `music_meta_req` as the older pending request. The encrypted path is layered on — a real Ed25519 device key generated in the page, and a `chat_keys_resp` sealed by the shipped Python, because a payload the page built itself would prove only that the page agrees with the page. * **`test_reply_correlation.py` now sends a sealed message.** Its subject is which of the two messages leaving that handler carries the id; plaintext chat was only the fixture, and the node refuses one now. * `groupbox` keeps both new purposes (`upload`, `chat_keys`); `protocol.py` keeps origin's removal of `STREAM_SEGMENT` and this branch's correction of the "Double Ratchet message" comment on `CHAT_MESSAGE`, which was wrong when it was written and is wrong differently now. Full suite on the merged tree: 1993 passed, 11 failed — the same 11 that fail on a pristine checkout (2 Windows service tests, 1 apps-enabled policy, 7 transcode tests that pass in isolation, and the WebRTC invite test that hangs on its own). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr

feat(chat): encrypt group chat under per-device epoch keys (MNP 2.0)

2026-09-07T15:50:28Z

Chat messages are sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key derived per group, per epoch, per *device*, and signed over the ciphertext with the device key the node pinned. The node relays and archives; it cannot read a message. There is no switch. MNP goes to 2.0 and MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED moves with it, so a 1.x peer is refused at the handshake with `version_too_old` rather than admitted and then unable to speak. An opt-in flag was designed and rejected: every node is a test node, so it would have bought nothing and left a plaintext branch reachable — C6's lesson one feature later. A test reads the source and refuses any code that consults a `chat_encrypted` setting. Not Sender Keys, and `senderkeys.py` is now documented as unused. With distribution under the group key and a node that serves history to devices which were not present, the node must retain each chain's earliest key, and a chain key at iteration i yields every message key from i on by pure HKDF — forward secrecy is zero either way. What the ratchet was left buying was stateful client code with silent failure modes, three of them reproduced: any member could sign as any other, a second device dropped the first's chain, and the skipped-key cache grew without bound. The reasoning is in docs/chat-sender-keys.md, which is the specification and the decision record. Epochs, not rotation: the epoch key is wrapped under the group key at delivery and never stored under it, so `gek_rotate` is a re-wrap. A group-key-derived archive key would have made every message ever sent unreadable on the first `member unpin`, which is the documented step after removing a member. A new epoch opens on member revoke/unpin, device revoke and `gek_rotate`; old epochs are kept and still delivered, so history stays readable to everyone who could already read it, and nothing anywhere deletes one. Three prerequisites this needed, each a live defect on its own: * The peer registry was keyed by user_id, so one account's second device evicted the first and the broadcast skipped recipients by account — a person's phone never saw what they typed on their laptop. * The handshake authenticated an account, never a device. `device_hello` (additive, signed, refused unless the key is a live device of this account in the node's own roster) is what lets the node refuse a member claiming somebody else's key. * `_admin_exec_file_delete` authorized against the exact uploading key, so device linking had already broken deleting your own file from your other device. It now authorizes against any non-revoked device of `uploader_id`. Found by driving the real panel over the real transport, not by reading source: `chat_keys_resp` was routed by arrival order and handed to an unanswered `media_meta_req` — the original frozen-tab defect in a message type that did not exist when that probe was written. And `_asText` had been deleted with an unrelated helper beside it; its only caller sits inside a promise the panel catches, so every conversation rendered empty with nothing in the console. Existing node data is migrated by QE/migration/migrate_chat_encryption.py (not versioned, per the QE rule), run with the node stopped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr

feat(mnp)!: seal the upload under the group key

2026-09-07T15:46:33Z

Downloads have been encrypted under a GEK-derived key since the beginning: `file_chunk` and `stream_data` both go through `chunk_ciphertext`. Uploads never were. `file_upload` carried the filename and the raw bytes in plain msgpack, and `file_upload_ack` carried the name the node stored them under — so the same file was ciphertext leaving a node and plaintext arriving at one. There was no threat model behind that asymmetry. Both halves now travel sealed under a third groupbox purpose, HKDF(GEK, info="meshbay:upload:v1"). The filename, the destination folder and the bytes are all inside the seal; only `upload_id` and `chunk_index` stay in clear, because the node routes and orders on them before it can decrypt. This direction seals *towards* the node — it holds the GEK for its own group — and it opens the payload before it picks a destination or touches the disk. What that forced, and why none of it is optional: - `filename` was the correlation key on both sides. It cannot be: matching an ack to its request by name would hand back exactly what the seal hides. `upload_id` replaces it — client-drawn, opaque to the node, unique within a connection, never an authorization input. The property it guarded (one refusal fails one upload, not every upload in flight) is unchanged. - Refusals can no longer quote what they refused. `No directory named 'X'` becomes `No such directory in this group` plus the `code` that was already there; the client knows what it sent. - No plaintext fallback. A path that still accepts plaintext is not a sealed path, so an unsealed `file_upload` is refused with `upload_not_sealed`. Hardened while here, because what comes out of a seal is authenticated but not validated — a member can seal anything: `filename` and `data` have their types checked before any upload state is created, and `chunk_index`/`total_chunks`, which are outside the seal by necessity, can no longer raise where a refusal was meant. Tests. `test_upload_sealed.py` pins the node half: nothing identifying on the wire, tamper/wrong-key/wrong-group all refused with nothing written, and multi-chunk reassembly unchanged. `test_upload_seal_client.py` drives the shipped `uploadFile` over the shipped `crypto.js` under node and feeds its real frames to the real `_do_file_upload` — the file lands intact, and the ack the node actually produced comes back with the name it chose for a collision, which is the half a source-reading test cannot see. Both upload purposes join the JS/Python groupbox parity vectors. BREAKING CHANGE: MNP 2.0. `file_upload`/`file_upload_ack` change shape on the wire every deployed client speaks, which is MAJOR by the same rule 1.0 was — but the break is confined to uploads. `MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` stays at "1.0", so a 1.x peer still connects, browses, downloads, streams and chats; only its uploads are refused, with a message saying which side is old. The client checks the node's version before sending a chunk, so neither side meets this as a timeout. This is the version negotiation shipped in 1.0 earning its keep: 1.0 cost a flag day, 2.0 costs a refusal code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3