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<title>meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_mnp_token.py, branch main</title>
<subtitle>MeshBay — read-only public mirror</subtitle>
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<updated>2026-09-26T00:03:50Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>feat(protocol): bind the MNP token to the node it is for (E10)</title>
<updated>2026-09-26T00:03:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Besson</name>
<email>cbesson@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-09-26T00:03:50Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
The audience split stopped a member's node credential from opening the hub API.
It did not stop the credential being *replayed to another node*: the MNP token
carried the member's whole group set and named no node, so a token handed to
node A's operator could be presented to node B the member also belongs to. That
does not read content on B — the handshake still requires proving node B's group
key, which the operator lacks — but it reaches B's pre-proof window and fetches
the member's *encrypted* keypair bundle for B (offline-attackable, bounded,
audited): a disclosure §2.4 says should not follow from hosting a member on A.

The token now names the node it is minted for (a `node` claim = that node's
Ed25519 key), and authorize_token refuses one that names a different key. The
client already knows the target node's key (from /v1/groups/{id}/nodes) and asks
for a token bound to it: POST /v1/nodes/mnp-token takes node_pk, and
transport.connect threads it (group-page, the connection pool and rewrap pass
n.pk_node; reconnect preserves it). A token that names no node is still
accepted, because the hub only mints one for the authenticated requester, so an
unbound token grants nothing across accounts — which also keeps non-binding
callers working with no churn.

Done before deploy, so it folds into the MNP 4.0 flag day rather than needing
its own. Docs: §5.2, register E10, MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md §6.3.
test_handshake.py and test_mnp_token.py hold the binding (a token for node A is
refused by node B, accepted by node A; an unbound token still works); red
before, green after. common/node/hub suites green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fix(hub): present a node-audience token in the handshake, not the hub session token</title>
<updated>2026-09-25T15:24:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Besson</name>
<email>cbesson@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-09-25T12:53:42Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:bce962c39fcb2d124506e33f77c3ca9082f145dd</id>
<content type='text'>
A member authenticated to a node in the MNP handshake with its hub *session*
token — scope=user, valid at the hub API for hours. A node operator is in the
threat model, so this handed them a live hub credential for the member: enough
to enumerate the member's other groups, act as them, and (before the previous
commit closed it) take the account over. The node genuinely needs a hub-signed
membership assertion, so the fix is to make that a separate credential that
opens nothing at the hub API.

Two audiences signed by the one hub key (meshbay_common/tokens.py):
- HUB_API_AUD — session tokens (login, device-auth, node-auth, refresh), used
  for hub calls and signaling. decode_access_token now binds this audience, so
  an MNP token cannot be replayed against the hub API.
- MNP_AUD — a short-lived token a member presents to a node and nothing else,
  from POST /v1/nodes/mnp-token. authorize_token now binds this audience, so a
  session token presented to a node is refused. This closes the disclosure.

The node's own self-decode (hub_client.py) reads its node token with
audience=HUB_API_AUD. The client fetches the MNP token inside transport.connect()
(and on every reconnect) using the session token, so callers are unchanged and
signaling keeps using the session token.

No regression to a long session: the MNP token is checked once, at the
handshake, before any proof — a film already playing is not re-authenticated, so
a 15-minute token does not interrupt a 4-hour film; reconnects refetch a fresh
one. Denylist and membership checks are unchanged (the MNP token carries
sub/jti/groups).

Tests: authorize_token refuses a session/no-audience token and accepts an MNP
token; the hub API refuses an MNP token; POST /v1/nodes/mnp-token is minted only
for a member's own session. Verified red-before/green-after; common, node and
hub suites green (the pre-existing test_cli_golden failure is an argparse/pytest
prog artifact unrelated to this change).

Still to do before deploy (B2): bump the MNP version and client.minimum so a
stale desktop client is told to update rather than getting a handshake refusal,
update docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md and MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md, and validate against
a real node locally, then deploy hub+node+SPA atomically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;
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</entry>
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