meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_transport_contracts.py, branch 0.14

fix(win): a service-mode daemon can be replaced, and the Node page can link one

2026-09-14T21:51:36Z

Two live-reproduced bugs in Windows node start/stop, found sideloading the 0.14.0 build: - node:start's crash-recovery step killed a service-mode daemon with taskkill/CTRL_BREAK, both of which fail with "Access is denied" against a process running under the Scheduled Task's own S4U logon session (a different session from the Electron app's). The daemon it was meant to replace just kept running, unreplaced, and schtasks /run on a task Windows still considered Running was then a silent no-op too. Route through winServiceTaskEnd() (schtasks /end) first, the way nodeServiceStop/ nodeServiceRestart already correctly do. service-mode.ps1 also now starts the task right after registering it -- Register-ScheduledTask's own AtStartup trigger does not run it immediately, so nothing was listening until the next reboot. - The Node page's Start button called node.start() with no arguments, so an unlinked node (a fresh install, or one whose hub-side link was lost) could never link on Start alone -- only create-group-page.js's own call passed {hubUrl, username, token}. Reproduced on a fresh non-service install signed in to the real hub: Start hung for ~105s and failed with "could not link", pointing at a "Link Node" control that lives on Settings, not the Node page (that message is fixed too). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5

feat: a group can be left out of Search, and Search tries every node

2026-09-14T19:45:53Z

`search_listed` is a per-group setting on the node, changed by a signed operator op and carried in the sealed handshake ack. Search reads it after the handshake and stops there: no index is fetched, cached or merged, in any of the four views, and the page says how many groups it left out. The switch is a "Search" section in the group's settings, shown to the operator. Absent means listed, at every layer: roster default, ack default, and the client only drops a group on an explicit `false` — so an upgrade or an older node removes nothing from anyone's Search. It is a listing preference and protects nothing: the node serves the same index to Search and to the group page and cannot tell them apart, every member lists the group by opening it, and a client that ignores the flag lists it in Search too. Design §9.11 says so, so it is never described as private. The cost is one handshake per unlisted group, because only the node knows the setting. Search also took `nodes[0]` twice — for the index and for the pooled connection — the defect 4cce50f fixed on the group page only. One `connectToGroup` now walks the list the same way: a refusal about this browser stops, `not_hosted` or a failed connection moves on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XuNrwLf5EFWCMHzfoEvnpm

fix: an empty group claim is a claim on nothing

2026-09-12T14:36:54Z

A node that hosts no groups sends no `group_ids` on its hub socket, and the hub resolved the claim with `set(claimed_groups or authorized)` — so "I host nothing" arrived as "I host every group this account belongs to", other members' included. Such a node can serve none of them: it holds no GEK, and its own handshake refuses them with "Group not hosted on this node". `/v1/groups/{id}/nodes` answers in registration order and `_node_groups` is in-memory, so which node a client was sent to depended on who reconnected first after a hub restart. GroupPage took `nodes[0]` with no fallback. On 2026-09-11 a hub deploy at 20:14 reshuffled the registry, a second member's unconfigured node won the race, and a group stopped opening for everyone in it with its only real host online throughout. Any member could take one of their groups down, by accident, by leaving an empty node running. Four changes, because no one of them is sufficient: - the hub never widens an absent claim, and `update_groups` goes through the same ceiling as registration — it assigned its list verbatim, so the bound that makes C2 hold at authentication was one message wide - the node states the empty set rather than omitting the field - the refusal carries `not_hosted`, so a client can tell "try the next node" from "you, here, must do something first" - GroupPage walks the list instead of indexing into it The three lines involved date from 13, 20 and 23 August and each is defensible alone. The defect is in the seam, which is where the last two also were: a falsy empty collection must never mean "unspecified". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT

refactor(spa): stop asking a node what version it is

2026-09-10T15:29:50Z

`MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` is the version this build speaks, so `check_version` refuses everything below it at the handshake. Every capability the client was gating on the node's version is therefore true of every peer it can reach: * `supportsSealedUpload` — an upload is sealed or it is not sent; * `supportsAppOps` — one `app_directories` op, and no `setVideoRoot` / `setAudioRoot` / `setPhotoRoots` wrappers behind it; * `supportsTransferSlots` and `Lease._skip()` — a lease is always real, so there is no branch where a transfer runs without one; * `legacyNode`, the read-only shared-directories table, and the two hints telling an operator their node is too old to configure an app. The version the node declares is still recorded, for diagnostics. Nothing branches on it, and the comment says so, because a field kept "just in case" is how the branches came back last time. `test_mnp_1_0_node_compat.py` goes with them: it existed to hold the fallbacks in place, and holding a fallback that cannot execute is how a suite starts lying. The two locale strings for those hints are removed from all ten catalogues. Hub suite 872 passed (test_sticky_header deselected — failing before this). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3

feat: resume an interrupted upload, and pause one

2026-09-09T10:01:06Z

Stage 8 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, second half, plus the gap it exposed in stage 7. **Asking where to resume.** The node identifies an upload by (member, directory, filename), so a client resuming one has to name the file — and `transfer_open`, the obvious place to ask, travels in clear. Naming it there would undo exactly what sealing this path bought in MNP 2.0: before it, the same file was ciphertext leaving a node and plaintext arriving at one. So the question is asked inside the seal that already exists, as an ordinary `file_upload` with no bytes and `chunk_index: -1`. The node writes nothing, creates no state, reserves no name, and answers with `resume_from` in the sealed ack. A node that predates it refuses the index, which the client reads as "start from the beginning" — the behaviour it had anyway — and the wait is bounded so one that answers neither does not strand an upload. The probe is answered after every check the write path makes, so it cannot ask questions about a directory the caller may not write to, and it answers only about the member who asks: otherwise one member could measure another's progress on a file they never sent, and worse, resume it. **Pausing an upload.** Reported: no pause button on an upload, even in the desktop app. Stage 7 built pause around the download path — a target declares whether it can be stopped — and an upload has no local target to ask. It was also refused by design, since a transfer handed a lease it cannot re-create must not be offered a button that would drop its slot for good. Uploads now ask for their slot rather than being handed one, and say they are pausable outright: a File is seekable and the node keeps the position. Resuming re-probes rather than trusting the client's own memory, so it works across a reconnect too. **And the slot they hold.** `_do_file_upload` never called `slots.touch(tr)`. Chunks are not gated by the lease, so the file arrived — but the node reclaimed a grant nobody appeared to be using after thirty seconds, twice, then abandoned it, and the widget follows the lease. Measured from the journal: a 3.5 GB upload read "waiting, 0 ahead" for a minute and a half while it was transferring. The download twin of this was fixed on 2026-09-08; the same omission was still here, invisible until uploads took a real lease. `test_the_upload_itself_is_sealed` now checks every message `uploadFile` sends rather than the first. Adding the probe put a second one in front of the one it was written for, and it would have kept passing while guarding nothing. Node suite 1202 passed, hub suite 850 passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST

feat(mnp)!: seal the upload under the group key

2026-09-07T15:46:33Z

Downloads have been encrypted under a GEK-derived key since the beginning: `file_chunk` and `stream_data` both go through `chunk_ciphertext`. Uploads never were. `file_upload` carried the filename and the raw bytes in plain msgpack, and `file_upload_ack` carried the name the node stored them under — so the same file was ciphertext leaving a node and plaintext arriving at one. There was no threat model behind that asymmetry. Both halves now travel sealed under a third groupbox purpose, HKDF(GEK, info="meshbay:upload:v1"). The filename, the destination folder and the bytes are all inside the seal; only `upload_id` and `chunk_index` stay in clear, because the node routes and orders on them before it can decrypt. This direction seals *towards* the node — it holds the GEK for its own group — and it opens the payload before it picks a destination or touches the disk. What that forced, and why none of it is optional: - `filename` was the correlation key on both sides. It cannot be: matching an ack to its request by name would hand back exactly what the seal hides. `upload_id` replaces it — client-drawn, opaque to the node, unique within a connection, never an authorization input. The property it guarded (one refusal fails one upload, not every upload in flight) is unchanged. - Refusals can no longer quote what they refused. `No directory named 'X'` becomes `No such directory in this group` plus the `code` that was already there; the client knows what it sent. - No plaintext fallback. A path that still accepts plaintext is not a sealed path, so an unsealed `file_upload` is refused with `upload_not_sealed`. Hardened while here, because what comes out of a seal is authenticated but not validated — a member can seal anything: `filename` and `data` have their types checked before any upload state is created, and `chunk_index`/`total_chunks`, which are outside the seal by necessity, can no longer raise where a refusal was meant. Tests. `test_upload_sealed.py` pins the node half: nothing identifying on the wire, tamper/wrong-key/wrong-group all refused with nothing written, and multi-chunk reassembly unchanged. `test_upload_seal_client.py` drives the shipped `uploadFile` over the shipped `crypto.js` under node and feeds its real frames to the real `_do_file_upload` — the file lands intact, and the ack the node actually produced comes back with the name it chose for a collision, which is the half a source-reading test cannot see. Both upload purposes join the JS/Python groupbox parity vectors. BREAKING CHANGE: MNP 2.0. `file_upload`/`file_upload_ack` change shape on the wire every deployed client speaks, which is MAJOR by the same rule 1.0 was — but the break is confined to uploads. `MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` stays at "1.0", so a 1.x peer still connects, browses, downloads, streams and chats; only its uploads are refused, with a message saying which side is old. The client checks the node's version before sending a chunk, so neither side meets this as a timeout. This is the version negotiation shipped in 1.0 earning its keep: 1.0 cost a flag day, 2.0 costs a refusal code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3

feat(client): HelloWorld, the reference application

2026-09-06T22:48:55Z

Every other test of the plugin architecture reads source for the *absence* of app names. That proves nobody wrote a special case for Videos; it cannot prove a genuinely new application works, because there was no new application. This is one. It stores directories, appears as a tab, has a settings pane and lists files, and the node has never heard its name outside a single allow-list entry. Two files and one registry line, which is the claim `docs/refactor-groups.md` §4.1 makes. It ships hidden behind `?dev=1` (`dev: true` in the registry, the same opt-in shape as transport.js's `?trace=1`). Registering it normally would put a toy app in every operator's group; not registering it would prove nothing, since registration is exactly what is claimed to be sufficient. **Adding it found two places where the claim was nearly true rather than true, and both are fixed by making the code less app-specific:** `group-settings.js` fell back to the whole registry when a group had no `enabled_apps` yet — which would have turned a hidden app on for everyone. It asks `availableApps()` now. `group-page.js` wrote out `videoDirectories` / `musicDirectories` / `photoDirectories` by hand, so a fifth app would have needed that file edited. It derives `Directories` from the registry. Neither was found by reading; both were found by adding the app, which is the whole reason it exists. Verified in a real Electron window as well as by the tests: hidden by default, present with the flag, offered its own settings section, and listing exactly the files under its configured folder and its subfolders — not the ones beside it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us

feat(client): Phase 2 — per-app settings panes, folder tree, multi-directory

2026-09-06T17:03:22Z

Each app's settings were inlined in `group-settings.js` — TMDB, MusicBrainz, and one folder picker per app, each with its own draft state and save handler saying the same thing about a different key. They are one file per app now, reached through the `apps.js` registry, and the page that renders them names no application at all: adding one is a registry entry and a settings file. The line between the two is what makes that true. What every app has — folders — the page does generically, through one `saveDirectories` bound to the app. What one app alone has, its pane does itself with the transport it is handed. An app that only needs directories touches neither `group-settings.js` nor `group-page.js`, which is `test_app_settings_plugin.py`'s subject. `settings-ui.js` exists because a pane importing the page that renders it is a cycle, and ES modules answer that with a temporal-dead-zone ReferenceError at first render — a component that silently does not appear, the fault already recorded in CLAUDE.md about hook ordering. The flat depth-indented `