meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/indexer/indexer.py, branch 0.14

feat(node): progress names the root under way and the roots waiting

2026-09-14T09:08:12Z

`IndexProgress` said "scanning, this many bytes of that many" and nothing more. A group's roots are walked one after another, so a second directory added during a large scan showed as the bar jumping back to 0 %. It now also carries the root being walked and its position in the roots table, the kind of walk (scan, rescan, reconcile, watch), file counts, and the roots waiting for the scan lock in order: queued by the initial scan, by a retarget, and by a plug; dropped when a root is removed. `GET /api/index-status` answers for every group at once, including a group still in its initial scan, so a client can show indexing on any page. It names roots: loopback only, like `current_dir`. `index_progress` and the handshake ack gain the same counters, still naming nothing (decision D3): the root is a position in the roots table the member already opened from the sealed index, and the queue is a count. The pusher keeps speaking while a root only waits for the lock. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya

fix(node): a scan keeps its progress while a burst or a plug runs beside it

2026-09-14T08:56:40Z

A watchdog burst wrote the indexer's single `progress` directly. A file dropped into a folder during a large scan added its size to the scan's total, then cleared `scanning` when its own hash finished, so the progress went blank with hours of hashing left. Bursts now keep their own counters, shown only while no whole-root walk runs. A plug rescan took no scan lock and walked its root beside an added root's scan, both resetting the same counters and reading the drive in turn. It now waits for the lock, and skips the rescan if the root was ejected or removed while it waited, since the rescan drops the entries before it walks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya

fix(node): a reload and a plug rescan outlive the session that asked

2026-09-14T07:40:23Z

A root added from the client arrives over MNP, and _retarget_indexer started the daemon's reload with the session's own _spawn. When that session closed - a client reconnecting 47 s into the scan of a 900 GB root - shutdown_tasks() cancelled the reload mid-scan, and the reload queued behind it, without a line in the log. The new root was in node.toml and in the indexer's set but never in the group's context; the lock was free and nothing retried, so the node served the old roots table for hours while reconcile hashed the whole drive as missed events. One loopback reload fixed the live node in 9 ms. _reload_config now runs the work in a node-owned task and awaits it through asyncio.shield, so a caller that goes away only stops waiting; a cancelled reload is logged. plug_root does the same for its rescan, which drops the root's entries before walking the disk and so left the root empty when its admin op's session closed. The existing MNP test replaced _spawn with a list and could not cancel anything; the new tests close the session for real and fail without this. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya

fix(node): an added root is served before it is scanned

2026-09-14T00:35:53Z

Adding a large directory to a running group made the reload await the scan of the new root before putting the new RootSet in the group's context, holding _reload_lock the whole time. For the hours a large drive takes to hash, the node served the old set: - a file request under the new root got None from entry_abs_path and the handler died on None.exists() without replying; - a writable/removable toggle answered with the live table, still the old one, so the directory vanished from the operator's settings; - reconcile saw every file the scan had not reached as a missed event and hashed it again on the same executor, rewriting progress under the scan. retarget now applies the set, the roots table and the watcher first, and with wait=False scans the added roots in the background; the daemon swaps ctx["roots"] before calling it. A scan lock shared by the initial scan, added-root scans and reconcile makes the reconcile loop sit out a running scan without backing off. Every transport site that resolves an entry answers ROOT_NOT_SERVED instead of crashing, and a delete keeps the entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya

fix: hold every background task, in both codebases

2026-09-13T13:40:50Z

asyncio keeps only a weak reference to a task, so a coroutine started with `asyncio.ensure_future(...)` whose result is discarded can be collected while it is still running: the loop logs "Task was destroyed but it is pending!" and the work simply does not happen. No error reaches the caller, and what is lost is whatever that coroutine was in the middle of. The node already had a guard for this, written after an abandoned stream task lost a transcode slot for good — and it read one file, `webrtc_server.py`, because that is where the defect was found. Outside that file there were nineteen sites: the hub's `chat_notify` (a notification for every member of a group), the indexer's debounce (every real-time index update), eleven in `daemon.py` including the SIGHUP reload and each enrichment pass, two in `ops.py`, and five in the loopback API. `meshbay_common.background.spawn()` is the one door. It holds the task, drops it when it finishes, and logs what it raised under the coroutine's own name — an exception in a task nobody awaits was otherwise reported by asyncio at collection time, out of context or not at all. A peer session's `_spawn` stays as it is: that one can also *cancel* what it holds, which a module-level holder cannot, because a session ends and a process does not. `test_background_tasks.py` walks every package's source and refuses a discarded handle. It parses rather than greps, so an assignment, a comprehension or an await is not mistaken for one, and it was checked against a deliberate reintroduction. A guard that stops at the edge of the file where the bug was found is a guard against that bug, not against its class. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW

fix(node): an uploaded file records who sent it

2026-09-13T13:40:34Z

`_register_uploader` walked the index for the entry it had just written, at a moment when no such entry can exist: the file was a `.part` until the rename on the line above, which is not indexable, and the watchdog that will index it debounces for two seconds and then hashes. The walk matched nothing, silently, so every uploaded file in every group was owned by nobody — and `file_delete` refuses a caller with no admin authority when the entry records no uploader, so a member could not delete what they had just sent. MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §5.4 grants that to any non-revoked device of the uploading account. The record is now written when the last chunk lands (`indexer.record_upload`) and the entry is stamped from it in `_hash_or_cached`, the one funnel every entry passes through — initial scan, watchdog, reconcile and replug alike. It lives in the index cache rather than on the entry alone, because the index is rebuilt from disk at every start and an owner the node forgets on restart is a right quietly taken away. It is validated against a live `stat()`, so whatever later occupies that path inherits nothing; and `_rescan_root`'s carry-over no longer copies over it, or memory would beat the durable record. §5.4 also claimed ownership was *provable* — a transcript the uploader signs, stored with the entry. No such signature has ever existed; `meshbay:upload:v1` in the code is the groupbox purpose that seals the envelope. The section now states what the code does, and the transcript is an open item in §15.3. `test_upload_attribution.py` drives the real handler and a real indexer across that seam. Against the previous source its two positive cases fail on the property, not on a missing method — an upload, then a rebuild from disk, then a different file at the same path inheriting nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW

fix(node): carry enrichment across a rescan instead of re-deriving it

2026-09-07T01:13:14Z

e1dbdf0 made a replugged root re-enrich, which was correct and not enough: the operator still watched their albums vanish. Measured on the reported library with a cold metadata cache, the node broadcast twice — the first delta stripped every album, the second put them back 14 seconds later. Fourteen seconds of "no music found" is the bug, whatever happens after. An entry's id is its content hash, so an entry that comes back under the same id, name and path is the same bytes in the same place and everything enrichment derived from it still holds. `_rescan_root` now carries those fields across the drop-and-rescan that `reconcile` and `plug_root` share. Re-enrichment stays as the fallback for what genuinely changed: a different id is different content, and a different name or path can change the folder and filename fallbacks that artist, album, display_title and track_no rest on, so those entries are still handed to the daemon through `rescanned_ids`. `uploader_id`/`uploader_pk` ride along. They are the same shape of field — set once on an entry, readable from nowhere on disk — and they decide who may delete the file, so losing them to a replug quietly took a right away. Verified on the running node: one broadcast 550ms after the plug, carrying the albums, and no metadata lookups at all. The tests now assert the field on the entry rather than a call to an enricher. Counting calls is what let the previous version of this file pass while the operator still saw an empty tab. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us

fix(node): a replugged root came back without its metadata

2026-09-07T00:26:17Z

Reported live: a removable root ejected from Files and plugged back in returned with its files and without its albums. Music showed "no music found" and stayed there through a force reload — the loss was on the node, not in the client. `plug_root` drops the root's entries and rescans, which is right; the drive may have changed while it was away. What comes back is a bare IndexEntry: `_hash_or_cached` fills id/name/path/size/type and nothing else. Every enrichment field goes with the old object, and the Music tag fields are cached nowhere by design (enrich_audio.py re-reads them so a rename can re-derive the filename fallback), so re-enrichment is the only way back. Two gates then made sure it never ran: * enrichment is scheduled for `delta.additions`, and ejecting broadcasts nothing, so `_last_broadcast_snapshot` still held those ids — the rebuilt entries diffed as updates, not additions; * `_enrich_new_*_entries` skips anything in `_enriched_attempted`, which is only discarded for `delta.deletions` — and dropping and rescanning inside one call broadcasts no deletion either. A restart cleared both, since an empty snapshot makes every entry an addition. Nothing short of one did. The indexer now records the ids it rebuilt and the daemon drains them at broadcast time: their "already attempted" mark is discarded and they rejoin the entries offered to the three enrichment passes. Not Music-specific — Videos lost durations and titles and Photos lost thumbnails the same way; Music is just where an untagged file has no album to file itself under, so the app goes empty rather than plain. `reconcile()` does the same drop-and-rescan when a root reappears on its own, so a USB drive that fell off and re-mounted hit this with nobody touching the UI. Covered too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us

fix(groups): finish Phase 1 — MNP root management, upload targets, eject state

2026-09-06T15:48:36Z

Review of the Phase 1 commit found the RO/RW model sound but three paths unfinished, each of which broke the flow the phase exists to deliver. Plus 29 test failures it introduced and no coverage for anything it added. Uploads went to the wrong directory. The node read a `root` field on file_upload that no client ever sent, so every upload landed in the first writable root while the Files toolbar offered its button based on the root being browsed — with two writable roots, uploading from one wrote into the other. Files now names the root it is showing; Chat names one chosen in the shell (an operator-configured directory arrives in Phase 2); the node refuses an unknown name rather than falling back, and refuses read-only and ejected roots by code. Shared directories were unreachable on the web. The table read its roots only from the loopback API, which resolves to "not available" in a browser, so the section rendered for nobody there — while the Uploads controls it replaced had worked — and the transport.updateRoot/ejectRoot/plugRoot methods beside it were dead. MNP is now the path, loopback the fallback for a local node with no live connection, and adding a root over MNP takes a typed path since no web page can browse a remote disk. Ejecting updated nobody's screen. transport.js resolves an admin ack against the pending request and returns, which is right for every op whose caller knows the value it chose; the root acks carry state only the node can compute, so the operator who clicked Eject was the one client that never saw it happen. And the ejected flag reached roster.db but was never read back, so a restart undid it and the next scan read an empty mount point as an erased library. Also: the member-upload endpoint answered 200 and did nothing (removed); the wizard ignored the first root's RW switch; reload compared roots on name and path, so editing writable in node.toml did nothing; the table had no path column, which is the only thing separating two libraries sharing a basename; apps_enabled normalisation differed between the two sides of a signed subject. Tests: eject/plug, per-root upload refusal and the node.toml rewrite had no coverage at all. test_member_upload_policy.py is replaced by test_root_writable_policy.py — it tested a removed feature — and every property worth keeping from it moved rather than being dropped. Docs: draft-v6 structural decision 9 is annotated as superseded (the operator can no longer have a directory only they may write to — a real capability removed, flagged rather than hidden), the man page documents the root verb and the RO/RW fields, and refactor-groups.md §7b records what the plan got wrong. Suite: 41 failures before, 13 after — all 13 pre-existing on main. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us

feat: groups refactor Phase 1 — root RO/RW model + shared directories UI

2026-09-06T14:05:39Z

Replace the upload boolean with per-root writable/removable/ejected flags. Backend: new ops (update_root, eject_root, plug_root), MNP 1.1 protocol messages, live RootSet updates so API always reflects current state, CLI root subcommand (add/remove/set/list/eject/plug). Frontend: SharedDirectoriesTable with optimistic toggle switches, eject/plug in Files and Settings, upload gated on root.writable, ejected-root filtering in all media apps, updated Create Group wizard, 10-locale i18n. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6