meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/webrtc/handshake.py, branch 0.17

fix(node): the roster, not the key alone, decides who gets a session

2026-09-30T09:57:03Z

The handshake opened a session for anyone holding the group key with a hub token naming the group; the roster was consulted only when wrapping the key in a join. A member revoked or unpinned on the node but still a member on the hub kept a full session with the key they already held — and was handed the chat epoch their removal had just opened, since chat keys go to any session. An honest client never met this (it asks for the key through join_request every time); one that kept the key did not have to. - After the proof, the node asks the roster and refuses with `not_authorized_for_group` unless the account is an active member of the group or the node's operator. - A removal from any door — MNP, the node page, the CLI — now opens a new chat epoch in each group the person could read, broadcasts it, and closes every connection they hold (`ops.members._after_removal`). The CLI and the node page did neither. - Design §5.2, protocol §6.1, §6.3, §14.2. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5

refactor: drop the unread transfer_limits field from the handshake ack

2026-09-28T20:38:41Z

The interface reads a member's cap from transfer_state and never read the copy on the ack. The transfer probe reads it from transfer_state too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5

feat(protocol): bind the MNP token to the node it is for (E10)

2026-09-26T00:03:50Z

The audience split stopped a member's node credential from opening the hub API. It did not stop the credential being *replayed to another node*: the MNP token carried the member's whole group set and named no node, so a token handed to node A's operator could be presented to node B the member also belongs to. That does not read content on B — the handshake still requires proving node B's group key, which the operator lacks — but it reaches B's pre-proof window and fetches the member's *encrypted* keypair bundle for B (offline-attackable, bounded, audited): a disclosure §2.4 says should not follow from hosting a member on A. The token now names the node it is minted for (a `node` claim = that node's Ed25519 key), and authorize_token refuses one that names a different key. The client already knows the target node's key (from /v1/groups/{id}/nodes) and asks for a token bound to it: POST /v1/nodes/mnp-token takes node_pk, and transport.connect threads it (group-page, the connection pool and rewrap pass n.pk_node; reconnect preserves it). A token that names no node is still accepted, because the hub only mints one for the authenticated requester, so an unbound token grants nothing across accounts — which also keeps non-binding callers working with no churn. Done before deploy, so it folds into the MNP 4.0 flag day rather than needing its own. Docs: §5.2, register E10, MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md §6.3. test_handshake.py and test_mnp_token.py hold the binding (a token for node A is refused by node B, accepted by node A; an unbound token still works); red before, green after. common/node/hub suites green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8

refactor(node): split ops.py into the ops package

2026-09-24T23:30:47Z

Each section of ops.py becomes a module of meshbay_node/ops/ (core, node_toml, members, chat, groups, roots, files, settings, apps), cut as text; ops/__init__.py keeps the docstring and re-exports every name, so `ops.` is unchanged for every caller. Logger name unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5

refactor(node): move the MNP handshake out of webrtc_server

2026-09-24T14:45:38Z

HandshakeMixin in transport/webrtc/handshake.py: challenge, proof, channel binding, and the sealed configuration a peer receives once admitted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5