meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_cli_dispatch.py, branch 0.13

fix(node): give the per-member transfer cap a door anyone can open

2026-09-08T23:15:41Z

Reported as "the slots seem hardcoded to 2": `meshbay-node transfers set 8 8` and still only two downloads at a time. Not hardcoded — that is the *per-member* cap, which is a group's setting and is checked before the node's, so raising the machine's total cannot move it. But the diagnosis was right in the way that matters: nothing could change it. `OP_TRANSFER_LIMITS` shipped with exactly one front door, the signed MNP handler, and nothing anywhere opened it — no client call, no CLI verb, no loopback route. So the cap sat at its default of 2 for ever, which from outside is indistinguishable from a constant. CLAUDE.md states the rule this missed: operator operations are one implementation with several front doors. - `PUT /api/groups/{id}/transfer-limits`, calling the same `ops.set_transfer_limits` the signed handler calls; - `meshbay-node transfers per-member [--group X]`; - `transfers show` now separates the node-wide pools from the per-group per-member caps, and marks each `[set]` or `[default]`. It printed "2 per member" with no indication of where the 2 came from, which is half of why this looked like a constant. Zero is refused here as everywhere else: it is not "unlimited", and a member who may not transfer at all is a member the operator revokes. Verified on a live node: the cap changes, survives a daemon restart, and `transfer_probe.py --want 6` measures 4 granted against a cap of 4 where it measured 2 before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST

feat(node): make the transfer caps settable, node-wide and per group

2026-09-08T12:53:03Z

Step 3 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md. Step 2 built the pools with constants; this gives them to the operator, in the two scopes they belong to. **The pools are the machine's.** `[node] max_concurrent_downloads` and `max_concurrent_uploads`, default 8, on the §2.11 pattern: node.toml for a fresh install, a roster.db override for immediate effect, editable from the Node page and from `meshbay-node transfers show|set`, applied live through the one `set_capacity` step 1 fixed. **The per-member cap is a group's.** How many transfers one member may run at once here — on the node like every other group setting (not the hub, which would have authority over someone else's disk; not node.toml, which is hand-written and needs a restart), changed by a signed operator instruction (`OP_TRANSFER_LIMITS`, subject "d=2,u=2" so what is signed names the outcome), broadcast to the group, and read live by the pools. That was the one thing step 2's shape could not express: `per_member` was a single node-wide number. `group_limits` and `member_cap(kind, member)` make it a lookup — the group's own value if it has one, the node's default otherwise — and it is deliberately the only dimension that is not node-wide. Three refusals, each with a test: - **absent means the default (2), never "unlimited".** A group that predates the setting coming back unlimited would leave the node-wide pool as the only control, which is the situation slots exist to end; - **zero is not "unlimited"**, and is not "this member may not transfer" either: the floor is one everywhere, and the CLI says to revoke the member instead; - **an unreadable row reads as unset**, not as zero — the same discipline the sealed messages follow, where a payload that does not open must never become a default state on its own. `handshake_ack` carries this member's own caps for this group, so the interface can say "2 of your 2 slots are busy" instead of drawing a bare spinner. Absent reads as "no limit known" and the hint is not drawn — never as "unlimited", which would have the interface contradicting the node. 1164 node, 793 hub, 0 failed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST

feat(chat): encrypt group chat under per-device epoch keys (MNP 2.0)

2026-09-07T15:50:28Z

Chat messages are sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key derived per group, per epoch, per *device*, and signed over the ciphertext with the device key the node pinned. The node relays and archives; it cannot read a message. There is no switch. MNP goes to 2.0 and MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED moves with it, so a 1.x peer is refused at the handshake with `version_too_old` rather than admitted and then unable to speak. An opt-in flag was designed and rejected: every node is a test node, so it would have bought nothing and left a plaintext branch reachable — C6's lesson one feature later. A test reads the source and refuses any code that consults a `chat_encrypted` setting. Not Sender Keys, and `senderkeys.py` is now documented as unused. With distribution under the group key and a node that serves history to devices which were not present, the node must retain each chain's earliest key, and a chain key at iteration i yields every message key from i on by pure HKDF — forward secrecy is zero either way. What the ratchet was left buying was stateful client code with silent failure modes, three of them reproduced: any member could sign as any other, a second device dropped the first's chain, and the skipped-key cache grew without bound. The reasoning is in docs/chat-sender-keys.md, which is the specification and the decision record. Epochs, not rotation: the epoch key is wrapped under the group key at delivery and never stored under it, so `gek_rotate` is a re-wrap. A group-key-derived archive key would have made every message ever sent unreadable on the first `member unpin`, which is the documented step after removing a member. A new epoch opens on member revoke/unpin, device revoke and `gek_rotate`; old epochs are kept and still delivered, so history stays readable to everyone who could already read it, and nothing anywhere deletes one. Three prerequisites this needed, each a live defect on its own: * The peer registry was keyed by user_id, so one account's second device evicted the first and the broadcast skipped recipients by account — a person's phone never saw what they typed on their laptop. * The handshake authenticated an account, never a device. `device_hello` (additive, signed, refused unless the key is a live device of this account in the node's own roster) is what lets the node refuse a member claiming somebody else's key. * `_admin_exec_file_delete` authorized against the exact uploading key, so device linking had already broken deleting your own file from your other device. It now authorizes against any non-revoked device of `uploader_id`. Found by driving the real panel over the real transport, not by reading source: `chat_keys_resp` was routed by arrival order and handed to an unanswered `media_meta_req` — the original frozen-tab defect in a message type that did not exist when that probe was written. And `_asText` had been deleted with an unrelated helper beside it; its only caller sits inside a promise the panel catches, so every conversation rendered empty with nothing in the console. Existing node data is migrated by QE/migration/migrate_chat_encryption.py (not versioned, per the QE rule), run with the node stopped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr

fix(node): remove --upload-dir rather than document it

2026-09-06T23:17:29Z

Caught in review, and the review was right. The previous commit documented the flag as deprecated so that `--help` and the man page would agree. That solved the wrong problem: the flag contradicts the model this whole refactor exists to establish, and the coherent answer was to delete it. It wrote `upload_dir` into a *brand-new* `[[groups]]` block, and `GroupConfig.__post_init__` reads that key by forcing every other root read-only and appending that path as the one writable one. So `group add --dir X --writable --upload-dir Y` silently made X read-only — two mechanisms deciding which directories accept uploads, one of them invisible, in a group created after the model that replaced it. Gone from the CLI, from `ops.attach_group`, from the loopback API and from the MNP `group_attach` payload, which now carries `writable` instead. The *read* path in `config.py` is deliberately untouched: an existing node.toml using `upload_dir` must keep working, and that is the only legitimate use left. The man page says so under the config key, and no longer lists an option. The test that guarded the deprecation wording now guards its absence — and earned itself immediately by finding a `group add` usage string still offering the flag. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us

chore(node): finish Phase 3 — CLI deprecations, Windows shapes, docs

2026-09-06T22:58:37Z

`member upload` reached the generic usage line for the other `member` verbs — "usage: meshbay-node member upload " — which advertises a removed feature and sends the operator looking for a username it would then reject. It names `root set --writable` now, and the man page carries the same. Three lines between an operator finding the replacement and concluding the CLI is broken. `--upload-dir` still works, so an existing script keeps working, but its help and the man page say it is the old spelling and name what replaced it. The Windows pass (§4.4) is what can be checked from here, made checkable: drive letters and UNC through `as_posix()` into TOML, a drive root having no basename to derive a name from — sharing a whole drive is ordinary there — and a case-insensitive collision, which on NTFS and exFAT is one directory indexed as two roots. `PureWindowsPath` throughout, for the reason the backslash test earlier this branch got wrong. What it cannot check is written down rather than glossed: ReadDirectoryChangesW dropping events, MAX_PATH, and whether an eject actually lets a drive be removed. §7d says so, along with two things the plan never considered — the RO/RW asymmetry in `_do_dir_delete`, and `index_delta` carrying roots but not `dirs`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us

fix(groups): finish Phase 1 — MNP root management, upload targets, eject state

2026-09-06T15:48:36Z

Review of the Phase 1 commit found the RO/RW model sound but three paths unfinished, each of which broke the flow the phase exists to deliver. Plus 29 test failures it introduced and no coverage for anything it added. Uploads went to the wrong directory. The node read a `root` field on file_upload that no client ever sent, so every upload landed in the first writable root while the Files toolbar offered its button based on the root being browsed — with two writable roots, uploading from one wrote into the other. Files now names the root it is showing; Chat names one chosen in the shell (an operator-configured directory arrives in Phase 2); the node refuses an unknown name rather than falling back, and refuses read-only and ejected roots by code. Shared directories were unreachable on the web. The table read its roots only from the loopback API, which resolves to "not available" in a browser, so the section rendered for nobody there — while the Uploads controls it replaced had worked — and the transport.updateRoot/ejectRoot/plugRoot methods beside it were dead. MNP is now the path, loopback the fallback for a local node with no live connection, and adding a root over MNP takes a typed path since no web page can browse a remote disk. Ejecting updated nobody's screen. transport.js resolves an admin ack against the pending request and returns, which is right for every op whose caller knows the value it chose; the root acks carry state only the node can compute, so the operator who clicked Eject was the one client that never saw it happen. And the ejected flag reached roster.db but was never read back, so a restart undid it and the next scan read an empty mount point as an erased library. Also: the member-upload endpoint answered 200 and did nothing (removed); the wizard ignored the first root's RW switch; reload compared roots on name and path, so editing writable in node.toml did nothing; the table had no path column, which is the only thing separating two libraries sharing a basename; apps_enabled normalisation differed between the two sides of a signed subject. Tests: eject/plug, per-root upload refusal and the node.toml rewrite had no coverage at all. test_member_upload_policy.py is replaced by test_root_writable_policy.py — it tested a removed feature — and every property worth keeping from it moved rather than being dropped. Docs: draft-v6 structural decision 9 is annotated as superseded (the operator can no longer have a directory only they may write to — a real capability removed, flagged rather than hidden), the man page documents the root verb and the RO/RW fields, and refactor-groups.md §7b records what the plan got wrong. Suite: 41 failures before, 13 after — all 13 pre-existing on main. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us

test(node): pin the fresh-install-before-provisioning safety property

2026-09-04T15:49:24Z

Two properties discussed but not yet pinned by a test, both load-bearing for service mode: 1. A bare `meshbay-node` with no config yet -- exactly what the W3 Startup .vbs and the service-mode Scheduled Task both run unattended, on the very first boot after a fresh install, quite possibly before the user has ever opened the client -- must fail closed, fast, and without a trace. Measured by hand first (under a second, zero bytes written against a real empty %LOCALAPPDATA%); this pins it as a test so it can't regress silently. load_config() already returns an empty Config on a missing path rather than raising, so main() reaches its own "hub.username not set" exit before ever touching NodeDaemon() or asyncio.run() -- nothing here has to mock the daemon startup. 2. node:start (main.js) must call provisionNode() before it ever checks for the service task or spawns -- reversed, the wizard's first Start on a fresh service-mode install would run/query the daemon before node.toml exists for it to read. Source-read, same technique as test_desktop_shell.py: the only evidence available without a live Electron run. Node suite 845 pass / 25 skip. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5

feat: opt-in Windows service mode (boot-time, one elevation) + v1.0.0

2026-09-04T15:29:24Z

The per-user Startup-folder launcher (W3) only ever runs after this user signs in. A real Windows Service would start earlier, but under LocalSystem/NetworkService -- accounts with no normal profile, so %LOCALAPPDATA%\meshbay\ (config, keystore, data) would not exist for it. Relocating storage to make that work is real surgery, deliberately not done here. Instead: a Scheduled Task, created once with admin rights, that runs AS THIS USER at boot without needing them to sign in first. `schtasks /create ... /ru /rp ""` with no `/it` registers an S4U (Service For User) logon -- no password stored anywhere, and unlike LocalSystem it loads this account's own profile, so config_dir()/ data_dir() need zero changes. The cost: S4U carries no network credential, which the node never needed -- everything it touches is local disk plus outbound internet. Creating the task needs admin (a boot trigger touches system-wide scheduler state, the same reason /sc onlogon needed it); querying/starting/stopping an existing one does not -- Task Scheduler grants the owning user that much itself, which is what lets the Node page's Start/Stop/Restart drive it with no further UAC prompts. meshbay_node/platform.py service_install/_remove/_status/_run/_end -- mirrors autostart_* but for the Scheduled Task; TASK_NAME moved here (was decorative before) meshbay_node/daemon.py new `service install|remove|start|stop|status` verb; restart-daemon and reset now check for the service task too packaging/win/service.ps1 the installer-side equivalent (extraResource); status/run/end never self-elevate -- only install/remove do, exactly matching what Task Scheduler itself requires packaging/win/service-mode.ps1 ONE elevated helper running service.ps1 + firewall.ps1 together, so choosing service mode costs exactly one UAC prompt, not two build/installer.nsh the install-time choice: "run as a background service?" (one elevation, both jobs) vs the existing per-user + separate firewall question. Checked first, unelevated, so re-running setup with everything already configured asks nothing. Uninstall offers the matching one-elevation cleanup, default No. src/main.js winServiceTaskStatus/Run/End, wired into node:installed, node:service-status/-stop/-restart and node:start: when the Scheduled Task exists, drive it; otherwise fall back to the existing per-user spawn/kill path. This is the hard requirement -- Start/Stop/Restart from the Node page must work in either mode. node-page.js / locales a hint explaining why the per-user autostart toggle is absent when service mode is active (info.mode from the backend, no new field to gate on -- it just isn't sent in that case) package.json: 0.1.0 -> 1.0.0. Verified: electron-builder compiles the new NSIS choice logic and ships all three scripts; service.ps1's S4U install fails cleanly (Access denied) when run unelevated, and its status/run/end never touch "runas". Cannot verify the elevated success path myself (no admin in this session) -- that needs a real UAC click. Node suite 843 pass / 25 skip; test_packaging_win.py pins the one-elevation property, the S4U flags, and that main.js actually checks the service task in all three handlers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5

feat: Windows daemon lifecycle (W3) — Startup-folder autostart

2026-09-04T01:58:16Z

The Linux node runs under `systemctl --user`. Windows has no per-user equivalent that works without elevation: `schtasks /create /sc ONLOGON` (even `/rl LIMITED /it`) fails with "Access is denied" for a non-admin user, because a logon trigger touches machine-wide scheduler state. So autostart is a `.vbs` in the per-user Startup folder instead: CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run Chr(34) & "" & Chr(34), 0, False wscript runs it at every sign-in, hidden (0) and non-blocking. No admin, no console window, no new dependency. Verified end to end: the launcher brings the daemon up with no window and it answers its loopback API. node/platform.py autostart_install/remove/status — write / delete / detect the launcher autostart_run/end — start now (DETACHED|NO_WINDOW) / taskkill _node_exe — PATH, then next to sys.executable, then argv[0] node/daemon.py new `autostart install|remove|start|stop|status` verb reload (win32) -> POST /api/reload on the loopback API restart-daemon (win32) -> autostart_end + autostart_run reset (win32) -> also removes the launcher client/main.js, preload.js node:autostart handler + winAutostart* helpers (kept in step with platform.py) node:service-status (win32) probes the daemon; stop/restart/start use taskkill + a detached, windowless spawn Tests: 8 autostart cases in test_platform.py (mocked sys.platform, APPDATA pointed at tmp); `autostart status` added to the CLI dispatch sweep. Full meshbay-node suite green on Windows (784 passed / 34 skipped). Still open: no CTRL_CLOSE_EVENT handler, so a bare taskkill / window close does not run _shutdown() (SetConsoleCtrlHandler, follow-up). Service mode (pywin32/NSSM) stays Phase 2. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5

test(node): make the suite pass on Windows

2026-09-04T00:20:57Z

- `.read_text()` on source files now `encoding="utf-8"` — cp1252 chokes on the em dashes / box-drawing chars those files contain. - test node.toml templates embed paths via `Path.as_posix()`: a raw Windows path in a basic TOML string is a parse error (`\U`, `\a`, ... are escapes). - new `test_platform.py` covers `meshbay_node.platform` by mocking `sys.platform` / `os.environ` — runs on both OSes. - `skipif(sys.platform == "win32")`, in `conftest.needs_subprocess` and inline, for the documented gaps: ffmpeg/ffprobe via asyncio subprocess (the win32 selector loop, forced for aiortc, cannot spawn one), the systemd `reload`/`restart-daemon` delegation (Windows path is W3), the keystore `st_mode == 600` assertion (NTFS ignores mode bits), and the symlink-escape test (needs Developer Mode). Windows: 781 passed, 25 skipped. No change on Linux. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5