meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_daemon.py, branch 0.3

test(node): allocate daemon test ports instead of hardcoding 28000

2026-08-13T23:25:10Z

test_daemon.py started the real admin UI on a fixed port, so every test file that also brought up a node collided with it. Each file passed on its own and the full node suite failed with EADDRINUSE on test_daemon_creates_chat_store — which reads as a flaky regression rather than a test-isolation bug. Confirmed against a clean worktree at HEAD before touching anything: the failure predates the invite work. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

fix: swarm privacy, revocation persistence, keystore KDF, audit integrity

2026-08-13T09:00:39Z

Phase 11.5 hardening batch — H7, H4, M2, M6, M7, L1, L3, L6. H7 — private content hashes leaked to the hub. The daemon registered blake3 hashes for every group it hosted, private ones included, giving the hub a content fingerprint of every private file and letting anyone confirm whether a known file exists in the network. The leak was dormant only because the routes were declared on the groups router with a full path and mounted at /v1/groups/v1/swarm/* — the node's calls 404'd into a swallowed exception. Fixing the path alone would have activated the leak, so both land together: registration is gated on group visibility, the routes moved to a real /v1/swarm router, and the lookup now requires authentication. H4 — revocation was advisory. Group revocations were signed and broadcast by the hub and then dropped by the node, whose handler understood only "user" and "jti", so "suspend a group" enforced nothing. The denylist was also in-memory only, so a restart silently un-revoked everyone. Now persisted to data_dir/denylist.json, group targets honoured on both transports, and live sessions for a revoked group are closed. M2 — the node keystore, which protects the node's Ed25519 and X25519 private keys, was still deriving at 64 MB long after the hub's password verifier moved to 256 MB; the docs recorded the bump as done, true for the hub only. Raising the constant alone would have made every existing keystore permanently undecryptable, so envelopes now record the parameters they were written with and pre-M2 files continue to open under the legacy profile. M6 — registration inserted its audit row with a NULL user_id and then ran UPDATE ip_logs SET user_id= WHERE user_id IS NULL, claiming every unattributed row in the table: failed logins for other usernames, concurrent registrations. In logs retained a year for legal requests, that attributed other people's connections to the wrong account. M7 — X-Forwarded-For was trusted unconditionally at four call sites, so anyone could forge the IP written to the compliance log and evade per-IP rate limits. New netutil.client_ip honours the header only from a trusted proxy and takes the rightmost hop (the one our proxy appended); no direct header reads remain. L1 dead GEK_REQUEST/GEK_RESPONSE constants removed; L3 peer errors no longer echo exception text (paths, internal state); L6 email sanity-checked instead of accepting any string — deliberately not RFC 5322, to avoid a new dependency. test_daemon_index_change_pushes_to_peers asserted that a PRIVATE group's hashes are registered with the hub. Split: private asserts not-called (index push to members still asserted), and a new test proves public groups still register. That is the fourth pre-existing test found asserting a vulnerability as intended behaviour, after gek auto-activation, the transport-wide chat_store and the blind admin challenge. Tests: 116 node, 132 hub+common. Regression suite now 43. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

fix(node): group isolation, upload confinement, GEK seizure, admin challenge

2026-08-13T08:43:16Z

Phase 11.5 — findings H1, C5a, H2, C5b, H5 (see second-review.md). Batched together because the node-side changes share webrtc_server.py and cannot be separated into working commits. H1 — cross-group chat leak. chat_store, the peer registry and the display-name cache were read from the shared transport context, and daemon.py hoisted the FIRST group's chat store onto it. On a node hosting several groups every group's messages went to one database, chat_history served them back to members of every other group, and chat broadcast reached all peers regardless of group. All three now resolve through _group_ctx(). C5a — upload confinement. Uploads landed in the shared root under a client-chosen name and overwrote whatever was there. Any member could destroy the operator's files, and by becoming the recorded uploader of the replaced file could then delete it through the uploader path, bypassing the Ed25519 admin challenge. Uploads now go to a per-user quarantine (.uploads/{user_id}/), refuse to overwrite, and enforce chunk ordering, a filename allowlist and a size cap. H2 — stored XSS in the node admin UI. Filenames chosen by any group member were interpolated raw into the localhost UI, which has no authentication, so script execution there equals control of the node admin API. Now html.escape() throughout, textContent in the audit table, plus CSP/nosniff/no-referrer. The CSP contains exfiltration but cannot stop injected inline script — escaping is the fix. C5b — group key seizure. gek_bundle_store wrote whatever any member sent and auto-activated bundles addressed to the node operator. The operator's X25519 public key is public (the node publishes it in handshake_ack), so any member could wrap a key of their choosing for it and take over the group, locking every legitimate member out. Storing now requires an operator signature and _try_activate_gek is removed: nothing arriving over MNP can set a live GEK. H5 — unbound signing oracle. The node challenged with 32 raw random bytes and the client signed them blind, so a signature named no operation, subject, node or time. New meshbay_common/adminop.py defines a length-prefixed, domain-separated transcript; both sides build it independently and the client refuses to sign when the announced op/subject do not match its request. BREAKING: a group admin who does not operate the node can no longer store GEK bundles on it. Invites must be performed by the node operator. Adds tests/test_security_regressions.py. Verified against pre-fix source via git stash. Three pre-existing tests asserted the vulnerable behaviour as a feature and were inverted: gek auto-activation, and the transport-wide chat_store in test_daemon. Tests: 109 node, 132 hub+common. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

fix(node)!: remove unauthenticated HTTP file API and TCP transport

2026-08-13T02:10:14Z

Phase 11.5.A — findings C1 and C6 (see second-review.md). C1: the per-group HTTP file API bound 0.0.0.0 for every configured group, private ones included, and served two endpoints with no authentication at all: GET /index (full Mesh Group Index) and GET /file/{id} (raw plaintext file via FileResponse). Anyone able to reach the port — LAN, forwarded port, permissive IPv6 — read every private file. This bypassed the entire GEK-proof and node sovereignty layer. Deleted rather than patched: it duplicated MNP without any of its controls. C6: the TCP+TLS chunk server accepted a bare JWT with no GEK proof, leaving a second non-compliant handshake path. Deleted; QUIC remains and will be brought to parity with WebRTC by the unified handshake in 11.5.4. Transport decision recorded in transport/__init__.py: WebRTC/ICE is primary for browser and native clients (the only NAT traversal validated here — 2 ISPs, IPv4 STUN + IPv6, 4G CGNAT); QUIC is kept for LAN, port-forwarded and hub-less group:// access. punch_nat() is a direct-connection helper, not a traversal stack. Also removed server_ssl_context()/client_ssl_context() from tls_cert.py (no remaining callers) and a dead import of the former in quic_server.py. generate_self_signed_cert() stays: QUIC uses it, and the certificate hash is the intended channel-binding anchor for 11.5.6, since QUIC has no DTLS fingerprint to bind the GEK proof to. BREAKING CHANGE: node.toml keys `port` and `http_port` are gone. Regenerate config with `meshbay-node init`. Env var MESHBAY_PORT -> MESHBAY_QUIC_PORT. Tests: 198 passed (209 - 7 test_http_server - 4 test_transport). No other test changed status. Net -1300 lines. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

feat: Phase 12 — P2P crypto material, password split, node Ed25519 auth

2026-08-13T01:56:30Z

Baseline commit capturing in-progress Phase 12 work that was already present in the working tree (uncommitted) before the Phase 11.5 security remediation begins. Committed as-is, without review or modification, so that remediation changes arrive as a separable diff. Contents: BundleStore (P2P GEK + keypair bundles), password split (auth_key / bundle_key), node Ed25519 auth (POST /v1/nodes/auth, node-scoped JWT), GEK-HMAC handshake proof with DTLS channel binding, Ed25519 admin challenge-response, node local admin UI rewrite, browser key persistence. Not authored in this session — captured to establish a baseline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

feat(node): index push to WebRTC peers + swarm registration (11.5, 11.9)

2026-08-11T20:16:59Z

When watchdog detects file changes, the daemon now: - Pushes INDEX_SYNC to all connected WebRTC peers in that group - Registers file hashes with hub /v1/swarm/register endpoint Also registers all file hashes on startup for initial discovery. hub_client: add register_swarm() method for bulk hash registration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat(node): Phase 11 — production-ready daemon with WebRTC, WS, chat, HTTP

2026-08-11T20:11:18Z

The node daemon was previously a skeleton that only started QUIC/TCP servers and the local web UI. All browser-facing functionality (WebRTC, hub WebSocket, chat store, HTTP file API) lived in QE demo scripts. This rewrites daemon.py to be fully self-contained: - WebRTC transport for browser clients (aiortc DataChannel) - Hub WebSocket task (signaling, revocations, WebRTC offers) - ChatStore per group (SQLite in ~/.local/share/meshbay/) - HTTP file API per group (create_http_app on configured port) - Graceful shutdown (all transports, stores, tasks) - hub_client: _ws tracking + send_ws() for chat notifications - config: data_dir field for persistent state - systemd: security hardening (ProtectSystem, StateDirectory) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6