meshbay.git/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_quic_transport.py, branch 0.5

feat(quic): GEK proof and mutual authentication — closes C6

2026-08-13T10:24:54Z

Phase 11.5.4/5/6 — finding C6, the last open critical finding. QUIC ran a JWT-only handshake: a forged or stolen token reached the node and could inject chat without ever holding the group key. It now runs the same challenge/response as WebRTC through meshbay_common.handshake — client nonce, role-bound length-prefixed transcript, GEK proof, and the node proving itself with a GEK proof plus an Ed25519 signature over the transcript (C3). 11.5.6 channel binding, resolved by spike and then by two findings the spike could not predict: * aioquic 1.3.0 exposes no RFC 5705 exporter, and the peer certificate only via a private attribute. The server reads its own certificate from disk, so no internals are touched on that side; the client's access is guarded and fails loudly if an upgrade moves it. * A RESUMED TLS session carries no certificate — aioquic does not re-send it, so there is nothing live to bind to. The anchor therefore travels with the session ticket, which is sound because the ticket is cryptographically derived from the handshake where that certificate was presented. * The anchor had to travel with the ticket rather than live on the client object: resumption constructs a fresh client, so an instance-level cache was silently useless. Caught by the resumption test, not by inspection. Both paths refuse rather than degrade. No certificate and no cached anchor means the handshake fails; it never falls back to an unbound proof, which would silently drop MitM detection (L4). QuicChunkClient gains a peer_cert_der property and constructor argument, mirroring how session_ticket is already carried by the caller. Tests: 9 quic/multi-group, full node+common suite green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

refactor(quic): share the unified handshake authorization

2026-08-13T09:56:04Z

Phase 11.5.4 — QUIC half. Findings M1, M9 on this transport. quic_server._do_handshake_sync was a second, weaker copy of the WebRTC logic: group_id was optional, so omitting it skipped the membership check entirely and fell back to the node's first group (M1); node-scoped daemon tokens were accepted as client tokens (M9); and the checks could drift from the WebRTC path independently, which is how they diverged in the first place. Authorization now comes from meshbay_common.handshake, shared with WebRTC. C6 IS STILL OPEN ON THIS TRANSPORT. There is no GEK proof here yet: a forged or stolen token still reaches the node over QUIC and can inject chat without holding the group key. What remains is the challenge/response and the mutual node proof — quic_binding() is written and unit-tested for exactly this, and 11.5.6 (whether a certificate hash is the right anchor, or an RFC 5705 exporter is reachable from aioquic) is still unproven. This commit narrows the gap to the proof itself; it does not close the finding. QUIC tests updated: default tokens are members of the test group, and clients pass group_id, since it is mandatory now. Tests: 9 quic/multi-group, full node+common suite green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5

feat: Phase 7 — Node v2 (multi-group, Sender Keys, 0-RTT, chat, denylist)

2026-08-10T01:07:56Z

Implements all 8 milestones (7.0-7.7): - 7.0: JWT carries `groups` claim; node verifies group membership at MNP handshake (QUIC + TCP+TLS). Resolves security review C2. - 7.1: QUIC 0-RTT session resumption via stored session tickets (17-21ms reconnect vs 47ms cold). - 7.2: Hub→node WebSocket signaling for NAT punch coordination (`client_incoming`/`punch_ready`) + jti denylist push. Denylist class blocks revoked users/jtis at handshake. - 7.3: Multi-group daemon — one QUIC port serves N groups with per-group GEK, shared_root, and index routing. - 7.4: HLS streaming via QUIC (STREAM_SEGMENT message type, ffmpeg segment extraction). - 7.5: Sender Keys protocol for group chat (Signal Groups approach). Each member has own sending chain key, HKDF chain ratchet, AES-256-GCM encryption, Ed25519 signing. Resolves security review C1. - 7.6: Chat store (SQLite via aiosqlite), CHAT_MESSAGE MNP wire type with peer broadcast, web UI with WebSocket push. - 7.7: Argon2id calibration CLI. First security review included (first-review.md). 109 tests, demo-v3 validated against meshbay.org production hub. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6

feat(node): add QUIC transport (MNP v2) — quic_server + quic_client

2026-08-09T03:13:51Z

QuicChunkServer/QuicChunkClient: same MNP protocol over QUIC/UDP. Enables hole-punching (Spike 4 Cone NAT validated). Uses aioquic 1.3.0. Bug found+fixed: asyncio.Event race condition in client recv loop (quic_event_received overwrote _stream_events[0] after _recv created it). Fixed with asyncio.Queue (no shared mutable state). Server uses synchronous handlers in quic_event_received (avoids ensure_future transmit timing issue). 3/3 tests. Full suite: 50/50. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context)