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| author | Christophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com> | 2026-08-13 14:30:51 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Christophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com> | 2026-08-13 14:30:51 +0200 |
| commit | 8c5227365118383540a5e77b1885aef7e62bf6ec (patch) | |
| tree | c288158f6f7cf36de8e4fa185c060402bca65ec4 /docs | |
| parent | 146a6759fa73386e9b59570956aeedd7e1cfd978 (diff) | |
| download | meshbay-8c5227365118383540a5e77b1885aef7e62bf6ec.tar.gz | |
fix(hub): require proof of possession on node announce — closes M8
Phase 11.5.10.
POST /v1/nodes/announce accepted any pk_node with no proof the announcer held
the matching private key, so a user could register a node record carrying
someone else's node key, and records accumulated without limit.
The announcer now signs a domain-separated message binding the key to their
account — meshbay:node_announce:{user_id}:{pk_node}:{timestamp} — reusing the
shape already proven by /v1/nodes/auth, so a signature for one can never
satisfy the other. Same 60-second window.
Re-announcing the same key now updates the existing record in place instead of
creating a new row.
Three test helpers had to be taught to sign, which is the useful part: nothing
in the suite had ever exercised announce with an attacker's key. The new tests
cover the missing proof, a foreign key, a stale timestamp, and idempotence.
Note for the record: the node key is independent of the user's identity key.
Two hub tests asserted the announced pk_node equalled the user's pk_ed, which
happened to be true only because the daemon announces its keystore key. They
now assert against the announced key itself.
Tests: 157 hub+common, node suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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