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| author | Christophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com> | 2026-08-09 22:56:18 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Christophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com> | 2026-08-09 22:56:18 +0200 |
| commit | 217b61ff34390fd24d0a2ad338f6094183debbe3 (patch) | |
| tree | d0e51d3138dfe4df6581c3e69b1c3536267ee2e5 /docs | |
| parent | 82ce18ef9f45f817505b12e24c958beda45465f0 (diff) | |
| download | meshbay-217b61ff34390fd24d0a2ad338f6094183debbe3.tar.gz | |
fix: 4 corrections — streaming hash, watchdog bug, cipher doc, deps
1. indexer.py: streaming blake3 (8MB chunks) instead of read_bytes().
Large files (initrd.img, ISOs, VM images) no longer load into RAM.
2. QE/demo-v1/run_node.py: call indexer.start() not initial_scan().
initial_scan() alone never starts the watchdog observer — files added
after startup were silently ignored. Added indexer.stop() on shutdown.
3. USERGUIDE.md §8: clarify symmetric vs asymmetric.
Ed25519/X25519 = asymmetric (key pairs). ChaCha20-Poly1305 and
AES-256-GCM = symmetric AEAD 256-bit (content encryption).
ChaCha20 is PRIMARY; AES-GCM is optional browser-compat variant only.
4. pyproject.toml: aioquic, websockets, aiosqlite, slowapi added to
proper package deps (were installed manually, now declared).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'docs')
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/USERGUIDE.md | 13 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/docs/USERGUIDE.md b/docs/USERGUIDE.md index af03a60..ccbf112 100644 --- a/docs/USERGUIDE.md +++ b/docs/USERGUIDE.md @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ player.load(); - Fetching the M3U8 playlist - Requesting encrypted chunks on demand - Deriving per-chunk keys from the GEK -- Decrypting with WebCrypto (ChaCha20-Poly1305) +- Decrypting with WebCrypto (AES-256-GCM — see §8 for cipher choice) - Feeding plaintext segments to MSE ### Seeking @@ -550,6 +550,17 @@ The node can serve HLS for any container it can segment at 1 MB boundaries: MP4, Understanding what the hub knows — and does not know — is essential for evaluating MeshBay's threat model. +### Cipher choices — symmetric, not asymmetric + +Clarification terminology : Ed25519 et X25519 sont des algorithmes **asymétriques** (paire clé publique/privée). Ils servent à la signature et à l'échange de clés. Les ciphers de chiffrement de contenu sont eux **symétriques** (une seule clé partagée, la GEK) : + +| Cipher | Usage | Où | +|---|---|---| +| **ChaCha20-Poly1305** | Chiffrement contenu (MNP) | Node → client natif (Python, Android) | +| **AES-256-GCM** | Chiffrement contenu (navigateur) | Variante pour les groupes accessibles depuis un browser (WebCrypto ne supporte pas ChaCha20) | + +Les deux sont des AEAD 256 bits avec authentification intégrée. ChaCha20 est le cipher **principal** — AES-GCM est une variante optionnelle pour la compat navigateur, pas un remplacement. Un groupe ne peut pas mélanger les deux : un groupe "browser-accessible" utilise AES-GCM pour tous ses membres. + ### What the hub stores | Data | Stored as | |