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authorChristophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com>2026-08-18 09:42:34 +0200
committerChristophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com>2026-08-18 09:42:34 +0200
commit30e855f55f1d920b25da0bdd8e538c249d3c0c26 (patch)
tree587dcad0beb8a120352613be8aa751a97040015c /packages/meshbay-client/src/preload.js
parent768e07046368819b8a8f15c8b21e5a8bbfcdf282 (diff)
downloadmeshbay-30e855f55f1d920b25da0bdd8e538c249d3c0c26.tar.gz
feat(client): the platform seam, and an Electron shell that has never been run
Stage D, and the honest half of it. D1 — the seam (done, and verified) ---------------------------------- `static/platform.js`. `HUB` becomes `platform.hubBase()` and the transport is built with the same base, so one address has one source. In a browser it returns '' and every path stays relative to the origin that served the page — the acceptance criterion for this split was "the browser SPA behaves identically", and it does. `platform.js` joins `_ASSETS`, or a change to it would not move the content hash and a cached browser would never ask for it. D2 — the shell (written, never launched) ----------------------------------------- **There is no npm on this machine. Electron was never installed and `packages/meshbay-client/` has not been run once.** That is stated here rather than discovered later. What is there: a main process serving the packaged interface over a privileged `app://` scheme (`secure` and `standard` are not cosmetic — without them the service worker refuses to register and streamed downloads break silently), a preload exposing an enumerated bridge that never passes a filesystem path, a window with `sandbox`, `contextIsolation` and no node integration, navigation away from the package refused, and a CSP where the hub is reachable over connect-src and is not a script source. The hub address arrives as a process argument because `platform.hubBase()` runs before anything can await. `test_desktop_shell.py` pins each of those by reading the source — the treatment `test_downloads.py` already gives the three browser save paths. It catches a property being removed and proves nothing about the application running. Two were checked by breaking them. The interface is *copied* into the package by `build/sync-ui.js` from the hub's static directory, and `ui/` is gitignored: a silent fork is the only real way to end up maintaining the interface twice. D3 — partial ------------ The bridge, and the part worth having now: safeStorage's backend is reported rather than assumed. On Linux it falls back to a fixed key when no keyring is running, silently — someone who believes the OS is holding their keys is told when it is not. The native key lifecycle belongs with D4 and needs a running application to mean anything. D8 — partial, and a real defect found -------------------------------------- `meshbay-node.spec` installed the SYSTEM template — the one carrying `User=%i` — into `%{_userunitdir}`. A user unit already runs as its owner and cannot carry `User=`; systemd refuses the file, so the packaged unit could never have started. Nothing noticed because nobody had built and installed the RPM. Two units now: the template to `%{_unitdir}`, and a new `meshbay-node-user.service` that a person enables themselves without a password — which is what lets the desktop client install a node without asking for one. It carries ExecReload, so `meshbay-node reload` does not have to stop a service somebody is streaming from, and documents the drop-in for a drive outside the home, RequiresMountsFor included. 798 tests pass; e2e.py still passes end to end. Nothing here was built or launched: no npm, no rpmbuild. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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+/**
+ * The bridge, and the whole of it.
+ *
+ * `contextIsolation` puts this in its own world, so what is exposed here is all
+ * the page can reach — page script cannot read the closure, cannot replace
+ * these functions for other code, and cannot call an IPC channel that is not
+ * named below. That is what makes the enumeration meaningful rather than
+ * decorative.
+ *
+ * The rule for anything added here: **the renderer never names a path, a file
+ * handle or a process.** It asks for a dialog and receives an opaque id. The
+ * renderer parses decrypted content from nodes — video, images, filenames —
+ * which is attacker-controlled input, so it is treated as hostile even though
+ * it is our own code.
+ */
+
+'use strict';
+
+const { contextBridge, ipcRenderer } = require('electron');
+
+const HUB_BASE = (process.argv.find(a => a.startsWith('--meshbay-hub=')) || '')
+ .slice('--meshbay-hub='.length);
+
+contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('meshbay', {
+ // Where the hub is. The interface prefixes every API path with this; in a
+ // browser the same function returns '' and relative paths go to the origin
+ // that served the page.
+ //
+ // Read from a process argument, not over IPC: the interface asks for this
+ // while its modules are still loading, before anything can await, and
+ // synchronous IPC would block the renderer for a value that cannot change
+ // within a run.
+ hubBase: () => HUB_BASE,
+ setHubBase: (base) => ipcRenderer.invoke('hub:set', base),
+
+ // What this build can do that a browser cannot. The interface renders
+ // features gated on these nowhere at all in a browser, rather than offering
+ // something that fails when clicked.
+ capabilities: {
+ nodeAdmin: true,
+ localFolders: true,
+ nativeSave: true,
+ },
+
+ secrets: {
+ get: (name) => ipcRenderer.invoke('secrets:get', name),
+ set: (name, value) => ipcRenderer.invoke('secrets:set', name, value),
+ clear: (name) => ipcRenderer.invoke('secrets:clear', name),
+ // 'unprotected_fallback' means safeStorage found no keyring and is using a
+ // fixed key. Encrypted on disk, by a key that is not a secret — the
+ // interface says so rather than letting someone believe otherwise.
+ backend: () => ipcRenderer.invoke('secrets:backend'),
+ },
+
+ // A save dialog and a write that never passes back through the page. The
+ // renderer holds an id, not a path.
+ saveFile: async (suggestedName) => {
+ const handle = await ipcRenderer.invoke('save:begin', suggestedName);
+ if (!handle) return null;
+ return {
+ name: handle.name,
+ write: (chunk) => ipcRenderer.invoke('save:write', handle.id, chunk),
+ close: () => ipcRenderer.invoke('save:end', handle.id),
+ };
+ },
+});