merge: Phase 11.5 security remediation, invite redesign, per-node identity

Brings in the security remediation branch. Three bodies of work, and what they
changed about what this project may claim.

Phase 11.5 closed the gap between the documents and the code: the unauthenticated
node HTTP API and the TCP transport deleted, one handshake shared by the
remaining two transports, mutual authentication, structured admin transcripts,
upload confinement, group isolation, revocation that reaches nodes. Six critical
and seven high findings closed, bounded, or deferred by decision.

The invite redesign closed H3 and M3 — the last open High. The hub was the key
directory: an inviter fetched the invitee's key from it and wrapped the group key
for whatever came back, so a hub answering with its own key was handed the group
key by an honest member following the protocol exactly. That lookup is gone. The
node holds the group key and wraps it itself, for a key its recipient proves
possession of, bound to an account by a one-time code the hub never sees. M3 fell
out of the same work: node authority comes from a local roster, never from the
hub.

Per-node identity cut what remains of C4 down to one operator. A single keypair
used to be copied to every node its owner joined; each node now gets its own, so
cracking the bundle on one machine yields a key that is a stranger everywhere
else — and on that machine, one that unlocks nothing its holder did not already
serve. The bundle KDF moved to Argon2id 128 MB, and the hub stopped storing or
publishing user keys at all.

What this project may now say: the hub cannot read your content unless it ships
you malicious client code. T3 remains, accepted (D1), and is what the native
client removes. C4 is reduced, not closed, until 13.3. Chat is still plaintext at
rest until Phase 15. Draft-v5 §2 states each claim against the adversary it holds
against, which is the convention this branch exists to keep.

Four defects were found by deploying it and using a browser, none by the test
suite: a node going deaf on its hub socket, a token that predated group
membership, a client reading values before they were assigned, and identity keys
a browser held but never re-read. The lessons are recorded in CLAUDE.md.

Tests: 343 across the three packages, plus QE/deploy/e2e.py — register, pair,
invite, join, download, stream, second browser, revoke — run against the live
deployment on a wiped hub and node.

1 files changed, 236 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/packages/meshbay-common/tests/test_js_python_parity.py b/packages/meshbay-common/tests/test_js_python_parity.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..340ea3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/packages/meshbay-common/tests/test_js_python_parity.py
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+"""
+Cross-language parity: the browser's transcripts must be byte-identical to Python's.
+
+The handshake proof and the admin signature are computed independently on both sides
+and compared by producing the same bytes. Nothing on the wire carries the transcript,
+which is the point — but it also means a one-byte disagreement between `crypto.js` and
+`meshbay_common` is invisible to every other test and produces a total outage: no
+browser can complete a handshake with any node.
+
+The rest of the suite runs in Python only, so nothing else crosses this boundary. These
+tests drive the real `crypto.js` under node and compare against the real Python.
+
+Skipped when node is unavailable; that is a coverage gap, not a pass.
+"""
+
+import json
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from meshbay_common.adminop import admin_transcript
+from meshbay_common.handshake import handshake_transcript, webrtc_binding
+from meshbay_common.join import join_transcript
+
+CRYPTO_JS = (Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+             / "meshbay-hub" / "src" / "meshbay_hub" / "static" / "crypto.js")
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(
+    shutil.which("node") is None or not CRYPTO_JS.exists(),
+    reason="node or crypto.js unavailable — parity cannot be checked",
+)
+
+# (role, group_id, nonce_c hex, nonce_s hex, offer_fp hex, answer_fp hex)
+HANDSHAKE_VECTORS = [
+    ("client", "g" * 32, "01" * 32, "02" * 32, "aa" * 32, "bb" * 32),
+    ("node",   "g" * 32, "01" * 32, "02" * 32, "aa" * 32, "bb" * 32),
+    # Short and empty group ids — length prefixing must keep these distinct.
+    ("client", "g",  "03" * 32, "04" * 32, "cc" * 32, "dd" * 32),
+    ("client", "",   "03" * 32, "04" * 32, "cc" * 32, "dd" * 32),
+    # Non-ASCII: JS TextEncoder and Python .encode() must agree on UTF-8.
+    ("client", "groupe-café-日本", "05" * 32, "06" * 32, "ee" * 32, "ff" * 32),
+    # Fields that could run together under naive concatenation.
+    ("client", "gg", "07" * 32, "08" * 32, "11" * 32, "22" * 32),
+]
+
+# (op, node_pk_b64, group_id, subject, nonce hex, ts)
+ADMIN_VECTORS = [
+    ("file_delete", "Tk9ERVBL", "g" * 32, "file-1", "01" * 32, 1_700_000_000),
+    ("gek_bundle_store", "Tk9ERVBL", "g" * 32, "user-2", "02" * 32, 1_700_000_001),
+    ("file_delete", "Tk9ERVBL", "", "", "03" * 32, 0),
+    ("file_delete", "Tk9ERVBL", "café", "fichier é.mp4", "04" * 32, 1_700_000_002),
+]
+
+# (node_pk_b64, group_id, user_id, pk_ed b64, pk_x b64, nonce hex, ts)
+JOIN_VECTORS = [
+    # Operator pairing: group_id is empty and must stay distinguishable from a
+    # request that names a group.
+    ("Tk9ERVBL", "", "grenet", "QUFB", "QkJC", "01" * 32, 1_700_000_000),
+    ("Tk9ERVBL", "g" * 32, "grenet", "QUFB", "QkJC", "01" * 32, 1_700_000_000),
+    # Identical to the previous vector except that the two keys are swapped —
+    # they are adjacent fields, so this isolates the ordering.
+    ("Tk9ERVBL", "g" * 32, "grenet", "QkJC", "QUFB", "01" * 32, 1_700_000_000),
+    ("Tk9ERVBL", "café", "utilisateur-é", "QUFB", "QkJC", "03" * 32, 0),
+]
+
+_HARNESS = r"""
+const fs = require('fs');
+
+// crypto.js ends with `window.MeshBayCrypto = {...}` and references SubtleCrypto in
+// functions we do not call. A stub is enough to evaluate the module body.
+globalThis.window = {};
+globalThis.crypto = globalThis.crypto || {};
+
+const src = fs.readFileSync(process.argv[2], 'utf8');
+const load = new Function(
+  src + '\nreturn { handshakeTranscript, adminTranscript, joinTranscript, '
+      + 'webrtcBinding, b64encode };');
+const M = load();
+
+const hex = (s) => {
+  const out = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2);
+  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += 2) out[i / 2] = parseInt(s.substr(i, 2), 16);
+  return out;
+};
+const toHex = (u8) =>
+  Array.from(u8).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+
+const input = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(process.argv[3], 'utf8'));
+const out = { handshake: [], admin: [], join: [] };
+
+for (const v of input.handshake) {
+  const binding = M.webrtcBinding(hex(v.offer_fp), hex(v.answer_fp));
+  out.handshake.push(toHex(M.handshakeTranscript(
+    v.role, v.group_id, hex(v.nonce_c), hex(v.nonce_s), binding)));
+}
+
+for (const v of input.admin) {
+  out.admin.push(toHex(M.adminTranscript(
+    v.op, v.node_pk, v.group_id, v.subject, M.b64encode(hex(v.nonce)), v.ts)));
+}
+
+for (const v of input.join) {
+  out.join.push(toHex(M.joinTranscript(
+    v.node_pk, v.group_id, v.user_id, v.pk_ed, v.pk_x, hex(v.nonce), v.ts)));
+}
+
+process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(out));
+"""
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
+def js_output(tmp_path_factory):
+    """Run the real crypto.js under node and return its transcripts as hex."""
+    d = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("parity")
+    harness = d / "harness.js"
+    harness.write_text(_HARNESS)
+
+    payload = d / "vectors.json"
+    payload.write_text(json.dumps({
+        "handshake": [
+            {"role": r, "group_id": g, "nonce_c": nc,
+             "nonce_s": ns, "offer_fp": ofp, "answer_fp": afp}
+            for r, g, nc, ns, ofp, afp in HANDSHAKE_VECTORS
+        ],
+        "admin": [
+            {"op": op, "node_pk": pk, "group_id": g,
+             "subject": s, "nonce": n, "ts": ts}
+            for op, pk, g, s, n, ts in ADMIN_VECTORS
+        ],
+        "join": [
+            {"node_pk": pk, "group_id": g, "user_id": u,
+             "pk_ed": pe, "pk_x": px, "nonce": n, "ts": ts}
+            for pk, g, u, pe, px, n, ts in JOIN_VECTORS
+        ],
+    }))
+
+    proc = subprocess.run(
+        ["node", str(harness), str(CRYPTO_JS), str(payload)],
+        capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60,
+    )
+    if proc.returncode != 0:
+        pytest.fail(f"node harness failed:\n{proc.stderr}")
+    return json.loads(proc.stdout)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("idx,vector", list(enumerate(HANDSHAKE_VECTORS)))
+def test_handshake_transcript_parity(idx, vector, js_output):
+    """
+    A mismatch here means no browser can complete a handshake with any node —
+    the GEK proof would never verify, and no other test would notice.
+    """
+    role, group_id, nonce_c, nonce_s, offer_fp, answer_fp = vector
+
+    expected = handshake_transcript(
+        role=role,
+        group_id=group_id,
+        nonce_client=bytes.fromhex(nonce_c),
+        nonce_node=bytes.fromhex(nonce_s),
+        binding=webrtc_binding(bytes.fromhex(offer_fp), bytes.fromhex(answer_fp)),
+    )
+    assert js_output["handshake"][idx] == expected.hex(), (
+        f"crypto.js and meshbay_common.handshake disagree for role={role!r} "
+        f"group={group_id!r}"
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("idx,vector", list(enumerate(ADMIN_VECTORS)))
+def test_admin_transcript_parity(idx, vector, js_output):
+    """
+    A mismatch here means the browser signs bytes the node did not ask for, so every
+    file deletion and GEK bundle store is rejected.
+    """
+    op, node_pk, group_id, subject, nonce, ts = vector
+
+    expected = admin_transcript(
+        op=op,
+        node_pk_b64=node_pk,
+        group_id=group_id,
+        subject=subject,
+        nonce=bytes.fromhex(nonce),
+        ts=ts,
+    )
+    assert js_output["admin"][idx] == expected.hex(), (
+        f"crypto.js and meshbay_common.adminop disagree for op={op!r} "
+        f"subject={subject!r}"
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("idx,vector", list(enumerate(JOIN_VECTORS)))
+def test_join_transcript_parity(idx, vector, js_output):
+    """
+    A mismatch here means no browser can pair with a node and no member can be
+    recognised — the node would reject every signature as invalid, and, as with
+    the other two, nothing else in the suite crosses this boundary.
+    """
+    node_pk, group_id, user_id, pk_ed, pk_x, nonce, ts = vector
+
+    expected = join_transcript(
+        node_pk_b64=node_pk,
+        group_id=group_id,
+        user_id=user_id,
+        pk_ed25519_b64=pk_ed,
+        pk_x25519_b64=pk_x,
+        nonce_node=bytes.fromhex(nonce),
+        ts=ts,
+    )
+    assert js_output["join"][idx] == expected.hex(), (
+        f"crypto.js and meshbay_common.join disagree for user={user_id!r} "
+        f"group={group_id!r}"
+    )
+
+
+def test_join_transcript_binds_the_two_keys_in_order(js_output):
+    """
+    The X25519 key is trusted only because the Ed25519 identity signed it, so the
+    two must not be interchangeable: swapping them has to produce different bytes.
+    """
+    assert js_output["join"][1] != js_output["join"][2]
+
+
+def test_operator_pairing_is_distinguishable_from_a_group_join(js_output):
+    """An empty group_id (node-wide operator authority) must not collide."""
+    assert js_output["join"][0] != js_output["join"][1]
+
+
+def test_length_prefixing_actually_disambiguates(js_output):
+    """
+    The reason both sides length-prefix: two different field splits must not collide.
+    Verified across the language boundary, since a JS implementation that concatenated
+    naively would still agree with itself.
+    """
+    a = js_output["handshake"][2]   # group_id "g"
+    b = js_output["handshake"][3]   # group_id ""
+    assert a != b, "JS transcripts collide across different group ids"