fix(hub): require proof of possession on node announce — closes M8

Phase 11.5.10.

POST /v1/nodes/announce accepted any pk_node with no proof the announcer held
the matching private key, so a user could register a node record carrying
someone else's node key, and records accumulated without limit.

The announcer now signs a domain-separated message binding the key to their
account — meshbay:node_announce:{user_id}:{pk_node}:{timestamp} — reusing the
shape already proven by /v1/nodes/auth, so a signature for one can never
satisfy the other. Same 60-second window.

Re-announcing the same key now updates the existing record in place instead of
creating a new row.

Three test helpers had to be taught to sign, which is the useful part: nothing
in the suite had ever exercised announce with an attacker's key. The new tests
cover the missing proof, a foreign key, a stale timestamp, and idempotence.

Note for the record: the node key is independent of the user's identity key.
Two hub tests asserted the announced pk_node equalled the user's pk_ed, which
happened to be true only because the daemon announces its keystore key. They
now assert against the announced key itself.

Tests: 157 hub+common, node suite green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

1 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport.js b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport.js
index 18faea1..50304f3 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport.js
+++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport.js
@@ -232,6 +232,11 @@ class MeshBayTransport {
           || !await C.verifyNodeSignature(ack.node_pk, ack.sig, transcript)) {
         throw new Error('Node signature invalid — refusing connection');
       }
+      // Trust On First Use (11.5.8). With C6 closed, a substituted node already
+      // fails the GEK proof — this covers the case where an attacker HAS the GEK
+      // (an ex-member, or a leaked key) and swaps the node underneath.
+      // Strict refusal: a warning users can click through is decorative.
+      _checkNodePin(nodeId, ack.node_pk);
       this.nodePk = ack.node_pk;
 
       return ack;
@@ -692,5 +697,48 @@ function _extractDtlsFingerprint(sdp) {
   return bytes;
 }
 
+// ── Node identity pinning (11.5.8) ───────────────────────────────────────────
+
+const NODE_PIN_PREFIX = 'mb_nodepin_';
+
+function _checkNodePin(nodeId, nodePk) {
+  if (!nodeId || !nodePk) return;
+  const key = NODE_PIN_PREFIX + nodeId;
+
+  let pinned = null;
+  try { pinned = localStorage.getItem(key); } catch { return; }
+
+  if (pinned === null) {
+    try { localStorage.setItem(key, nodePk); } catch {}
+    return;
+  }
+  if (pinned !== nodePk) {
+    throw new Error(
+      'This node\'s identity key has changed. That is expected only if its ' +
+      'operator reinstalled the node — otherwise someone may be impersonating ' +
+      'it. Verify with the operator out of band, then clear the pin in ' +
+      'Settings to accept the new key.');
+  }
+}
+
+/** Forget a pinned node identity — the deliberate escape hatch for a legitimate rotation. */
+function clearNodePin(nodeId) {
+  try {
+    if (nodeId) localStorage.removeItem(NODE_PIN_PREFIX + nodeId);
+    else {
+      for (const k of Object.keys(localStorage))
+        if (k.startsWith(NODE_PIN_PREFIX)) localStorage.removeItem(k);
+    }
+  } catch {}
+}
+
+function pinnedNodeCount() {
+  try {
+    return Object.keys(localStorage).filter(k => k.startsWith(NODE_PIN_PREFIX)).length;
+  } catch { return 0; }
+}
+
 // Export
+MeshBayTransport.clearNodePin = clearNodePin;
+MeshBayTransport.pinnedNodeCount = pinnedNodeCount;
 window.MeshBayTransport = MeshBayTransport;