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Diffstat (limited to 'docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md')
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md | 17 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md b/docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md index 16e728f..8da4552 100644 --- a/docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md +++ b/docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md @@ -2499,6 +2499,16 @@ the wrong thing** — a per-IP rate limit bounds a caller, never the mailbox tha receives what they cause, which is why `AV10` is a cooldown per *account* under a limit per IP rather than a tighter limit. +**Open for decision, not a defect:** `moderation.AUTO_BLOCK_THRESHOLD` is 3. +Three distinct accounts blocking a hash adds it to the list every node +enforces, network-wide, automatically, with manual admin removal the only +undo. That is already far better than the anonymous version it replaced, and +it is still a censorship primitive an attacker buys for the price of three +email addresses. Raising it buys little; requiring the reporting accounts to +be more than a day old would cost a patient attacker a day and cost an honest +reporter nothing after their first. Left as it is because it is a moderation +policy rather than a bug, and the person who sets that policy is the operator. + `admin.py` was read under this lens and needed nothing. Its moderator/admin line is drawn explicitly — a moderator may not change a role, may not revoke, and may not touch an admin's account at all — self-modification is refused, and @@ -2516,9 +2526,12 @@ had already been asked. | **AV7** | **A node bounds how many peers it holds and how long an unproven one lasts.** The hub's cap is per calling account, which is a limit on each member and not on the machine, so without this an operator's exposure grew with the size of their groups | | **AV8** | **One account cannot make the hub mail another at will.** The invitation email's subject comes from the group row, never from the request, and the endpoint is metered | | **AV9** | **No mail is sent from the event loop.** `smtplib` is synchronous and waits up to ten seconds; called from an async handler that wait is the whole instance's, not one request's. Every send goes through `mail.send_off_loop` | -| **AV10** | **Every path that makes the hub send mail is metered, per account.** A rate limit that counts by IP bounds a caller, not an inbox. Changing one's address mails an arbitrary stranger, so it carries a cooldown as well as a limit; so does a reset request | +| **AV10** | **Every path that makes the hub send mail is metered, per account.** A rate limit that counts by IP bounds a caller, not an inbox. Changing one's address mails an arbitrary stranger, so it carries a cooldown *and* a daily ceiling; a reset request and a registration resend carry cooldowns | +| **AV13** | **The mail server is not a relay, and `mail.py` is where that is decided.** Every message passes one function; `purpose` is keyword-required and checked against a closed list, so a helper that names anything else does not send and one that names nothing is a TypeError. Under it sit a bound per **recipient** — the thing a person being mail-bombed actually experiences, unmoved by which account, address or endpoint asks — and an instance-wide hourly ceiling, because registration is open and "per account" is a bound an attacker buys more of | | **AV11** | **A namespace a client writes into is closed, and its rows are capped.** The preference key space is an allow-list plus `default_tab:<group_id>` checked as a group id, the value is length-bounded, and the row count per account is bounded | -| **AV12** | **Every list has an upper bound on `limit` and a floor under `offset`.** Including the ones that take no authentication at all | +| **AV12** | **Every list has an upper bound on `limit` and a floor under `offset`.** Including the ones that take no authentication at all — the public group directory and the content blocklist | +| **AV14** | **MHP binds its audience, and the hub reads its own identity at call time.** A token is minted for one peer and accepted by that peer only. `federation.py` bound `_hub_id` and `_hub_sk_pem` at import, which is before `load_hub_keypair` runs, so it signed with `None` and called itself `meshbay.org` whatever the instance was named — and the verifier named no audience for the `aud` the issuer sets, which PyJWT refuses outright. MHP could not complete one authenticated request between two hubs | +| **AV15** | **A hash is checked for shape before it is a key lookup**, on the unauthenticated blocklist endpoints a node consults | ### 13.6 Chat design findings |