1 files changed, 1 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md b/docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md
index 3f767d9..f1055a7 100644
--- a/docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md
+++ b/docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md
@@ -2859,7 +2859,7 @@ had already been asked.
 | **AV6** | **A relay proves possession of its approved key.** A public key is not a password, and the register call is unauthenticated by design — it is not a user — so the proof is the only thing standing between a stranger and where nodes send relayed traffic |
 | **AV7** | **A node bounds how many peers it holds and how long an unproven one lasts.** The hub's cap is per calling account, which is a limit on each member and not on the machine, so without this an operator's exposure grew with the size of their groups |
 | **AV8** | **One account cannot make the hub mail another at will.** The invitation email's subject comes from the group row, never from the request, and the endpoint is metered |
-| **AV9** | **No mail is sent from the event loop.** `smtplib` is synchronous and waits up to ten seconds; called from an async handler that wait is the whole instance's, not one request's. Every send goes through `mail.send_off_loop`. **Argon2 is held to the same rule**: every derivation runs on one dedicated worker thread (`auth.*_off_loop`), never on the loop and never two at a time, because two concurrent `lanes=4` derivations deadlock in OpenSSL |
+| **AV9** | **No mail is sent from the event loop.** `smtplib` is synchronous and waits up to ten seconds; called from an async handler that wait is the whole instance's, not one request's. Every send goes through `mail.send_off_loop`. **Argon2 is held to the same rule**: every derivation runs on one dedicated worker thread (`auth.*_off_loop`), never on the loop and never two at a time, because two concurrent `lanes=4` derivations deadlock in OpenSSL. **So is the node's disk**: every filesystem call on a group's content — the stat as much as the read, since a stat is what wakes a sleeping disk — goes through `roots.off_disk`, onto one worker thread per root set. A spun-down or network-mounted root answers its first syscall in seconds, and on the loop that is every group, every stream and the hub socket waiting for a platter |
 | **AV10** | **Every path that makes the hub send mail is metered, per account.** A rate limit that counts by IP bounds a caller, not an inbox. Changing one's address mails an arbitrary stranger, so it carries a cooldown *and* a daily ceiling; a reset request and a registration resend carry cooldowns |
 | **AV13** | **The mail server is not a relay, and `mail.py` is where that is decided.** Every message passes one function; `purpose` is keyword-required and checked against a closed list, so a helper that names anything else does not send and one that names nothing is a TypeError. Under it sit a bound per **recipient** — the thing a person being mail-bombed actually experiences, unmoved by which account, address or endpoint asks — and an instance-wide hourly ceiling, because registration is open and "per account" is a bound an attacker buys more of |
 | **AV11** | **A namespace a client writes into is closed, and its rows are capped.** The preference key space is an allow-list plus `default_tab:<group_id>` checked as a group id, the value is length-bounded, and the row count per account is bounded |
@@ -3039,7 +3039,6 @@ is a different question from whether they install.
 | **QUIC** | Off by default, and **not at parity**: it serves the index and file chunks with no transfer lease, no leaseless ceiling and no root-availability check, does its file I/O on the event loop, and returns exception text to the peer (**L3**). No client speaks it. Either it comes to parity or it goes; until then §5.1's "chat is the only gap" is the one sentence here that overstates the code |
 | **The relay registry** | **Closed in the code**: `relay.RELAYS_ENABLED` is False and every `/v1/relays` route answers 503, as federation does. Nothing in the tree calls them, node or client, and §11.1 measured two ISPs with no TURN relay needed. Kept code that nothing calls is what **L7** says not to keep; it stays only as the proof-of-possession design (**AV6**) until a node needs a relay or it is deleted |
 | **Free-text third-party search** | `tmdb_search_req` takes a member's query and spends the operator's per-credential quota with no rate limit and no per-member bound, where link previews carry both. §6.5's standing rule — a bound and a named adversary in the same commit — was not applied here |
-| **Disk I/O on the node's event loop** | A chunk read-and-encrypt and every upload chunk write run in the message handler, and `RootSet.refresh_availability` stats every root from the loop as well. On a spun-down or network-mounted root that stalls every group, every stream and the hub socket, which is `AV9`'s lesson with the disk in place of the mail server. **A disk waking from standby stalls it long enough for a client's WebRTC connection to time out and have to be reopened** — measured on one node with one member, so it is not a contention effect |
 | **Node announcements are not bounded** | One account may announce unlimited distinct node keys, each a row plus an IP-log row under a one-year retention. Proof of possession is checked (**M8**); the count is not |
 | **Migrations run on SQLite only** | The chain reaches head and agrees with the models there (§12), which is not where it ships. **The exposure is one revision deep, not the whole chain**: every revision behind the first packaged release was development that no installation ever ran, so nothing replays them on PostgreSQL. What is unguarded is the *next* migration — a default, an index type or a constraint PostgreSQL refuses reaches a deploy without the suite saying so |