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Diffstat (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_node_ws_auth.py')
| -rw-r--r-- | packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_node_ws_auth.py | 346 |
1 files changed, 346 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_node_ws_auth.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_node_ws_auth.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1391722 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_node_ws_auth.py @@ -0,0 +1,346 @@ +""" +Phase 11.5 security regression tests — node WebSocket registration (finding C2). + +The hub relays every WebRTC offer for a node to whoever holds that node's entry in +`_connected_nodes`. That registration used to be established from a client-supplied +`node_id` with no ownership check, so any registered user could take over a victim +node's signaling and become the endpoint browsers connect to. + +These exercise `_authorize_node_ws` directly rather than through a socket: it is the +function that makes the authorization decision, and the hub test harness uses +ASGITransport, which has no WebSocket support. +""" + +import base64 + +import pytest +from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey +from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.x25519 import X25519PrivateKey + +from meshbay_common.crypto import pk_to_b64 + + +async def _make_user(client, username: str) -> dict: + """Register + log in a user, returning ids, token and keys.""" + sk_ed, sk_x = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate(), X25519PrivateKey.generate() + pk_ed, pk_x = pk_to_b64(sk_ed.public_key()), pk_to_b64(sk_x.public_key()) + + r = await client.post("/v1/users/register", json={ + "username": username, + "email": f"{username}@example.test", + "auth_key": base64.b64encode(b"k" * 32).decode(), + "pk_user_ed25519": pk_ed, + "pk_user_x25519": pk_x, + }) + assert r.status_code == 201, r.text + user_id = r.json()["user_id"] + + r = await client.post("/v1/users/login", json={ + "username": username, + "auth_key": base64.b64encode(b"k" * 32).decode(), + }) + assert r.status_code == 200, r.text + return {"user_id": user_id, "token": r.json()["access_token"], + "pk_ed": pk_ed, "sk_ed": sk_ed} + + +async def _announce_node(client, user: dict) -> str: + # Announce now requires proof of possession of the node key (M8). + import time as _t + ts = int(_t.time()) + msg = f"meshbay:node_announce:{user['user_id']}:{user['pk_ed']}:{ts}".encode() + r = await client.post( + "/v1/nodes/announce", + json={ + "pk_node": user["pk_ed"], "endpoint_hint": "test", + "timestamp": ts, + "signature": base64.b64encode(user["sk_ed"].sign(msg)).decode(), + }, + headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user['token']}"}, + ) + assert r.status_code == 201, r.text + return r.json()["node_id"] + + +def _node_token(user: dict) -> str: + from meshbay_hub.auth import issue_access_token + return issue_access_token(user["user_id"], scope="node") + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_ws_rejects_user_scoped_token(client): + """C2: a browser token must never be able to register as a node.""" + from meshbay_hub.api.revocation import _authorize_node_ws + + victim = await _make_user(client, "victim1") + node_id = await _announce_node(client, victim) + + resolved, detail = await _authorize_node_ws(victim["token"], node_id, None) + assert resolved is None + assert "node-scoped" in detail.lower() + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_ws_rejects_foreign_node_id(client): + """ + C2: the impersonation itself. An attacker with a perfectly valid node-scoped + token of their own must not be able to claim someone else's node_id. + """ + from meshbay_hub.api.revocation import _authorize_node_ws + + victim = await _make_user(client, "victim2") + attacker = await _make_user(client, "attacker2") + victim_node = await _announce_node(client, victim) + await _announce_node(client, attacker) + + resolved, detail = await _authorize_node_ws( + _node_token(attacker), victim_node, None) + assert resolved is None, "attacker hijacked the victim's node registration (C2)" + assert "does not belong" in detail.lower() + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_ws_rejects_unknown_node_id(client): + """C2: an invented node_id must not register either.""" + from meshbay_hub.api.revocation import _authorize_node_ws + + user = await _make_user(client, "user3") + resolved, _ = await _authorize_node_ws(_node_token(user), "no-such-node", None) + assert resolved is None + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_ws_rejects_missing_node_id(client): + """C2: identity may not fall back to the token subject.""" + from meshbay_hub.api.revocation import _authorize_node_ws + + user = await _make_user(client, "user4") + resolved, _ = await _authorize_node_ws(_node_token(user), "", None) + assert resolved is None + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_ws_accepts_own_node(client): + """The legitimate path still works.""" + from meshbay_hub.api.revocation import _authorize_node_ws + + user = await _make_user(client, "owner5") + node_id = await _announce_node(client, user) + + resolved, groups = await _authorize_node_ws(_node_token(user), node_id, None) + assert resolved == node_id + assert groups == [] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_ws_group_claims_cannot_widen_beyond_membership(client): + """ + C2: `group_ids` used to be taken verbatim, letting a node advertise itself as + an online source for any group on the hub and attract clients to it. + """ + from meshbay_hub.api.revocation import _authorize_node_ws + + user = await _make_user(client, "owner6") + node_id = await _announce_node(client, user) + + r = await client.post( + "/v1/groups", + json={"name": "mine", "visibility": "private", "join_policy": "invite"}, + headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user['token']}"}, + ) + assert r.status_code == 201, r.text + own_group = r.json()["group_id"] + + resolved, groups = await _authorize_node_ws( + _node_token(user), node_id, [own_group, "someone-elses-group"]) + + assert resolved == node_id + assert groups == [own_group], "node advertised a group it is not a member of" + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_signaling_rejects_non_member(client): + """ + H6/H4: POST /v1/nodes/{id}/webrtc/offer was reachable by any authenticated + user for any node, with no membership check and no rate limit. Each call makes + the target node allocate an aiortc PeerConnection and gather ICE, so it was a + remote resource-exhaustion primitive against a third party's machine. + """ + from meshbay_hub.api import revocation as rev + + owner = await _make_user(client, "owner8") + outsider = await _make_user(client, "outsider8") + node_id = await _announce_node(client, owner) + + r = await client.post( + "/v1/groups", + json={"name": "private-g", "visibility": "private", "join_policy": "invite"}, + headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {owner['token']}"}, + ) + group_id = r.json()["group_id"] + + # Pretend the node is connected and hosting that group. + class _FakeWS: + async def send_text(self, _): + raise AssertionError("offer relayed to node despite non-membership") + + rev._connected_nodes[node_id] = _FakeWS() + rev._node_groups[node_id] = [group_id] + try: + resp = await client.post( + f"/v1/nodes/{node_id}/webrtc/offer", + json={"sdp": "v=0", "ice_candidates": []}, + headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {outsider['token']}"}, + ) + assert resp.status_code == 403, resp.text + finally: + rev._connected_nodes.pop(node_id, None) + rev._node_groups.pop(node_id, None) + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_signaling_rejects_oversized_sdp(client): + """H6: an SDP offer is ~2 KB; unbounded input is a memory amplifier.""" + user = await _make_user(client, "user9") + resp = await client.post( + "/v1/nodes/whatever/webrtc/offer", + json={"sdp": "v=0" + ("x" * 200_000), "ice_candidates": []}, + headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user['token']}"}, + ) + assert resp.status_code == 413 + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_incoming_rejects_foreign_peer_ip(client): + """ + H6: peer_ip was taken verbatim, letting any user make an arbitrary node emit + UDP packets to an address of their choosing — reflection via someone else's + machine. The probe target must be the caller's own address. + """ + from meshbay_hub.api import revocation as rev + + owner = await _make_user(client, "owner10") + node_id = await _announce_node(client, owner) + + class _FakeWS: + async def send_text(self, _): + raise AssertionError("punch relayed with attacker-chosen peer_ip") + + rev._connected_nodes[node_id] = _FakeWS() + try: + resp = await client.post( + f"/v1/nodes/{node_id}/incoming", + json={"peer_ip": "198.51.100.7", "peer_port": 9999}, + headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {owner['token']}"}, + ) + assert resp.status_code == 403, resp.text + finally: + rev._connected_nodes.pop(node_id, None) + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_ws_node_may_narrow_its_group_set(client): + """A node hosting a subset of the operator's groups may say so.""" + from meshbay_hub.api.revocation import _authorize_node_ws + + user = await _make_user(client, "owner7") + node_id = await _announce_node(client, user) + + created = [] + for name in ("g-one", "g-two"): + r = await client.post( + "/v1/groups", + json={"name": name, "visibility": "private", "join_policy": "invite"}, + headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user['token']}"}, + ) + created.append(r.json()["group_id"]) + + resolved, groups = await _authorize_node_ws( + _node_token(user), node_id, [created[0]]) + assert resolved == node_id + assert groups == [created[0]] + + +# ── M8: announce proof of possession ───────────────────────────────────────── + +def _announce_payload(user_id: str, sk, pk_b64: str, ts: int | None = None): + import time as _t + ts = ts if ts is not None else int(_t.time()) + msg = f"meshbay:node_announce:{user_id}:{pk_b64}:{ts}".encode() + return { + "pk_node": pk_b64, + "endpoint_hint": "test", + "timestamp": ts, + "signature": base64.b64encode(sk.sign(msg)).decode(), + } + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_announce_requires_proof_of_possession(client): + """ + M8: /v1/nodes/announce accepted any pk_node with no proof the announcer held + the private key, so a user could announce a record carrying someone else's + node key. + """ + user = await _make_user(client, "ann1") + r = await client.post( + "/v1/nodes/announce", + json={"pk_node": user["pk_ed"], "endpoint_hint": "test"}, + headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user['token']}"}, + ) + assert r.status_code == 400, r.text + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_announce_rejects_foreign_key(client): + """M8: announcing someone else's public key must fail — no matching private key.""" + user = await _make_user(client, "ann2") + victim_sk = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate() + victim_pk = pk_to_b64(victim_sk.public_key()) + + attacker_sk = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate() + payload = _announce_payload(user["user_id"], attacker_sk, victim_pk) + + r = await client.post( + "/v1/nodes/announce", json=payload, + headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user['token']}"}, + ) + assert r.status_code == 401, r.text + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_announce_rejects_stale_timestamp(client): + """M8: a captured announce must not be replayable later.""" + import time as _t + user = await _make_user(client, "ann3") + sk = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate() + payload = _announce_payload( + user["user_id"], sk, pk_to_b64(sk.public_key()), ts=int(_t.time()) - 3600) + + r = await client.post( + "/v1/nodes/announce", json=payload, + headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user['token']}"}, + ) + assert r.status_code == 401, r.text + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_announce_with_valid_proof_succeeds_and_is_idempotent(client): + """The legitimate path works, and re-announcing updates rather than piling up rows.""" + user = await _make_user(client, "ann4") + sk = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate() + pk_b64 = pk_to_b64(sk.public_key()) + + first = await client.post( + "/v1/nodes/announce", json=_announce_payload(user["user_id"], sk, pk_b64), + headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user['token']}"}, + ) + assert first.status_code == 201, first.text + + second = await client.post( + "/v1/nodes/announce", json=_announce_payload(user["user_id"], sk, pk_b64), + headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user['token']}"}, + ) + assert second.status_code == 201, second.text + assert second.json()["node_id"] == first.json()["node_id"], ( + "re-announcing the same key must not create a second node record (M8)") |