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-rw-r--r--packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ui/app.py79
1 files changed, 61 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ui/app.py b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ui/app.py
index 31deb66..d2c3429 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ui/app.py
+++ b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ui/app.py
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import base64
import json
import logging
import time
+from html import escape
from pathlib import Path
from fastapi import FastAPI, WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect, Query
@@ -35,6 +36,33 @@ def create_ui_app(state: dict) -> FastAPI:
redoc_url=None,
)
+ @app.middleware("http")
+ async def _security_headers(request, call_next):
+ """
+ Defence in depth behind the escaping fixes for H2. This UI is unauthenticated
+ on loopback, so script execution here equals full control of the node admin API.
+
+ Note what this does and does not do: the page relies on inline <script>, so
+ script-src must allow 'unsafe-inline' and CSP therefore does NOT prevent an
+ injected script from running. Escaping is the actual fix. What CSP buys is
+ containment — connect-src/img-src/form-action 'self'|'none' stop an injected
+ script from exfiltrating the audit log or config to an external host.
+ """
+ response = await call_next(request)
+ response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = (
+ "default-src 'none'; "
+ "style-src 'unsafe-inline'; "
+ "script-src 'unsafe-inline'; "
+ "connect-src 'self'; "
+ "img-src 'self' data:; "
+ "form-action 'none'; "
+ "frame-ancestors 'none'; "
+ "base-uri 'none'"
+ )
+ response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"
+ response.headers["Referrer-Policy"] = "no-referrer"
+ return response
+
# ── JSON API ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@app.get("/api/status")
@@ -353,12 +381,16 @@ def _render_page(state: dict) -> str:
fcount = idx.count if idx else 0
total_size = sum(e.size for e in idx.entries) if idx else 0
+ # Everything interpolated below is attacker-controlled: filenames come from
+ # uploads by any group member. Rendering them raw was a stored XSS into the
+ # unauthenticated localhost admin UI, i.e. full control of the node admin API
+ # from the operator's browser (finding H2).
file_rows = ""
if idx:
for e in sorted(idx.entries, key=lambda x: x.name):
file_rows += (
- f"<tr><td>{e.name}</td><td>{e.type}</td>"
- f"<td>{_fmt_size(e.size)}</td><td>{e.path or '/'}</td></tr>"
+ f"<tr><td>{escape(e.name)}</td><td>{escape(e.type)}</td>"
+ f"<td>{_fmt_size(e.size)}</td><td>{escape(e.path or '/')}</td></tr>"
)
has_gek = bool(ctx.get("gek"))
@@ -382,14 +414,14 @@ def _render_page(state: dict) -> str:
groups_html += f"""
<div class="card">
- <h3>{name}
- <span class="badge" style="background:#6366f1">{vis}</span>
+ <h3>{escape(str(name))}
+ <span class="badge" style="background:#6366f1">{escape(str(vis))}</span>
{gek_badge}
</h3>
- <p><b>Directory:</b> <code>{shared}</code></p>
+ <p><b>Directory:</b> <code>{escape(str(shared))}</code></p>
<p><b>Files:</b> {fcount} &mdash; <b>Total:</b> {_fmt_size(total_size)}</p>
{gek_action}
- <p class="muted">ID: {gid}</p>
+ <p class="muted">ID: {escape(gid)}</p>
<details><summary>File list</summary>
<table>
<thead><tr><th>Name</th><th>Type</th><th>Size</th><th>Path</th></tr></thead>
@@ -405,10 +437,10 @@ def _render_page(state: dict) -> str:
from meshbay_node.transport.webrtc_server import _get_remote_ip
ip = session._remote_ip or _get_remote_ip(session._pc)
peers_html += (
- f"<tr><td>{session._username or session._user_id or '—'}</td>"
- f"<td>{ip or '—'}</td>"
- f"<td>{session._group_id[:8] if session._group_id else '—'}</td>"
- f"<td>{session._pc.connectionState}</td></tr>"
+ f"<tr><td>{escape(session._username or session._user_id or '—')}</td>"
+ f"<td>{escape(ip or '—')}</td>"
+ f"<td>{escape(session._group_id[:8] if session._group_id else '—')}</td>"
+ f"<td>{escape(session._pc.connectionState)}</td></tr>"
)
if not peers_html:
peers_html = '<tr><td colspan="4" class="muted">No connected peers</td></tr>'
@@ -625,14 +657,25 @@ async function load() {
const data = await r.json();
const tbody = document.getElementById('tbody');
document.getElementById('count').textContent = data.entries.length + ' entries';
- tbody.innerHTML = data.entries.map(e => {
- const t = new Date(e.timestamp * 1000).toLocaleString();
- return '<tr><td>' + t + '</td><td>' + e.event + '</td><td>'
- + (e.username || e.user_id.slice(0,8)) + '</td><td>'
- + (e.ip || '—') + '</td><td>'
- + (e.group_id ? e.group_id.slice(0,8) : '—') + '</td><td>'
- + (e.detail || '') + '</td></tr>';
- }).join('');
+ // textContent, not innerHTML: e.detail carries filenames chosen by group members
+ // (finding H2). Building this row with string concatenation was a stored XSS.
+ tbody.replaceChildren(...data.entries.map(e => {
+ const tr = document.createElement('tr');
+ const cells = [
+ new Date(e.timestamp * 1000).toLocaleString(),
+ e.event,
+ e.username || (e.user_id || '').slice(0, 8),
+ e.ip || '—',
+ e.group_id ? e.group_id.slice(0, 8) : '—',
+ e.detail || '',
+ ];
+ for (const value of cells) {
+ const td = document.createElement('td');
+ td.textContent = value;
+ tr.appendChild(td);
+ }
+ return tr;
+ }));
}
document.getElementById('eventFilter').onchange = load;
document.getElementById('limitSelect').onchange = load;