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-rw-r--r--packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_webrtc_transport.py368
1 files changed, 263 insertions, 105 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_webrtc_transport.py b/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_webrtc_transport.py
index 693a68b..93cd3fd 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_webrtc_transport.py
+++ b/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_webrtc_transport.py
@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ import jwt
import msgpack
import pytest
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
-from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import (
+ Ed25519PrivateKey, Ed25519PublicKey,
+)
from aiortc import RTCPeerConnection, RTCSessionDescription
from meshbay_common import MNP_VERSION
@@ -29,10 +31,24 @@ from meshbay_common.crypto import (
wrap_gek,
wrap_gek_aes,
unwrap_gek,
+ unwrap_gek_aes,
)
from meshbay_common.webcrypto import chunk_key_aes, decrypt_chunk_aes
from meshbay_common.protocol import MNP
+TEST_GROUP = "g"
+
+from meshbay_common.handshake import (
+ NONCE_LEN, ROLE_CLIENT, ROLE_NODE, handshake_transcript,
+ make_proof, verify_proof, webrtc_binding,
+)
+from meshbay_common.adminop import (
+ OP_FILE_DELETE,
+ OP_INVITE_CREATE,
+ admin_transcript,
+)
+from meshbay_common.join import ROLE_MEMBER, ROLE_OPERATOR, join_transcript
from meshbay_node.bundle_store import BundleStore
+from meshbay_node.roster import Roster
from meshbay_node.indexer import DirectoryIndexer
from meshbay_node.transport.webrtc_server import WebRTCTransport
@@ -72,6 +88,9 @@ def _hub_pk_pem(sk_hub):
def _make_jwt(sk_hub, groups=None, pk_user="test"):
+ # group_id is mandatory now (M1), so the default token must be a member
+ # of the group the tests connect to. Tests that exercise refusal pass
+ # groups=[...] explicitly.
sk_pem = sk_hub.private_bytes(
serialization.Encoding.PEM,
serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
@@ -82,10 +101,25 @@ def _make_jwt(sk_hub, groups=None, pk_user="test"):
"iss": "test-hub", "sub": "user-001",
"pk_user": pk_user, "hub_id": "test-hub",
"jti": "test-jti-webrtc", "iat": now, "exp": now + 3600,
- "groups": groups or [],
+ "groups": groups if groups is not None else [TEST_GROUP],
}, sk_pem, algorithm="EdDSA")
+def _transcript_from(challenge_msg: dict) -> bytes:
+ """
+ Rebuild the signed transcript from an admin_challenge, the way a real client
+ does — from the announced fields, never from opaque bytes on the wire (H5).
+ """
+ return admin_transcript(
+ op=challenge_msg["op"],
+ node_pk_b64=challenge_msg["node_pk"],
+ group_id=challenge_msg["group_id"],
+ subject=challenge_msg["subject"],
+ nonce=base64.b64decode(challenge_msg["nonce"]),
+ ts=challenge_msg["ts"],
+ )
+
+
def _pack(obj: dict) -> bytes:
data = msgpack.packb(obj, use_bin_type=True)
return struct.pack(">I", len(data)) + data
@@ -103,36 +137,80 @@ def _extract_dtls_fp(sdp: str) -> bytes:
return b""
-async def _handshake_with_gek_proof(channel, received, sk_hub, gek, groups=None,
- browser_pc=None):
- """Send handshake, handle GEK challenge, return handshake_ack."""
- token = _make_jwt(sk_hub, groups=groups)
+async def _do_mnp_handshake(channel, received, token, gek, pc, group_id):
+ """
+ Client half of the unified handshake (11.5.4): client nonce, length-prefixed
+ role-bound transcript, and verification of the node's own proof + signature.
+ """
+ nonce_c = os.urandom(NONCE_LEN)
channel.send(_pack({
- "type": MNP.HANDSHAKE,
- "v": MNP_VERSION,
- "token": token,
+ "type": MNP.HANDSHAKE, "v": MNP_VERSION,
+ "token": token, "group_id": group_id,
+ "nonce": base64.b64encode(nonce_c).decode(),
}))
msg = await asyncio.wait_for(received.get(), timeout=5.0)
- if msg["type"] == MNP.HANDSHAKE_CHALLENGE:
- nonce = base64.b64decode(msg["nonce"])
- offer_fp = b""
- answer_fp = b""
- if browser_pc:
- offer_fp = _extract_dtls_fp(browser_pc.localDescription.sdp)
- answer_fp = _extract_dtls_fp(browser_pc.remoteDescription.sdp)
- proof = hmac.new(gek, nonce + offer_fp + answer_fp, hashlib.sha256).digest()
- channel.send(_pack({
- "type": MNP.HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE,
- "v": MNP_VERSION,
- "proof": base64.b64encode(proof).decode(),
- }))
- msg = await asyncio.wait_for(received.get(), timeout=5.0)
+ if msg["type"] != MNP.HANDSHAKE_CHALLENGE:
+ return msg
+
+ nonce_s = base64.b64decode(msg["nonce"])
+ binding = webrtc_binding(
+ _extract_dtls_fp(pc.localDescription.sdp),
+ _extract_dtls_fp(pc.remoteDescription.sdp),
+ )
+ proof = make_proof(gek, ROLE_CLIENT, group_id, nonce_c, nonce_s, binding)
+ channel.send(_pack({
+ "type": MNP.HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE, "v": MNP_VERSION,
+ "proof": base64.b64encode(proof).decode(),
+ }))
+ ack = await asyncio.wait_for(received.get(), timeout=5.0)
+
+ if ack.get("type") == MNP.HANDSHAKE_ACK:
+ # The client must authenticate the node too (C3).
+ assert verify_proof(
+ gek, base64.b64decode(ack["proof"]), ROLE_NODE,
+ group_id, nonce_c, nonce_s, binding), "node proof invalid"
+ transcript = handshake_transcript(
+ ROLE_NODE, group_id, nonce_c, nonce_s, binding)
+ Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(
+ base64.b64decode(ack["node_pk"])
+ ).verify(base64.b64decode(ack["sig"]), transcript)
+ return ack
+
+
+async def _handshake_with_gek_proof(channel, received, sk_hub, gek, groups=None,
+ browser_pc=None, group_id=TEST_GROUP):
+ """Send handshake, handle GEK challenge, return handshake_ack."""
+ token = _make_jwt(sk_hub, groups=groups or [group_id])
+ msg = await _do_mnp_handshake(
+ channel, received, token, gek, browser_pc, group_id)
assert msg["type"] == MNP.HANDSHAKE_ACK
return msg
-async def _setup_peer(transport, sk_hub, gek, peer_id, jwt_sub="user-001", sk_user=None):
- """Create a peer connection, perform handshake with GEK proof, return (pc, channel, queue)."""
+def _token(sk_hub, jwt_sub, peer_id, group_id, pk_user="test"):
+ """A hub-issued user token, as the browser would present it."""
+ sk_h_pem = sk_hub.private_bytes(
+ serialization.Encoding.PEM,
+ serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
+ serialization.NoEncryption(),
+ )
+ now = int(time.time())
+ return jwt.encode({
+ "iss": "test-hub", "sub": jwt_sub,
+ "pk_user": pk_user, "hub_id": "test-hub",
+ "jti": f"jti-{peer_id}", "iat": now, "exp": now + 3600,
+ "groups": [group_id], "scope": "user",
+ }, sk_h_pem, algorithm="EdDSA")
+
+
+async def _open_channel(transport, peer_id):
+ """
+ Signaling only: a live DataChannel with no MNP handshake performed.
+
+ Separate from `_setup_peer` because someone joining a group for the first time
+ cannot complete the handshake — they have no GEK to prove — and the join has to
+ happen in that window.
+ """
pc = RTCPeerConnection()
q = asyncio.Queue()
buf = bytearray()
@@ -161,6 +239,13 @@ async def _setup_peer(transport, sk_hub, gek, peer_id, jwt_sub="user-001", sk_us
answer_sdp, _ = await transport.handle_offer(pc.localDescription.sdp, peer_id)
await pc.setRemoteDescription(RTCSessionDescription(sdp=answer_sdp, type="answer"))
await asyncio.wait_for(ready.wait(), timeout=5.0)
+ return pc, ch, q
+
+
+async def _setup_peer(transport, sk_hub, gek, peer_id, jwt_sub="user-001", sk_user=None,
+ group_id=TEST_GROUP):
+ """Create a peer connection, perform handshake with GEK proof, return (pc, channel, queue)."""
+ pc, ch, q = await _open_channel(transport, peer_id)
pk_user = "test"
if sk_user:
@@ -169,31 +254,9 @@ async def _setup_peer(transport, sk_hub, gek, peer_id, jwt_sub="user-001", sk_us
serialization.Encoding.Raw, serialization.PublicFormat.Raw)
).decode()
- sk_h_pem = sk_hub.private_bytes(
- serialization.Encoding.PEM,
- serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
- serialization.NoEncryption(),
- )
- now = int(time.time())
- token = jwt.encode({
- "iss": "test-hub", "sub": jwt_sub,
- "pk_user": pk_user, "hub_id": "test-hub",
- "jti": f"jti-{peer_id}", "iat": now, "exp": now + 3600,
- "groups": [],
- }, sk_h_pem, algorithm="EdDSA")
+ token = _token(sk_hub, jwt_sub, peer_id, group_id, pk_user)
- ch.send(_pack({"type": MNP.HANDSHAKE, "v": MNP_VERSION, "token": token}))
- msg = await asyncio.wait_for(q.get(), timeout=5.0)
- if msg["type"] == MNP.HANDSHAKE_CHALLENGE:
- nonce = base64.b64decode(msg["nonce"])
- offer_fp = _extract_dtls_fp(pc.localDescription.sdp)
- answer_fp = _extract_dtls_fp(pc.remoteDescription.sdp)
- proof = hmac.new(gek, nonce + offer_fp + answer_fp, hashlib.sha256).digest()
- ch.send(_pack({
- "type": MNP.HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE, "v": MNP_VERSION,
- "proof": base64.b64encode(proof).decode(),
- }))
- msg = await asyncio.wait_for(q.get(), timeout=5.0)
+ msg = await _do_mnp_handshake(ch, q, token, gek, pc, group_id)
assert msg["type"] == MNP.HANDSHAKE_ACK
return pc, ch, q
@@ -676,6 +739,8 @@ async def test_webrtc_wrong_gek_proof_rejected(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shared_dir)
token = _make_jwt(sk_hub)
channel.send(_pack({
"type": MNP.HANDSHAKE, "v": MNP_VERSION, "token": token,
+ "group_id": TEST_GROUP,
+ "nonce": base64.b64encode(os.urandom(NONCE_LEN)).decode(),
}))
challenge = await asyncio.wait_for(received.get(), timeout=5.0)
@@ -734,6 +799,8 @@ async def test_webrtc_dtls_channel_binding_detects_mitm(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, sh
token = _make_jwt(sk_hub)
channel.send(_pack({
"type": MNP.HANDSHAKE, "v": MNP_VERSION, "token": token,
+ "group_id": TEST_GROUP,
+ "nonce": base64.b64encode(os.urandom(NONCE_LEN)).decode(),
}))
challenge = await asyncio.wait_for(received.get(), timeout=5.0)
@@ -783,13 +850,13 @@ async def test_webrtc_admin_challenge_response(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shared_dir)
challenge_msg = await asyncio.wait_for(received.get(), timeout=5.0)
assert challenge_msg["type"] == MNP.ADMIN_CHALLENGE
- assert challenge_msg["file_id"] == entry.id
+ assert challenge_msg["op"] == OP_FILE_DELETE
+ assert challenge_msg["subject"] == entry.id
- challenge = base64.b64decode(challenge_msg["challenge"])
- signature = sk_admin.sign(challenge)
+ signature = sk_admin.sign(_transcript_from(challenge_msg))
channel.send(_pack({
"type": MNP.ADMIN_RESPONSE, "v": MNP_VERSION,
- "file_id": entry.id,
+ "op_id": challenge_msg["op_id"],
"signature": base64.b64encode(signature).decode(),
}))
@@ -832,11 +899,10 @@ async def test_webrtc_admin_bad_signature_rejected(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shared_
challenge_msg = await asyncio.wait_for(received.get(), timeout=5.0)
assert challenge_msg["type"] == MNP.ADMIN_CHALLENGE
- challenge = base64.b64decode(challenge_msg["challenge"])
- bad_sig = sk_attacker.sign(challenge)
+ bad_sig = sk_attacker.sign(_transcript_from(challenge_msg))
channel.send(_pack({
"type": MNP.ADMIN_RESPONSE, "v": MNP_VERSION,
- "file_id": entry.id,
+ "op_id": challenge_msg["op_id"],
"signature": base64.b64encode(bad_sig).decode(),
}))
@@ -914,14 +980,14 @@ async def test_webrtc_uploader_delete_requires_challenge(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, s
challenge_msg = await asyncio.wait_for(received.get(), timeout=5.0)
assert challenge_msg["type"] == MNP.ADMIN_CHALLENGE
- assert challenge_msg["file_id"] == entry.id
+ assert challenge_msg["op"] == OP_FILE_DELETE
+ assert challenge_msg["subject"] == entry.id
# Sign with uploader's Ed25519 key
- challenge = base64.b64decode(challenge_msg["challenge"])
- signature = sk_uploader.sign(challenge)
+ signature = sk_uploader.sign(_transcript_from(challenge_msg))
channel.send(_pack({
"type": MNP.ADMIN_RESPONSE, "v": MNP_VERSION,
- "file_id": entry.id,
+ "op_id": challenge_msg["op_id"],
"signature": base64.b64encode(signature).decode(),
}))
@@ -979,11 +1045,10 @@ async def test_webrtc_uploader_impersonation_blocked(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, share
assert challenge_msg["type"] == MNP.ADMIN_CHALLENGE
# Sign with user B's key (wrong key)
- challenge = base64.b64decode(challenge_msg["challenge"])
- bad_sig = sk_user_b.sign(challenge)
+ bad_sig = sk_user_b.sign(_transcript_from(challenge_msg))
channel.send(_pack({
"type": MNP.ADMIN_RESPONSE, "v": MNP_VERSION,
- "file_id": entry.id,
+ "op_id": challenge_msg["op_id"],
"signature": base64.b64encode(bad_sig).decode(),
}))
@@ -1014,54 +1079,122 @@ def x25519_keypair():
@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_gek_bundle_store_and_fetch(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shared_dir,
- tmp_path, x25519_keypair):
- """GEK bundle stored on node via DataChannel, then fetched during handshake."""
+async def test_invite_then_join_delivers_the_gek(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shared_dir,
+ tmp_path, x25519_keypair):
+ """
+ The whole invite flow over a real DataChannel, end to end.
+
+ The operator asks for a code; the invitee — who has never held the group key
+ and therefore cannot complete the GEK proof — redeems it in the pre-proof
+ window and the node wraps the key for the X25519 key they just proved they
+ hold. At no point is a public key fetched from the hub, which is the point:
+ that lookup was H3.
+ """
hub_pk_pem = _hub_pk_pem(sk_hub)
indexer = DirectoryIndexer(root=shared_dir, group_id="g", sk_node=sk_node, gek=gek)
await indexer.initial_scan()
- bundle_store = BundleStore(db_path=tmp_path / "bundles.db")
- await bundle_store.open()
+ roster = Roster(db_path=tmp_path / "roster.db")
+ await roster.open()
transport = WebRTCTransport(
sk_node=sk_node, hub_pk_pem=hub_pk_pem, gek=gek,
shared_root=shared_dir, index=indexer.index,
stun_servers=[],
)
- transport._ctx["bundle_store"] = bundle_store
+ transport._ctx["roster"] = roster
+ transport._ctx["has_admin_authority"] = True
+ transport._ctx["groups"] = {
+ TEST_GROUP: {"gek": gek, "shared_root": shared_dir, "index": indexer.index},
+ }
+
+ # A paired operator, as `meshbay-node operator pair` would have left it.
+ sk_admin = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+ admin_pk_b64 = pk_to_b64(sk_admin.public_key())
+ await roster.pin_identity("user-001", "grenet", admin_pk_b64, "AA==", "code")
+ await roster.set_member("", "user-001", ROLE_OPERATOR, "active", "local-cli")
- # Connect as admin and store a GEK bundle for user-002
pc_admin, ch_admin, q_admin = await _setup_peer(
transport, sk_hub, gek, "peer-admin")
- sk_x_raw, pk_x_raw = x25519_keypair
- bundle = wrap_gek(gek, pk_x_raw)
+ # 1. The operator asks the node for an invitation code.
+ ch_admin.send(_pack({
+ "type": MNP.INVITE_CREATE, "v": MNP_VERSION,
+ "user_id": "user-002", "group_id": TEST_GROUP, "username": "bob",
+ }))
+ challenge_msg = await asyncio.wait_for(q_admin.get(), timeout=5.0)
+ assert challenge_msg["type"] == MNP.ADMIN_CHALLENGE
+ assert challenge_msg["op"] == OP_INVITE_CREATE
+ assert challenge_msg["subject"] == "user-002"
ch_admin.send(_pack({
- "type": MNP.GEK_BUNDLE_STORE,
- "v": MNP_VERSION,
- "user_id": "user-002",
- "group_id": "g",
- "pk_eph_b64": bundle["pk_eph_b64"],
- "nonce_b64": bundle["nonce_b64"],
- "wrapped_b64": bundle["wrapped_b64"],
+ "type": MNP.ADMIN_RESPONSE, "v": MNP_VERSION,
+ "op_id": challenge_msg["op_id"],
+ "signature": base64.b64encode(
+ sk_admin.sign(_transcript_from(challenge_msg))).decode(),
}))
- ack = await asyncio.wait_for(q_admin.get(), timeout=5.0)
- assert ack["type"] == "ack"
- assert ack["detail"] == "gek_bundle_stored"
+ invite = await asyncio.wait_for(q_admin.get(), timeout=5.0)
+ assert invite["type"] == MNP.INVITE_RESULT
+ code = invite["code"]
+ assert code and len(code) == 9 # XXXX-XXXX
- # Verify bundle was persisted
- stored = await bundle_store.fetch("g", "user-002")
- assert stored is not None
- assert stored["pk_eph_b64"] == bundle["pk_eph_b64"]
+ # 2. Bob connects. He cannot prove GEK possession — he has never had it — so
+ # he redeems the code in the pre-proof window instead.
+ sk_x_raw, pk_x_raw = x25519_keypair
+ sk_bob_ed = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+ pc_bob, ch_bob, q_bob = await _open_channel(transport, "peer-bob")
- # Unwrap to verify it's correct
- recovered = unwrap_gek(stored, sk_x_raw, pk_x_raw)
- assert recovered == gek
+ nonce_c = os.urandom(NONCE_LEN)
+ ch_bob.send(_pack({
+ "type": MNP.HANDSHAKE, "v": MNP_VERSION,
+ "token": _token(sk_hub, "user-002", "peer-bob", TEST_GROUP),
+ "group_id": TEST_GROUP,
+ "nonce": base64.b64encode(nonce_c).decode(),
+ }))
+ challenge = await asyncio.wait_for(q_bob.get(), timeout=5.0)
+ assert challenge["type"] == MNP.HANDSHAKE_CHALLENGE
+ nonce_s = base64.b64decode(challenge["nonce"])
- await bundle_store.close()
+ # Bob signs a transcript naming the node, and he cannot complete the handshake
+ # that would prove its key — he has no GEK yet. So he has to be able to learn
+ # it from the challenge; taking it from the test's own knowledge of sk_node
+ # would hide the fact that a real client cannot.
+ assert challenge["node_pk"] == pk_to_b64(sk_node.public_key()), (
+ "the challenge must announce the node key to a first-time joiner")
+ node_pk_b64 = challenge["node_pk"]
+
+ pk_ed_b64 = pk_to_b64(sk_bob_ed.public_key())
+ pk_x_b64 = base64.b64encode(pk_x_raw).decode()
+ ts = int(time.time())
+ transcript = join_transcript(
+ node_pk_b64=node_pk_b64,
+ group_id=TEST_GROUP, user_id="user-002",
+ pk_ed25519_b64=pk_ed_b64, pk_x25519_b64=pk_x_b64,
+ nonce_node=nonce_s, ts=ts,
+ )
+ ch_bob.send(_pack({
+ "type": MNP.JOIN_REQUEST, "v": MNP_VERSION,
+ "group_id": TEST_GROUP,
+ "pk_ed25519": pk_ed_b64, "pk_x25519": pk_x_b64,
+ "code": code, "ts": ts,
+ "sig": base64.b64encode(sk_bob_ed.sign(transcript)).decode(),
+ }))
+
+ result = await asyncio.wait_for(q_bob.get(), timeout=5.0)
+ assert result["type"] == MNP.JOIN_RESULT
+ assert result["ok"] is True
+ assert result["gek"] is True
+ assert result["role"] == ROLE_MEMBER
+
+ # 3. The key really is the group key, and only Bob's secret opens it.
+ assert unwrap_gek_aes(result, sk_x_raw, pk_x_raw) == gek
+
+ # 4. The code is spent.
+ assert await roster.consume_invite(code, "user-002") is None
+
+ await roster.close()
await pc_admin.close()
+ await pc_bob.close()
await transport.close_all()
@@ -1124,8 +1257,10 @@ async def test_gek_bundle_fetch_during_handshake(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shared_di
# Step 1: Send handshake with group_id so _pending_group is set
token = _make_jwt(sk_hub, groups=["g"])
+ nonce_c = os.urandom(NONCE_LEN)
channel.send(_pack({
"type": MNP.HANDSHAKE, "v": MNP_VERSION, "token": token, "group_id": "g",
+ "nonce": base64.b64encode(nonce_c).decode(),
}))
msg = await asyncio.wait_for(received.get(), timeout=5.0)
assert msg["type"] == MNP.HANDSHAKE_CHALLENGE
@@ -1140,11 +1275,12 @@ async def test_gek_bundle_fetch_during_handshake(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shared_di
recovered_gek = unwrap_gek(bundle_resp, sk_x_raw, pk_x_raw)
assert recovered_gek == gek
- nonce = base64.b64decode(msg["nonce"])
- offer_fp = _extract_dtls_fp(browser_pc.localDescription.sdp)
- answer_fp = _extract_dtls_fp(browser_pc.remoteDescription.sdp)
- proof = hmac.new(recovered_gek, nonce + offer_fp + answer_fp,
- hashlib.sha256).digest()
+ nonce_s = base64.b64decode(msg["nonce"])
+ binding = webrtc_binding(
+ _extract_dtls_fp(browser_pc.localDescription.sdp),
+ _extract_dtls_fp(browser_pc.remoteDescription.sdp),
+ )
+ proof = make_proof(recovered_gek, ROLE_CLIENT, "g", nonce_c, nonce_s, binding)
# Step 4: Complete handshake
channel.send(_pack({
@@ -1229,8 +1365,10 @@ async def test_keypair_bundle_store_and_fetch(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shared_dir,
await asyncio.wait_for(ready.wait(), timeout=5.0)
token = _make_jwt(sk_hub, groups=["g"])
+ nonce_c = os.urandom(NONCE_LEN)
channel.send(_pack({
"type": MNP.HANDSHAKE, "v": MNP_VERSION, "token": token, "group_id": "g",
+ "nonce": base64.b64encode(nonce_c).decode(),
}))
msg = await asyncio.wait_for(received.get(), timeout=5.0)
assert msg["type"] == MNP.HANDSHAKE_CHALLENGE
@@ -1296,8 +1434,10 @@ async def test_keypair_bundle_fetch_not_found(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shared_dir,
await asyncio.wait_for(ready.wait(), timeout=5.0)
token = _make_jwt(sk_hub, groups=["g"])
+ nonce_c = os.urandom(NONCE_LEN)
channel.send(_pack({
"type": MNP.HANDSHAKE, "v": MNP_VERSION, "token": token, "group_id": "g",
+ "nonce": base64.b64encode(nonce_c).decode(),
}))
msg = await asyncio.wait_for(received.get(), timeout=5.0)
assert msg["type"] == MNP.HANDSHAKE_CHALLENGE
@@ -1313,9 +1453,18 @@ async def test_keypair_bundle_fetch_not_found(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shared_dir,
@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_gek_auto_activate_on_node_bundle_store(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shared_dir,
+async def test_gek_not_auto_activated_on_bundle_store(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shared_dir,
tmp_path, x25519_keypair):
- """Storing the node operator's GEK bundle auto-activates GEK (AES variant)."""
+ """
+ A GEK bundle arriving over MNP must NOT become the node's live key (C5b).
+
+ This test previously asserted the opposite: storing a bundle addressed to the
+ node operator auto-activated it, with no signature required. Because the
+ operator's X25519 public key is public — the node publishes it in handshake_ack
+ — any group member could wrap a key of their own choosing for it and take over
+ the group, locking every legitimate member out. GEK activation now happens only
+ through the node's local admin UI or CLI.
+ """
hub_pk_pem = _hub_pk_pem(sk_hub)
indexer = DirectoryIndexer(root=shared_dir, group_id="g", sk_node=sk_node, gek=gek)
await indexer.initial_scan()
@@ -1324,7 +1473,8 @@ async def test_gek_auto_activate_on_node_bundle_store(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shar
bundle_store = BundleStore(db_path=tmp_path / "bundles.db")
await bundle_store.open()
- new_gek = generate_gek()
+ attacker_gek = generate_gek()
+ assert attacker_gek != gek
transport = WebRTCTransport(
sk_node=sk_node, hub_pk_pem=hub_pk_pem, gek=gek,
@@ -1336,14 +1486,18 @@ async def test_gek_auto_activate_on_node_bundle_store(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shar
transport._ctx["sk_x25519_raw"] = sk_x_raw
transport._ctx["pk_x25519_raw"] = pk_x_raw
transport._ctx["pk_x25519_b64"] = base64.b64encode(pk_x_raw).decode()
+ transport._ctx["admin_pk_ed25519"] = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key()
pc_admin, ch_admin, q_admin = await _setup_peer(
transport, sk_hub, gek, "peer-setup-admin")
- # Store GEK bundle wrapped with AES-GCM (browser-compatible)
- node_bundle = wrap_gek_aes(new_gek, pk_x_raw)
+ # An ordinary member wraps a key of their choosing for the operator's public
+ # key and offers it to the node. The message that used to carry this no longer
+ # exists (the node wraps the GEK itself now), so it reaches no handler at all —
+ # a stronger outcome than the admin challenge this test used to assert.
+ node_bundle = wrap_gek_aes(attacker_gek, pk_x_raw)
ch_admin.send(_pack({
- "type": MNP.GEK_BUNDLE_STORE,
+ "type": "gek_bundle_store",
"v": MNP_VERSION,
"user_id": "node-operator",
"group_id": "g",
@@ -1351,12 +1505,12 @@ async def test_gek_auto_activate_on_node_bundle_store(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shar
"nonce_b64": node_bundle["nonce_b64"],
"wrapped_b64": node_bundle["wrapped_b64"],
}))
- ack = await asyncio.wait_for(q_admin.get(), timeout=5.0)
- assert ack["type"] == "ack"
- await asyncio.sleep(0.2)
+ await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
+ assert q_admin.empty(), "the retired bundle message still gets a response"
- assert transport._ctx.get("gek") == new_gek
+ assert transport._ctx.get("gek") == gek, "group key was seized over MNP (C5b)"
+ assert await bundle_store.fetch("g", "node-operator") is None
await bundle_store.close()
await pc_admin.close()
@@ -1398,6 +1552,8 @@ async def test_webrtc_no_gek_connection_refused(sk_node, sk_hub, shared_dir):
token = _make_jwt(sk_hub)
channel.send(_pack({
"type": MNP.HANDSHAKE, "v": MNP_VERSION, "token": token,
+ "group_id": TEST_GROUP,
+ "nonce": base64.b64encode(os.urandom(NONCE_LEN)).decode(),
}))
msg = await asyncio.wait_for(received.get(), timeout=5.0)
@@ -1457,8 +1613,10 @@ async def test_gek_bundle_fetch_not_found(sk_node, sk_hub, gek, shared_dir, tmp_
await asyncio.wait_for(ready.wait(), timeout=5.0)
token = _make_jwt(sk_hub, groups=["g"])
+ nonce_c = os.urandom(NONCE_LEN)
channel.send(_pack({
"type": MNP.HANDSHAKE, "v": MNP_VERSION, "token": token, "group_id": "g",
+ "nonce": base64.b64encode(nonce_c).decode(),
}))
msg = await asyncio.wait_for(received.get(), timeout=5.0)
assert msg["type"] == MNP.HANDSHAKE_CHALLENGE