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`search_listed` is a per-group setting on the node, changed by a signed
operator op and carried in the sealed handshake ack. Search reads it after
the handshake and stops there: no index is fetched, cached or merged, in any
of the four views, and the page says how many groups it left out. The switch
is a "Search" section in the group's settings, shown to the operator.
Absent means listed, at every layer: roster default, ack default, and the
client only drops a group on an explicit `false` — so an upgrade or an older
node removes nothing from anyone's Search.
It is a listing preference and protects nothing: the node serves the same
index to Search and to the group page and cannot tell them apart, every
member lists the group by opening it, and a client that ignores the flag
lists it in Search too. Design §9.11 says so, so it is never described as
private. The cost is one handshake per unlisted group, because only the node
knows the setting.
Search also took `nodes[0]` twice — for the index and for the pooled
connection — the defect 4cce50f fixed on the group page only. One
`connectToGroup` now walks the list the same way: a refusal about this
browser stops, `not_hosted` or a failed connection moves on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XuNrwLf5EFWCMHzfoEvnpm
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The router rendered `#/login`, `#/register` and `#/reset` before it checked
for a user. A browser signed in as one account, opening on a `#/login` left
in the address bar, drew the login form (prefilled by the browser with
another account) under a navigation bar and a sidebar already showing the
first account and its Administration entry.
`#/login` and `#/register` now need no one signed in, and a signed-in person
landing on either is sent home with `location.replace`, so Back does not lead
to the form again. `#/reset` stays reachable: that flow signs in half-way and
still has its progress and result to show.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya
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Adding a large directory left the operator nothing to look at once they left
the Settings panel that started it, and nothing at all when it was added from
another machine. A band now sits above the music bar on every page: one row
per group with indexing under way, naming the root being walked, percent,
bytes and files, and the roots waiting their turn; "indexing finished" for a
few seconds at the end. A click opens the group's Settings, and × hides the
row until that group is idle.
Two sources feed it. On the node's own machine the desktop client polls the
loopback `GET /api/index-status` for every group, whatever the route. An
operator's group page forwards MNP `index_progress` pushes, resolving the
root from the roots table it opened; an ordinary member keeps the sidebar dot
only, and a page clears its row when it lets go of the group. Where both
describe a group, loopback wins.
Reconcile passes and watchdog bursts show only past 1 GB or 5 s, so a single
dropped file does not flash a bar. The logic lives in index-dock-model.js,
which has no imports and is tested under node. The dock publishes
`--index-dock-h` and the sidebar stops above it and the music bar.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya
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`IndexProgress` said "scanning, this many bytes of that many" and nothing
more. A group's roots are walked one after another, so a second directory
added during a large scan showed as the bar jumping back to 0 %. It now also
carries the root being walked and its position in the roots table, the kind
of walk (scan, rescan, reconcile, watch), file counts, and the roots
waiting for the scan lock in order: queued by the initial scan, by a
retarget, and by a plug; dropped when a root is removed.
`GET /api/index-status` answers for every group at once, including a group
still in its initial scan, so a client can show indexing on any page. It
names roots: loopback only, like `current_dir`.
`index_progress` and the handshake ack gain the same counters, still naming
nothing (decision D3): the root is a position in the roots table the member
already opened from the sealed index, and the queue is a count. The pusher
keeps speaking while a root only waits for the lock.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya
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A watchdog burst wrote the indexer's single `progress` directly. A file
dropped into a folder during a large scan added its size to the scan's
total, then cleared `scanning` when its own hash finished, so the progress
went blank with hours of hashing left. Bursts now keep their own counters,
shown only while no whole-root walk runs.
A plug rescan took no scan lock and walked its root beside an added root's
scan, both resetting the same counters and reading the drive in turn. It
now waits for the lock, and skips the rescan if the root was ejected or
removed while it waited, since the rescan drops the entries before it walks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya
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A root added from the client arrives over MNP, and _retarget_indexer
started the daemon's reload with the session's own _spawn. When that
session closed - a client reconnecting 47 s into the scan of a 900 GB
root - shutdown_tasks() cancelled the reload mid-scan, and the reload
queued behind it, without a line in the log. The new root was in
node.toml and in the indexer's set but never in the group's context; the
lock was free and nothing retried, so the node served the old roots table
for hours while reconcile hashed the whole drive as missed events. One
loopback reload fixed the live node in 9 ms.
_reload_config now runs the work in a node-owned task and awaits it
through asyncio.shield, so a caller that goes away only stops waiting; a
cancelled reload is logged. plug_root does the same for its rescan, which
drops the root's entries before walking the disk and so left the root
empty when its admin op's session closed.
The existing MNP test replaced _spawn with a list and could not cancel
anything; the new tests close the session for real and fail without this.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya
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Adding a large directory to a running group made the reload await the
scan of the new root before putting the new RootSet in the group's
context, holding _reload_lock the whole time. For the hours a large drive
takes to hash, the node served the old set:
- a file request under the new root got None from entry_abs_path and the
handler died on None.exists() without replying;
- a writable/removable toggle answered with the live table, still the
old one, so the directory vanished from the operator's settings;
- reconcile saw every file the scan had not reached as a missed event and
hashed it again on the same executor, rewriting progress under the scan.
retarget now applies the set, the roots table and the watcher first, and
with wait=False scans the added roots in the background; the daemon swaps
ctx["roots"] before calling it. A scan lock shared by the initial scan,
added-root scans and reconcile makes the reconcile loop sit out a running
scan without backing off. Every transport site that resolves an entry
answers ROOT_NOT_SERVED instead of crashing, and a delete keeps the entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya
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One derivation is 256 MB and a quarter to half a second of CPU (240 ms here,
485 ms on meshbay.org). All eleven call sites — sign-in, registration, the two
rehashes, passphrase change, reset and account deletion — ran it inline in an
async handler, so every one stopped the whole hub for that long: no request
served, no node socket read, no offer relayed. Measured on a local hub during
eight concurrent sign-ins, the worst `/v1/health` response went from 232 ms to
10 ms; the sign-ins themselves take the same time.
It could not simply go to a thread pool. Two concurrent `lanes=4` derivations
deadlock inside OpenSSL and never return, at no CPU — reproduced on
cryptography 50.0.x / OpenSSL 4.0.x both locally and on meshbay.org, while
`lanes=1` does not. `lanes` is part of every stored hash, so it is not ours to
change, and inline on the loop two derivations could never overlap, which is
the only reason production never hung.
So `auth.hash_password_off_loop` / `verify_password_off_loop` hand the work to
a dedicated executor with exactly one worker. Not a semaphore around
`to_thread`: a cancelled request would release its permit while its thread was
still deriving, and the next derivation would start beside it. One worker also
bounds Argon2's memory to one derivation whatever the number of callers.
`test_argon2_off_loop.py` reads every module for a direct call, pins the single
worker, runs four derivations and four sign-ins concurrently to completion, and
checks the loop keeps turning during a derivation; each fails with its guard
removed. CLAUDE.md and AV9 state the rule and the trap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt
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Passphrase sign-in locks per username: after `login.max_failures` wrong
passphrases (default 4) the name is refused with `429 account_locked` and a
`Retry-After` for `login.lockout_minutes` (default 60), without the passphrase
being checked. Both numbers are instance policy an admin sets from the panel;
zero failures turns it off. The per-IP limit bounds one address, and IPv6
gives every subscriber a /64 of them — an online guess targets an account, so
the account is what is counted.
- Counted by the name as typed, existing or not, so `login` stays uniform (M1).
The key is a hash: people type passphrases into the username field.
- The attempt is taken before the check in one `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE
… WHERE … RETURNING`, so a concurrent burst gets no more than the limit.
- Sign-in, passphrase change and account deletion count on the same row; the
last had no rate limit at all.
- A lockout refuses passphrase sign-in and nothing else: sessions, renewal and
device sign-in continue, and a reset code clears it (AV26). A session learns
its own lockout from `/v1/users/me`, and the passphrase change checks it
before re-wrapping any node's bundle — the hub accepts the new passphrase
only after the nodes have it.
The SPA now shows what the hub said. `loginAndRecover` threw "Login failed:
{json}", so `email_verification_required` never matched and was never shown;
the passphrase-change form rendered no error at all in its first phase.
The unauthenticated surface, reviewed route by route:
- No `/docs`, `/redoc` or `/openapi.json`, in the code. The Caddyfile hid them
on meshbay.org only; a packaged hub behind any other proxy published all three.
- The node socket's first message must arrive within ten seconds. It is
accepted before anyone is known, and an unbounded read is a connection any
stranger holds for free.
- `/v1/relays` answers 503 behind `relay.RELAYS_ENABLED`, as federation does:
nothing in the tree calls it and two of its routes take no account.
- `test_unauthenticated_surface.py` walks every route and fails on one without
an authentication dependency that is not listed with its reason.
Verified in Chrome against a local hub: the lockout and wrong-passphrase
messages, the admin section saving both lockout and mail limits, and the
passphrase change refused while locked. Not verified in Firefox (a running
instance blocks the headless one), nor the upsert's concurrency on PostgreSQL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt
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Every MHP route answers a stated 503. `federation.FEDERATION_ENABLED` is the
only thing that decides it, applied as a dependency on the router so the six
routes that exist and any added later are covered by construction — a gate you
have to remember to write in each handler is the shape C6 is the standing
lesson about.
The protocol is not what is wrong with it. What is wrong is that nothing has
ever run it: two hubs have never completed one authenticated request between
them. AV14 was two defects in the same path — an issuer signing with a key
bound before it was loaded, naming itself after the reference deployment
whatever the instance was called, and a verifier naming no audience for the
`aud` the issuer sets, which PyJWT refuses outright. Both stood for a month
behind a green suite, and both were found by reading rather than by running,
because a second implementation of a peer proves the protocol and nothing about
two machines.
Four of the six routes carry no authentication of their own — the MHP token is
the authentication — and two of those write, a directory push and a revocation.
That is the surface being closed until somebody stands up a second hub.
A constant and not a `hub_settings` row, deliberately: a switch in the admin
panel invites an operator to turn on a feature that has never worked between
two machines, where this takes an edit, a deploy, and reading the comment above
it. `/v1/hub/info` reports the state, because the `mhp_version` beside it would
otherwise be a claim the hub does not honour.
The protocol tests open the gate for their own duration and say why; the one
that runs with the flag as it ships asserts all six routes refuse. §7.6 states
the closure, §15.2 carries federation between two hubs as not built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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§15.3 gains the items the review found and did not close, each as what it is
rather than as a plan: the packaged install that has never been installed, QUIC
serving content outside every cap it does not implement, a relay registry
nothing calls, an unmetered third-party search, disk I/O on the node's event
loop, unbounded node announcements, and a migration chain exercised on a
database it does not ship on.
They are in the design rather than in a tracker because each is a sentence about
what the system currently is, and §15.3 is where the document already keeps
those. The seven that were closed this week are in §13.5b as AV20–AV25 and in
the sections they belong to.
CLAUDE.md gains the Firefox harness, which is the other kind of entry: eleven
errors at setup that look exactly like a regression, are not, and cost a full
diagnosis to place. `HOME` isolates the profile and not snap's single instance,
so any running Firefox blocks the headless probe, `--no-remote` and
`--new-instance` do not help, and a failed run leaves a process that blocks the
next. The chrome half covers the same geometry meanwhile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`add_email_verification` wrote PostgreSQL's `(now() at time zone 'utc')` as a
literal server default, where every other migration in the chain uses
`sa.func.now()` and lets the dialect render it. On SQLite that is
`sqlite3.OperationalError: near "at": syntax error` — so `meshbay-hub migrate`
could not reach head on the database the suite and the documented local-hub
workflow both use.
Which is how it survived: the only test that ran alembic at all stopped at
`c3d4e5f6a7b8`, the revision immediately before it. The two newest migrations —
email verification, and the mail quota committed two days ago — had been run by
exactly one thing, a production deploy, and the newest by nothing at all.
`test_migrations_reach_head.py` upgrades to head and compares what that built
against `Base.metadata`, both directions: a column in the models and in no
migration never reaches production, and one in the migrations and in no model is
a rename abandoned halfway. Both tests fail on the unfixed migration with the
error above; the drift half was checked by adding a model column on purpose and
watching it be named. The schemas agree today.
It still does not check PostgreSQL-only behaviour — a default, an index type or
a constraint one dialect accepts and the other refuses. Running the chain
somewhere beats running it nowhere, and is not the same as running it where it
ships.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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group's hosts are its members'
Two checks that were not performed, in the same shape: something true of the
public case, written so it did not apply to the rest.
**Signaling.** The membership check read `if node_group_ids:`, so an empty set
skipped it — membership, group status and the public-group gate together — and
the offer was relayed. Since AV1 made an empty claim mean "no groups" rather
than "all of my owner's", that is the *normal* registration of a node hosting
nothing: the unconfigured node left running, the machine in this register's
founding incident, and the one least able to absorb the work. Each offer makes
it allocate an RTCPeerConnection and gather ICE, 30 a minute, which is H6
restored in exactly the case AV1 made common. It is refused now. Nothing
legitimate is lost: such a node refuses the handshake anyway — `group_id` is
mandatory (M1) and a node with no group key refuses (NS8) — so this declines
work the node would decline one step later at its own expense.
**The node list.** `GET /v1/groups/{id}/nodes` checked membership only for a
public group with public groups switched off. A private one answered any
authenticated account that knew the id — which an ex-member knows for ever —
with the ids and public keys of the machines hosting it. §7.4 already stated the
property for the public case. Membership is required now unless the group is
public and public groups are on. Nothing needs the list before joining: an open
join writes the membership row first, and an invitation registers the invitee's
when the code is created, both checked before making the change.
`test_webrtc_signaling_roundtrip` had to be repaired, and is the finding
restated: it registered a node in `_connected_nodes` and never in
`_node_groups`, so it drove the relay through the hole rather than through the
door — the check it routed around was the defect. It now registers the group a
real node registers.
§7.2 and §7.3 gain the rules, the register AV24 and AV25, and
test_availability_between_members.py two cases that fail on the property
against the previous source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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A chat message is the plainest member-supplied write there is: the node stores
it in `chat.db`, where nothing expires it — retention is a manual command
(§6.6) — relays it to every other connected member, and has the hub write a
notification for every member of the group. Nothing bounded any of it. The only
ceiling was the DataChannel frame, 64 MB once the handshake is done, so one
member in a loop filled the operator's disk and saturated everyone else's
connection, and the node's answer to each message was `ack`.
Uploads, the other member-supplied write, have carried a filename allowlist,
strict chunk ordering, a no-overwrite rule and a 4 GB cap since C5a — because
somebody asked what one member costs the others on that path. Nobody had asked
it on this one.
Two bounds, for the two halves of the question: **64 KB of ciphertext** for what
one message may cost, and **60 a minute per account per group** for how often
one member may impose it. Both are checked before anything is stored or relayed;
a refusal names itself and is audited, so "why is my disk full" has an answer.
The rate is keyed by account, not by connection: a second tab does not make
anyone type faster, and keying on the session would hand a script one budget per
socket it opens.
No node-wide ceiling beside it, deliberately. The link-preview limiter has one
because a preview spends the *node's* egress and its third-party quota, which is
one shared thing; a chat message spends the sender's own group, and a node-wide
ceiling would let a busy group silence a quiet one — this same defect one level
up. The last test in the new file is that property: a member at their limit has
not spent anybody else's.
Two things stay open on purpose and are named rather than quietly done:
retention still keeps everything, because a default that deletes people's
history is not a review's call; and the composer still offers to send an
oversized message, so this is §6.4's pattern with only the node half built.
§6.6 gains the rule, §13.5b the label — AV20, with AV21–AV23 registering the
three fixes this week that closed the same kind of gap elsewhere.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`_is_node_admin()` is `self._user_id == node_user_id`, and `_user_id` is the
`sub` of a JWT the hub issued. Six node-wide controls were gated on that alone:
`node_status` — which lists every group on the machine with each root's
**absolute path** — plus `node_settings_set`, `roster_read`, `denylist_read`,
`denylist_clear` and `node_reload`.
So the answer to "are you the operator of this node" was "the hub says so",
which NS4 and M3 rule out in as many words: operator authority comes from the
node's roster and from nowhere else, and asking the hub is how the hub installs
itself as node administrator. The reach is bounded — a completed handshake also
needs the group key — but an active hub obtains one legitimately in an
open-join group, which §3.5 concedes, and from there it could read the
operator's directory layout or clear the denylist, which is the persisted
revocation H4 exists to keep.
`_operator_device()` requires both halves now: the account is the one the node
belongs to, *and* the device on this connection has proved a key the roster
holds as an operator. `device_hello` is signed over a transcript naming the
node, the group and this connection's nonce, and `operator_pks()` is rebuilt
from the roster on each call, so an unpinned browser and a revoked one are both
refused at once. The hub holds no user keys and cannot countersign a device.
Keeping the account check as well is deliberate: dropping it would widen these
node-wide controls to any paired operator of any group on the machine, which is
a separate decision. `_is_node_admin()` stays as what it is in the handshake
ack — a hint telling a client whether to offer the Node page — and says so.
Nothing changes for a paired operator: `device_hello` runs unconditionally
after the ack, and anyone using the Node page's controls is already paired,
since `root_add` and every other signed op has always verified against
`operator_pks()`. A browser that never paired now reads nothing there, which is
the state in which it could already write nothing.
test_node_status.py's fixture set the account and not the device, which is how
it went on passing; it now wires the device the way `device_hello` leaves it.
The adversary itself is in test_security_regressions.py — a token naming the
owner's account with no proved device, which the previous source answered with
`node_status_ack`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`_do_file_request` read `tr` as a boolean. Present meant "this is a leased
transfer, skip the leaseless ceiling", and nothing asked whether this node had
ever granted such a lease — `slots.touch(tr)` was called beside it and its
answer, `False` if it is not granted, was discarded. So any non-empty string
bought the whole library with no ceiling of any kind: not the per-member cap,
not the node-wide one, not the leaseless bound that exists to bound a client
claiming to be browsing. The queue held only the clients that chose to wait.
`_lease_of` decides it now, and the three answers differ on purpose:
- **granted**, and of *this* session — served, and touched so the sweeper
does not reclaim a transfer that is plainly moving. The session is checked
as well as the id, because touching another connection's lease refreshed
its idle timer.
- **queued** — refused with `lease_not_granted`, on the upload path too,
before anything reaches the operator's disk. A member reading while queued
is the cap not applying.
- **unknown** — bounded by the leaseless ceiling rather than refused. That is
also what a reconnect looks like from here, where the session's leases died
with the old connection and the client is re-opening them, and it leaves
the residual §5.5 already states: a client that lies gets that bound's
worth of files at a time, not the group. Noted once per connection so the
residual is visible rather than merely documented.
Nothing changes for the shipped client: the transfer store awaits
`lease.acquire()` before it reads a byte, so the refused case is one it never
enters. §5.5 gains a paragraph saying the node decides which of the two a
request is — the document described the accounting without ever saying it was
enforced, which is how it came not to be.
`test_lease_enforcement.py` drives the real handlers over a real index; six of
its nine cases fail against the previous source, each on the property.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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asyncio keeps only a weak reference to a task, so a coroutine started with
`asyncio.ensure_future(...)` whose result is discarded can be collected while
it is still running: the loop logs "Task was destroyed but it is pending!" and
the work simply does not happen. No error reaches the caller, and what is lost
is whatever that coroutine was in the middle of.
The node already had a guard for this, written after an abandoned stream task
lost a transcode slot for good — and it read one file, `webrtc_server.py`,
because that is where the defect was found. Outside that file there were
nineteen sites: the hub's `chat_notify` (a notification for every member of a
group), the indexer's debounce (every real-time index update), eleven in
`daemon.py` including the SIGHUP reload and each enrichment pass, two in
`ops.py`, and five in the loopback API.
`meshbay_common.background.spawn()` is the one door. It holds the task, drops
it when it finishes, and logs what it raised under the coroutine's own name —
an exception in a task nobody awaits was otherwise reported by asyncio at
collection time, out of context or not at all. A peer session's `_spawn` stays
as it is: that one can also *cancel* what it holds, which a module-level holder
cannot, because a session ends and a process does not.
`test_background_tasks.py` walks every package's source and refuses a discarded
handle. It parses rather than greps, so an assignment, a comprehension or an
await is not mistaken for one, and it was checked against a deliberate
reintroduction. A guard that stops at the edge of the file where the bug was
found is a guard against that bug, not against its class.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`_register_uploader` walked the index for the entry it had just written, at a
moment when no such entry can exist: the file was a `.part` until the rename on
the line above, which is not indexable, and the watchdog that will index it
debounces for two seconds and then hashes. The walk matched nothing, silently,
so every uploaded file in every group was owned by nobody — and `file_delete`
refuses a caller with no admin authority when the entry records no uploader, so
a member could not delete what they had just sent. MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §5.4
grants that to any non-revoked device of the uploading account.
The record is now written when the last chunk lands (`indexer.record_upload`)
and the entry is stamped from it in `_hash_or_cached`, the one funnel every
entry passes through — initial scan, watchdog, reconcile and replug alike. It
lives in the index cache rather than on the entry alone, because the index is
rebuilt from disk at every start and an owner the node forgets on restart is a
right quietly taken away. It is validated against a live `stat()`, so whatever
later occupies that path inherits nothing; and `_rescan_root`'s carry-over no
longer copies over it, or memory would beat the durable record.
§5.4 also claimed ownership was *provable* — a transcript the uploader signs,
stored with the entry. No such signature has ever existed; `meshbay:upload:v1`
in the code is the groupbox purpose that seals the envelope. The section now
states what the code does, and the transcript is an open item in §15.3.
`test_upload_attribution.py` drives the real handler and a real indexer across
that seam. Against the previous source its two positive cases fail on the
property, not on a missing method — an upload, then a rebuild from disk, then
a different file at the same path inheriting nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`ExecStartPre` ran `alembic -c /opt/meshbay-hub/migrations/alembic.ini upgrade
head`. The build does stage that file, so the path existed and the contents
were wrong: `alembic.ini` resolves `script_location` with `%(here)s`, so the
copy pointed at `/opt/meshbay-hub/migrations/src/meshbay_hub/db/migrations` —
which nothing installs, because the migrations ship inside `meshbay_hub`, in
the shared venv.
`ExecStartPre` failing stops the unit. A hub installed from the RPM or the DEB
could not start at all, and nothing noticed because the one live deployment
was assembled by hand — the same shape as the node unit that carried `User=`
into the user unit directory.
The same `%(here)s` trap was already found once on the server, where a stray
`alembic.ini` resolved to a month-old snapshot of the tree. Twice is a trap
rather than an accident, so the fix is that the path is no longer written down
anywhere: `meshbay-hub migrate` asks the installed package where its own
migrations are, which is correct for the RPM, the DEB, a venv and a checkout.
The build stages no `alembic.ini`; the repo keeps its own for `alembic
revision` and for deploy scripts that already work.
`env.py` now prefers a URL the caller resolved over re-reading the environment
itself, so `migrate --config` connects with exactly the string the server
will — one resolution, not two that agree until they do not.
Six tests, three of which fail against the unit as it was. They read the
directives rather than the file, because searching the whole thing finds the
comment explaining a directive and calls that the directive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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The figure was a line beside the settings form, which is where it is changed
and not where it is watched. It sits with the other live figures under
Statistics now — four cards and, above them, a banner saying which of the two
ceilings has fallen. The two states are not the same to whoever is reading:
one means newcomers are turned away, the other means somebody locked out of
their account cannot get back in. The settings block keeps a line pointing at
it.
And an operator no longer has to be looking. When a global ceiling is reached
the administrators are notified — in `mail.py`, in its own session, never
raising, because this runs while a request is being refused and an alert that
fails must not turn a refusal into a 500. Once per hour, keyed on a row
rather than a flag in memory: a flood is what spends the budget, so one alert
per refusal would bury the message under its own cause, and a hub that is
refusing mail is a hub somebody is about to restart.
`/v1/admin/mail` gains `general_exhausted` and `all_exhausted` rather than
leaving the panel to compare two numbers.
Labels in all ten catalogues; `.warn-msg` for the middle state, on the
`--warn` token both themes already define.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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AV16 the allowance that survives a restart and that an operator can see and
change; AV17 the single worker.
And a lesson that cost a full suite run: `node --check` reports success on a
module-syntax error. An unclosed `.map(` inside a tagged template came back
clean four times. `test_spa_syntax.py` says exactly this in its own docstring
— copying to `.mjs` is what forces the module parser — and the reflex still
reached for `node --check`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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`_connected_nodes`, `_node_groups`, `_webrtc_answers` and the relay registry
are per-process dictionaries. With two workers a node registers in one and
the WebRTC offers for it arrive at the other, so the symptom is a node that
is intermittently offline for half its members — which reads as a network
problem, a NAT problem, anything but a configuration line.
`server.workers` has always defaulted to 1 and the constraint was written
down nowhere. One line at startup, and a function rather than an inline check
so it can be tested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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They were constants in two modules, so an operator could not touch them
without editing code and redeploying — and the hour a budget runs out is not
when anyone wants to do that.
`[mail]` in hub.toml carries the defaults; the live values live in
`hub_settings`, read at each use. A missing row falls back to what the
configuration file says, so an instance that never opens the panel behaves as
its file describes. The panel sends only what changed, the hub clamps each
value to a stated range and refuses a key it does not know, and the response
is what gets rendered — so a clamped value is never shown as stored.
`GET /v1/admin/mail` is the other half. There was no way to see any of this:
a refusal was a line in the journal, so an instance that had stopped sending
sign-up codes looked, from the panel, exactly like one with no sign-ups. It
reports the hour's use, what is left for sign-ups, and what is left for
recovery — the difference between those two being the reserved share made
visible.
Labels in all ten catalogues.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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Two dicts in `mail.py` held the budget, so every deploy handed out a fresh
one — and this hub is deployed several times a day. A bound a restart forgets
is not a bound, for the reason the denylist is persisted rather than held in
memory (S3). It is a `mail_quota` table now, one row per counter, the
recipient hashed so the table does not become a list of plaintext addresses.
The counting moves with it, into an async `reserve` that has a session, and
`send_off_loop` is the one door it stands in. `_send` keeps the purpose
allow-list: that half needs no state, and it is what stops anything which
puts a message on the wire from naming a reason this hub does not send for.
The caller owns the commit, so a request that fails afterwards is not charged
for mail nobody received.
`hourly_reserved_for_recovery` is new. A flood of sign-ups used to be able to
spend the whole hour and lock out the person waiting on a passphrase reset;
registration and address changes may now spend only the unreserved share.
Values changed as agreed: 10 messages a day to one recipient, 300 s between
two reset codes. The address-change ceiling and its cooldown were two bounds
on one thing — 3 a day and 60 s apart — and collapse into one 48-hour delay.
Asking again for the address already pending is exempt: it reaches no new
recipient, that recipient is bounded anyway, and without the exemption a typo
locked the account out of correcting it for two days.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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AV13 the mail gate, AV14 the MHP audience and the hub's own identity, AV15
the shape check on the unauthenticated blocklist endpoints. §13.5b also
records the auto-block threshold as an open decision rather than a defect.
Two lessons, both about tests.
A fixture narrower than production tests the fixture — and when it writes down
*why* it has to be narrow, that is a bug report nobody filed. Two test helpers
described the federation defects accurately, in comments, while routing
around them.
And a global's state is not a given, in a test least of all. One assertion —
that a refusal never logs the address — took three attempts, each passing
alone and failing in the full run, for three different reasons: caplog saw
nothing because the app configures logging, then a handler saw nothing
because an earlier test raised the logger's level, then because `disabled`
was left True.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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`GET /v1/blocklist` takes no authentication — a node syncs it at startup —
and had no ceiling on `limit`, so anyone could ask for the table in one query,
repeatedly. `GET /v1/blocklist/check` took any string of any length straight
into a primary-key lookup, unmetered.
Not changed, and worth a decision rather than a quiet edit:
`AUTO_BLOCK_THRESHOLD` is 3. Three distinct accounts blocking a hash adds it
to the list every node enforces, network-wide, automatically, with manual
admin removal the only undo. Far better than the anonymous version it
replaced, and still a censorship primitive an attacker buys for three email
addresses. §13.5b records the option — count only accounts more than a day
old, which costs a patient attacker a day and an honest reporter nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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Federation has never worked between two hubs, and the tests said so without
anyone reading it that way.
`federation.py` did `from meshbay_hub.auth import _hub_id, _hub_sk_pem` at
import — which is before `load_hub_keypair` runs. So it held the key as
`None` and the identity as the module default: `_issue_mhp_token` could only
raise, and `/mhp/info`, the directory export and every token announced this
instance as `meshbay.org` whatever it was configured as. Read through
accessors now, at call time.
And `_verify_mhp_token` named no audience while `_issue_mhp_token` sets one.
PyJWT refuses a token carrying `aud` when decode is given none, so every
token this hub issues was rejected by every hub running this code. Naming the
audience fixes that and makes the binding real: a token minted for one peer
is refused by another, which is what stops a captured request being replayed
at a third hub. The comment claiming audience binding was unavailable because
"the sending side is unbuilt" was describing a function four lines below it.
Both were already written down. `test_federation.py` built envelopes by hand
without an `aud`; `test_public_groups_toggle.py` signed its own token with a
comment saying `_issue_mhp_token` "binds `_hub_sk_pem` at import time, before
the lifespan loads it, so it cannot be used from a test", and another saying
PyJWT rejects a token carrying `aud` when decode is given none. Both
observations were exactly right, and both were treated as facts to route
around. When a test has to work around the code to run, the thing it worked
around is the finding. Those helpers now go through the real issuer, and two
tests pin the identity and the audience refusal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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The previous commit metered the paths that send mail. It was not enough, and
saying it was would have been wrong: a 60-second cooldown per account still
allows one stranger a minute — 1440 a day — and registration is open, so
"per account" is a bound an attacker buys more of. And there was a third door
nobody had counted.
POST /v1/users/register an address nobody has verified
PATCH /v1/users/me an address nobody has verified, signed in
POST /v1/users/password/reset only the address already on file
POST /v1/groups/{id}/invite-notify only a registered member's address
The widest was the register *resend* branch: no token, no captcha, and the
username and address are the caller's own from a moment ago — registering a
victim's address once bought the right to mail them at the endpoint's rate
limit for as long as the account stayed pending.
So the bound moves into `mail.py`, where every message passes one function.
`purpose` is keyword-required and checked against a closed list, so a helper
that names anything else does not send and one that names nothing is a
TypeError rather than an unrestricted send. Under it:
- a bound per **recipient**, across every purpose, account and endpoint —
what a person being mail-bombed actually experiences, and the only bound
that describes it. Keyed on a hash, because this would otherwise be the
one place in the hub holding plaintext addresses in memory (S2)
- an instance-wide hourly ceiling, which cannot be bought with more accounts
- a cooldown on the resend branch, a cooldown and a daily ceiling on the
address change, and the IP-log entry that endpoint never wrote — alone
among the ones that mail
The ceiling on address changes counts IP-log rows, not EmailVerification: the
handler deletes this account's unverified rows before writing a new one, so
counting those counts one, always. Which is what the first version of it did.
Refusals never carry the address: that line goes to the journal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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The register grows by the four findings from users.py, and gains the pattern
underneath several of them: a limit written on one of several equivalent paths
(three endpoints send mail, one had no limit; every list in admin.py is
bounded, the two outside it were not; the group claim was bounded at
registration and not on reload), and a bound that counts the wrong thing (a
per-IP rate limit bounds a caller, never the mailbox that receives what they
cause).
Also records that admin.py was read under the lens and needed nothing, so the
next reader does not re-derive that.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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`users.py` and `admin.py` under the availability lens. `admin.py` needed
nothing — its moderator/admin line is drawn explicitly, self-modification is
refused, and every list it serves is bounded. `users.py` had four findings and
one of them is the worst of this whole pass.
AV9 `mail._send` is `smtplib` with a ten-second timeout, called straight
from four async handlers. That wait is not one request's, it is the
instance's: nothing else served, no node socket read, no WebRTC offer
relayed, until the MTA answers. Reachable by any signed-in user at
request rate through the endpoint below. It has no symptom a test
catches — everything simply works slowly, for everyone, whenever the
mail server is having a bad day.
AV10 `PATCH /v1/users/me` is the third path that makes the hub send mail
and the only one with neither a rate limit nor a captcha, while
`register` and `password/reset-request` have both. The address is any
string the caller types and the duplicate check only rejects one
already held by an account here, so every address *not* registered on
this hub was a valid target: a relay for verification codes with the
hub's own reputation attached. A rate limit counting by IP bounds a
caller and not an inbox, so the floor under it is a cooldown per
account — the same for a reset request, whose cost also lands in a
mailbox that is not the asker's.
AV11 `default_tab:` accepted any suffix on a `{key:path}` route with an
unbounded Text value and no cap on rows: one account could write
without limit into a table shared with everyone. The suffix is a group
id, which is what the SPA writes, so it is checked as one. A key over
64 characters was also a 500 rather than a 400 — the column is
String(64), which PostgreSQL enforces and SQLite does not, so it would
have appeared in production and in no test.
AV12 `/v1/notifications` and `/v1/groups` had no upper bound on `limit` and
no floor under `offset`, while every list in `admin.py` carries
`le=200`. The group directory takes no authentication at all.
Two shapes recur and are now named in §13.5b: a limit written on one of
several equivalent paths, and a bound that counts the wrong thing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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The first three reviews asked who can read what, who can impersonate whom,
and what a hostile node can forge. None asked what a legitimate but
misconfigured or careless member costs everyone else — which is the question
a group platform lives on, because every member was invited by someone who
trusted them and none of them is an attacker.
C2 had asked "can a node claim a group its owner is not in?" and the answer
was correctly no. Nobody had asked what happens when a node claims one its
owner *is* in but does not host, which is how a group went dark for all of
its members with its real host online throughout.
§13.5b is the register, AV1 to AV8. The lens, for anything reviewed from
here: a participant supplies input; if anyone other than the sender bears the
cost, there is a ceiling to write, and it goes on every path that writes the
state.
CLAUDE.md gets the working rule and the incident as a lesson, and the stale
path to sync-ui.js corrected — it lives under scripts/, not build/.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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An availability review, prompted by the group claim above: a participant
supplies input — who else bears the cost? Six answers where the cost fell on
someone other than the sender, and none of them needs an attacker.
AV3 `chat_notify` carried a `group_id` the hub believed, so any connected
node could write a notification to every member of any group on the
hub, carrying a display string of its choosing, with its account
having no relation to that group. This is the group claim again, two
hundred lines further down the same socket. Gated on what the node is
registered for, and metered: the fan-out is one write per member. The
budget expires by time rather than on disconnect, or reconnecting
would refill it and a node token is good for an hour.
AV4 A swarm source named its own `endpoint` as free text documented as
"ip:port", so an account could publish a third party's address — H6's
`peer_ip` defect, never applied here. Nothing dials a swarm source
today, which is the only reason it was not already a reflection
primitive. It is a transport and a port now, never a host, and the
number of hashes one account may claim is bounded: rows were keyed
(hash, account) with no cap at all.
AV5 `handle_webrtc_answer` resolved any pending `peer_id` from any node's
socket. The answer is the SDP a browser then connects to. That this
had not happened rested on a uuid4 being unguessable.
AV6 `relay_register` had no authentication of any kind: it compared
`pk_relay` against the approved value, which is a *public* key, so
anyone who could read it could rewrite where the hub tells nodes to
send relayed traffic. The module docstring promised signed JWTs and
`jwt` was imported and never used.
AV7 The node held unlimited peer connections and kept one that never
completed a handshake for the life of the daemon. H6 bounded what one
unauthenticated peer costs; the hub's cap is three offers in flight
per *account*, a limit on each caller and not on the machine, so an
operator's exposure grew with the size of their groups.
AV8 `invite-notify` put a request-supplied `group_name` into the subject
of an email the hub sends under its own domain, to any account, with
no rate limit. The name comes from the group row now.
The tests are two accounts each, in one file that says why: a one-member test
proves a one-member property, and every finding here needed a second person
to exist at all. Each was checked against the unfixed code. Two did not
survive that check and were rewritten — one re-enacted the disconnect path
instead of running it (hence `forget_node`), the other called the reaper
itself and would have passed with the call removed from `handle_offer`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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A node that hosts no groups sends no `group_ids` on its hub socket, and the
hub resolved the claim with `set(claimed_groups or authorized)` — so "I host
nothing" arrived as "I host every group this account belongs to", other
members' included. Such a node can serve none of them: it holds no GEK, and
its own handshake refuses them with "Group not hosted on this node".
`/v1/groups/{id}/nodes` answers in registration order and `_node_groups` is
in-memory, so which node a client was sent to depended on who reconnected
first after a hub restart. GroupPage took `nodes[0]` with no fallback. On
2026-09-11 a hub deploy at 20:14 reshuffled the registry, a second member's
unconfigured node won the race, and a group stopped opening for everyone in
it with its only real host online throughout. Any member could take one of
their groups down, by accident, by leaving an empty node running.
Four changes, because no one of them is sufficient:
- the hub never widens an absent claim, and `update_groups` goes through
the same ceiling as registration — it assigned its list verbatim, so the
bound that makes C2 hold at authentication was one message wide
- the node states the empty set rather than omitting the field
- the refusal carries `not_hosted`, so a client can tell "try the next
node" from "you, here, must do something first"
- GroupPage walks the list instead of indexing into it
The three lines involved date from 13, 20 and 23 August and each is
defensible alone. The defect is in the seam, which is where the last two
also were: a falsy empty collection must never mean "unspecified".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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A second-machine sideload of the MSIX target surfaced three things the
earlier verification round (which only proved the package installs and
runs) had missed:
1. meshbay-node missing from PATH. installer.nsh's customInstall adds
node-runtime\ to HKCU\Environment at install time -- an unelevated
per-user write, never blocked by MSIX's no-elevation rule, only by the
more basic fact that an AppX/MSIX install runs no custom code at all.
packaging/win/ensure-node-path.ps1 (idempotent, no admin verb) plus
main.js's winEnsureNodeOnPath() do it from the app itself instead, once
per launch, shipped to Full and MSIX (not Light, nothing to add there).
Verified live via the Node inspector protocol: the entry was in
HKCU\Environment\Path after a launch, absent before.
2. A daemon that crashes on startup failed silently. spawnNodeDetached()
used stdio: 'ignore', so a real crash reproduced live (a second instance
colliding with the first on 127.0.0.1:18000) left waitForNode()'s
generic 60s timeout as the only failure ever shown. spawnNodeDetachedWatched()
pipes stdio and watches ~2.5s, rejecting immediately with the daemon's
own stderr on an early exit; a survivor has its streams released and
runs fully detached exactly as before. First version bounded the
captured text by line count and a live test showed that cut the actual
OSError line -- two uvicorn/asyncio tracebacks followed it in the real
capture -- so it is bounded by characters instead.
3. No hint that a startup-mode choice exists. The install-time radio page
was the only place this was ever offered, and nothing replaces it now
that no install-time page can exist at all. SetupWelcome (the existing
first-run banner) grew a conditional hint, shown only while a bundled
node is present and neither autostart nor service mode is configured
yet. Considered and rejected: linking straight to the Node page -- its
route is gated on a linked hub node key, false on the exact fresh-install
screen this hint targets, so the link would have been dead on arrival.
New key setup.node_startup_hint, added to all ten locale catalogues.
test_packaging_win.py gained six tests pinning all three (69 total).
Full plan and verification detail: C:\Users\admin\devel\msix-installer.md
section 13 (out of repo).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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An administrator's deletion answered 409 for any account owning a group,
so an erasure ordered by an authority had to wait on the person it was
about. It now deletes the account's groups with it, then pushes a signed
revocation for the account and for each group to every connected node:
an access token already issued stays valid on a node until it expires,
and the revocation is what makes the nodes refuse the account and close
the groups' sessions now. The action is written to the IP log, and the
confirmation dialog says the groups go too, in all ten catalogues.
The owner's own deletion is unchanged: refused while they own groups,
which they can hand over first (CGU 3.4, privacy statement).
Deleting a group had three partial cascades. The owner's route left
email_verifications behind, and the cleanup of unhosted groups left
notifications, invitations and reports - each an IntegrityError on
PostgreSQL, invisible on SQLite, which does not enforce foreign keys by
default. db/purge.py is now the one implementation: it finds every table
referencing groups.id from the schema, deletes the group's rows and
detaches content reports, which are evidence and outlive the group.
test_group_purge.py turns foreign-key enforcement on for its connection,
seeds every referencing table, and fails without the fix on all three
routes. MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 7.7 states the rule, and now lists the device
keys and swarm sources that e3c68b3 erases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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Store certification of the NSIS "MSI/EXE" submission failed on three
checks (silent-install verification, Add/Remove Programs entry, bundleware
check) -- traced and reproduced live to one cause: SmartScreen blocks an
unsigned, internet-downloaded installer at the shell layer before
Microsoft's own unattended validation bot ever gets to run it. MSIX
sidesteps this class of failure entirely: submitted through the Store's
native pipeline, there is no browser-download-then-launch step for
SmartScreen to intercept, and Microsoft signs the package itself at
publish time -- free, and specific to this submission type (Trusted
Signing remains a paid service for the MSI/EXE path). Full plan and
findings: C:\Users\admin\devel\msix-installer.md (out of repo).
electron-builder.msix.yml carries the same bundle as Full (node runtime,
ffmpeg, both service scripts) -- an AppX/MSIX install never elevates, by
design, but that changes only *when* the two elevated operations can run,
not whether the daemon ships. No main.js changes were needed: the on-demand
elevation path for service-mode (winElevateServiceMode(), driven from the
Node page) already existed for a different reason and depends only on
service-mode.ps1 being present as an extraResource, true for any packaged
Windows target. identityName/publisher/publisherDisplayName are the real
values from Partner Center's app-identity reservation, not placeholders.
build-win-msix.ps1 points electron-builder at the system Windows 10 SDK
(auto-detected) instead of letting it download its own bundled copy --
that download's 7z extraction creates symlinks this target never uses and
fails without SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege, reproduced on this machine.
build/appx/ carries the four tile images the AppX target requires
regardless of showNameOnTiles, generated once from the existing app icon
(see that directory's README) since the system-SDK redirect has no vendor
samples to fall back to. build/appx-extensions.xml declares
windows.startupTask by hand rather than via electron-builder's
addAutoLaunchExtension, which always targets the Electron shell -- this
points at the bundled node binary instead, matching what "starts at sign
in" already means for Full.
Verified live via a signed sideload install (self-signed test cert,
cleaned up after): the package installs and the app runs correctly. One
finding worth carrying forward -- the declared network capabilities
(internetClientServer, privateNetworkClientServer) do not create any
firewall exemption for this app, most likely because automatic
capability-based exemption is an AppContainer-sandbox property and this
app deliberately runs full-trust, outside any sandbox. Not a regression:
no install-time elevation was possible either way, so the cost is the same
one-time OS firewall prompt firewall.ps1's own header already documents as
its fallback today.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MeshBay Light has no bundled meshbay-node.exe, so the create-group wizard
(which assumes it can start a local node) needs its own signal, not just
platform.node.available. main.js exposes it over IPC (node:bundled) by
checking the packaged resources directory rather than trusting a build-time
constant; preload.js and platform.js carry it through the usual
contextBridge/wrapper path.
winCanElevateServiceMode() replaces the two prior 'app.isPackaged' checks
for whether the app can offer service-mode elevation -- Light is packaged
but has no service-mode.ps1 to elevate into, so packaged alone was already
the wrong test even before this target existed.
create-group-page.js gates the wizard step that starts a node on the new
capability instead of hiding the whole feature; node-page.js's comment fix
is unrelated cosmetic drift caught in the same pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MeshBay Light ships the Electron client + UI only -- no PyInstaller node
freeze, no ffmpeg, no service install/autostart. Two standalone
electron-builder configs (Full via package.json's build field, Light via
electron-builder.light.yml passed with --config, which reads only that
file -- confirmed against app-builder-lib's own config loader) rather than
one config branching on a flag.
build-win-common.ps1 holds the steps both orchestrators share (Node check,
npm ci, Electron bump, sync-ui) so build-win.ps1 (Full) and the new
build-win-light.ps1 cannot drift apart; build-win.ps1 is refactored to
dot-source it with no behavior change (rebuilt and diffed byte-identical
output).
installer-light.nsh keeps the one thing Light still needs -- an
unconditional firewall rule, since the client listens too -- and none of
the service-mode/autostart machinery installer.nsh carries, which has
nothing to gate without a bundled node.
dist-light/ (Light's own electron-builder output dir) gets its own
.gitignore line since the bare dist/ rule does not match it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Everything under static/ is served at /a/<hash>/ with a year's
`immutable`, but the hash was computed from a hand-kept list of 43
top-level modules. The ten catalogues and vendor/ were not on it, nor
was anything the guarding test could see: it globbed *.js at the top
level only. A change confined to the catalogues therefore kept the hash,
and a phone went on showing a heading that had been rewritten and
deployed - pull-to-refresh fetched the no-store shell, which was
current, and never refetched en.js at a URL that had not moved.
The fingerprint now hashes every file under static/, path and content,
so a change, a rename or a new file moves the version with nothing to
register. _ASSETS is gone, and CLAUDE.md, MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 9.4 step 6,
assets/brand/README.md and docs/playlists.md no longer ask for it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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A small link to the hub's legal pages, pinned to the bottom of the
sidebar once signed in. It opens in a new tab: the desktop application
refuses to navigate away from its interface and hands a new window to
the system browser, and in a browser it keeps the session on screen. The
address comes from hubBase(), so it is the legal pages of the hub in use.
The sidebar now sticks under the navigation bar at the window's height;
otherwise, on a long file list, the link would sit at the bottom of the
page. The music bar, pinned to the bottom of the window as well,
publishes its height through useStickyBand as --music-bar-h and the
sidebar stops above it. On a phone the slide-out panel does the same.
test_sidebar_legal_measured.py measures the real stylesheet: the link at
the bottom of the window on a 3000px page, and above the music bar, at
phone and desktop widths. Checked signed in on a local hub in Chrome and
Firefox 155.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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The browser sign-in page now carries the project's pitch beside the form:
what MeshBay is, the applications, what it is for, and what meshbay.org
does and never sees, with links to the downloads and the legal pages.
Text on the left and the form on the right on a desktop; one column,
form first, below 1000px. Not shown in the desktop application, whose
user has already downloaded it. All ten catalogues carry the text.
Every claim is held to MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 2.3: the page says content never
reaches the hub, not that the hub can read nothing (T3), and "end-to-end"
means device to node.
Signed out there is no sidebar, so the 960px main column sat at the left
of the window and the sign-in, register and reset forms were centred in
it (x=290 in 1440). `.page-center` pages now lift that cap.
test_welcome_layout_measured.py measures the real stylesheet in Chrome:
no horizontal overflow from 320 to 1440px, form first on narrow screens,
form right of the text on desktops, pair centred in the window.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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erase_account cleared memberships, notifications, tokens and node
registrations, but not user_devices or swarm_sources.
A device key left on the tombstone still belonged to it, so an account
created later from the same desktop installation - which keeps its
private half - was refused that device with a 409 that only reached the
console. swarm_sources is keyed by the user id despite its column name
and carries the node's ip:port.
Both are now erased, which is what the privacy statement promises: every
account row goes except the one-year IP log.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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Operator feedback on the 0.13.0 installer:
- The all-users / current-user page (electron-builder's PAGE_INSTALL_MODE)
only ever showed "anyone who uses this computer" disabled -- MeshBay is
per-user only (account-bound keystore/DPAPI, MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 11.2) and
build.nsis forbids elevation. customInstallMode forces $isForceCurrentInstall
so the page is skipped.
- The two nested Yes/No MessageBoxes are one nsDialogs radio page
(customPageAfterChangeDir): only-while-open / at-sign-in / background service,
default background service. customInit seeds MB_AutoMode "2" for silent
installs where the page never runs. "At sign-in" now writes the Startup .vbs
from the installer (meshbay-node autostart install, unelevated); the old
per-user branch set up nothing.
- The firewall rules go in for every mode, not behind a second opt-in -- a node
that accepts no connections is the failure mode MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 7.5 names.
Folded into the service elevation for mode 2; their own single elevation for
0/1. Unelevated short-circuit kept but narrower: firewall.ps1 check AND
service.ps1 status must both pass to skip mode 2's UAC.
Var MB_AutoMode lives inside customPageAfterChangeDir, not at file scope: the
uninstaller compile pass inserts none of the macros that read it and
makensis -WX turns "unused Var" (6001) into a hard error.
Not yet exercised on a real machine -- the NSIS UI cannot be driven from the
build env. test_packaging_win.py pins the script shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Twenty-four files, about 17 000 lines: the two architecture drafts, the three
security reviews, eleven design notes, the roadmap, the decisions file, the v1–v4
archive, the deprecated user guide and the stale quickstart. Their content is in
MESHBAY_DESIGN.md, and git history holds the originals.
The reason to delete rather than keep bannered: a document that is superseded but
present still gets read, and a reader cannot always tell which of two accounts of
one mechanism is the live one. That was the argument for retiring the user guide
rather than repairing it, and it applies to the whole set.
What made this safe is the concordance. Roughly 290 comments and docstrings cite
these files by section — `musicbay.md §6`, `mediacenter.md §5.5`, `draft-v6 §2.11`
— and section 16 maps every one onto its replacement, so not a single comment
needs editing to stay followable. It now says plainly that the files are gone and
where to recover them, and it gained rows for the three reviews (their findings
are section 13), and for the two guides.
Four kept documents pointed into the set and were repointed first: `playlists.md`
(nine references — it is a live proposal and must not dangle), `WINDOWS-PORT.md`,
and CLAUDE.md's example. No dangling reference remains outside section 16.
Two files were dropped from the list after checking what they hold. `HTTPS.md` is
an operational runbook — Caddy, certificate renewal, DNS, troubleshooting — and
MESHBAY_DESIGN.md deliberately covers no operations, so nothing would replace it;
the versioned Caddyfile is the config, not the procedure. `cast-smart-tv.md` is
the plan for the unbuilt DLNA phase of a feature whose first two phases ship, and
section 11.4 summarises it in four lines rather than carrying the SSDP/UPnP work.
There is no user guide now, and section 0.1 says so rather than leaving a reader
to discover it.
Suites green: 2258 passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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It is too far out of date to be worth repairing. It describes identity keys
derived from a username and password, one `shared_dir` per group with an
`uploads/` quarantine, ChaCha20 as the content cipher, a hub that stores users'
public keys and the wrapped group keys, and a member wrapping that key for
another member — which is finding H3, in the section that explains why the hub
cannot read your files.
The banner lists each of those against what is actually true, so that no section
below it is mistaken for current, and points at MESHBAY_DESIGN.md and
MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md instead. It also records what the document predates
entirely: encrypted chat, the sealed index and upload path, transfer leases,
device linking, the application framework.
Repairing it section by section is refused deliberately. Enough of it is wrong
that a reader cannot tell the sound parts from the stale ones, which is worse
than having no guide, and fixing one section leaves exactly that problem in
place. The previous commit — which translated two French passages and corrected
the errors immediately around them — is dropped for the same reason: it made a
small part of a misleading document accurate, which makes the whole harder to
distrust, not easier.
There is no replacement user guide today. That gap is real and is better stated
than papered over.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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The ack was assembled from its own tuple of application names, a copy of the
daemon's `APP_DIR_KEYS`, and the two had drifted: the copy was missing
`helloworld`. So the reference application — the one that exists to prove a new
application needs no special-casing — was the single application whose
configured folders never reached a client, which made the plugin claim false
exactly where it is demonstrated.
Fixed by removing the copy rather than syncing it. The ack now emits whatever
`<app>_directories` the group context carries, and `_app_directories_ctx` is the
only thing that puts one there, so the two cannot disagree again. The transport
names an application in one place, `ALLOWED_APPS`, which is enforcement rather
than a directory list.
The client had the same fault one layer up: `group-page.js` read three names by
hand from the ack while the live-update path beside it was already generic. It
derives the map from the ack's own keys now, so the fix reaches the settings
pane instead of stopping at the wire.
A first attempt moved the list to `roster.py`, where directory *storage* lives,
and `test_helloworld_proves_the_plugin_claim.py` refused it: the roster, the ops,
the config and the root set must name no application at all. That test is the
architecture's own guard and it was right — the list belongs on the daemon, which
is what wires a group's context, and everything downstream is derived from it.
Two new tests, both verified to fail against the previous shape: the ack carries
an application the node names nowhere else, and the ack keeps no list of its own.
`test_the_lists_are_read_under_one_name_each` now asserts the shell names no
application rather than that it names exactly three.
Two stale comments went with it — the ack's, which described scalars removed in
07ff8b4, and the client's, which said those scalars still rode the wire for
MNP 1.0 peers that can no longer connect.
Full suite: 2258 passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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The handshake ack's app-directories entry still said "the same three answers in
one shape" and "the scalars above are derived from these and kept for MNP 1.0
clients". Neither is true since the per-app ops were folded into one: there are
no scalars above, and a 1.0 client cannot reach this code at all — the floor
moved to 3.0 with the lease flag day.
A comment that contradicts the code beside it is worse than no comment, because
one of them is wrong and the reader cannot tell which. This is the same fault
the leaseless-bound comment had, one commit earlier.
What it says instead is what is actually load-bearing: `<app>_directories` is
the only form on the wire, and `chat_directory` below is safe as a second name
for one of them because `_app_directories_ctx` derives it on every build rather
than storing it alongside — which is precisely what the removed scalars did not
do.
daemon.py had the same stale reference three lines from the code that produces
these, pointing at `video_root` for the shape a per-group signed setting takes.
Comments only; no behaviour change. Node suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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CLAUDE.md was half a second specification. It carried summaries of three
security reviews, the invite redesign, per-node identity, the desktop client, a
protocol-version history and a sixty-row module table — all of it now in
MESHBAY_DESIGN.md, and some of it wrong: an errata list asserted a keystore
parameter that had been raised months earlier, and the module table pointed at
two implementations that no longer exist.
An errata list beside a specification is a second specification, and the older
one wins by being read first. Those sections become a pointer table naming which
part of the design document answers which question.
What stays is what has no other home: the conventions, and the engineering
lessons — the ones that are not deducible from the design because they are what
the code and the platforms actually do. They keep every word.
The module table stays as locators, stripped of the design prose it duplicated,
with a note kept only where it is a rule about editing the code. Every path in
it was verified to exist; two were wrong, and the harness directory was wrong
throughout.
Two references to files outside the repository are gone from the reference
table — a document about this repository should not send a reader somewhere they
cannot follow. The rules about that directory stay, because they are rules about
what must never be committed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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