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Everything under static/ is served at /a/<hash>/ with a year's
`immutable`, but the hash was computed from a hand-kept list of 43
top-level modules. The ten catalogues and vendor/ were not on it, nor
was anything the guarding test could see: it globbed *.js at the top
level only. A change confined to the catalogues therefore kept the hash,
and a phone went on showing a heading that had been rewritten and
deployed - pull-to-refresh fetched the no-store shell, which was
current, and never refetched en.js at a URL that had not moved.
The fingerprint now hashes every file under static/, path and content,
so a change, a rename or a new file moves the version with nothing to
register. _ASSETS is gone, and CLAUDE.md, MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 9.4 step 6,
assets/brand/README.md and docs/playlists.md no longer ask for it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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A small link to the hub's legal pages, pinned to the bottom of the
sidebar once signed in. It opens in a new tab: the desktop application
refuses to navigate away from its interface and hands a new window to
the system browser, and in a browser it keeps the session on screen. The
address comes from hubBase(), so it is the legal pages of the hub in use.
The sidebar now sticks under the navigation bar at the window's height;
otherwise, on a long file list, the link would sit at the bottom of the
page. The music bar, pinned to the bottom of the window as well,
publishes its height through useStickyBand as --music-bar-h and the
sidebar stops above it. On a phone the slide-out panel does the same.
test_sidebar_legal_measured.py measures the real stylesheet: the link at
the bottom of the window on a 3000px page, and above the music bar, at
phone and desktop widths. Checked signed in on a local hub in Chrome and
Firefox 155.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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The browser sign-in page now carries the project's pitch beside the form:
what MeshBay is, the applications, what it is for, and what meshbay.org
does and never sees, with links to the downloads and the legal pages.
Text on the left and the form on the right on a desktop; one column,
form first, below 1000px. Not shown in the desktop application, whose
user has already downloaded it. All ten catalogues carry the text.
Every claim is held to MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 2.3: the page says content never
reaches the hub, not that the hub can read nothing (T3), and "end-to-end"
means device to node.
Signed out there is no sidebar, so the 960px main column sat at the left
of the window and the sign-in, register and reset forms were centred in
it (x=290 in 1440). `.page-center` pages now lift that cap.
test_welcome_layout_measured.py measures the real stylesheet in Chrome:
no horizontal overflow from 320 to 1440px, form first on narrow screens,
form right of the text on desktops, pair centred in the window.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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erase_account cleared memberships, notifications, tokens and node
registrations, but not user_devices or swarm_sources.
A device key left on the tombstone still belonged to it, so an account
created later from the same desktop installation - which keeps its
private half - was refused that device with a 409 that only reached the
console. swarm_sources is keyed by the user id despite its column name
and carries the node's ip:port.
Both are now erased, which is what the privacy statement promises: every
account row goes except the one-year IP log.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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Operator feedback on the 0.13.0 installer:
- The all-users / current-user page (electron-builder's PAGE_INSTALL_MODE)
only ever showed "anyone who uses this computer" disabled -- MeshBay is
per-user only (account-bound keystore/DPAPI, MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 11.2) and
build.nsis forbids elevation. customInstallMode forces $isForceCurrentInstall
so the page is skipped.
- The two nested Yes/No MessageBoxes are one nsDialogs radio page
(customPageAfterChangeDir): only-while-open / at-sign-in / background service,
default background service. customInit seeds MB_AutoMode "2" for silent
installs where the page never runs. "At sign-in" now writes the Startup .vbs
from the installer (meshbay-node autostart install, unelevated); the old
per-user branch set up nothing.
- The firewall rules go in for every mode, not behind a second opt-in -- a node
that accepts no connections is the failure mode MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 7.5 names.
Folded into the service elevation for mode 2; their own single elevation for
0/1. Unelevated short-circuit kept but narrower: firewall.ps1 check AND
service.ps1 status must both pass to skip mode 2's UAC.
Var MB_AutoMode lives inside customPageAfterChangeDir, not at file scope: the
uninstaller compile pass inserts none of the macros that read it and
makensis -WX turns "unused Var" (6001) into a hard error.
Not yet exercised on a real machine -- the NSIS UI cannot be driven from the
build env. test_packaging_win.py pins the script shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Twenty-four files, about 17 000 lines: the two architecture drafts, the three
security reviews, eleven design notes, the roadmap, the decisions file, the v1–v4
archive, the deprecated user guide and the stale quickstart. Their content is in
MESHBAY_DESIGN.md, and git history holds the originals.
The reason to delete rather than keep bannered: a document that is superseded but
present still gets read, and a reader cannot always tell which of two accounts of
one mechanism is the live one. That was the argument for retiring the user guide
rather than repairing it, and it applies to the whole set.
What made this safe is the concordance. Roughly 290 comments and docstrings cite
these files by section — `musicbay.md §6`, `mediacenter.md §5.5`, `draft-v6 §2.11`
— and section 16 maps every one onto its replacement, so not a single comment
needs editing to stay followable. It now says plainly that the files are gone and
where to recover them, and it gained rows for the three reviews (their findings
are section 13), and for the two guides.
Four kept documents pointed into the set and were repointed first: `playlists.md`
(nine references — it is a live proposal and must not dangle), `WINDOWS-PORT.md`,
and CLAUDE.md's example. No dangling reference remains outside section 16.
Two files were dropped from the list after checking what they hold. `HTTPS.md` is
an operational runbook — Caddy, certificate renewal, DNS, troubleshooting — and
MESHBAY_DESIGN.md deliberately covers no operations, so nothing would replace it;
the versioned Caddyfile is the config, not the procedure. `cast-smart-tv.md` is
the plan for the unbuilt DLNA phase of a feature whose first two phases ship, and
section 11.4 summarises it in four lines rather than carrying the SSDP/UPnP work.
There is no user guide now, and section 0.1 says so rather than leaving a reader
to discover it.
Suites green: 2258 passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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It is too far out of date to be worth repairing. It describes identity keys
derived from a username and password, one `shared_dir` per group with an
`uploads/` quarantine, ChaCha20 as the content cipher, a hub that stores users'
public keys and the wrapped group keys, and a member wrapping that key for
another member — which is finding H3, in the section that explains why the hub
cannot read your files.
The banner lists each of those against what is actually true, so that no section
below it is mistaken for current, and points at MESHBAY_DESIGN.md and
MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md instead. It also records what the document predates
entirely: encrypted chat, the sealed index and upload path, transfer leases,
device linking, the application framework.
Repairing it section by section is refused deliberately. Enough of it is wrong
that a reader cannot tell the sound parts from the stale ones, which is worse
than having no guide, and fixing one section leaves exactly that problem in
place. The previous commit — which translated two French passages and corrected
the errors immediately around them — is dropped for the same reason: it made a
small part of a misleading document accurate, which makes the whole harder to
distrust, not easier.
There is no replacement user guide today. That gap is real and is better stated
than papered over.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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The ack was assembled from its own tuple of application names, a copy of the
daemon's `APP_DIR_KEYS`, and the two had drifted: the copy was missing
`helloworld`. So the reference application — the one that exists to prove a new
application needs no special-casing — was the single application whose
configured folders never reached a client, which made the plugin claim false
exactly where it is demonstrated.
Fixed by removing the copy rather than syncing it. The ack now emits whatever
`<app>_directories` the group context carries, and `_app_directories_ctx` is the
only thing that puts one there, so the two cannot disagree again. The transport
names an application in one place, `ALLOWED_APPS`, which is enforcement rather
than a directory list.
The client had the same fault one layer up: `group-page.js` read three names by
hand from the ack while the live-update path beside it was already generic. It
derives the map from the ack's own keys now, so the fix reaches the settings
pane instead of stopping at the wire.
A first attempt moved the list to `roster.py`, where directory *storage* lives,
and `test_helloworld_proves_the_plugin_claim.py` refused it: the roster, the ops,
the config and the root set must name no application at all. That test is the
architecture's own guard and it was right — the list belongs on the daemon, which
is what wires a group's context, and everything downstream is derived from it.
Two new tests, both verified to fail against the previous shape: the ack carries
an application the node names nowhere else, and the ack keeps no list of its own.
`test_the_lists_are_read_under_one_name_each` now asserts the shell names no
application rather than that it names exactly three.
Two stale comments went with it — the ack's, which described scalars removed in
07ff8b4, and the client's, which said those scalars still rode the wire for
MNP 1.0 peers that can no longer connect.
Full suite: 2258 passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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The handshake ack's app-directories entry still said "the same three answers in
one shape" and "the scalars above are derived from these and kept for MNP 1.0
clients". Neither is true since the per-app ops were folded into one: there are
no scalars above, and a 1.0 client cannot reach this code at all — the floor
moved to 3.0 with the lease flag day.
A comment that contradicts the code beside it is worse than no comment, because
one of them is wrong and the reader cannot tell which. This is the same fault
the leaseless-bound comment had, one commit earlier.
What it says instead is what is actually load-bearing: `<app>_directories` is
the only form on the wire, and `chat_directory` below is safe as a second name
for one of them because `_app_directories_ctx` derives it on every build rather
than storing it alongside — which is precisely what the removed scalars did not
do.
daemon.py had the same stale reference three lines from the code that produces
these, pointing at `video_root` for the shape a per-group signed setting takes.
Comments only; no behaviour change. Node suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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CLAUDE.md was half a second specification. It carried summaries of three
security reviews, the invite redesign, per-node identity, the desktop client, a
protocol-version history and a sixty-row module table — all of it now in
MESHBAY_DESIGN.md, and some of it wrong: an errata list asserted a keystore
parameter that had been raised months earlier, and the module table pointed at
two implementations that no longer exist.
An errata list beside a specification is a second specification, and the older
one wins by being read first. Those sections become a pointer table naming which
part of the design document answers which question.
What stays is what has no other home: the conventions, and the engineering
lessons — the ones that are not deducible from the design because they are what
the code and the platforms actually do. They keep every word.
The module table stays as locators, stripped of the design prose it duplicated,
with a note kept only where it is a rule about editing the code. Every path in
it was verified to exist; two were wrong, and the harness directory was wrong
throughout.
Two references to files outside the repository are gone from the reference
table — a document about this repository should not send a reader somewhere they
cannot follow. The rules about that directory stay, because they are rules about
what must never be committed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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Twenty-three documents that MESHBAY_DESIGN.md absorbs gain a header saying so
and naming the sections their content went to. None is deleted: code comments,
tests and the documents themselves cite their sections and their labels, and
each records reasoning a synthesis compresses.
The header states the precedence, because two documents describing one system
will disagree eventually: where a draft disagrees with MESHBAY_DESIGN.md the
design document is right, and where either disagrees with the code the code is.
Seven status lines were corrected on the way through, all of them claiming less
than the truth. Videos, Music, Photos, partial-read hashing and account recovery
were headed "proposal, not implemented" months after they shipped; the desktop
client said "nothing here is implemented" with stages A through D running; draft
v6 still called itself the current specification.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md and playlists.md move into the repository, where a
reader can follow them.
The protocol reference was written against the tree before the cleanup landed
and described three things that no longer exist. Corrected here rather than
left to be discovered:
* member_upload is gone from the handshake ack and from the message
catalogue. Whether a member may write is a property of each root, and a
summary field beside the authoritative one is a second source for one
question — whichever the reader consults first decides it.
* video_root, audio_root and photo_roots are gone from the ack, the signed-op
table and the message reference. app_directories is not "the general form"
of three narrower ops any more; it is the only one. What survives is their
storage key on the node, because that is a key on an operator's disk rather
than on the wire, and a node upgraded into this has to find its own
configuration.
* The sender-key implementation the chat section pointed at has been deleted,
along with the ratchet. The argument for deriving a key per device stands on
its own now instead of pointing at a module to compare against.
playlists.md is added as written — a design for a feature that is not built, and
the first one to need per-account state spanning several groups on several
nodes. Its decided shape is summarised in MESHBAY_DESIGN.md section 9.10.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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Thirty documents under docs/ described this system between them: two
architecture drafts, three security reviews, eleven design notes, a roadmap and
a decisions file. Reading any one of them meant following cross-references into
four others, and several were flatly wrong — the keystore KDF, the protocol
version, and four features whose headers still said "not implemented" months
after they shipped.
This is the synthesis. It states design rather than history: a section says why
the node wraps the group key itself, not which finding made it necessary.
Development history, spikes and reversed directions are gone. The security
findings survive as section 13, where each label names the invariant it stands
for today rather than the defect it was reported as.
Two things it is careful about, because hundreds of code comments depend on
them. Every short label — C1, H3, NS6, T3, C5b, W2, E9, F1 — is defined in
section 13, including the three colliding namespaces (each review numbered its
findings from C1, and the code means the second review's). And section 16 maps
every "<doc> section n" reference the code makes onto its replacement, so no
comment has to be edited to stay resolvable.
transfers-v1.md comes in from outside the tree with it. The lease design is
section 5.5; what a synthesis cannot carry is that document's failure-mode
analysis — every way a slot can be lost, every way a client can be left
waiting — and what a live pass found after the work was called done.
Every claim was checked against the code rather than the drafts.
Suites green: 2256 passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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`video_root`, `audio_root` and `photo_roots` are gone — the messages, the
signed operations, the handlers, the `ops` wrappers, the three scalars on the
handshake ack, and the client's handlers for their acks. `app_directories`
does the same thing for every application, keyed by the app's own registry
name, and it is what the SPA has been sending.
The three were the same instruction three times, differing only in the key they
wrote and whether they carried a string or a list. That shape is what made
adding an application mean adding a message type, an op, a handler and a widget;
it also meant three validation paths, and the older ones validated nothing —
a typo was stored and then quietly matched no entry, an app showing an empty tab
with no way to tell "misconfigured" from "no files yet".
**What stays, and why.** `Roster.LEGACY_DIR_KEYS` still reads `video_root` and
friends out of `group_settings`: that is a key on an operator's disk, not on the
wire, and a node upgraded into this must find its own configuration. The Search
page still reads its own older cache keys, for the same reason — the cache
outlives a deploy. `CTX_ALIASES` keeps only `chat`, which is the one app whose
second name something still reads.
The two per-app policy test files go with the messages. What only they held —
the real challenge/response path from message to database, which no other test
exercises — is retargeted at `app_directories` in
`test_app_directories_signed.py`, and the handler's own refusals (unknown app,
malformed `directories`, nobody to authorize it) join `test_app_directories.py`.
Node and common suites 1368 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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311 lines of Signal Double Ratchet and 167 lines of tests for it, with no
caller: group chat is a key per group, per epoch, per device, and a ratchet was
ruled out for it on the record — a node that serves history to devices which
were not present has to hand out each chain's earliest key, which is forward
secrecy of zero.
Deleted for the same reason `senderkeys.py` was: an implementation kept for a
use nobody has reads as an alternative somebody may reach for, and its cost is
paid at every refactor that has to keep it compiling. The four comments that
mention a ratchet keep doing so — they explain why this is not one, which is
the part worth keeping.
Common suite 158 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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Seven comments pointed at sections of `~/next/improve-downloads.md`, which is
not in the tree and not anywhere a reader of this repository can follow. Each
now states the thing it was citing: why a paused transfer holds nothing, why the
lease is taken after the save target and not before, why a chunk request marks
a lease alive, where the leaseless bound's number comes from.
The leaseless comment also said "two files at a time" three paragraphs under
`MAX_LEASELESS_IN_FLIGHT = 12`, left behind when the bound was raised. A comment
that contradicts the constant beside it is worse than no comment: one of them is
wrong and the reader cannot tell which.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`device_add_request` and `device_hello` were dispatched behind
`and self._nonce_node`, which reads as "pre-proof, once the challenge has gone
out" — and is not what happens: both branches sit after the
`self._user_id is None` guard, so the nonce is always set by the time either is
reached, and a peer that has not finished its handshake gets "Handshake
required" instead.
The guard is removed rather than the branches moved. Filing a device is not
something a peer needs *in order to* prove possession of the group key, which is
the only reason anything is served pre-proof: the request is countersigned later
by a device already pinned, so requiring the caller to finish its own handshake
first costs nothing and keeps the pre-proof surface at three messages.
A test drives all six device messages through the real dispatcher on an
unauthenticated session, because this is a property of the order of its branches
and of nothing else.
Node suite 1216 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`senderkeys.py` and its 13 tests implemented Signal-style sender keys, and
production has never called them: chat is a key per group, per epoch, per
device, derived by name. The reasoning that ruled the ratchet out stays where it
belongs — in `chatbox.py`, at the top of the module that replaced it — because
the argument is the useful part, and it now stands on its own instead of
pointing at a file to compare against.
Kept code that nothing calls is worse than absent code: it reads as an
alternative somebody may reach for, and it has to be maintained past every
refactor to stay compiling, which is maintenance spent on a decision already
made.
The three comments naming `GroupSenderKeyStore` are rewritten to say the thing
they were illustrating.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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The QUIC handler stored `payload` as it arrived and broadcast it: no envelope,
no signature check, no `device_hello` to check one against. A message reaching
a group's archive that way is a plaintext row in an encrypted history, and it
would be indistinguishable from one somebody actually wrote.
Removed rather than gated. The transport implements neither the per-device
sealing nor the device identification the WebRTC path requires, so refusing
here would mean maintaining a second, weaker set of rules for a transport with
no client; an unimplemented type is logged and dropped, like every other message
this transport does not have.
The comment on the peer registry loses its chat fan-out aside for the same
reason.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` is the version this build speaks, so `check_version`
refuses everything below it at the handshake. Every capability the client was
gating on the node's version is therefore true of every peer it can reach:
* `supportsSealedUpload` — an upload is sealed or it is not sent;
* `supportsAppOps` — one `app_directories` op, and no `setVideoRoot` /
`setAudioRoot` / `setPhotoRoots` wrappers behind it;
* `supportsTransferSlots` and `Lease._skip()` — a lease is always real, so
there is no branch where a transfer runs without one;
* `legacyNode`, the read-only shared-directories table, and the two hints
telling an operator their node is too old to configure an app.
The version the node declares is still recorded, for diagnostics. Nothing
branches on it, and the comment says so, because a field kept "just in case" is
how the branches came back last time.
`test_mnp_1_0_node_compat.py` goes with them: it existed to hold the fallbacks
in place, and holding a fallback that cannot execute is how a suite starts
lying. The two locale strings for those hints are removed from all ten
catalogues.
Hub suite 872 passed (test_sticky_header deselected — failing before this).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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The group-wide `member_upload` switch is gone: the message, the signed
operation, the field on the handshake ack, the `upload` alias on every root in
the index payload, and the client's fallback path to it.
Whether a member may write has been a property of each root for a while, and
that is the model that survives: a single flag over the group cannot express
"this library is published read-only and that folder is a drop box", which is
the ordinary arrangement. What was left of the switch was a handler that logged
a deprecation and acted on nothing, and a client that read `ack.member_upload`
whenever the roots carried no `writable` — a second source for one question,
with whichever the code consulted first deciding it.
`roots.describe()` drops `upload` for the same reason: it was `writable` under
an older name, and two names for one boolean is one too many.
The paperclip now says "nowhere to write" rather than picking a root, in a group
that has none writable. That is the honest answer; the fallback picked whatever
came first and failed at send time.
Node suite 1215 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`transfer_state` read `slots.per_member` — the node-wide default — while
`_has_room` decides with `member_cap()`, which prefers the group's own signed
limit, and the handshake ack announces that same `member_cap()`. Three readings
of one number, and one of them was the odd one out.
In a group where the operator signed a higher limit, every lease update told the
client "cap: 2" while the node would grant five: the transfers widget draws
`used >= cap` as saturated, so a member with two transfers running saw the rest
of their slots disappear. Lowered the other way it is worse in the other
direction — the interface offers slots the node will queue.
Nothing was ever granted or refused wrongly; the enforcement was right on both
paths. It is the number beside it that contradicted them.
Two tests, one override above the default and one below, because a bug that
reads the node-wide value passes the first whenever the default happens to be
the larger number.
Node suite 1215 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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The tab bar paints an opaque ring of page colour around itself, `--band-margin`
wide, so the gap it keeps in the flow is still there once it pins. A box-shadow
spread goes out on all four sides, and above the tab bar there is only whatever
the element before it happened to leave: the join-code form under a group's
title leaves 12px, the ring is 16px, and the form came back with the bottom 4px
of its field and its button painted over — page colour at z-index 30, against
content that has none to answer with. Reported as "the form is slightly cut
off", which is exactly what it looks like and says nothing about a stylesheet.
The same 4px went off the bottom of the "could not reach this node" banner, the
other thing that stands between a group's title and its tabs.
The band reserves that room itself now. `* +`, so it is the gap between two
elements rather than a margin the band always carries: `.search-bar` is a first
child on the Search page, and a margin-top there would collapse through the
page root and take the whole page down with it. Between siblings the two
margins collapse to the larger of the pair, so everywhere that already leaves
enough is untouched and only what was being painted over moves.
Only the two bands that pin against the navigation bar, and that is the rule
rather than an economy. Written for all six it fails 22 of the sticky-header
cases: the gap *between* two bands is the upper one's `--band-margin` and
nothing else — the number `--chrome-h` carries and the offset the lower band
pins at — so a lower band's own margin-top wins the collapse wherever it is the
bigger of the two and leaves the flow layout wider than the pinned one, at
every phone width in every media view. A band under another band needs no room
above it anyway: what is there is a band of higher z-index, which a ring cannot
paint over.
Measured against the shipped GroupPage in the state that was reported — a node
answering `code_required` — in Chrome: 12px of clearance under a 16px ring
before, 16 against 16 after. test_sticky_band_ring.py holds the two selector
lists together out of the source rather than in a browser, because what a
browser shows is the 4px at one width in one of the states that happen to put
something above a band, while what has to hold is which bands are in which
list. docs/apps.md sends the author of a new application to that section to
make its toolbar pin; this is what says the toolbar they add does not get the
gap, and why.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BAJawZ25MZPBJ7TKgnVA1n
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Files, Videos, Music and Photos are read by scrolling, and everything that
steers that reading left with the first screenful. Three bands now pin under
the navigation bar, in a group and on the Search page alike: the tab bar (the
search field, on Search), the application's own toolbar, and the file table's
column heads. The group's name and description still scroll — they say nothing
a reader needs while walking a directory, and the height they would cost is
height the list does not get.
A band's offset is the heights of the bands above it, and those are not
constants: the toolbar wraps to three rows on a phone, grows a field while a
folder is being named, and loses its filter on Search. So each band measures
itself and publishes `--chrome-h` / `--toolbar-h` (static/sticky.js) and the
stylesheet does the arithmetic in calc(), rather than a number written down
twice — the fault CLAUDE.md already records against this layout twice over.
A band publishes height *plus its own bottom margin*, and paints that margin
as a ring of page colour, so the pinned layout is pixel-identical to the flow
layout and nothing shifts at the moment a band pins.
Three overflow faults came out of it, all of the same class and all of them
what "the header does not stay" actually meant on Android — a document wider
than the screen leaves everything pinned attached to a viewport the reader can
no longer see, the navigation bar included:
- a directory's name cell was a bare <td>, so an unbreakable folder name
(`Rage_Against_The_Machine_Discography_1992-2000_FLAC`) set the column's
minimum: a 527px table in a 390px window
- Search's group column did the same at 442px with an underscored group
name. It also goes entirely below 768px, where there is no room for it and
the breadcrumb already names the group
- the shared-directories table has four columns of controls with a combined
minimum near 440px, none of it compressible. On a phone the row stops
being a row: the name and its eject/remove pair on one line, the two
switches — each carrying the column head's own string as a label — on the
next
- and, found by measuring at 360px, the tab bar itself was 19px too wide
`.file-table` moves to separated borders: a collapsed border belongs to the
table rather than to the cell, so the column heads lost their rule the moment
they pinned.
Measured, not read. tests/harness/sticky_header_probe.py drives the shipped
GroupPage and SearchPage against a stub node, walks to each application,
scrolls to the end and reports every rectangle — 11 views x 4 widths x 2
engines. Its fixture says what real data says: the first version used
`note-007.txt` and `un groupe`, which fit any screen, and found none of the
above. A fixture narrower than real data tests the fixture.
Also: `test_desktop_shell` no longer looks for the CSP after the first `-->`,
which made it fail on correct markup as soon as a comment was added above it,
and `search-page.js` joins test_hook_ordering's file list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tx16FhyD2BUdpooGb5jcyN
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Streaming an Xvid/MP3 .avi answered "Unsupported video codec" — a refusal, on
a file ffmpeg re-encodes at about six times playback speed on the machine that
reported it. Nothing about the source was wrong. The node simply never reached
its own re-encode path.
`probe_video` maps a source codec to an MSE codec string and knows four:
h264, hevc, vp9, av1. Everything else returns None, because there is no
MediaSource decoder in any mainstream browser to give a string to — MPEG-4
Part 2 (Xvid, DivX), MPEG-2, VC-1, WMV, Theora. `_stream_video_inner` read
that None as a verdict on the file and refused, while the re-encode sitting
twenty lines below it was gated on `raw_video_codec in
BROWSER_INCOMPATIBLE_VIDEO_CODECS` — a set containing "hevc" and nothing else.
So the whole ffmpeg fallback existed, worked, and was unreachable for every
codec that most needed it.
The setting that governs the fallback has documented the intended behaviour
since it was introduced: draft-v6 §2.11 says `transcode_incompatible_video`
covers "HEVC *and other browser-incompatible video codecs*". Only HEVC was
ever wired up.
Two questions were being answered by one value, and they are separated now.
"Is there a video stream at all" is the only thing this path genuinely cannot
serve, and the only refusal left. "Can it be copied" needs both an MSE string
to put in `stream_init` and a codec browsers decode; a source failing either
is re-encoded.
The operator's opt-out keeps meaning what it says, and it no longer means the
same thing for every source, because it cannot: HEVC has a codec string, so
`transcode_incompatible_video = false` falls back to a copy and the viewer's
own decoder decides (unchanged). MPEG-4 Part 2 has none, so there is nothing
to fall back to — a `stream_init` with no codec string is one the client
refuses before the first byte — and the stream is refused naming the setting.
"Unsupported video codec" is what sent this report to the file, and the file
was fine.
Verified against the reported file end to end: ffprobe reports mpeg4/mp3
720x404, the decision comes out `can_copy=False`, and the pipeline's exact
argv produces H264 High level 4.1 plus stereo AAC-LC — matching the
`avc1.640029,mp4a.40.2` that `stream_init` advertises and that the client puts
through MediaSource.isTypeSupported byte for byte.
test_stream_hevc_transcode.py becomes test_stream_video_transcode.py: it was
always about the policy rather than about one codec, and it now carries both
halves of it, with a synthetic Xvid/MP3 .avi built the same way as the HEVC
clip. Its module-level skip on libx265 went with it — an ffmpeg without x265
still encodes MPEG-4 Part 2, so that marker was skipping the reported defect
entirely on any box without it; it now gates the HEVC cases alone. Three
cases added, checked against the unfixed source. Hub and node suites 2269
passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019GXmScYB1uR29YCt74si9J
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The reconnect scenario added with the fix proved the composer follows
`_setDevicePk`, and it poked that method itself at both ends. That is a
narrower claim than it reads as: it says nothing about whether a reconnect
*reaches* it, and the harness's own `Host` stands in for group-page.js, so a
green probe did not mean the page joins the two.
Both halves are real now. The scenario calls `connect()` with the arguments
`_reconnectLoop` calls it with; it stops at signaling, because there is no hub
in the harness, and the identity has to be gone by then — connect() drops it
before it touches the network. The restore is the shipped `_announceDevice`,
answered by the stand-in node with a `device_hello_ack` as `_do_device_hello`
answers it, and the key it settles on is the one the following send seals and
signs with. Three assertions check the scenario went that way rather than
through a variable set by the test.
The seam the harness cannot drive gets its own check: the wiring exists, the
prop is in `commonProps`, and the callback is set *before* `connect()` — after
it, device_hello's answer is missed and the composer starts closed. That check
first passed with the wiring deleted, on the strength of a comment naming the
callback; it matches the assignment now.
Two things the harness turned up. `do_POST` answered every path, so the offer
connect() posts to the hub was swallowed as the measurement and put the
machine's own SDP, public address included, into the probe's output — it
answers `/log` and nothing else now. And a connect() that gives up before
`await channelReady` left that promise rejected with nobody attached, so
closing the peer connection printed "Uncaught (in promise) DataChannel closed"
on every failed reconnect attempt — noise in exactly the log a freeze is read
from.
Checked against the unfixed source both ways: with the clear removed from
connect() and the wiring removed from group-page.js, three cases fail; with
them back, 15 pass. Hub and node suites 2266 passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019GXmScYB1uR29YCt74si9J
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The Chat tab froze about every other day — the textbox stopped taking clicks —
and it never recovered on its own: no timeout ends this one, only leaving the
group or restarting the client. A console dump of a session it happened in ruled
out everything it could and named nothing.
What that dump established was almost entirely negative, and that was the useful
part. No `Response timeout`, no `unsolicited`/`unrouted`/`with nothing waiting`
— so the 2026-08-30 routing defect, which produces this exact symptom for thirty
seconds, had not recurred. No `PC state: disconnected|failed`, no second ICE
cycle, no `Reconnected after N attempt(s)` — so the connection was alive and
untouched. The freeze was in the page, and no path that logs anything had run.
The composer is `disabled=${sending || cannotSend}`, and `cannotSend` was
`transport.connected && !transport.devicePk`, read off a **ref** during render.
`devicePk` is settled inside connect(), so every reconnect clears it and settles
it again; a ref changing re-renders nothing, and nothing else announced it. So
the panel went disabled on whatever unrelated re-render came next — a message
arriving — long after the identity was actually lost, and had no event that
would open it again. group-page.js never touches `status` after 'connected', and
`onReconnected` is claimed by video-player.js, so there was no second chance.
It was silent as well as sticky. `_announceDevice` had three exits that wrote
`devicePk` without a word: two early returns that left the *previous*
connection's value standing, and a reply that is not `device_hello_ack` — an
`error` reply does not throw, so the `.catch()` at the call site never saw it.
Reproduced in chat_send_probe.py, which mounts the real ChatPanel over the real
transport: with the old code, identity cleared leaves the composer open, an
arriving message latches it shut, and restoring the identity does not reopen it.
Every write to `devicePk` now goes through `_setDevicePk(pk, why)`, which logs,
traces and calls `onDeviceIdentity`; group-page holds the answer as state and
ChatPanel takes it as `deviceReady`. Defaulting that prop to `true` fails open —
a wiring mistake here must not be able to leave anyone with a dead textbox.
Two things found on the same path and fixed with it. `_send` throwing inside
_sendAndWait's executor left the pending entry and its 30s timer behind, so a
request that never reached the wire still logged a "Response timeout" half a
minute later. And the instrumentation this was meant to be diagnosed with
(3be8bd2) writes to localStorage behind ?trace=1, not to the console, so the
dump could not have carried it: the two lines that decide the composer's state
are now logged unconditionally, and MeshBayTrace gains `record` so the composer
writes into the same timeline as the channel events.
Hub suite 2264 passed, 4 skipped. chat_send_probe.py gains a `reconnect`
scenario and test_chat_send.py four cases, each checked against the unfixed
source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019GXmScYB1uR29YCt74si9J
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A PDF preview showed the "this browser will not display the PDF inline"
fallback everywhere — in the desktop client since its first launch, and in
the browser since the hub started sending a CSP on 2026-09-01. It read as a
missing native feature because before that commit the hub sent no policy at
all, so Chrome had once worked and the application never had.
Two directives govern one feature. `files-app.js` decrypts the file in the
page and hands it to `<object type="application/pdf">` from a Blob; Chromium
loads that as plugin data (`object-src`, absent and therefore falling back to
`default-src 'none'`) and then renders it in an internal frame (`frame-src`).
Opening either alone changes nothing visible — the second refusal produces the
same fallback. `'self'` covers neither: a same-origin `blob:` URL is not
matched by it in either directive, measured in Chrome 152 against the deployed
page and in Electron 44 against the client's own policy.
`plugins` stays at its default `false`: the built-in viewer is not behind that
flag on Electron 44, verified by rendering one.
Widening `object-src` from `'none'` to `blob:` admits only what page script
minted itself, at a type this code sets — PDFium parsing bytes that came from
a node, which is what any browser does with the same file once downloaded.
Tests: each policy is pinned to carry `blob:` in both directives (each fails
if either token is removed), and the two policies are now held identical
directive by directive apart from the two deliberate differences — the comment
claiming they were the same had already drifted and nothing checked it. The
CSP source parser in test_desktop_shell.py read `//` comment lines as
directives, which is the "parse directives, not text" mistake this file
already records; it skips them now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XauykfBvRrpy6RYbF6F7Wu
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Reported the day MNP 3.0 shipped: playing a track answered "Too many files open
at once without a transfer. Download this one instead of previewing it."
§3.4.1's bound of two was reasoned about *viewers* — a photo viewer shows one
photo, a preview modal one document, and the second is for prefetching the next.
It forgot the music player, which warms a read-ahead window: `prefetchDepth()`
returns 5 on Wi-Fi and 3 otherwise, so playing an album has six files in flight
and the fourth was refused. Browsing a group is never subject to a transfer slot
— that is a stated requirement, not a tuning parameter — and a constant nobody
had checked against the client broke it.
Twelve now: six for the music read-ahead at its widest, two for a photo viewer
and its own prefetch in the same session, the rest as headroom. Generosity is
cheap here and refusal is not — this is a fairness control among cooperating
clients, not a security boundary, so a client that lies gets twelve files at a
time instead of its member cap, bounded and audited, while refusing a legitimate
read breaks the requirement outright.
And the number is now derived rather than chosen: a test reads `prefetchDepth()`
out of the shipped player and fails if the node's bound no longer covers it, so
widening the client's read-ahead breaks the build instead of reaching a person.
Checked by widening it: "the music player reads 21 files ahead and the node
admits only 12".
Three cases that hard-coded "two then refuse" now set their own limit — they are
about the mechanism, and the shipped number moves with the client.
Node suite 1210 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Concurrent-transfer limits, with the queue, the pause and the flag day.
A node now caps how many transfers it runs at once (8 downloads, 8 uploads,
node-wide) and how many one member may run in one group (2 by default,
operator-signed). Beyond that the node answers "queued" and the client waits its
turn, visibly, in the transfers panel — and a slot that frees starts whatever is
next, skipping past a member who is at their own cap rather than letting them
stall everyone behind them.
Browsing is never subject to a slot: not the poster grid, not the covers, not
opening a photo to look at it. That is structural — a transfer is what the
transfers widget shows — and the exemption is bounded rather than open, at two
files in flight per session, because an exemption with no bound is a leaseless
branch under another name.
Transfers can be cancelled, and now paused and resumed. A paused one holds
nothing: its slot goes back at once and resuming rejoins the queue at the tail.
Uploads survive the connection that started them and resume where the node
stopped, asked for inside the seal rather than on a clear message. What they
leave behind when they are abandoned is reaped, which closes a disk leak that
predates this work.
MNP 3.0 makes the lease compulsory and refuses 2.x at the handshake, with the
desktop client checking `client.minimum` before connecting so an un-updated one
says "update" instead of failing every connection in a protocol vocabulary.
Fourteen defects were found on the way, eight of them by a person clicking
Download and pasting a console — none of which 2075 tests could reach. Section
12 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md is that report, including the three this work
introduced itself and the one that turned out to be caused by an instruction to
hard-reload after each deployment.
Node suite 1209 passed, hub suite 866 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Reported from Chrome, with a screenshot: four downloads with no pause button
and an upload beside them with one, and nothing anywhere saying why.
The reason is real. Without a granted download folder the browser writes
through the service worker — a download it already owns, which cannot be paused
without stalling it somewhere we can neither see nor resume. An upload writes to
the node, which keeps the position, so it is always pausable. But that was
stated only in a Settings line nobody reads on the way to a download, and a gap
where the row above has a button is not an explanation.
So a download that cannot be paused now shows a dimmed pause icon where the
button would be, carrying the reason and the remedy in its tooltip. Not a
button: there is nothing to click, and a disabled one invites the click anyway.
And only where the advice can be taken. Firefox and Safari have no folder to
choose — the streamed path is the only target they have, which is what §6.5 of
~/next/improve-downloads.md costs out — so telling someone there to choose one
would be advice they cannot follow. Nothing is drawn.
Hub suite 866 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Reported while testing the flag day: pausing an upload put it under "Finished".
"Finished" was defined by exclusion — everything that is not running, queued or
preparing — so it swallowed `paused` the day pausing shipped. A transfer
somebody stopped on purpose then sat beside the ones that are actually over,
offering a resume button in the section of things that cannot be resumed, and
dropped out of the badge, which announced less activity than there was.
Paused is now its own group, in all ten catalogues, and counts as active: it is
not over, the person means to come back to it.
The three filters are lifted out of `app.js` and executed rather than described
in the test, and one case asserts that every status lands in exactly one group
— a state added later that falls into none is a transfer the panel simply does
not show, which is how this one got in.
The same report also said the three running downloads lost their pause buttons
when the upload was paused. That part is **not** explained and **not** fixed:
the store returns `pausable` true and status `running` for all three (new test),
closing an upload lease pumps only the upload queue, and the button's condition
is a pure function of those two. All three say the buttons should have stayed,
so an observation is missing rather than a cause.
Hub suite 864 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Stage 4 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, the flag day. Leases become compulsory
and a 2.x peer is refused at the handshake.
**The bound on leaseless reads (§3.4.1) did not exist, and it is what makes the
rest mean anything.** Browsing a group is never subject to a transfer slot —
that is an operator decision and a requirement: a member must be able to browse
a group at capacity exactly as they browse an idle one. But "not leased" cannot
mean "unbounded", or a client that simply omits `tr` transfers outside every cap
and the caps are decoration. A session may now read two distinct files at once
without a lease: one because a viewer looks at one file, two so that prefetching
the next photo stays possible. A count of files and not a byte budget, because a
RAW photo is 60-80 MB and is browsing while a 40 MB archive is a download, and
no size threshold separates them. Thumbnails, posters and cover art never reach
this check at all — they resolve out of the node's own cache.
It is a fairness control among cooperating clients, in the company of
`max_concurrent_streams`, and is not a defence against a member determined to
saturate a node's disk. That member is a member, and the answer to them is
`member revoke`.
**MNP_VERSION and MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED both move to 3.0**, on both sides. The
messages are additive; the requirement is not. An opt-in switch would leave a
leaseless branch reachable on every node, which is finding C6's lesson — a
transport that accepted a bare JWT — one feature later.
**The desktop client now checks before it connects.** The SPA is served by the
hub and picks up a new client on reload; the application ships its own
interface, so an un-updated one would sign in, list groups, and fail every
connection with `version_too_old` — a refusal in a protocol vocabulary with
nothing anyone can act on. It asks `/v1/hub/version` for `client.minimum` and
says so plainly instead. An unreachable hub is deliberately *not* "too old": a
captive portal or a closed laptop must not make starting the application
impossible.
**Every package is aligned on 0.13.0.** `meshbay-client/package.json` had
drifted to 1.0.0 while the Python packages were on 0.12.0 — invisible until
something compared those numbers, and then load-bearing: an installed client
announcing 1.0.0 sorts above a 0.13.0 minimum and walks through the gate meant
to stop it. That is stated in the code rather than left to be rediscovered; it
is acceptable exactly once, because the operator is updating every client, node
and hub by hand for this flag day. A new test fails if two packages ever
disagree again, and another fails if the hub would refuse the client the tree
builds.
Node suite 1209 passed, hub suite 861 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Reported from Chrome: a download started while an upload was running took
thirty seconds to begin, every time. The console named it exactly —
/_mbdl/mtty5btz-sbmgdegx 404 ()
[MeshBay] the worker did not answer the download within 15s (attempt 1)
A 404 from the hub means the request reached the *network*: the worker looked,
found no entry for that id and let it through. So the worker was alive and
controlling the page, and the message handing it the stream had simply never
been processed.
`pending` lives in the worker's memory, and a worker with nothing to do is
terminated within tens of seconds. A WebRTC upload gives it no events at all,
so minutes of uploading leave it dead; the stream posted to it is lost,
silently, and the iframe then wakes it with nothing to find.
`mbdl-ping` already existed for this exact reason -- sent every ten seconds
*while* writing, because a streaming response does not count as activity.
Nothing sent one before *starting*. So a download now wakes the worker and waits
for the pong, and `sw.js` answers `mbdl-ready` once it has actually stored the
entry, which the page waits for before navigating: confirmed rather than
assumed. A worker that predates the ack sends nothing and the page navigates
anyway, which is what it did before.
This cause was measured and wrongly dismissed hours earlier, with an idle probe
that made the worker work between its own attempts -- it never actually slept.
A measurement that does not reproduce the conditions refutes nothing. The
harness now models a worker that is asleep: a ping wakes it, and anything else
posted while it sleeps is lost, which is what made the failure silent.
`test_backpressure_is_real` read the first `worker.postMessage` in the function
to check that the readable half is transferred rather than copied. The wake-up
put a ping in front of it, so it began inspecting a call that carries only a
port -- and kept passing. It now checks every post, each bounded by its own
call, since the keep-alive ping transfers nothing at all. Same shape as the
upload-seal contract this morning: a guard that reads "the first" stops
guarding the moment something is inserted before it.
Hub suite 851 passed. Both new cases checked against the unfixed source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Stage 8 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, second half, plus the gap it exposed in
stage 7.
**Asking where to resume.** The node identifies an upload by (member,
directory, filename), so a client resuming one has to name the file — and
`transfer_open`, the obvious place to ask, travels in clear. Naming it there
would undo exactly what sealing this path bought in MNP 2.0: before it, the same
file was ciphertext leaving a node and plaintext arriving at one. So the
question is asked inside the seal that already exists, as an ordinary
`file_upload` with no bytes and `chunk_index: -1`. The node writes nothing,
creates no state, reserves no name, and answers with `resume_from` in the sealed
ack. A node that predates it refuses the index, which the client reads as "start
from the beginning" — the behaviour it had anyway — and the wait is bounded so
one that answers neither does not strand an upload.
The probe is answered after every check the write path makes, so it cannot ask
questions about a directory the caller may not write to, and it answers only
about the member who asks: otherwise one member could measure another's
progress on a file they never sent, and worse, resume it.
**Pausing an upload.** Reported: no pause button on an upload, even in the
desktop app. Stage 7 built pause around the download path — a target declares
whether it can be stopped — and an upload has no local target to ask. It was
also refused by design, since a transfer handed a lease it cannot re-create must
not be offered a button that would drop its slot for good. Uploads now ask for
their slot rather than being handed one, and say they are pausable outright: a
File is seekable and the node keeps the position. Resuming re-probes rather than
trusting the client's own memory, so it works across a reconnect too.
**And the slot they hold.** `_do_file_upload` never called `slots.touch(tr)`.
Chunks are not gated by the lease, so the file arrived — but the node reclaimed
a grant nobody appeared to be using after thirty seconds, twice, then abandoned
it, and the widget follows the lease. Measured from the journal: a 3.5 GB upload
read "waiting, 0 ahead" for a minute and a half while it was transferring. The
download twin of this was fixed on 2026-09-08; the same omission was still here,
invisible until uploads took a real lease.
`test_the_upload_itself_is_sealed` now checks every message `uploadFile` sends
rather than the first. Adding the probe put a second one in front of the one it
was written for, and it would have kept passing while guarding nothing.
Node suite 1202 passed, hub suite 850 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Stage 8 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, first half. Two defects that are the
same defect seen from two sides.
An upload's progress lived on the session, keyed by `rel_dir/filename`. A
dropped connection threw it away and the client's next chunk was refused with
`not_started`: an upload interrupted at 99% could only be started again from
zero, on a link flaky enough to have interrupted it once. It now lives in the
group context, keyed by member as well -- a shared directory means two people
can be sending IMG_1234.jpg at the same moment and neither may inherit, or
overwrite the position of, the other's.
What the lost state left behind was a `.part` nothing would ever finish, delete
or look at again. It is not an index entry, so it is invisible to every member
and to the operator's own file list: one abandoned film is a gigabyte of their
disk, kept for ever. That leak predates this branch.
A `.part` is deleted only when **both** hold: no upload is writing it, and
nothing has been written to it for 24 hours. Waiting costs disk; being wrong
costs somebody their upload, and is not reversible -- so a read-only root is
never walked (it cannot have received an upload), an unavailable one is never
walked (an unmounted drive reporting "nothing found" is how a careless janitor
deletes a library), and a file whose mtime is in the future is left alone (a
clock that went backwards is not evidence). The reaper matches whole paths and
the state records the path it is writing, rather than both sides rebuilding one
from a root name -- two implementations of one rule whose failure mode is
deleting a live upload.
The rules are in `uploads.py`, pure logic with no asyncio and no transport, the
same shape as `transfers.py` and for the same reason.
23 cases, four of them checked against the unfixed source. Node suite 1195
passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Reported from Chrome: connecting to a group triggered a page refresh within
seconds, taking the WebRTC session down with it.
The boot check added with the bypass repair asked its question by *performing a
download* -- a four-byte stream through a hidden iframe. Chrome rations the
downloads a page may start without a user gesture to about three, measured: on
a first visit three consecutive attempts went served, served, refused. So the
check competed with the person's own downloads for that budget, and its answer
depended on how much of the budget was left. On a healthy page it concluded the
worker could not serve, and reloaded.
The same mistake the repair was written to fix, from the other side: paying a
capability to obtain a diagnostic.
The replacement costs nothing and asks nothing. Measured on Chrome, at document
start, before anything registers:
first visit controller false, registration false
ordinary reload controller true, registration true
hard reload controller false, registration true
Being uncontrolled while an active registration already exists names a
hard-reloaded document exactly, so that is now the whole of the evidence. A
first visit is uncontrolled too and is not a bypass -- the worker is installing
and will claim the page in a moment -- which is precisely the case that was
reloading.
Four cases, each checked against the unfixed source, including that priming
performs no download at all. Hub suite 847 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Reported from testing 7a: pause worked in the desktop app and no button
appeared in Chrome. That is the design working — without a granted download
folder, "save automatically" means the service worker, and that target is a
download the browser already owns — but nothing anywhere said so, and choosing
a folder looked like a question of where files land.
So the Settings line now says what it costs not to choose one, in all ten
catalogues. It renders only where a folder can be chosen at all, which is
exactly the browsers the advice applies to.
Also pins the tier table the pause button is drawn from: a granted folder, a
save dialog and the desktop sink can be paused, a service-worker stream cannot.
Four cases through the real `_openDownloadTarget`, and one more that reads the
value off the real `downloads.js` rather than a stub of it -- the first version
of these stubs did not carry the field at all, so the cases would have passed
while checking nothing.
Hub suite 847 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Stage 7a of ~/next/improve-downloads.md: pausing within a session, on the
targets that can actually do it. Resuming across a reload is 7b.
A paused transfer holds **nothing**. Its slot goes back to the node the moment
it stops and resuming rejoins the queue at the tail, because anything else lets
one member close a node by pausing four downloads and going to lunch. So the
lease is taken inside the run loop rather than before it, and pause is refused
outright for a transfer that could not ask for another one.
Resuming is exact rather than approximate: the pipeline stops between two
chunks and never inside one, so what is on disk is always a whole number of
chunks and `fromChunk` is a verified position. The failure mode being avoided
is a file that looks complete and is quietly corrupt.
The target has to survive it, so a pause no longer reaches the `abort()` that a
failure does -- that would delete Electron's `.part` or the file just created in
the granted folder, leaving nothing to continue. And the in-memory fallback
keeps its accumulated chunks rather than starting a second array.
The button is drawn only where the target says it can. A service-worker stream
says no, in its own code and for its own reasons: the browser is already writing
an HTTP response into its own download folder, not feeding it stalls that
download where we cannot see or resume it, and an idle worker is terminated
within seconds. Firefox and Safari therefore keep cancel and get no pause, which
is the decision recorded in §6.5.
Cancelling a paused transfer ends it. A paused run is parked on a promise;
without waking it the row said "cancelled" over work that had not stopped and a
target that was still open.
Six cases, each checked against the unfixed source. Hub suite 842 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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The repair worked but arrived too late to help: about thirty seconds after a
hard reload, by which time four downloads had been started and hung, and the
page reloading under them read as an unexplained refresh.
Two delays, both removed.
`_claimController` waited its whole control budget before asking for the claim.
A page that is uncontrolled while an active worker exists will never be claimed
on its own -- a document fetched by a hard reload is exactly that shape -- so
the fifteen seconds were spent waiting for something that was not coming. The
claim is now asked for first; waiting is the fallback, not the opening move.
Measured in the harness: 6042ms of a 6000ms budget before, milliseconds after.
And a download that starts while the self-test is still running now waits for
it rather than racing it. Otherwise the click spends both its attempts failing
on a path that is about to be repaired, which is what put four frozen rows on
screen.
Hub suite 836 passed. Both new cases were checked against the unfixed source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Downloads on Firefox failed with "the worker did not answer the download within
15s", every time, for one operator, while the same profile driven from here
succeeded every time. Their own test sequence found it: a freshly started
browser downloaded four files out of four, twice; one Ctrl+F5 and every
attempt afterwards failed; restart, fine again; Ctrl+F5 before any attempt and
the very first one failed.
A document fetched by a hard reload is loaded with the service worker bypassed.
It can still be claimed afterwards, so `navigator.serviceWorker.controller`
comes back and every check in `_claimController` passes — but the navigations
that document starts keep missing the worker, and the hidden iframe a streamed
download needs is a navigation. On Firefox and Safari that is the only way to
write a file too large to hold in memory, so the download cannot happen at all,
for the life of the page.
Being controlled is not being servable, so priming now asks the question
directly instead of inferring it: a four-byte stream and a hidden iframe,
exactly as a real download would, torn down completely so nothing lands in the
download folder. When it goes unanswered the page reloads once, ordinarily,
which puts it back under the worker. The flag lives in sessionStorage rather
than a variable because it has to survive the reload it triggers, and because a
page that is still unservable afterwards must stop rather than loop.
Also stops telling people to change browser. The message said "use the desktop
app, or Chrome or Edge" for a state an ordinary reload undoes, on the one path
Firefox has no alternative to; all ten catalogues now say to reload first.
The hard reloads were on my instruction: the SPA's HTML is served `no-store`,
so a plain reload has always picked up a new build and Ctrl+F5 was never needed.
Hub suite 834 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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"The node saw no transfer" was concluded twice from a journal that could not
have shown one: the open was logged at DEBUG, and the daemon runs at INFO. Two
diagnoses were built on that non-observation, and both were wrong.
Turning the root logger up to DEBUG is not the answer either — aiortc logs every
SCTP chunk, which on a 2 GB download is both unreadable and slow. One line per
transfer is not a volume problem, and it is the line that answers "did the
client ever ask for a slot, and what was it told".
Node suite 1172 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Four downloads on Firefox sat at "preparing" indefinitely, with the target queue
already bypassed there, so each opening was hanging on its own. The node journal
showed `d=0/8(q0) u=0/8(q0)` — no transfer had been asked for yet.
`_claimController` had two waits with no deadline at all,
`navigator.serviceWorker.register()` and `navigator.serviceWorker.ready`, while
SW_CONTROL_BUDGET_MS bounded only the wait that comes after them. `_swPromise`
is shared, so one unsettled wait left every download on the page suspended on
the same promise for the life of the tab.
Measured on Firefox 154, against a local 127.0.0.1 site so no hub was involved:
a worker that installs gives register() in 8ms and ready in 0ms; a worker whose
install handler rejects gives register() in 7ms and a `ready` that never settles
— still pending past ten seconds. register() resolves as soon as the
registration object exists, carrying nothing but an *installing* worker; ready
is what waits for an active one.
Every wait is now inside one budget, with two carve-outs so that a deadline
never costs a capability. A `ready` that times out while registration.active is
set is not fatal: ready may be waiting on a newer worker that cannot install
while an older one serves perfectly well. And the mbdl-claim recovery keeps its
own budget outside the deadline, because giving up there would cost Firefox the
only unbounded way it has to write a download to disk.
A deadline alone would have been a better-explained failure rather than a fix: a
registration stuck with nothing but an installing worker does not heal, and
every later visit finds the same one. So when ready times out with no active
worker, the registration is discarded and asked for once more with a fresh
budget, and the page repairs itself instead of needing developer tools.
Four cases pinned, each checked against the unfixed source. Hub suite 830
passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Four downloads on Firefox all sat at "preparing", with the node journal showing
`d=0/8(q0) u=0/8(q0)` — not one transfer opened, so nothing had got past the
client's target opening.
Serialising those openings was new in d6c4808, and on Firefox it regressed what
had always worked: four openings that ran at the same time began waiting on the
slowest. `_targetQueue` is module-level and never reset, so an opening that
never settles leaves the page unable to start any download again until it is
reloaded.
Two bounds, both narrowings of the queue rather than of any capability:
Only an opening that could actually show a dialog joins it. Firefox and Safari
have no `showSaveFilePicker` at all, so nothing there can race anything and the
queue bought nothing while costing everything; they now bypass it entirely,
which restores the previous behaviour by construction rather than by tuning.
And no opening waits behind another for longer than TARGET_QUEUE_BUDGET_MS
(90s) — generous enough never to cut in front of a real dialog, finite because
the alternative is a download panel that only a reload can fix. Releasing early
is safe: whatever is ahead is still the only unbatched opening, so the released
one takes the streamed path and opens no second dialog.
Measured on Firefox 154 against the deployed hub before writing any of this:
`register` and `ready` return instantly, the page is controlled, and four
serialised openings are served in 5-18 ms. The streamed path was never the
delay; the queue was.
Both new cases were checked against the unfixed source: without the bypass the
peak concurrency is 1 instead of 4, and without the budget the stuck-opening
case hangs. Hub suite 826 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Selecting four files on Chrome produced a Save As dialog for the first, then
one for the second only after that file had finished, while the last two timed
out; on a later attempt the three remaining transfers appeared frozen.
Two things were going on. Opening the target inside `prepare` had removed the
accidental serialisation that `for (…) await downloadFile(e)` used to provide,
so `_openTargetInTurn` now queues the openings — but a queue whose head is an
unanswered dialog is a head-of-line block, which is what the "freeze" was.
The code already recovered from a picker with no gesture behind it by streaming
instead, on the `SecurityError` Chrome throws. That branch was never reached:
Chrome does not throw, it shows the dialog anyway and waits for a human. So
anything that has to wait its turn is now marked `batched`, and a batched
opening prefers the streamed path whatever the download mode says. The first
file of a batch — the one actually holding the gesture — still gets its dialog,
so the preference is honoured where it can be. For the rest there is no gesture
left to spend and nothing is lost by streaming: the file still lands on disk,
in the browser's own download folder. Only the choice of folder goes, and it
was not on offer. If the worker does not answer, a batched download falls back
to the dialog rather than failing.
Also logs which path led to a dialog. A dialog is the one outcome nobody can
diagnose after the fact — it looks the same whether it was asked for or fallen
back to — and the report this fixes needed three test cycles to narrow. The two
harnesses that lift `_openDownloadTarget` as text now route console.info to
stderr, since they parse stdout as JSON.
Measured against the deployed hub in Chrome 152: the streamed path serves the
hidden iframe in 2-3 ms on a normal load, after a hard reload (via the
`mbdl-claim` recovery already in `_claimController`), and twice in the same
document. Hub suite 824 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Three defects in the probe, found while extending it to cover the per-member
hot-swap. The third is the one worth keeping.
`transfer_state` is the reply to an open, the acknowledgement of a close, and
the push that carries a grant minutes later. Reading "the next one" therefore
returns somebody else's answer as soon as more than one transfer is in play —
the probe took two stale `closed` acks as the replies to two opens and reported
a working cap as broken. That is exactly the defect `req_id` exists for in this
protocol, committed inside the tool written to check it. Replies are matched on
`tr` now.
The other two: the `transfers show` parser counted the pool summary line as a
lease once that command grew a per-group section (a probe that reads a
human-facing format signs up for this), and the per-member check began with a
member who already held several leases, which measures nothing. It waits for
the operator's own view to go quiet first — waited for, not slept through.
Both probes written today reproduced a bug already recorded in CLAUDE.md: this
one, and yesterday's timer with no strong reference. A tool that verifies the
code is not exempt from the code's rules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Raising the per-member cap from 2 to 4 left both waiting transfers on
"waiting". The pool granted them correctly and nobody told the peers:
`ops.set_transfer_limits` computed `granted` and never sent a `transfer_state`,
where the node-wide path (`WebRTCTransport.set_capacity`) does.
That is the first row of §5.2 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md — "node granted a
slot, the push was lost" — reached by writing the decision and forgetting the
send. It is the same omission as the missing `touch()` call one layer up, on the
same day: a mechanism that is right everywhere except at the seam where it has
to reach somebody.
The client recovered after its 60-second watchdog re-asked, which is why this
looked like a slow queue rather than a lost message.
`transfer_probe.py --operator` covers it now, separately from the node-wide
hot-swap it already covered — different door, different code path, and only one
of them was tested. Verified failing with the push removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Reported as "the slots seem hardcoded to 2": `meshbay-node transfers set 8 8`
and still only two downloads at a time. Not hardcoded — that is the *per-member*
cap, which is a group's setting and is checked before the node's, so raising the
machine's total cannot move it. But the diagnosis was right in the way that
matters: nothing could change it.
`OP_TRANSFER_LIMITS` shipped with exactly one front door, the signed MNP
handler, and nothing anywhere opened it — no client call, no CLI verb, no
loopback route. So the cap sat at its default of 2 for ever, which from outside
is indistinguishable from a constant. CLAUDE.md states the rule this missed:
operator operations are one implementation with several front doors.
- `PUT /api/groups/{id}/transfer-limits`, calling the same
`ops.set_transfer_limits` the signed handler calls;
- `meshbay-node transfers per-member <downloads> <uploads> [--group X]`;
- `transfers show` now separates the node-wide pools from the per-group
per-member caps, and marks each `[set]` or `[default]`. It printed "2 per
member" with no indication of where the 2 came from, which is half of why
this looked like a constant.
Zero is refused here as everywhere else: it is not "unlimited", and a member who
may not transfer at all is a member the operator revokes.
Verified on a live node: the cap changes, survives a daemon restart, and
`transfer_probe.py --want 6` measures 4 granted against a cap of 4 where it
measured 2 before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Clicking Download produced nothing — no row, no icon, no panel — for as long as
it took to open somewhere to write, and then several rows at once. The streamed
path waits for the worker twice; a Save As dialog waits for a person. The row
was created after that, so the slowest part of a download happened with nothing
on screen to say it had begun.
The store gains a `prepare` step, distinct from `run`, and the order is now:
row, then target, then slot.
That last part is why the obvious fix was wrong. Taking the slot first would let
the row appear immediately, and it was tried this morning: a granted slot has to
be taken up within the node's deadline, opening a target can outlast it, and
three downloads became one. (The diagnosis at the time blamed that ordering for
revocations which were in fact a missing `touch()` call — the revert was right
for the wrong reason.) `makeLease` is called after `prepare` succeeds, never
before.
Three behaviours fall out, each with a test:
- a dismissed dialog leaves nothing behind. `prepare` returning false drops
the row: nothing started, so nothing should remain on screen to explain it;
- the row takes the name the file was actually saved under, once known;
- a refusal above the memory ceiling fails the row that is already there,
rather than creating one to kill it.
`preparing` counts as live everywhere — badge, cancel, clearFinished, and
`_busy`, since closing a transport under a preparing transfer strands it exactly
as under a queued one. Six places asked "is this finished?" and were drifting
apart; there is one definition now.
Two mistakes in the tests, worth the note: one counted positions in an output
array by hand and was one out, which reads exactly like a failing assertion
about the code — the values are tagged now, not indexed. And
test_zip_size_limit.py's stub did not run `prepare`, so it no longer reached the
size check the file is about; it now behaves like the real store.
819 hub, 1169 node, 0 failed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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The service worker one is the expensive one: an idle worker is terminated and a
streaming response does not count as activity, so `writable.write()` hung with
no error anywhere while the node stayed healthy. Written down with what made it
unfindable — a stress probe fast enough to hide it, three measurements that
correctly cleared everything they touched, and an empty console that was the
evidence rather than the absence of it.
The other two are the framing headers (three of them, all visible in one
`curl -I`, fixed one at a time over an afternoon) and `encodeURIComponent`
leaving the apostrophe that RFC 5987 uses as its delimiter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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