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The pre-authentication guards stay explicit code, in the same order and
text. After the handshake, a table maps each type to its handler and to
whether it runs as a task, the choice each branch made; the three inline
blocks become StreamingMixin methods, unchanged. The dispatch golden is
identical, including types that are not strings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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DispatchMixin in transport/webrtc/dispatch.py, with the pre-proof fetch
bound it enforces. The elif chain moves as it is; turning it into a table
is the next commit, on its own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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SessionCore in transport/webrtc/core.py, last among the bases: state,
the data channel, task ownership, the peer registry, sending and teardown.
The facade keeps _dispatch_message and WebRTCTransport.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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FilesMixin in transport/webrtc/files.py; the blocking disk helpers join
_locate in webrtc/disk.py, and the lease states go to webrtc/limits.py.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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StreamingMixin in transport/webrtc/apps/streaming.py: stream credit,
handover, the transcode slots and _stream_video_inner, moved unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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SubtitlesMixin in transport/webrtc/apps/subtitles.py; _locate, which it
shares with the files, music and streaming handlers, in webrtc/disk.py.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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transport/webrtc/channel.py, limits.py and media_tools.py, cut from
webrtc_server.py as text; the facade imports them back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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#/invite takes the link out of the address on load and keeps it in the
tab through registration and sign-in; joining is one click, only the
ticket goes to the hub, and the code goes only to the node the link
names once it has signed its challenge. Members tab gains "Invite by
link" (shared e-mail box, pending list, cancel both halves); home page
takes a pasted link. Browser probe drives the real app, signed out and in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A native confirm() or alert() leaves the desktop client unable to type
until the window is refocused. ask.js draws both in the page; the SPA
test now bans all three browser dialogs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A member row appears only when a code is consumed, so revoking someone
invited to the wrong group was refused for having no row — and the node's
refusal aborted the browser's removal before its hub half, leaving them a
member everywhere with a live code. Revoking now cancels unredeemed codes
for that group, and a node refusal no longer cancels the hub removal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`test_sticky_header.py[firefox]` failed with twelve setup errors whenever
a Firefox was open, and the note in CLAUDE.md said to close it and trust
the Chrome half meanwhile. The cause was not snap's single instance: the
harness pointed HOME at a throwaway directory, snapd sets its own HOME
inside the sandbox, and that directory came back empty on every run — so
Firefox opened the real profile, which the open browser locks.
`--profile` needs a path the sandbox can see: the snap has a private
/tmp, and its home interface grants no hidden directory. Both refusals
print "Firefox is already running", which it also prints when nothing is.
24 passed in 15s with a Firefox open throughout, against 12 errors in 60s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`.admin-table` column heads are `white-space: nowrap`, which meets a
translated string: "Username" is one word, "Nom d'utilisateur" is three,
uppercased with letter-spacing on top. The heads alone overflowed a 360px
window by 11px, and on Android an overflowing document takes every sticky
element with it.
11px was only what could be measured: the probe served no members, so the
table measured its headers and nothing else. With one realistic username
in it the same page overflowed by 248px, at 420px-wide windows too. The
cells get `word-break: break-word`, as `.file-name` already had.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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media_cache held video_meta, photo_meta and thumbs; the audio tags lived
only in the in-memory IndexEntry. So every start re-read every audio file
the node serves, and until that pass landed it served an index with no
artist on any track — one the Music app cannot group. Over a real
6176-file library the pass costs 27.8s cold and 6.4s from audio_meta.
Only what the bytes decided is stored. The filename and folder fallbacks
still run live, or a renamed file would get the old name's answer; the
sibling-cover scan reads the folder, so it stays live too; and a read
that failed is not cached, or one bad read becomes permanent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The grid's unit is an album, so a track whose artist tag is empty was
drawn nowhere — while `empty` counted it and stayed false, so no message
appeared either. An untagged library rendered a toolbar over a blank
page, with every track one mode-switch away and nothing saying so.
It gets a card, the same shape the singleton folding already mints. No
cover is looked up for it, or for any album this file invented: the
release name is one the browser wrote, and the request cannot match.
music_untagged_probe.py renders the real grid and reads the page back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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One conflict, in §15.3's open list, and it was two changes agreeing rather than
disagreeing: this side removed the rows for the third-party search bound and the
node-announcement bound because both are now built (AV27, AV28), while the other
side kept them and added a new one. Resolved by keeping what is genuinely still
open — per-device revocation having no CLI — and leaving the two closed.
`webrtc_server.py` merged without conflict but the two sides met inside one
function: `_upload_chunk` gained the operator's `max_upload_gb` ceiling from
there and the per-group lock and `off_disk` calls from here. Read back rather
than trusted: the operator's ceiling now sits inside the critical section that
keeps chunk ordering, and the unlink beside it goes to the disk thread with
everything else.
2893 passed. The twelve `test_sticky_header.py[firefox]` setup errors are the
open Firefox on this machine, as before.
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QUICKSTART takes one Linux machine from downloaded packages to a working
group with a second member. USERGUIDE covers using a group and running a
node, for a reader who is not a developer. Windows stays in
PACKAGING-GUIDE.md.
Both are written from the code — the CLI, ops.py, the systemd units and
the interface catalogue — rather than from the specification, and they
state what is not built as readily as what is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`group_indexes` was an IndexedDB store holding a decrypted copy of each group's
index — every file's name, path, size, hash and uploader — written on every index
and on every delta, from three call sites.
It was the cross-group search of Phase 10b: `doSearch` read `getAllCachedIndexes`
and searched those records instead of dialling anything. On 2026-08-28 Search
began dialling the nodes, and that commit removed the reader and left the writers.
Since then the browser has gone on building a cleartext file listing that nothing
consulted, that no sign-out removed — the key database is a different one — and
that grew with every group ever opened. L7, at rest: kept code that nothing calls
does not sit still.
Drawing a group's files while its node is unreachable is the only thing such a
cache buys, and it is not wanted: a listing that cannot be opened is worse than an
honest absence. So there is nothing to read it with, and the writers go.
The store stays in the schema and is emptied instead. Dropping it needs a version
bump, a version bump is an upgrade another tab can block, and playlists share this
database — so the tidier change is the one with a failure mode. `purgeGroupIndexCache`
runs once per browser behind a flag, which clears what is already on people's
machines; a browser that refuses storage simply runs it again, which is harmless
because it is idempotent.
Three guards, each checked by reintroducing the fault: only `openDB` and the purge
may touch the store, the purge may only clear it, and the purge must actually be
called at start-up — a purge nobody calls is the same defect wearing the opposite
hat.
`test_sticky_header.py[firefox]` reports twelve setup errors in a full run here.
A Firefox instance is open on this machine, which is the trap CLAUDE.md describes;
the same twelve appear with these changes stashed, and the `[chrome]` half of the
same file, covering the same geometry, is clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The per-feature design notes were merged into docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md and
deleted from the tree on 2026-09-11, but ~230 comments across the three
packages still named them — usually written `docs/musicbay.md §3.2`, as
though the file were still in docs/. A reader had to know §16 existed to
resolve any of them. They now name the section directly.
Every mapping comes from §16, the concordance, which already records where
each old section landed: musicbay -> §9.8, mediacenter -> §9.7 for the
Videos app and §6.5 where the subject is derived data, photos -> §9.9,
auth-confirm -> §3.6, refactoring-search -> §9.11, invite-pairing-v1 ->
§3.4, per-node-identity-v1 -> §3.2, captcha -> §7.7, chat-sender-keys ->
§4.5, apps/refactor-groups -> §9.1–§9.4, desktop-client-v1 per section.
Bare citations of the same documents (`draft-v6 §2.11`, `§4.8`, `§3.4`)
are retargeted too: those collide with real section numbers in the design
document, so leaving them would have been worse than the named form.
Four cases the concordance does not cover, each decided rather than guessed:
Sub-item references into documents that no longer exist — mediacenter's
`§3.3 row 4`, `§3.4b/c`, `apps.md §3b` — name rows and sub-items §9.7 and
§9.2 do not reproduce. The module-level citation stays; the sub-item
pointer is dropped.
The V-findings keep their labels but lose the dead `§10.1/` prefix.
§13.8 lists V1–V13 as per-application open items, which is not what the
labels mean in these comments, so pointing them at §13.8 would have been
a false citation.
`apps.md §5`'s virtualization requirement has no counterpart anywhere in
the design document. The requirement is stated in the comment itself, so
the citation is dropped rather than aimed at a section that does not say
it.
Comments that attributed a *sentence* to an old note — musicbay's "several
thousand files" example, its "what got measured" note, its measured
~11%/~26% cover-art figures, the "original no root, whole shared tree"
call — state the fact without attribution now. §9.8 does not contain those
sentences and citing it for them would have been wrong.
CLAUDE.md's "a reference to a document that no longer exists" row now says
the concordance is for git history and out-of-tree material; the code cites
sections directly.
Verified: 2851 passed, 4 skipped. The 12 errors in the run are the Firefox
leg of test_sticky_header.py's browser harness, which is broken at the
browser level on this machine — headless Firefox (snap) dies with
`[GFX1-]: RenderCompositorSWGL failed mapping default framebuffer`, renders
nothing, and the probe exits `{"error": "no measurement"}` after its full
90s wait. Chrome runs the same 12 assertions in 3.2s and passes. Nothing
here can affect it: every changed line in style.css is inside a comment.
Also checked: ast.parse on every changed .py, `node --check` on every
changed .js, the /* */ balance in style.css, and that no changed line
exceeds the width its file already used.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A 1080p film is decoded by whoever watches it and re-encoded by the node
when no browser can decode the source. Both were on the CPU, and on an
Atom or Celeron mini-PC neither reaches real time — which is what
`transcode_incompatible_video` exists to refuse. This adds the mechanism
that makes refusing it unnecessary.
Node — `hwaccel.py`: VA-API on Linux, Quick Sync or NVENC on Windows,
established by encoding 1080p and reading the file back with ffprobe.
Nothing is accepted that does not produce the exact profile and level
`stream_init` announces, since the client checks that string before it
trusts a byte: an encoder that wrote another level would make the node's
own codec string a lie, and ffmpeg takes `-level 4.1` and `-level 41`
from h264_qsv without saying which it understood. Three modes per
stream — hardware decode and encode, hardware encode alone, libx264 —
demoted per source codec, because a GPU that decodes HEVC may have no
decoder for MPEG-4 Part 2 and only asking it finds out. A mode that
fails is detected on an empty stdout before `stream_init` goes out, so
the viewer sees one working stream and never an error.
Client — Chromium ships VA-API off on Linux. It is enabled where a
render node and a driver are present, then verified through
`navigator.mediaCapabilities`: a no moves to the next GL backend on the
next launch and an exhausted list drops the switches, so a renamed
feature cannot pass for a feature that is on and `--ignore-gpu-blocklist`
cannot survive on a machine it did not help. Feature lists now merge
rather than overwrite — `appendSwitch` replaces the value, and a second
caller would have silently cancelled the mDNS switch aiortc depends on.
Packaging — the drivers are weak dependencies on all four formats, so a
machine without a GPU installs exactly as before. `dpkg -i` and
`rpm -ivh` ignore weak deps; `packaging/README.md` now says so. Windows
needs no driver: the bundled ffmpeg already carries h264_qsv and
h264_nvenc, and a re-pin that dropped them would cost every low-power
Windows node its hardware encoding silently.
AMD on Windows (AMF) and macOS (VideoToolbox) are named gaps, not
oversights: neither could be tried anywhere in this project, and both
re-encode in software as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The documented setup was `pip install pytest pytest-asyncio aiosqlite`, three
lines under a rule saying not to install packages that are not declared in a
pyproject.toml. All three packages declare a `dev` extra, and the hand-written
list missed what was in it.
It cost three invisible things. Without `piexif`, `test_enrich_photo.py` fails
at import and the whole node suite stops at collection — not one test, the
run. Without `pytest-timeout`, `timeout = 60` in pyproject.toml is an unknown
config option, so the protection its own comment describes ("a hung test must
not wedge the run") was absent, announced only in a warning among the
deprecation notices. Without `ruff`, the project's linter is not installed.
`aiosqlite` never needed naming: it is a runtime dependency of the hub and the
node and arrives with the `-e` installs.
Verified with the corrected line: 2804 tests collected, 2800 passed, 4
skipped, and no unknown-option warning — nothing exceeds the timeout that is
now actually enforced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UGY17EPph5LsLzePPXhUVc
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names its parameters
`pw_version` 4: Argon2id 64 MiB, t=3, lanes=4 — RFC 9106's second recommended
setting. A v3 hash (256 MB) still verifies at its own parameters and is
rewritten at the new ones on the next sign-in, through the rehash path that
already existed.
Why not more. The verifier matters against an offline attacker holding the
database; online guessing is bounded by the sign-in lockout. That attacker pays
the client's 600 000 PBKDF2-SHA512 iterations and the hub's Argon2id per guess,
since `auth_key` is 256 bits and cannot be searched directly. Memory above
64 MiB multiplies that cost by a constant — at most 16 at 256 MB, less with
PBKDF2 counted — while the hub pays the same memory at every sign-in, one
derivation at a time. Measured on meshbay.org: 450 ms at 256 MB, 105 ms at
64 MiB, so a burst of sign-ins clears about four times faster.
Changing the current version exposed a latent lockout. `hash_password` always
used the current version's parameters, while the raw-password scheme recorded
`pw_version = 2` — harmless while versions 2 and 3 shared their parameters,
and with version 4 every legacy registration and v1→v2 rehash would have
stored a 64 MiB hash labelled 256 MB, which nothing could then verify. Seventeen
tests caught it. `hash_password` now takes the version it is hashing for.
The OpenSSL deadlock between two concurrent `lanes=4` derivations is the same at
64 MiB, so Argon2 stays on its single worker. The loop-stall test measures
against a v3 hash, because half of a 45 ms inline derivation is too close to
scheduling noise to be a reliable bound.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt
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when idle
Browser idle sign-out (media playback counts as activity; not the desktop app),
refresh idle window and maximum session length, in hours. Sign-out now revokes
on the hub, and the profile has "sign out everywhere".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XuNrwLf5EFWCMHzfoEvnpm
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One derivation is 256 MB and a quarter to half a second of CPU (240 ms here,
485 ms on meshbay.org). All eleven call sites — sign-in, registration, the two
rehashes, passphrase change, reset and account deletion — ran it inline in an
async handler, so every one stopped the whole hub for that long: no request
served, no node socket read, no offer relayed. Measured on a local hub during
eight concurrent sign-ins, the worst `/v1/health` response went from 232 ms to
10 ms; the sign-ins themselves take the same time.
It could not simply go to a thread pool. Two concurrent `lanes=4` derivations
deadlock inside OpenSSL and never return, at no CPU — reproduced on
cryptography 50.0.x / OpenSSL 4.0.x both locally and on meshbay.org, while
`lanes=1` does not. `lanes` is part of every stored hash, so it is not ours to
change, and inline on the loop two derivations could never overlap, which is
the only reason production never hung.
So `auth.hash_password_off_loop` / `verify_password_off_loop` hand the work to
a dedicated executor with exactly one worker. Not a semaphore around
`to_thread`: a cancelled request would release its permit while its thread was
still deriving, and the next derivation would start beside it. One worker also
bounds Argon2's memory to one derivation whatever the number of callers.
`test_argon2_off_loop.py` reads every module for a direct call, pins the single
worker, runs four derivations and four sign-ins concurrently to completion, and
checks the loop keeps turning during a derivation; each fails with its guard
removed. CLAUDE.md and AV9 state the rule and the trap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt
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Passphrase sign-in locks per username: after `login.max_failures` wrong
passphrases (default 4) the name is refused with `429 account_locked` and a
`Retry-After` for `login.lockout_minutes` (default 60), without the passphrase
being checked. Both numbers are instance policy an admin sets from the panel;
zero failures turns it off. The per-IP limit bounds one address, and IPv6
gives every subscriber a /64 of them — an online guess targets an account, so
the account is what is counted.
- Counted by the name as typed, existing or not, so `login` stays uniform (M1).
The key is a hash: people type passphrases into the username field.
- The attempt is taken before the check in one `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE
… WHERE … RETURNING`, so a concurrent burst gets no more than the limit.
- Sign-in, passphrase change and account deletion count on the same row; the
last had no rate limit at all.
- A lockout refuses passphrase sign-in and nothing else: sessions, renewal and
device sign-in continue, and a reset code clears it (AV26). A session learns
its own lockout from `/v1/users/me`, and the passphrase change checks it
before re-wrapping any node's bundle — the hub accepts the new passphrase
only after the nodes have it.
The SPA now shows what the hub said. `loginAndRecover` threw "Login failed:
{json}", so `email_verification_required` never matched and was never shown;
the passphrase-change form rendered no error at all in its first phase.
The unauthenticated surface, reviewed route by route:
- No `/docs`, `/redoc` or `/openapi.json`, in the code. The Caddyfile hid them
on meshbay.org only; a packaged hub behind any other proxy published all three.
- The node socket's first message must arrive within ten seconds. It is
accepted before anyone is known, and an unbounded read is a connection any
stranger holds for free.
- `/v1/relays` answers 503 behind `relay.RELAYS_ENABLED`, as federation does:
nothing in the tree calls it and two of its routes take no account.
- `test_unauthenticated_surface.py` walks every route and fails on one without
an authentication dependency that is not listed with its reason.
Verified in Chrome against a local hub: the lockout and wrong-passphrase
messages, the admin section saving both lockout and mail limits, and the
passphrase change refused while locked. Not verified in Firefox (a running
instance blocks the headless one), nor the upsert's concurrency on PostgreSQL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt
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Every MHP route answers a stated 503. `federation.FEDERATION_ENABLED` is the
only thing that decides it, applied as a dependency on the router so the six
routes that exist and any added later are covered by construction — a gate you
have to remember to write in each handler is the shape C6 is the standing
lesson about.
The protocol is not what is wrong with it. What is wrong is that nothing has
ever run it: two hubs have never completed one authenticated request between
them. AV14 was two defects in the same path — an issuer signing with a key
bound before it was loaded, naming itself after the reference deployment
whatever the instance was called, and a verifier naming no audience for the
`aud` the issuer sets, which PyJWT refuses outright. Both stood for a month
behind a green suite, and both were found by reading rather than by running,
because a second implementation of a peer proves the protocol and nothing about
two machines.
Four of the six routes carry no authentication of their own — the MHP token is
the authentication — and two of those write, a directory push and a revocation.
That is the surface being closed until somebody stands up a second hub.
A constant and not a `hub_settings` row, deliberately: a switch in the admin
panel invites an operator to turn on a feature that has never worked between
two machines, where this takes an edit, a deploy, and reading the comment above
it. `/v1/hub/info` reports the state, because the `mhp_version` beside it would
otherwise be a claim the hub does not honour.
The protocol tests open the gate for their own duration and say why; the one
that runs with the flag as it ships asserts all six routes refuse. §7.6 states
the closure, §15.2 carries federation between two hubs as not built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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§15.3 gains the items the review found and did not close, each as what it is
rather than as a plan: the packaged install that has never been installed, QUIC
serving content outside every cap it does not implement, a relay registry
nothing calls, an unmetered third-party search, disk I/O on the node's event
loop, unbounded node announcements, and a migration chain exercised on a
database it does not ship on.
They are in the design rather than in a tracker because each is a sentence about
what the system currently is, and §15.3 is where the document already keeps
those. The seven that were closed this week are in §13.5b as AV20–AV25 and in
the sections they belong to.
CLAUDE.md gains the Firefox harness, which is the other kind of entry: eleven
errors at setup that look exactly like a regression, are not, and cost a full
diagnosis to place. `HOME` isolates the profile and not snap's single instance,
so any running Firefox blocks the headless probe, `--no-remote` and
`--new-instance` do not help, and a failed run leaves a process that blocks the
next. The chrome half covers the same geometry meanwhile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`add_email_verification` wrote PostgreSQL's `(now() at time zone 'utc')` as a
literal server default, where every other migration in the chain uses
`sa.func.now()` and lets the dialect render it. On SQLite that is
`sqlite3.OperationalError: near "at": syntax error` — so `meshbay-hub migrate`
could not reach head on the database the suite and the documented local-hub
workflow both use.
Which is how it survived: the only test that ran alembic at all stopped at
`c3d4e5f6a7b8`, the revision immediately before it. The two newest migrations —
email verification, and the mail quota committed two days ago — had been run by
exactly one thing, a production deploy, and the newest by nothing at all.
`test_migrations_reach_head.py` upgrades to head and compares what that built
against `Base.metadata`, both directions: a column in the models and in no
migration never reaches production, and one in the migrations and in no model is
a rename abandoned halfway. Both tests fail on the unfixed migration with the
error above; the drift half was checked by adding a model column on purpose and
watching it be named. The schemas agree today.
It still does not check PostgreSQL-only behaviour — a default, an index type or
a constraint one dialect accepts and the other refuses. Running the chain
somewhere beats running it nowhere, and is not the same as running it where it
ships.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`ExecStartPre` ran `alembic -c /opt/meshbay-hub/migrations/alembic.ini upgrade
head`. The build does stage that file, so the path existed and the contents
were wrong: `alembic.ini` resolves `script_location` with `%(here)s`, so the
copy pointed at `/opt/meshbay-hub/migrations/src/meshbay_hub/db/migrations` —
which nothing installs, because the migrations ship inside `meshbay_hub`, in
the shared venv.
`ExecStartPre` failing stops the unit. A hub installed from the RPM or the DEB
could not start at all, and nothing noticed because the one live deployment
was assembled by hand — the same shape as the node unit that carried `User=`
into the user unit directory.
The same `%(here)s` trap was already found once on the server, where a stray
`alembic.ini` resolved to a month-old snapshot of the tree. Twice is a trap
rather than an accident, so the fix is that the path is no longer written down
anywhere: `meshbay-hub migrate` asks the installed package where its own
migrations are, which is correct for the RPM, the DEB, a venv and a checkout.
The build stages no `alembic.ini`; the repo keeps its own for `alembic
revision` and for deploy scripts that already work.
`env.py` now prefers a URL the caller resolved over re-reading the environment
itself, so `migrate --config` connects with exactly the string the server
will — one resolution, not two that agree until they do not.
Six tests, three of which fail against the unit as it was. They read the
directives rather than the file, because searching the whole thing finds the
comment explaining a directive and calls that the directive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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The figure was a line beside the settings form, which is where it is changed
and not where it is watched. It sits with the other live figures under
Statistics now — four cards and, above them, a banner saying which of the two
ceilings has fallen. The two states are not the same to whoever is reading:
one means newcomers are turned away, the other means somebody locked out of
their account cannot get back in. The settings block keeps a line pointing at
it.
And an operator no longer has to be looking. When a global ceiling is reached
the administrators are notified — in `mail.py`, in its own session, never
raising, because this runs while a request is being refused and an alert that
fails must not turn a refusal into a 500. Once per hour, keyed on a row
rather than a flag in memory: a flood is what spends the budget, so one alert
per refusal would bury the message under its own cause, and a hub that is
refusing mail is a hub somebody is about to restart.
`/v1/admin/mail` gains `general_exhausted` and `all_exhausted` rather than
leaving the panel to compare two numbers.
Labels in all ten catalogues; `.warn-msg` for the middle state, on the
`--warn` token both themes already define.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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AV16 the allowance that survives a restart and that an operator can see and
change; AV17 the single worker.
And a lesson that cost a full suite run: `node --check` reports success on a
module-syntax error. An unclosed `.map(` inside a tagged template came back
clean four times. `test_spa_syntax.py` says exactly this in its own docstring
— copying to `.mjs` is what forces the module parser — and the reflex still
reached for `node --check`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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AV13 the mail gate, AV14 the MHP audience and the hub's own identity, AV15
the shape check on the unauthenticated blocklist endpoints. §13.5b also
records the auto-block threshold as an open decision rather than a defect.
Two lessons, both about tests.
A fixture narrower than production tests the fixture — and when it writes down
*why* it has to be narrow, that is a bug report nobody filed. Two test helpers
described the federation defects accurately, in comments, while routing
around them.
And a global's state is not a given, in a test least of all. One assertion —
that a refusal never logs the address — took three attempts, each passing
alone and failing in the full run, for three different reasons: caplog saw
nothing because the app configures logging, then a handler saw nothing
because an earlier test raised the logger's level, then because `disabled`
was left True.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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The register grows by the four findings from users.py, and gains the pattern
underneath several of them: a limit written on one of several equivalent paths
(three endpoints send mail, one had no limit; every list in admin.py is
bounded, the two outside it were not; the group claim was bounded at
registration and not on reload), and a bound that counts the wrong thing (a
per-IP rate limit bounds a caller, never the mailbox that receives what they
cause).
Also records that admin.py was read under the lens and needed nothing, so the
next reader does not re-derive that.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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The first three reviews asked who can read what, who can impersonate whom,
and what a hostile node can forge. None asked what a legitimate but
misconfigured or careless member costs everyone else — which is the question
a group platform lives on, because every member was invited by someone who
trusted them and none of them is an attacker.
C2 had asked "can a node claim a group its owner is not in?" and the answer
was correctly no. Nobody had asked what happens when a node claims one its
owner *is* in but does not host, which is how a group went dark for all of
its members with its real host online throughout.
§13.5b is the register, AV1 to AV8. The lens, for anything reviewed from
here: a participant supplies input; if anyone other than the sender bears the
cost, there is a ceiling to write, and it goes on every path that writes the
state.
CLAUDE.md gets the working rule and the incident as a lesson, and the stale
path to sync-ui.js corrected — it lives under scripts/, not build/.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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Everything under static/ is served at /a/<hash>/ with a year's
`immutable`, but the hash was computed from a hand-kept list of 43
top-level modules. The ten catalogues and vendor/ were not on it, nor
was anything the guarding test could see: it globbed *.js at the top
level only. A change confined to the catalogues therefore kept the hash,
and a phone went on showing a heading that had been rewritten and
deployed - pull-to-refresh fetched the no-store shell, which was
current, and never refetched en.js at a URL that had not moved.
The fingerprint now hashes every file under static/, path and content,
so a change, a rename or a new file moves the version with nothing to
register. _ASSETS is gone, and CLAUDE.md, MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 9.4 step 6,
assets/brand/README.md and docs/playlists.md no longer ask for it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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Twenty-four files, about 17 000 lines: the two architecture drafts, the three
security reviews, eleven design notes, the roadmap, the decisions file, the v1–v4
archive, the deprecated user guide and the stale quickstart. Their content is in
MESHBAY_DESIGN.md, and git history holds the originals.
The reason to delete rather than keep bannered: a document that is superseded but
present still gets read, and a reader cannot always tell which of two accounts of
one mechanism is the live one. That was the argument for retiring the user guide
rather than repairing it, and it applies to the whole set.
What made this safe is the concordance. Roughly 290 comments and docstrings cite
these files by section — `musicbay.md §6`, `mediacenter.md §5.5`, `draft-v6 §2.11`
— and section 16 maps every one onto its replacement, so not a single comment
needs editing to stay followable. It now says plainly that the files are gone and
where to recover them, and it gained rows for the three reviews (their findings
are section 13), and for the two guides.
Four kept documents pointed into the set and were repointed first: `playlists.md`
(nine references — it is a live proposal and must not dangle), `WINDOWS-PORT.md`,
and CLAUDE.md's example. No dangling reference remains outside section 16.
Two files were dropped from the list after checking what they hold. `HTTPS.md` is
an operational runbook — Caddy, certificate renewal, DNS, troubleshooting — and
MESHBAY_DESIGN.md deliberately covers no operations, so nothing would replace it;
the versioned Caddyfile is the config, not the procedure. `cast-smart-tv.md` is
the plan for the unbuilt DLNA phase of a feature whose first two phases ship, and
section 11.4 summarises it in four lines rather than carrying the SSDP/UPnP work.
There is no user guide now, and section 0.1 says so rather than leaving a reader
to discover it.
Suites green: 2258 passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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CLAUDE.md was half a second specification. It carried summaries of three
security reviews, the invite redesign, per-node identity, the desktop client, a
protocol-version history and a sixty-row module table — all of it now in
MESHBAY_DESIGN.md, and some of it wrong: an errata list asserted a keystore
parameter that had been raised months earlier, and the module table pointed at
two implementations that no longer exist.
An errata list beside a specification is a second specification, and the older
one wins by being read first. Those sections become a pointer table naming which
part of the design document answers which question.
What stays is what has no other home: the conventions, and the engineering
lessons — the ones that are not deducible from the design because they are what
the code and the platforms actually do. They keep every word.
The module table stays as locators, stripped of the design prose it duplicated,
with a note kept only where it is a rule about editing the code. Every path in
it was verified to exist; two were wrong, and the harness directory was wrong
throughout.
Two references to files outside the repository are gone from the reference
table — a document about this repository should not send a reader somewhere they
cannot follow. The rules about that directory stay, because they are rules about
what must never be committed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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Files, Videos, Music and Photos are read by scrolling, and everything that
steers that reading left with the first screenful. Three bands now pin under
the navigation bar, in a group and on the Search page alike: the tab bar (the
search field, on Search), the application's own toolbar, and the file table's
column heads. The group's name and description still scroll — they say nothing
a reader needs while walking a directory, and the height they would cost is
height the list does not get.
A band's offset is the heights of the bands above it, and those are not
constants: the toolbar wraps to three rows on a phone, grows a field while a
folder is being named, and loses its filter on Search. So each band measures
itself and publishes `--chrome-h` / `--toolbar-h` (static/sticky.js) and the
stylesheet does the arithmetic in calc(), rather than a number written down
twice — the fault CLAUDE.md already records against this layout twice over.
A band publishes height *plus its own bottom margin*, and paints that margin
as a ring of page colour, so the pinned layout is pixel-identical to the flow
layout and nothing shifts at the moment a band pins.
Three overflow faults came out of it, all of the same class and all of them
what "the header does not stay" actually meant on Android — a document wider
than the screen leaves everything pinned attached to a viewport the reader can
no longer see, the navigation bar included:
- a directory's name cell was a bare <td>, so an unbreakable folder name
(`Rage_Against_The_Machine_Discography_1992-2000_FLAC`) set the column's
minimum: a 527px table in a 390px window
- Search's group column did the same at 442px with an underscored group
name. It also goes entirely below 768px, where there is no room for it and
the breadcrumb already names the group
- the shared-directories table has four columns of controls with a combined
minimum near 440px, none of it compressible. On a phone the row stops
being a row: the name and its eject/remove pair on one line, the two
switches — each carrying the column head's own string as a label — on the
next
- and, found by measuring at 360px, the tab bar itself was 19px too wide
`.file-table` moves to separated borders: a collapsed border belongs to the
table rather than to the cell, so the column heads lost their rule the moment
they pinned.
Measured, not read. tests/harness/sticky_header_probe.py drives the shipped
GroupPage and SearchPage against a stub node, walks to each application,
scrolls to the end and reports every rectangle — 11 views x 4 widths x 2
engines. Its fixture says what real data says: the first version used
`note-007.txt` and `un groupe`, which fit any screen, and found none of the
above. A fixture narrower than real data tests the fixture.
Also: `test_desktop_shell` no longer looks for the CSP after the first `-->`,
which made it fail on correct markup as soon as a comment was added above it,
and `search-page.js` joins test_hook_ordering's file list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tx16FhyD2BUdpooGb5jcyN
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The service worker one is the expensive one: an idle worker is terminated and a
streaming response does not count as activity, so `writable.write()` hung with
no error anywhere while the node stayed healthy. Written down with what made it
unfindable — a stress probe fast enough to hide it, three measurements that
correctly cleared everything they touched, and an empty console that was the
evidence rather than the absence of it.
The other two are the framing headers (three of them, all visible in one
`curl -I`, fixed one at a time over an afternoon) and `encodeURIComponent`
leaving the apostrophe that RFC 5987 uses as its delimiter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Chat messages have been signed by the sending device since MNP 2.0, but a
reader had no way to know that the device belonged to the account the node
named: the signature proved *a device*, and `sender_id` was still the node's
word. This closes that for any account a client has already seen.
**What was blocking it was not effort — the evidence was not being kept.**
`_do_device_add` verified the countersignature that admits a second device and
stored only `added_by_pk`: *which* key approved, never the proof. And
`device_add_transcript` binds `nonce_node`, the approving connection's handshake
nonce, so even a stored signature was unverifiable by anyone who had not been on
that connection. `identities` gains `add_sig`, `add_nonce` and `add_ts`, added
before the migration's early return — which fires on every roster widened since
2026-08-18, i.e. all of them, so putting them inside it would have meant they
never arrived.
`group_roster_req`/`resp` relays, sealed under a new groupbox purpose and
answered to **any member of the group**, every live device of every active
member with the evidence that admitted it. The node decides nothing: it hands
over evidence and the client walks the chain from each account's root outwards
(`_verifyRoster`). That is deliberate — the node is the party the property holds
against, so it is not asked to assert trust.
Two holes the tests caught while this was being built:
- "no signature" was being treated as a trust root, so a node that writes the
roster could put any key in an account's row and have it laundered straight
into the verified set. A root is a device that names **no** countersigner.
- pinning only the verified subset at first sight raised "key changed" on
legitimate second devices whose countersignature predates this change. First
sight pins everything the node says, because that is what trust-on-first-use
means and an alarm that fires on normal events stops being read.
The property, and it must not be rounded up: **once a client has seen an
account, a node that later substitutes a key for it is detected. Nothing is
gained at first sight**, where there is nothing to compare against — the same
boundary `per-node-identity-v1.md` draws, unmoved.
The cost, stated because it is real: the roster is member-visible, so every
member learns how many devices the others hold and their public keys. It stays
inside the group, the hub is not involved, and it is scoped per group. A member
who cannot see the keys cannot check them.
User-visible surface: one notice, "this account is using a key you have not seen
before", in ten languages. Nothing else.
16 tests — 7 on the node (the evidence is stored, it verifies from the roster
alone, a fabricated device carries none, another group's members are not
disclosed), 9 running the shipped `_verifyRoster` under node against rosters
built by the shipped Python: a chain of three in any order, a signature by the
wrong key, one for another node, one for another account, and two fabricated
devices signing each other admitting nothing.
Tier 3 (operator-signed roster attestation) stays deferred, with nothing
depending on it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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Both sides landed a breaking MNP change and both called it 2.0, which is right:
the sealed upload, the removal of `stream_seg` and mandatory chat encryption
share one flag day. They are recorded as one version in `__init__.py` rather
than as a race between two.
The resolutions that were decisions rather than mechanics:
* **`MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` moves to "2.0".** The sealed upload alone was a
*confined* break — a 1.x peer could still connect, browse, download, stream
and chat, with only its uploads refused by `upload_not_sealed` — so the floor
deliberately stayed at "1.0". Mandatory chat encryption ends that
confinement: a 1.x peer can neither produce a sealed chat message nor read
one, so it would connect, look fine, and be unable to say anything. Refusing
it at the handshake is the honest form. The per-message `upload_not_sealed`
path is untouched and still right if the floor is ever lowered.
* **`sendChat` throws on an `error` reply**, from origin, applied to the sealed
send. It matters more after this change, not less: the node now refuses a
stale epoch, a malformed envelope and a device claim that is not the
connection's own, so there are three new ways for a message to be rejected
and none of them may look like a message that was sent.
* **`req_id` supersedes the per-type routing** this branch added for
`chat_keys_resp` and `device_hello_ack`. Both blocks are kept beside the
existing `chat_hist_resp` one, for the same stated reason — a node too old to
stamp — and their comments no longer claim to be the mechanism that closes
the class. `req_id` is.
* **`chat_send_probe.py` is rebuilt on origin's structure**, not beside it: two
scenarios, a stub that stamps `req_id`, `music_meta_req` as the older pending
request. The encrypted path is layered on — a real Ed25519 device key
generated in the page, and a `chat_keys_resp` sealed by the shipped Python,
because a payload the page built itself would prove only that the page agrees
with the page.
* **`test_reply_correlation.py` now sends a sealed message.** Its subject is
which of the two messages leaving that handler carries the id; plaintext chat
was only the fixture, and the node refuses one now.
* `groupbox` keeps both new purposes (`upload`, `chat_keys`); `protocol.py`
keeps origin's removal of `STREAM_SEGMENT` and this branch's correction of
the "Double Ratchet message" comment on `CHAT_MESSAGE`, which was wrong when
it was written and is wrong differently now.
Full suite on the merged tree: 1993 passed, 11 failed — the same 11 that fail
on a pristine checkout (2 Windows service tests, 1 apps-enabled policy, 7
transcode tests that pass in isolation, and the WebRTC invite test that hangs
on its own).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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MNP carried no correlation id. A reply named its own type and nothing
else, so a client with more than one request in flight worked out which
one a message answered from the message itself — and for the replies
that name nothing it could not. `_dispatch` fell through to matching by
arrival order, which is a guess. `_sendAndWait` had the right value all
along: it keys `_pending` by `this._seqId++` and never put it on the
wire.
The guess fails asymmetrically, which is why it hid. The victim is not
the request that was answered wrongly — it is the unrelated one that now
waits out its own 30s timeout for a reply already delivered elsewhere.
Live on 2026-09-06: five `music_meta_req` sat pending for over 100
seconds behind a failing MusicBrainz, and a `device_list_result` was
handed to one of them. The composer is disabled while a send is in
flight, so a chat message whose reply went astray the same way left the
Chat tab looking frozen for thirty seconds, then unfroze on its own.
The `ack` half of this was fixed on 2026-08-30 by matching on request
type. That closed the instance and left the class open: a refusal has no
type to match on either, and `_dispatch_message`'s catch-all answers
every unforeseen failure with `{"type": "error", "detail": "Request
failed"}` — 238 of this module's 240 error sends name nothing at all.
`req_id` now rides on the request and comes back on the reply. On the
node it is published for the whole handler in a ContextVar and stamped
by `_send`: a parameter would have meant threading an argument through
all 240 send sites, and asyncio copies the context into a task, so a
handler that `_spawn`s its real work still answers under the right id.
It is never stamped on a broadcast — those answer nothing, and the
owner check in `_send` is what keeps a chat broadcast or an index push
from reaching another peer looking like a reply.
On the client, `_dispatch` resolves on `req_id` first and the
arrival-order fallback is gone the moment a node proves it stamps
(`_correlates`, armed by the handshake's own reply). The fallback stays
for an MNP 1.0 node, unchanged and no wider: there it is the only thing
there is, and removing it would leave device_list_result, join_result
and the handshake replies reaching nobody.
Two things fall out. `sendChat` refuses an `error` reply like every
other request in the file — it returned it as success, which did not
matter while a refusal reached the wrong caller anyway and would now
show a rejected message as sent. And `_group_ctx` uses `.get`: a reload
pops a removed group while sessions connected to it are open, and every
request they had left raised KeyError into that same catch-all.
Sealed index messages are the one exception to the fast path. They
cannot be handed over until they are opened, which is asynchronous while
`_dispatch` is not — resolving on the id alone gave `fetchIndex` the
envelope and skipped `onIndexSync` entirely. Caught by extending
`index_seal_probe.mjs` to stamp a reply the way a current node does,
after the hub suite passed over it: the probe built its own frames and
had never seen one.
Tests, all failing before and passing after: `test_chat_send.py` drives
the real ChatPanel over the real transport for both shapes of reply with
an older request pending (3 of its 6 are new, and the 3 for `ack` pass
either way, so it discriminates); `test_reply_correlation.py` pins the
node's half — the refusals that name nothing else, the broadcast that
must not be stamped, and a late reply from a spawned task answering
under its own id rather than the most recent request's.
Full suite: 1897 passed, same 11 pre-existing failures as before.
QUIC keeps its own dispatch and is not stamped. It is disabled by
default and no browser request reaches it, but the asymmetry is real.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dn1xYx9uT69mCB6UDvyKAN
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Chat messages are sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key derived per group, per
epoch, per *device*, and signed over the ciphertext with the device key the
node pinned. The node relays and archives; it cannot read a message.
There is no switch. MNP goes to 2.0 and MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED moves with it, so a
1.x peer is refused at the handshake with `version_too_old` rather than
admitted and then unable to speak. An opt-in flag was designed and rejected:
every node is a test node, so it would have bought nothing and left a plaintext
branch reachable — C6's lesson one feature later. A test reads the source and
refuses any code that consults a `chat_encrypted` setting.
Not Sender Keys, and `senderkeys.py` is now documented as unused. With
distribution under the group key and a node that serves history to devices
which were not present, the node must retain each chain's earliest key, and a
chain key at iteration i yields every message key from i on by pure HKDF —
forward secrecy is zero either way. What the ratchet was left buying was
stateful client code with silent failure modes, three of them reproduced: any
member could sign as any other, a second device dropped the first's chain, and
the skipped-key cache grew without bound. The reasoning is in
docs/chat-sender-keys.md, which is the specification and the decision record.
Epochs, not rotation: the epoch key is wrapped under the group key at delivery
and never stored under it, so `gek_rotate` is a re-wrap. A group-key-derived
archive key would have made every message ever sent unreadable on the first
`member unpin`, which is the documented step after removing a member. A new
epoch opens on member revoke/unpin, device revoke and `gek_rotate`; old epochs
are kept and still delivered, so history stays readable to everyone who could
already read it, and nothing anywhere deletes one.
Three prerequisites this needed, each a live defect on its own:
* The peer registry was keyed by user_id, so one account's second device
evicted the first and the broadcast skipped recipients by account — a
person's phone never saw what they typed on their laptop.
* The handshake authenticated an account, never a device. `device_hello`
(additive, signed, refused unless the key is a live device of this account in
the node's own roster) is what lets the node refuse a member claiming
somebody else's key.
* `_admin_exec_file_delete` authorized against the exact uploading key, so
device linking had already broken deleting your own file from your other
device. It now authorizes against any non-revoked device of `uploader_id`.
Found by driving the real panel over the real transport, not by reading source:
`chat_keys_resp` was routed by arrival order and handed to an unanswered
`media_meta_req` — the original frozen-tab defect in a message type that did
not exist when that probe was written. And `_asText` had been deleted with an
unrelated helper beside it; its only caller sits inside a promise the panel
catches, so every conversation rendered empty with nothing in the console.
Existing node data is migrated by QE/migration/migrate_chat_encryption.py
(not versioned, per the QE rule), run with the node stopped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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`index_sync`, `index_delta` and the `handshake_ack` config payload now travel
sealed under a GEK-derived subkey (`meshbay_common/groupbox.py`, mirrored by
`sealGroup`/`openGroup` in `crypto.js`). Only `type`, `v`, `group_id` and the
ack's `node_pk`/`proof`/`sig` stay in clear — a receiver must route and
authenticate before it would trust a decryption. Verify, then decrypt.
The ack line is integrity, not confidentiality: the signed handshake transcript
names no ack field, so `is_node_admin`, `enabled_apps`, `video_root` and the
rest were authenticated by the DTLS channel alone. The index line is defence in
depth against a repeat of C1/C6 — a peer served before the handshake completes
now gets ciphertext, not filenames. Nothing against an observer, the hub, or a
member; that is the whole claim. `index_progress` stays clear (D3, counters
only). Chat is out of scope.
Failure is fatal: a payload that does not open ends the session naming the
message type — never an empty index or an empty `enabled_apps`, both of which
are legitimate states.
Version negotiation ships here too (phase 15.6, brought forward): `v` + `v_min`
on `handshake` and `handshake_challenge`, refused with `version_too_old` /
`version_too_new` / `version_unreadable`. The flag day was already being paid
for; the next breaking change now costs a refusal message.
BREAKING CHANGE: breaks the WebRTC wire every deployed client speaks. Hub and
every node must deploy together; the SPA is served by the hub, so a browser
picks up the new client on reload. See MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md §11.1a, §13.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkzbhmMmK8PqQBtGz5zCvY
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Add docs/WINDOWS-PORT.md with the full portability audit (what is
already portable, what blocks, implementation plan W1-W7).
Reverse structural decision 20: sender keys are distributed
GEK-wrapped, not pairwise to identity keys. The GEK is the group
secret; files and chat share the same access boundary. Per-device
chains (15.0b) remain required for correctness.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Typing a message froze the Chat tab: the composer stopped taking clicks and
keystrokes, the message never appeared, and it was there all along on the next
visit to the tab.
The node answers a chat message with a bare {"type": "ack"} -- no request id,
no type of its own -- so _dispatch had nothing to match it on and left it to
the arrival-order guess at the end of the function. That guess is wrong the
moment anything else this browser asked for is still waiting: the ack went to
*that* request, and the chat send waited out _sendAndWait's own 30s timeout.
Since the composer is disabled while a send is in flight, that reads as a
frozen tab; the node had stored the message and answered, into somebody else's
promise.
An outstanding request is the ordinary case, not a rare one. The node refuses
an unknown file_id with a bare `error`, which names no request either and so
reaches none, leaving the Videos tab's media_meta_req in _pending for the full
30s. That is the one that was live when this was found.
- `ack` is now matched by request type: chat_msg, or the keypair-bundle store
and delete, which name themselves in `detail`. A node naming neither still
has its reply placed rather than dropped.
Every line of chat-app.js is correct and every routed message in transport.js
is routed correctly -- the defect is in the seam, so tests/harness/
chat_send_probe.py drives the two together: the real ChatPanel over the real
MeshBayTransport, with only the DataChannel replaced by a stand-in answering
what the node answers. test_chat_send.py asserts against it, and with the fix
reverted all three of its tests fail on the three visible halves of the defect
-- the composer still disabled, the message absent, and the ack resolving the
unrelated request.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GFF4BL8VSKrghkSLzCrTVs
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A group could open on a tab that rendered nothing: no panel, no tab shown
active, and nothing on screen to explain it.
The landing tab is chosen at mount from a preference -- default_tab for the
group, else the account-wide one, else 'chat'. Which applications the group
runs comes from the node, in the handshake ack, several awaits later. A
preference is a preference, not a promise that the app exists here, so the
two disagree in two ordinary cases: the group has Chat disabled while
'chat' is everyone's default, or the reader prefers an app this group does
not run. `apps.map(a => tab === a.key && ...)` then matches nothing.
The first app the group does offer answers both. Two more cases come free:
a preference naming an app that no longer exists, and an operator disabling
the app someone is currently looking at -- enabledApps changes live over
apps_enabled, and being moved to a working tab beats staring at an empty
panel. Settings is exempt: it is not an application, and the create-group
wizard lands on it deliberately.
`const apps` moves above the effect that reads it; a const further down
would be in its temporal dead zone, which is the hook-ordering trap already
recorded in CLAUDE.md.
tests/harness/group_tab_probe.py renders the real GroupPage against a stub
node answering a chosen enabled_apps and reads the tab bar back, over five
cases. With the fix reverted the three fallback cases report no active tab
at all and four of the six tests fail; the two that pass either way are the
ones that must not change -- a group running everything, and a preference
the group does honour (Videos stays selected, so the fallback has not
become "always the first app").
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W8oRqEHhnKUr1NfmTVdcyL
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The chat could not be read back: any wheel gesture was undone in the frame
it happened in, and the "jump to latest" button never appeared.
None of the pins in ChatPanel are at fault -- every one of them is guarded
by "only if the reader is at the bottom". The reader never got to stop
being at the bottom.
fit() set the panel's height, read documentElement.scrollHeight back and
subtracted the overflow, so the document alternately did and did not
overflow the window. The page scrollbar appeared and vanished with it and
visualViewport fired resize at every pass -- the event fit() is bound to.
It therefore re-entered itself for the life of the panel: measured at 240
firings in two seconds on a page nobody was touching, against 2 for a bare
document. Each pass ran fitAndPin, which re-pinned the list to the bottom
before the scroll event that would have recorded the gesture was delivered
a frame later, so atBottomRef never went false.
- fit() learns the space below the panel once and remembers it on the
element instead of re-deriving it by writing and measuring back. At the
steady state it writes nothing, so it produces no resize. A real window
resize or an orientation change forgets the learnt value and measures
again (the page under the panel may have reflowed); visualViewport
deliberately does not, since a phone fires it constantly.
- The scroll-to-bottom is now scoped to *arrival*, which is all it was ever
for: opening the group, or coming back to the Chat tab, including the
thumbnails and link-preview cards that keep growing the list for a second
afterwards. It ends when the reader takes hold of the scroll, and the
ResizeObserver disconnects there.
- That release is recorded from the gesture (wheel/touchmove/pointerdown/
keydown), not from the scroll event, which arrives too late to protect
anything.
Unchanged: landing on the newest message, following new messages while
already at the bottom, the "load older" anchor and the unread marker.
tests/harness/chat_scroll_probe.py mounts the real ChatPanel in a browser
and reads a conversation back; test_chat_scroll_up.py asserts against it.
With the fix reverted, five of its six tests fail and the sixth -- landing
on the newest message -- still passes, which is the property that must not
have been traded away. A structural test cannot see any of this, which is
why it is measured.
test_layout_responsive.py pinned the listener's name and follows the
rename.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W8oRqEHhnKUr1NfmTVdcyL
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Move the remaining root-level .md files (except CLAUDE.md) into docs/:
devel-phases.md, devel-phases-next.md, first-review.md, second-review.md,
tmp-decisions.md. Update all inbound references in CLAUDE.md (now docs/-prefixed)
and strip the now-redundant docs/ prefix from links inside the moved files.
Consolidate the superseded material into docs/old-draft.md: architecture
drafts v1-v4, POC v1, and the Phase 1-12 development log, each under an
ARCHIVED banner with a preamble pointing at the current specs. Delete the
merged originals plus the unreferenced French translations (v1-fr, v2-fr,
poc-v1-fr). Repoint the surviving file-links in first-review.md,
second-review.md and meshbay-draft-v5.md at old-draft.md; prose "draft-v3 §x"
mentions are left as-is since the content now lives in the archive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01J74kj44q6REczub8XR3DRy
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Remove the node daemon's server-rendered admin UI (GET / and /audit, the
_render_* helpers and inline templates) and the `meshbay-node ui` CLI verb.
The loopback control API stays; it is now JSON only, ruff-clean, and 453
lines (was 1074). Also drop three never-wired endpoints (/api/config,
/api/chat/history, /ws/chat, plus broadcast_chat) and the pointless
18000/tcp firewall profiles.
The desktop client's Node page (static/node-page.js) takes over what the
dashboard showed, reorganised into six tabs (Overview, Groups, Roster,
Peers, Audit, Settings):
- Overview: version, node id, QUIC port, hub, index-cache maintenance
- Roster: node-wide view with unpin
- Peers and Audit: auto-load on open, no Load button
- Audit: real usernames and group names (resolved from the roster and
node.toml), Previous/Next pagination newest-first, Export CSV of every
matching row
- Settings: node settings, STUN, ICE, denylist, then Unlink from hub
Backend: audit.get_entries gains `offset`; /api/audit and /api/peers
resolve ids to names via a new _display_names helper; CSP tightened to
default-src 'none' now that no HTML is served. draft-v6 sections 2.11 and
2.12 corrected -- the Node page uses the loopback API, not MNP.
One capability is intentionally dropped: browser-based admin on a headless
server. The CLI covers every operation there.
See docs/refactor-node-ui.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MQCaZnde4Bjjdu84dhSuF5
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Real franchise / show / release-group names had crept back into test
fixtures, code comments, a docstring and docs/mediacenter.md while fixing
the saga-match and misclassification bugs. Replace them all with invented
placeholders ("Some Saga", "A Different Show") and shape descriptions
("a franchise-origin film", "a 3-season show"). Behaviour and assertions
unchanged; 738 node tests still pass.
Record the rule in CLAUDE.md so it stops recurring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018BMLQjqFGCize2KtNBT79v
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