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* refactor(mnp)!: remove stream_seg, the last unencrypted content messageChristophe Besson2026-09-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | `stream_seg` answered with an MPEG-TS segment as base64 with no encryption at all — the one message on the content plane that never went through a GEK-derived key. Live on both transports, answering any authenticated member. It predates `stream_data`, which does the same job properly (`chunk_ciphertext`, keyed per segment, AES-256-GCM) and has since Phase 12. Its only browser caller, `fetchStreamSegment`, was defined and never once invoked — a plaintext media endpoint with no client. Removed rather than repaired. Gone with it: `_extract_segment` and the ffmpeg semaphore in quic_server, the `fetch_stream_segment` QUIC client method, and `_b64decode` in transport.js, which had no other caller. The H6 regression test lived on this handler — it pinned `_do_stream_segment_async` to a coroutine so `subprocess.run` could not stall the event loop for thirty seconds per request. It is replaced by the property that outlives the handler: no transport carries media outside an AEAD, asserted on `stream_seg` and `data_b64` across all three transport modules. The half of H6 that survives — the live streaming path still spawns ffmpeg — keeps its own test. BREAKING CHANGE: `stream_seg` is no longer answered on either transport. No shipping client sends it. Recorded as part of MNP 2.0, whose other half — the sealed upload — carries the version bump. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
* feat!: MNP 1.0 — seal index and handshake_ack under the group keyChristophe Besson2026-09-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | `index_sync`, `index_delta` and the `handshake_ack` config payload now travel sealed under a GEK-derived subkey (`meshbay_common/groupbox.py`, mirrored by `sealGroup`/`openGroup` in `crypto.js`). Only `type`, `v`, `group_id` and the ack's `node_pk`/`proof`/`sig` stay in clear — a receiver must route and authenticate before it would trust a decryption. Verify, then decrypt. The ack line is integrity, not confidentiality: the signed handshake transcript names no ack field, so `is_node_admin`, `enabled_apps`, `video_root` and the rest were authenticated by the DTLS channel alone. The index line is defence in depth against a repeat of C1/C6 — a peer served before the handshake completes now gets ciphertext, not filenames. Nothing against an observer, the hub, or a member; that is the whole claim. `index_progress` stays clear (D3, counters only). Chat is out of scope. Failure is fatal: a payload that does not open ends the session naming the message type — never an empty index or an empty `enabled_apps`, both of which are legitimate states. Version negotiation ships here too (phase 15.6, brought forward): `v` + `v_min` on `handshake` and `handshake_challenge`, refused with `version_too_old` / `version_too_new` / `version_unreadable`. The flag day was already being paid for; the next breaking change now costs a refusal message. BREAKING CHANGE: breaks the WebRTC wire every deployed client speaks. Hub and every node must deploy together; the SPA is served by the hub, so a browser picks up the new client on reload. See MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md §11.1a, §13.1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkzbhmMmK8PqQBtGz5zCvY
* docs: Windows port audit and sender key distribution decisionChristophe Besson2026-09-031-33/+55
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add docs/WINDOWS-PORT.md with the full portability audit (what is already portable, what blocks, implementation plan W1-W7). Reverse structural decision 20: sender keys are distributed GEK-wrapped, not pairwise to identity keys. The GEK is the group secret; files and chat share the same access boundary. Per-device chains (15.0b) remain required for correctness. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: move root docs into docs/ and archive superseded draftsChristophe Besson2026-09-011-0/+1343
Move the remaining root-level .md files (except CLAUDE.md) into docs/: devel-phases.md, devel-phases-next.md, first-review.md, second-review.md, tmp-decisions.md. Update all inbound references in CLAUDE.md (now docs/-prefixed) and strip the now-redundant docs/ prefix from links inside the moved files. Consolidate the superseded material into docs/old-draft.md: architecture drafts v1-v4, POC v1, and the Phase 1-12 development log, each under an ARCHIVED banner with a preamble pointing at the current specs. Delete the merged originals plus the unreferenced French translations (v1-fr, v2-fr, poc-v1-fr). Repoint the surviving file-links in first-review.md, second-review.md and meshbay-draft-v5.md at old-draft.md; prose "draft-v3 §x" mentions are left as-is since the content now lives in the archive. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01J74kj44q6REczub8XR3DRy