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Both sides landed a breaking MNP change and both called it 2.0, which is right:
the sealed upload, the removal of `stream_seg` and mandatory chat encryption
share one flag day. They are recorded as one version in `__init__.py` rather
than as a race between two.
The resolutions that were decisions rather than mechanics:
* **`MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` moves to "2.0".** The sealed upload alone was a
*confined* break — a 1.x peer could still connect, browse, download, stream
and chat, with only its uploads refused by `upload_not_sealed` — so the floor
deliberately stayed at "1.0". Mandatory chat encryption ends that
confinement: a 1.x peer can neither produce a sealed chat message nor read
one, so it would connect, look fine, and be unable to say anything. Refusing
it at the handshake is the honest form. The per-message `upload_not_sealed`
path is untouched and still right if the floor is ever lowered.
* **`sendChat` throws on an `error` reply**, from origin, applied to the sealed
send. It matters more after this change, not less: the node now refuses a
stale epoch, a malformed envelope and a device claim that is not the
connection's own, so there are three new ways for a message to be rejected
and none of them may look like a message that was sent.
* **`req_id` supersedes the per-type routing** this branch added for
`chat_keys_resp` and `device_hello_ack`. Both blocks are kept beside the
existing `chat_hist_resp` one, for the same stated reason — a node too old to
stamp — and their comments no longer claim to be the mechanism that closes
the class. `req_id` is.
* **`chat_send_probe.py` is rebuilt on origin's structure**, not beside it: two
scenarios, a stub that stamps `req_id`, `music_meta_req` as the older pending
request. The encrypted path is layered on — a real Ed25519 device key
generated in the page, and a `chat_keys_resp` sealed by the shipped Python,
because a payload the page built itself would prove only that the page agrees
with the page.
* **`test_reply_correlation.py` now sends a sealed message.** Its subject is
which of the two messages leaving that handler carries the id; plaintext chat
was only the fixture, and the node refuses one now.
* `groupbox` keeps both new purposes (`upload`, `chat_keys`); `protocol.py`
keeps origin's removal of `STREAM_SEGMENT` and this branch's correction of
the "Double Ratchet message" comment on `CHAT_MESSAGE`, which was wrong when
it was written and is wrong differently now.
Full suite on the merged tree: 1993 passed, 11 failed — the same 11 that fail
on a pristine checkout (2 Windows service tests, 1 apps-enabled policy, 7
transcode tests that pass in isolation, and the WebRTC invite test that hangs
on its own).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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`stream_seg` answered with an MPEG-TS segment as base64 with no encryption at
all — the one message on the content plane that never went through a
GEK-derived key. Live on both transports, answering any authenticated member.
It predates `stream_data`, which does the same job properly (`chunk_ciphertext`,
keyed per segment, AES-256-GCM) and has since Phase 12. Its only browser caller,
`fetchStreamSegment`, was defined and never once invoked — a plaintext media
endpoint with no client. Removed rather than repaired.
Gone with it: `_extract_segment` and the ffmpeg semaphore in quic_server, the
`fetch_stream_segment` QUIC client method, and `_b64decode` in transport.js,
which had no other caller.
The H6 regression test lived on this handler — it pinned `_do_stream_segment_async`
to a coroutine so `subprocess.run` could not stall the event loop for thirty
seconds per request. It is replaced by the property that outlives the handler:
no transport carries media outside an AEAD, asserted on `stream_seg` and
`data_b64` across all three transport modules. The half of H6 that survives —
the live streaming path still spawns ffmpeg — keeps its own test.
BREAKING CHANGE: `stream_seg` is no longer answered on either transport. No
shipping client sends it. Recorded as part of MNP 2.0, whose other half — the
sealed upload — carries the version bump.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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Chat messages are sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key derived per group, per
epoch, per *device*, and signed over the ciphertext with the device key the
node pinned. The node relays and archives; it cannot read a message.
There is no switch. MNP goes to 2.0 and MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED moves with it, so a
1.x peer is refused at the handshake with `version_too_old` rather than
admitted and then unable to speak. An opt-in flag was designed and rejected:
every node is a test node, so it would have bought nothing and left a plaintext
branch reachable — C6's lesson one feature later. A test reads the source and
refuses any code that consults a `chat_encrypted` setting.
Not Sender Keys, and `senderkeys.py` is now documented as unused. With
distribution under the group key and a node that serves history to devices
which were not present, the node must retain each chain's earliest key, and a
chain key at iteration i yields every message key from i on by pure HKDF —
forward secrecy is zero either way. What the ratchet was left buying was
stateful client code with silent failure modes, three of them reproduced: any
member could sign as any other, a second device dropped the first's chain, and
the skipped-key cache grew without bound. The reasoning is in
docs/chat-sender-keys.md, which is the specification and the decision record.
Epochs, not rotation: the epoch key is wrapped under the group key at delivery
and never stored under it, so `gek_rotate` is a re-wrap. A group-key-derived
archive key would have made every message ever sent unreadable on the first
`member unpin`, which is the documented step after removing a member. A new
epoch opens on member revoke/unpin, device revoke and `gek_rotate`; old epochs
are kept and still delivered, so history stays readable to everyone who could
already read it, and nothing anywhere deletes one.
Three prerequisites this needed, each a live defect on its own:
* The peer registry was keyed by user_id, so one account's second device
evicted the first and the broadcast skipped recipients by account — a
person's phone never saw what they typed on their laptop.
* The handshake authenticated an account, never a device. `device_hello`
(additive, signed, refused unless the key is a live device of this account in
the node's own roster) is what lets the node refuse a member claiming
somebody else's key.
* `_admin_exec_file_delete` authorized against the exact uploading key, so
device linking had already broken deleting your own file from your other
device. It now authorizes against any non-revoked device of `uploader_id`.
Found by driving the real panel over the real transport, not by reading source:
`chat_keys_resp` was routed by arrival order and handed to an unanswered
`media_meta_req` — the original frozen-tab defect in a message type that did
not exist when that probe was written. And `_asText` had been deleted with an
unrelated helper beside it; its only caller sits inside a promise the panel
catches, so every conversation rendered empty with nothing in the console.
Existing node data is migrated by QE/migration/migrate_chat_encryption.py
(not versioned, per the QE rule), run with the node stopped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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`index_sync`, `index_delta` and the `handshake_ack` config payload now travel
sealed under a GEK-derived subkey (`meshbay_common/groupbox.py`, mirrored by
`sealGroup`/`openGroup` in `crypto.js`). Only `type`, `v`, `group_id` and the
ack's `node_pk`/`proof`/`sig` stay in clear — a receiver must route and
authenticate before it would trust a decryption. Verify, then decrypt.
The ack line is integrity, not confidentiality: the signed handshake transcript
names no ack field, so `is_node_admin`, `enabled_apps`, `video_root` and the
rest were authenticated by the DTLS channel alone. The index line is defence in
depth against a repeat of C1/C6 — a peer served before the handshake completes
now gets ciphertext, not filenames. Nothing against an observer, the hub, or a
member; that is the whole claim. `index_progress` stays clear (D3, counters
only). Chat is out of scope.
Failure is fatal: a payload that does not open ends the session naming the
message type — never an empty index or an empty `enabled_apps`, both of which
are legitimate states.
Version negotiation ships here too (phase 15.6, brought forward): `v` + `v_min`
on `handshake` and `handshake_challenge`, refused with `version_too_old` /
`version_too_new` / `version_unreadable`. The flag day was already being paid
for; the next breaking change now costs a refusal message.
BREAKING CHANGE: breaks the WebRTC wire every deployed client speaks. Hub and
every node must deploy together; the SPA is served by the hub, so a browser
picks up the new client on reload. See MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md §11.1a, §13.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkzbhmMmK8PqQBtGz5zCvY
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Add docs/WINDOWS-PORT.md with the full portability audit (what is
already portable, what blocks, implementation plan W1-W7).
Reverse structural decision 20: sender keys are distributed
GEK-wrapped, not pairwise to identity keys. The GEK is the group
secret; files and chat share the same access boundary. Per-device
chains (15.0b) remain required for correctness.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Move the remaining root-level .md files (except CLAUDE.md) into docs/:
devel-phases.md, devel-phases-next.md, first-review.md, second-review.md,
tmp-decisions.md. Update all inbound references in CLAUDE.md (now docs/-prefixed)
and strip the now-redundant docs/ prefix from links inside the moved files.
Consolidate the superseded material into docs/old-draft.md: architecture
drafts v1-v4, POC v1, and the Phase 1-12 development log, each under an
ARCHIVED banner with a preamble pointing at the current specs. Delete the
merged originals plus the unreferenced French translations (v1-fr, v2-fr,
poc-v1-fr). Repoint the surviving file-links in first-review.md,
second-review.md and meshbay-draft-v5.md at old-draft.md; prose "draft-v3 §x"
mentions are left as-is since the content now lives in the archive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01J74kj44q6REczub8XR3DRy
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