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Server-side verification module, CaptchaConfig in hub.toml,
captcha_site_key exposed via /v1/hub/info, useCaptcha() hook
in the SPA with stable DOM rendering (strength bar always present
to avoid Preact re-ordering the captcha widget). Native clients
(auth_key path) skip captcha. All 10 locales updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The passphrase derives two independent client-side values: auth_key (the
hub verifier) and bundle_key (AES-GCM key for the per-node identity
bundles, which live on nodes and never on the hub). Changing or
recovering a passphrase is therefore two operations — swap the hub
verifier, and re-wrap every reachable node's identity bundle.
Flow A — change a known passphrase (Profile page)
- POST /v1/users/password re-proves the current passphrase, swaps
pw_hash/salt/version, revokes every refresh token and returns a fresh
pair so the tab that made the change stays signed in.
- MeshBayTransport.rewrapAllNodes: for every group's online node, connect
with the old key, read the identity off the handshake, store it back
under the new key. Returns updated / unreachable / failed so the UI can
point at the operator-unpin fallback for the gaps. Always-shown
confirmation dialog listing reachable and unreachable groups.
Recovery key
- keyderive.js generateRecoveryKey (32 random bytes, grouped Base32) and
deriveRecoveryKey (HKDF-SHA256, domain meshbay:recovery:v1:<username>).
- Every per-node identity gets a second copy wrapped under the recovery
key: keypair_bundles.bundle_enc_recovery (node-only column, added in
_SCHEMA_KEYPAIR and via a PRAGMA-guarded ALTER for existing DBs),
carried on keypair_bundle_store / _resp. MNP 0.13 -> 0.14, additive.
- session.recoveryKey is persisted in IndexedDB (slot rk) and lazy-loaded
on connect, so a group joined in any later session still leaves a
recovery copy.
- Shown once at registration; optionally folded into the verification
e-mail as a pass-through the hub never stores or logs, with an opt-out.
- Profile -> Recovery key re-loads R and backfills every reachable node
via rewrapAllNodes in bundleKey mode (no passphrase re-entry).
Flow B — recover a lost passphrase (#/reset, linked from sign-in)
- POST /v1/users/password/reset-request {username, email}: both must be
the pair on file, checked against the blind email_hash (never
decrypted). A mismatch — wrong e-mail, unknown username, non-active
account — takes the identical no-op path (no code, no mail, same 200),
so it reveals nothing and cannot be used to spray reset mail from a
username alone. 5/min, 1-hour single-use code.
- POST /v1/users/password/reset {username, code, new_auth_key}: same
expiry / attempts / single-use checks as e-mail verification; revokes
every session and deletes every registered device key so a stored one
cannot sign back in past the reset.
- ResetPasswordPage: request code -> code + optional recovery key + new
passphrase -> reset + sign-in -> fan-out. connect() falls back to the
recovery-wrapped copy when the passphrase key cannot open bundle_enc.
Without a recovery key: sign-in is restored and each group needs the
operator-unpin fallback.
Supporting fixes (found in live testing)
- member unpin now also deletes the keypair bundle; connect() mints a
fresh identity when handed a bundle it cannot open (unless _rewrapOnly,
set by rewrapAllNodes), so a rejoin completes instead of dead-ending
before the invite-code prompt.
- A browser with no bundle key gets a passphrase prompt on the group page
instead of a "go back to the browser you registered on" message.
- RegisterPage / LoginPage / ResetPasswordPage trim the username so every
key derivation matches the hub's stored form.
Docs: docs/auth-confirm.md. Locale keys across all ten catalogues.
Tests: test_password_change, test_password_reset, test_recovery_email,
test_recovery_key, test_rewrap_fanout, test_bundle_store_recovery, plus
additions to test_admin_ops_mnp and test_webrtc_transport. Hub suite 492
passed; node suite 741 passed (the lone test_packaging_units failure is a
pre-existing RPM-spec flake, reproducible on main).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GGkxJW9br8Y9bhT8ywJ3oc
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Registration now creates a pending account and sends a 6-digit code via
email; the account activates only after verification. Email changes on
the profile page follow the same flow. Group invitations send a
notification email to the invitee (without revealing their address to
the inviter) containing the invite code and hub link.
Backend: blind HMAC-SHA256 email index for uniqueness without decryption,
mail.py for localhost Postfix delivery, verification endpoints, cleanup
of expired codes and stale pending accounts, startup backfill of
email_hash for existing users.
Frontend: 3-phase register page, inline email change verification on
profile, invite-notify call with status display. All 10 locales updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Packaging system complete and verified on Ubuntu 26.04 and Fedora 44.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Real franchise / show / release-group names had crept back into test
fixtures, code comments, a docstring and docs/mediacenter.md while fixing
the saga-match and misclassification bugs. Replace them all with invented
placeholders ("Some Saga", "A Different Show") and shape descriptions
("a franchise-origin film", "a 3-season show"). Behaviour and assertions
unchanged; 738 node tests still pass.
Record the rule in CLAUDE.md so it stops recurring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018BMLQjqFGCize2KtNBT79v
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Every "<Saga> Episode <N> - <subtitle>" file in a numbered franchise
resolved to the series' first entry (a real, older film). `sequel_variants`
stripped "Episode <N>" and offered the bare "<Saga>" as a candidate query;
that matches the first film's original_title at ratio 1.0 and beat PASS 1's
correct-but-lower hit. A franchise's bare name is very often a real,
different film.
When a Part/Episode/Chapitre/… keyword carried the index, sequel_variants
no longer emits the bare base — only "<base> <digit>" and "<base> <roman>".
Without a keyword ("<Franchise> 3") the bare base is still offered, so that
fix is untouched. Verified live against TMDB: the franchise's episodes each
resolve to their own entry; the earlier numbered-sequel, two-part-film and
franchise-subtitle regressions all hold.
docs/mediacenter.md §10.3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018BMLQjqFGCize2KtNBT79v
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V12 collapsed movies that TMDB resolved to the same tmdb_id into one
card. With the matcher still imperfect that fuses *different films*:
every numbered entry of a saga whose bare title resolves to the same
base id becomes one card, and two unrelated movies sharing a title do
too (seen live on a 9-film saga and a 2-film pair). A tmdb_id-keyed
merge only works once matching is reliable, which it is not yet.
Movies render one card per file again; VideoDetailModal loses the
`files` prop and the versions list, back to a single Play button;
`.video-version-list` and the `video.versions` key (×10 locales) are
removed. mergedShows (V6) is untouched — the operator's report was
about movies.
docs/mediacenter.md §10.1: V12 un-struck, marked reverted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018BMLQjqFGCize2KtNBT79v
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Expose invite_ttl_hours, pair_ttl_hours, device_request_ttl_minutes,
max_concurrent_streams and transcode_incompatible_video in the Node
management panel. Changes are applied immediately via roster.db and
written back to node.toml so they survive a DB wipe. On startup,
roster overrides take precedence over node.toml defaults.
Draft v6 §2.11 documents the design; MNP gains node_settings_set /
node_settings_set_ack for the browser path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Found on demo35: "Some.Film.2017.MULTI.108.grp.mkv" — the release name's
"1080p" truncated to "108" — makes guessit read S01E08, so enrich.py's
flat-library branch (elif ep.episode is not None) filed a standalone film
as a series. "Fix match" then only offered TV results for the phantom
show, so there was no way out from the UI.
- title_parse.has_episode_marker(): true only for an explicit SxxExx /
1x08 / "Episode N" / "Season N" token, not a bare 3-4 digit run.
- enrich.py: the flat-library branch now needs ep.season AND ep.episode,
plus either a real marker or the absence of a "(2019)"-style year.
Every genuine flat-dumped episode in the corpus carries a marker, so
real shows are untouched; the same misparse on "1280" ("...2013.1280...")
is covered too.
docs/mediacenter.md §10.2. Known gap left open: no operator control over
the movie/show kind itself — a "this is a movie / a show" toggle would.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018BMLQjqFGCize2KtNBT79v
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A one-click alternative to the full "Fix match" search-and-pick flow, and
reachable without SSH (`meshbay-node video rematch` clears a whole group).
- MNP 0.13: tmdb_rematch / tmdb_rematch_ack (additive — an older node
logs "unknown type", the button just does nothing). OP_TMDB_REMATCH,
signed like tmdb_override (media_cache is shared node-wide).
- media_cache.drop_tmdb_match(file_id): forgets the match AND the
override marker — deliberately stronger than clear_file_tmdb, since the
operator is explicitly asking for a fresh resolution.
- webrtc_server: _do_tmdb_rematch / _admin_exec_tmdb_rematch, dispatch +
admin-response routing, broadcasts tmdb_rematch_ack.
- transport.js: rematchTmdbMatch(fileId, signFn); 'tmdb_rematch' in the
admin-op allowlist; tmdb_rematch_ack handled like tmdb_override_ack.
- video-app.js: a "Re-match" button beside "Fix match" in the detail
modal (isNodeAdmin), then bumpMediaMetaGeneration(). video.rematch_one
key in all ten locales.
docs/mediacenter.md §10.1: V8–V13 marked done.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018BMLQjqFGCize2KtNBT79v
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A batch of wrong poster-grid matches found live on a real library
(2026-08-29): a two-volume film's second part matched the first; a
numbered sequel matched a same-year making-of documentary; several
entries of one franchise matched a single early entry whose localized
TMDB title is the franchise name; one matched nothing. One mechanism:
_tmdb_search returned the first candidate query whose title-similarity
ratio merely cleared 0.6, before alternative_title / the Roman-numeral
variant was ever tried.
Matching:
- title_parse: fold guessit's volume/part number back into display_title
so the parts of a multi-part film stay distinct in the query, the card
and the override.
- _tmdb_search: keep a strong PASS 1 fast path (ratio >= 0.85, one
request), otherwise score every candidate query and pick the best. A
year-exact rescue lifts a sub-0.6 top hit to the confidence floor only
when TMDB's own year-filtered result lands exactly on the filename's
year. No local re-ranking of any single result list; no tmdb.py change.
Fix match / rematch:
- _admin_exec_tmdb_override: a movie override touches its own file only
(guessit gives a whole franchise one display_title); a show override
still fans out. Corrected files are marked in media_cache.tmdb_override.
- media_cache: tmdb_override table; clear_file_tmdb / clear_tmdb_matches
drop auto-resolved matches while sparing manual corrections.
- ops.rematch_video + `meshbay-node video rematch` (loopback endpoint +
CLI verb): re-resolve a group's video matches after a matcher fix.
file_tmdb is keyed by content hash and otherwise only pruned on
deletion, so nothing dislodged a cached match before.
- a rename now drops the stale auto match too (daemon
_reenrich_renamed_video_entries).
UI:
- VideoDetailModal shows the source filename and resolved TMDB id; an
unmatched poster gets a badge (3 new video.* i18n keys x 10 locales).
So a wrong match can actually be identified before hitting Fix match.
docs/mediacenter.md 10.1 records this and the V8-V13 follow-up backlog
(show-branch ladder, year-aware _best_match, wider sequel_variants, the
0.6-0.85 extra calls, movie grid merge, per-card rematch).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018BMLQjqFGCize2KtNBT79v
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Amend v6 (§1 rows 11–13, §§2.8–2.10) with the three architectural changes
made after the 2026-08-17 desktop-client discussion:
- §2.8 hub_settings — a runtime instance-policy store; public groups can be
switched off hub-wide, enforced on every hub-mediated path. Records the
suspend-vs-revoke distinction (hub flag vs signed node-enforced revocation).
- §2.9 group names unique per owner account; identity still the UUID; shown
as name@owner.
- §2.10 chat link previews as a new instance of the "node on demand, asking
device caches, nothing durable" rule; the SSRF gate; MNP 0.12.
Also notes hub_settings in §2.5's list of what the hub holds, so that rule
stays accurate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018gKJ85aZyvEwarXMFzFEwi
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A new group application (docs/apps.md's plug-in mechanism), following the
plan in docs/photos.md. Unlike Videos/Music: several photo roots per group
instead of one (photo_roots is a set, one signed op replaces it whole),
a single album-grid view with no third-party matching step, and per-photo
info read from the file's own EXIF at index time — no metadata service,
no credential, no outbound network call at all.
Protocol (meshbay-common, MNP 0.10 -> 0.11, additive): `taken_at`/`camera`
on IndexEntry; `photo_roots`/`photo_roots_ack`; `OP_PHOTO_ROOTS`.
Node: roster.py stores photo_roots as a group_settings entry (JSON list,
same shape as enabled_apps); ops.py/webrtc_server.py validate and sign the
whole set in one op, same pattern as apps_enabled; a new PhotoEnricher
(indexer/enrich_photo.py) runs Pillow in its own small bounded pool,
separate from the video/audio pools, producing a resized thumbnail plus
the two EXIF fields — never GPS, checked by a grep-based regression test.
Client: photos-app.js — one album card per directory containing images,
a per-album photo grid, and a lightbox with next/previous (keyboard and
buttons), zoom in/out/fit/100% starting from the actual on-screen fit
percentage, and a "zip this album" button reusing files-app.js's own zip
mechanism (lifted into file-utils.js's downloadDirectory so both call the
same implementation). group-settings.js gets an add/remove multi-root
picker, distinct from Videos/Music's single-value one.
Bugs found and fixed before this ever shipped, worth keeping the story of:
- enrich_photo.py read width/height from the raw image *before* applying
EXIF orientation correction, and read DateTimeOriginal off the plain
0th-IFD Exif object — a real camera stores it in the Exif sub-IFD, which
Pillow only exposes via get_ifd(Exif). A flat, hand-built EXIF dict
round-trips through Pillow either way, which is exactly what would have
hidden both bugs; the regression test builds EXIF with piexif instead,
matching what real hardware produces.
- photos-app.js's album grouping stripped a trailing path segment from
entry.path under the assumption it still carried a filename — it
doesn't (files-app.js's own convention: e.path is already the
containing directory), so every album collapsed one level into its
parent. Found live against a real multi-folder library.
- transport.js's ADMIN_OP_TYPES allowlist (already the fix for an
identical bug on video_root/apps_enabled, see 4783d81) was missing
photo_roots: its admin_challenge matched no pending request and was
silently dropped, so saving a photo root just timed out after 30s with
no error.
- daemon.py pruned a thumbnail when its file left the index (root removed
or reconfigured) but never forgot the content hash was "already
attempted" — the same bytes reappearing under a renamed/relocated root
(an operator's real workflow) were then permanently skipped, forever,
with nothing to indicate why. Discarding the attempt alongside the
cache entry on prune is what makes pruning actually reversible.
- packages/meshbay-client's app:// protocol handler served every file
with no Cache-Control header, so Chromium was free to serve a stale
cached copy indefinitely — none of several `npm run sync-ui` + reload
cycles during development actually picked up the new code until the
renderer's disk cache was cleared by hand. Now sends Cache-Control:
no-store.
- the lightbox's zoomed image used flex centering (align-items/
justify-content: center) combined with overflow: auto — a well-known
trap where the browser centers overflowing content by shifting it, and
the leading half of that overflow (here, the top of a zoomed photo)
sits outside what the scrollport can actually reach. Reported live as
"unusable". Fixed by switching to top/left alignment once zoomed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TiZG4AuSnxHohQMpwTHTyL
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Records why the original no-root call was wrong (mixing, not cost) and
points at the new §4.3b protocol section — same treatment already given
to the WMA/Musepack transcode amendment above it.
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Tagging and covers for these two formats landed already, but neither one
decodes in any mainstream browser's <audio> element at all — a real
library scan turned up 273 such files that would show up correctly in the
Music app and then simply fail on click. This closes that gap: the node
transcodes to AAC/M4A on request (a one-shot whole-file conversion, not
live-piped like video's fMP4 segments — an audio file is small enough that
streaming it buys nothing), caches the result under its own content hash
the same way a TMDB poster or a MusicBrainz cover is cached, and serves it
back through the ordinary file_req/chunk path. That path used to assume
anything in the media cache was thumbnail-sized (single chunk, always);
generalized it to slice a cached blob the same way a real file on disk
gets sliced, since a transcoded track can be several MB.
New MNP pair (`audio_transcode_req`/`_resp`, version bump to 0.9), shares
its concurrency cap with video's transcode pool rather than getting its
own — both are real ffmpeg processes on the same node. Every other audio
format is untouched: this only fires for .wma/.mpc, the two extensions
that need it.
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Proposal only, not implemented. Same plug-in mechanism as Videos
(apps.md), but no new streaming path — a track is downloaded and
decrypted like any other file, not transcoded/remuxed like a film.
Metadata: local tags first (mutagen), MusicBrainz/Cover Art Archive
as node-side fallback enrichment, no API key needed (unlike TMDB) —
just a rate-limited, self-identifying client. Player state (queue,
shuffle, repeat) moves up into the group-page shell so playback
survives a tab switch, mirroring how the video/preview modal is
already shell-owned.
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Three bugs found live testing the Videos app against a real HEVC/EAC3 show,
plus a design change requested afterward:
- Streaming always did "-c:v copy", which faithfully reports a source's real
hev1 codec string but is unplayable in a browser with no HEVC decoder
(most Chrome/Linux builds). The node now transcodes to H264 whenever the
probed codec is browser-incompatible (media_probe.py's new
BROWSER_INCOMPATIBLE_VIDEO_CODECS), with a `transcode_incompatible_video`
node.toml opt-out for operators who know their viewers already decode it.
- Dropping a whole season into an already-watched folder gave no scanning
indicator and no progress bar: IndexProgress was only ever updated by the
two bulk scan paths, never by the real-time per-file watchdog path
(_schedule_update/_debounce/_update_entry). That path now accounts a
"burst" the same way, without double-counting a file rewritten mid-debounce.
- A stray literal "0" rendered in the video detail modal when there was no
TMDB match (`meta.confidence` is 0, and `0 && x` renders "0" in JSX/htm,
not nothing) — `confident` is now a real boolean.
- Whether TMDB is used at all moves from a node-wide setting to per-group
(OP_TMDB_ENABLED/tmdb_enabled/tmdb_enabled_ack, scoped like OP_VIDEO_ROOT):
an operator running a real media-library group alongside test/demo groups
on one node wants outbound TMDB traffic for the one that needs it, not all
of them. The custom API token and query language stay node-wide, one
shared credential/cache (tmdb_config/OP_TMDB_CONFIG, unchanged reasoning).
MNP_VERSION 0.6 -> 0.7, additive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LAmyXtc6dAADsH23ydXQpY
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wizard polish
Two operator-facing fixes for a real 3-season show whose automatic TMDB
match was wrong at the show level: per-season overview/air_date tabs in the
detail modal (falling back to the show-level text when a season's own is
empty), and a "Fix match…" search-and-correct affordance that re-resolves
every file sharing the corrected show's display_title. New signed op
OP_TMDB_OVERRIDE and two read-only pairs (season_meta_req/resp,
tmdb_search_req/resp), MNP_VERSION 0.5 -> 0.6.
Also: the create-group wizard gets a spinning indexing indicator and an
app-selection step, group settings default the TMDB language to the
operator's own locale (never as a global default), and a file renamed
mid-session now re-triggers title parsing instead of being silently
skipped by the enrichment dedup guard.
Fixes two bugs found during this work: the search overlay's z-index lost
to the base video-overlay class and rendered invisibly, and season_meta's
own empty overview didn't fall back to the show-level one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LAmyXtc6dAADsH23ydXQpY
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Implements docs/mediacenter.md: a "Videos" group application built on the
existing files index rather than a separate catalogue. On the node side,
new indexer enrichment (technical probe, filename/season parsing, thumbnail
generation) runs per-file once an operator has chosen a video_root for the
group, plus a TMDB client for on-demand poster/metadata lookups (never
client-side, thumbnails delivered over the existing chunk path). On the hub
side, a new video-app.js renders a lazily-mounted poster grid or a
thumbnail-only flat list, with TMDB entirely optional per group.
Along the way: the global apps registry now drives Settings' default-tab
picker instead of a hardcoded list, and the video_root is configured from
group Settings (like uploads) rather than from Files, with the node
refusing to run any TMDB/thumbnail work until one is set.
Fixes several bugs found via live testing against a real library, notably
a race between two effects writing the same "image ready" state that could
leave a poster grid spinning forever on a same-tab revisit — see
mediacenter.md §5.4 for the full account of each one.
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Design for a poster-grid / flat-thumbnail group video browser: TMDB
enrichment and plain-folder modes, filename parsing validated against
a real ~1950-file library (guessit, >95% target), and a revision of
desktop-client-v1.md's O12 decision to centralize TMDB metadata and
thumbnail caching on the node (data_dir, not the shared roots).
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GroupPage's 6620-line app.js carried Chat and Files wedged in directly, with
no way to add another group-level app without touching the shell itself. It
is now app.js (routing, non-group pages) plus nine focused files — apps.js
(the registry), chat-app.js, files-app.js, video-player.js, group-page.js
(the shell), group-settings.js, hub-client.js, icon.js and file-utils.js —
with docs/apps.md as the checklist for adding one (Videos/Music/Photos are
sketched there, not built).
Node side gained the matching enablement mechanism, mirroring
member_upload exactly: a roster setting, a signed apps_enabled op enforced
by _has_admin_authority, exposed in the handshake ack. Operators toggle
applications per group from Settings, which also gained a small reorder:
Invite, Pairing, Applications, Shared directories, Uploads, danger zone,
Your devices, Members.
Two bugs surfaced during the split, both missing an import across the new
file boundary and invisible to node --check or a module-load probe since
they only throw when the code path actually runs:
- group-page.js called onRefreshAuth on a stale-token handshake rejection,
but app.js never imported refreshAccessToken from hub-client.js — so a
brand new member (including a group's own creator) hit "Not a member of
this group" and the retry silently failed, throwing before it could
refresh the token.
- chat-app.js called getLocale() for message timestamps without importing
it from i18n.js. Opening Chat on a group with real messages threw mid-
render; uncaught, that appears to wedge Preact's render scheduler, so
every button on the page stopped responding until reload.
Caught the second class of bug with a proper no-undef audit across all
split files (a temporarily installed ESLint 9, since the system one is too
old to parse this codebase's syntax) rather than trusting grep. 827 tests
pass; 6 new ones cover the apps_enabled policy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016SF6RKNBKg9qejmoMJ9ybA
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Re-serve decrypted fMP4 video over HTTP on the LAN so a Chromecast can
play the stream. The relay runs in the Electron main process — same trust
boundary as downloads and MSE playback.
- cast-relay.js: HTTP server with BoxAccumulator (reassembles WebRTC
chunks into moof+mdat pairs), ring buffer, backpressure, finish() for
clean end-of-stream, fixed port range 19550-19553
- cast-chromecast.js: mDNS discovery (bonjour-service) + CASTV2 protocol
(castv2-client), connect/reload/disconnect lifecycle
- Seek-aware: relay restarts on every seek, Chromecast reloads new URL;
generation counter prevents stale async errors from killing active
restarts; landingPlayheadRef suppresses programmatic seeking events
- Device picker in video top bar with scan, device selection, copy-URL
fallback, and cast status indicator
- IPC bridge (main/preload/platform) for start/push/stop/finish/status/
discover/chromecastConnect/chromecastReload/chromecastDisconnect
- Phase 3 design doc for DLNA/Smart TV in docs/cast-smart-tv.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A group where every member may add files stays the default. Some groups want a
library the operator curates, and until now the only way to get one was to
designate no upload root at all — which refuses the operator too.
**The node enforces it; the interface merely stops offering it.** The Upload
button in the Files toolbar and the paperclip in the chat composer both
disappear, which is a courtesy to the people who are not trying. The control is
`_do_file_upload` refusing with `member_upload_off`, so a member on an old tab,
or one speaking MNP directly, gets the same answer. There is a test for each,
and the enforcement test is in the node package rather than beside the UI one so
nobody reads the hidden button as the mechanism.
**Changing it is a signed operator instruction** — `OP_MEMBER_UPLOAD`, on the
same path as removing a member. An unsigned one would let any member turn it
back on and make the setting a suggestion. The transcript's subject is `on` or
`off`: what the operator is shown before signing has to name the outcome, not
the operation.
**It lives on the node**, in a new `group_settings` table in `roster.db`. Not
the hub, which has no business deciding who may write to someone else's disk.
Not `node.toml` either: that file is hand-written and full of comments recording
decisions, `ops.py` appends to it rather than round-tripping it through a
writer, and a setting toggled from a panel must not rewrite the operator's file
or need a restart. The value is cached in the group context because the upload
path is synchronous, and the signed operation updates both — storing it without
applying it would make the panel say one thing while the node did another.
**Absent means allowed**, at every layer: no row in the table, no key in the
context, no field in `handshake_ack`. An older node and an older client both
behave exactly as before, and upgrading never silently closes a group. Each of
those three has its own test, because they fail independently.
The operator is always exempt — otherwise turning it off locks them out of their
own node with a config file and a restart as the only way back. `is_node_admin`
was being computed in two places by then and is now one function, since two
copies of "is this the operator" is how the ack and the gate come to disagree.
A change reaches everyone already connected via `member_upload_ack`, so the
button goes without a reconnection. That message is both a broadcast and the
reply to the request that caused it, which is why the client does not return
early on it.
Docs updated for a cold start: draft-v6 §2.1b and change 9, a new "Where Phase
13 stands" section in CLAUDE.md recording what is built, deployed and still
missing, the module map row, and desktop-client-v1 §10b on the Settings tab and
where group settings live.
883 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**Full-screen was denied, and the denial was invisible.** The permission
handler was written from a true sentence — nothing here needs a camera, a
microphone or a location — and implemented as `callback(false)` for everything.
Chromium's own video controls ask for the `fullscreen` permission, so a film
could not be watched full-screen.
What made it hard to find, and what the test now pins: **a denied `fullscreen`
does not reject.** `requestFullscreen()` returns a promise that never settles.
No exception, no console message, nothing in the renderer that mentions a
permission — the button just does nothing. Measured rather than reasoned: the
probe reported `NEVER SETTLED` while the main process, instrumented for one run,
logged `PERMISSION ASKED: fullscreen`. After the fix the same probe reports
`granted` with `document.fullscreenElement` set.
The handler now enumerates what is *granted* — `fullscreen`, and nothing else —
so a camera, a microphone, a location, notifications and MIDI are still refused
and whatever Chromium adds next arrives refused rather than quietly allowed.
`Permissions.query` takes the other handler, so both now answer from the one
list instead of eventually disagreeing.
The old test asserted `callback(false)`, which is to say it locked in the bug.
It is replaced by three: what must stay denied, that `fullscreen` is granted,
and that both handlers read the same list.
**"Save automatically" opened a dialog.** The automatic path required a folder
to have been chosen first, and on a new profile nobody has chosen one — so the
very first download fell through to Save As, which is the one thing the setting
promises not to do. A browser does not make you pick a folder before it will
save a file; the system Downloads folder is the answer when there is no other.
Verified on a fresh profile with a home of its own: no dialog, 1024 bytes on
disk, destination reported as the default (`/home/…/Téléchargements` on this
machine, via the localized XDG directory).
A folder that *was* chosen and has since gone still asks. Silently redirecting
those files is worse than a dialog: someone who picked an external drive wants
to be told it is not there, not to find the film in their home directory a week
later. Settings shows the effective destination either way, and offers "forget"
only for a folder somebody actually chose.
813 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**Downloads were going through RAM.** `_openDownloadTarget` tries a granted
folder, then a service worker, then its floor: collect the whole file in the
page and hand the browser a blob. Both of the first two are absent in the
desktop application — `showDirectoryPicker` does not exist, and Chromium refuses
a service worker on a custom scheme — so every download under 512 MB took the
floor. A gigabyte of film meant a gigabyte of RAM, and the only visible symptom
was a Save As dialog at the *end* rather than the start, which is what the
operator noticed and asked about.
The main process now streams to disk: it honours "save automatically" with a
folder chosen once and no dialog, never overwrites (a colliding name gets a
suffix), awaits each write so the renderer cannot outrun the disk and queue the
file in memory anyway, and unlinks a cancelled download rather than leaving a
truncated file that looks complete to whoever opens it next. Settings now offers
the native folder picker instead of saying downloads are unsupported.
Measured in the running application: the file on disk grows 256 KB → 512 KB →
768 KB → 1 MB as the chunks arrive, and an aborted download leaves nothing
behind.
**A permanent scrollbar on sign-in.** `.layout` and `.page-center` each reserved
`100vh - 52px`, and `.page-center` sits inside `main`'s 24px vertical padding —
so the page overflowed by exactly 48px at every window size. Found by measuring
in the app rather than reading the stylesheet: `scrollHeight` 819 against a 771
viewport, then the bottom edge of every element. The centring page brings its
own padding, so main's is dropped for it and the duplicated arithmetic goes
rather than growing a third term. Now `scrollHeight == innerHeight`, no
overflowing elements.
**The first-run screen was unstyled.** It used a class name I invented
(`auth-page`) that appears nowhere in the stylesheet, so it had no card and the
button sat against the input. It now uses the same `page-center` + `login-card`
markup as sign-in, which is where the 12px gap comes from. The sign-in link in
the nav is hidden until a hub is chosen — it led to a page that could not work.
809 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The last thing that could only be checked on a real desktop. The application was
quit and relaunched on Ubuntu GNOME and signed in with the device key alone;
safeStorage is genuinely keyring-backed (secrets.bin carries Chromium's v11
prefix, where the fixed-key fallback would write v10).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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All three came from the operator running the application on Ubuntu GNOME. None
would have been found by anything already in the suite.
**A second copy of the hub address.** `keyderive.js` carried
`const HUB = '' // same origin` — true of a page the hub served, false of one
loaded from a package, where the origin is `app://meshbay` and `/v1/users/register`
resolves against the application's own protocol handler. **Sign-up and sign-in,
the first two things anybody does, failed with "Not found."** The seam was
changed in `app.js` and in the signalling call and this was missed: the same
shape as the duplicate `MNP_VERSION` in `protocol.py`, a second copy of a
constant that is harmless until the context changes. `test_hub_address_seam.py`
refuses any file that decides where the hub is, and any `fetch('/v1/…')`
relative to the page origin.
**A window handler reading a variable another path reassigns.** Changing the hub
closes one window and opens another; `closed` arrives *after* the replacement is
assigned, so the outgoing window nulled the reference to the incoming one and
its `ready-to-show` crashed on it — a modal "A JavaScript error occurred in the
main process". Every handler now belongs to the window it was created with. The
CDP test wrote `config.json` in advance, so it never took the one path that
creates a second window; it does now, starting from an empty user-data dir.
**A first run that could not be undone.** The hub address was accepted on
anything URL-shaped and there was no way to change it afterwards — the prompt
only appears when none is set, so a typo meant editing JSON by hand. `https`
typed at a hub speaking `http` produced `TypeError: fetch failed`, which names
nothing. Now: the address is probed before being written, failures say which
URL and why ("does not speak https. If this hub is on your own machine, it is
probably http"), Settings can change it, and Electron's
"Error invoking remote method" wrapper is stripped from what a person reads.
Verified on the operator's desktop: **safeStorage really uses the GNOME
keyring** — Settings reports `gnome-libsecret`, and `secrets.bin` is written
0600 with Chromium's `v11` prefix, the marker for keyring-backed encryption
(the fixed-key fallback writes `v10`). Headless, the same code reports
`unavailable` and refuses to store rather than downgrading in silence, which is
now explained in Settings instead of shown as a bare word.
Unrelated but found while testing: `test_locales.py` assigned to
`globalThis.navigator`, which is read-only from Node 22. The client's build
already requires Node 22+, so the first CI machine configured for it would have
failed these tests for no visible reason. 809 tests pass on Node 18 and Node 24.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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D4. The passphrase stays the account's credential and its only recovery path;
what changes is that it is not asked for on every launch.
**The renderer never holds the device key.** It is generated, stored and used
entirely in the main process, which signs `meshbay:user_auth:<username>:<ts>` on
request. Same rule as the save dialog, for the same reason: the renderer is the
part of this application that parses decrypted content from nodes, which is
attacker-controlled input. And this key is *not* a per-node identity key — those
are generated per node and never leave that relationship, so nothing here
correlates a person across operators.
First run asks which hub, with no default. A client that picks its own hub is a
client that can be pointed at one, and the address is the whole of what this
application trusts a hub for — the interface comes from the package.
Verified against a hub running this code, not against the deployed one:
register 201 → passphrase login 200 → device register 201 → **device sign-in 200
with a real session** → `/v1/users/me` 200 → a stranger's key 401. The
signature was also checked directly against the hub's own Python verifier before
any of that.
Inside the running application, over the debugging protocol: the bridge reaches
the main process, the renderer calls the hub **through it** (200 — the CORS fix
working end to end), and a call to a host that is not the configured hub is
refused.
**Not verified:** safeStorage persisting the key. This session has no secret
service, and standing one up in xvfb did not succeed. The application behaves
correctly there — it *refuses* rather than storing unprotected, and now says so
in Settings, which is a real case rather than a hypothetical one since it is
exactly what a headless or minimal desktop looks like.
Worth remembering for next time: meshbay.org runs whatever was last deployed. It
answered 405 on the Stage-C endpoints and reported MNP 0.2 while the tree had
0.3, so a local `uvicorn meshbay_hub.app:create_app --factory` on SQLite is what
tests hub changes. Nothing was deployed to production for this.
799 tests pass; e2e.py passes end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Electron 42 / Chromium 148, launched under xvfb. The packaged interface mounts
over `app://` with a secure context, `crypto.subtle` present, Argon2 WASM
loaded, and no console errors. Three statements in the design were wrong, and
only launching it found them.
**A CSP in a `<meta>` tag silently drops `frame-ancestors`.** Chromium says so
in the console. A policy carrying a directive that does nothing is worse than
one without it, so the policy is sent as a header by the protocol handler —
which is also the only thing serving the interface, so one source instead of
two.
**`secure: true` is not what makes the service worker register.** Chromium
refuses a worker on a custom scheme whatever its privileges: "The URL protocol
of the current origin ('app://meshbay') is not supported". The application has
no service worker and needs none — it saves through a native dialog, which is
the better of the two paths. `sw.js` stays in the package because the same files
serve the browser, where it is one of only three ways to write a large file.
What `secure: true` is actually for was measured at the same time: without it
**the whole of `crypto.subtle` is undefined**. The first probe loaded a `data:`
URL and every algorithm failed with TypeError, AES-GCM included — which is why
the probe was rewritten before believing its answer. X25519 and Ed25519 are both
present on Chromium 148, settling the version floor left open as O6.
**The renderer cannot call the hub.** Its origin is `app://meshbay` and CORS
refuses it. The hub has *no CORS middleware at all* — its API is reachable from
no web origin whatever — and that is worth keeping. Widening it for
`app://meshbay` would be worse than it looks: that origin is not a credential,
since any Electron application can claim the same scheme and host name.
So every hub call leaves from the main process, exactly as saving a file does,
and it refuses any origin that is not the hub the user signed in to.
`platform.apiFetch()` is `fetch` in a browser and the bridge in the application,
so no caller has to know which it got. `transport.js` reaches it through a
global because it is a classic script, not a module — the alternative was a
second fetch path, which is how two callers of one hub start disagreeing about
how to reach it.
Verified from inside Electron: the main process gets 200 from
/v1/hub/version, the renderer is refused by CORS, and **a script served by the
hub is refused by the policy** — T3's mitigation demonstrated rather than
asserted.
Build note, written into the README because it will bite the next person:
**Ubuntu 24.04's nodejs 18 cannot install Electron at all** — the download
script `require()`s an ESM module, which Node gained in 22. Node 24 LTS,
checksum-verified against nodejs.org, is what this was built with.
package-lock.json is committed; builds use `npm ci`, not `npm install`.
799 tests pass, e2e.py still passes end to end. The session harness needed a
platform stub: it lifts `hubFetch` out of app.js as text and runs it, so the
adapter is now part of the environment it models.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Stage D, and the honest half of it.
D1 — the seam (done, and verified)
----------------------------------
`static/platform.js`. `HUB` becomes `platform.hubBase()` and the transport is
built with the same base, so one address has one source. In a browser it returns
'' and every path stays relative to the origin that served the page — the
acceptance criterion for this split was "the browser SPA behaves identically",
and it does. `platform.js` joins `_ASSETS`, or a change to it would not move the
content hash and a cached browser would never ask for it.
D2 — the shell (written, never launched)
-----------------------------------------
**There is no npm on this machine. Electron was never installed and
`packages/meshbay-client/` has not been run once.** That is stated here rather
than discovered later.
What is there: a main process serving the packaged interface over a privileged
`app://` scheme (`secure` and `standard` are not cosmetic — without them the
service worker refuses to register and streamed downloads break silently), a
preload exposing an enumerated bridge that never passes a filesystem path, a
window with `sandbox`, `contextIsolation` and no node integration, navigation
away from the package refused, and a CSP where the hub is reachable over
connect-src and is not a script source. The hub address arrives as a process
argument because `platform.hubBase()` runs before anything can await.
`test_desktop_shell.py` pins each of those by reading the source — the treatment
`test_downloads.py` already gives the three browser save paths. It catches a
property being removed and proves nothing about the application running. Two
were checked by breaking them.
The interface is *copied* into the package by `build/sync-ui.js` from the hub's
static directory, and `ui/` is gitignored: a silent fork is the only real way to
end up maintaining the interface twice.
D3 — partial
------------
The bridge, and the part worth having now: safeStorage's backend is reported
rather than assumed. On Linux it falls back to a fixed key when no keyring is
running, silently — someone who believes the OS is holding their keys is told
when it is not. The native key lifecycle belongs with D4 and needs a running
application to mean anything.
D8 — partial, and a real defect found
--------------------------------------
`meshbay-node.spec` installed the SYSTEM template — the one carrying `User=%i` —
into `%{_userunitdir}`. A user unit already runs as its owner and cannot carry
`User=`; systemd refuses the file, so the packaged unit could never have
started. Nothing noticed because nobody had built and installed the RPM.
Two units now: the template to `%{_unitdir}`, and a new `meshbay-node-user.service`
that a person enables themselves without a password — which is what lets the
desktop client install a node without asking for one. It carries ExecReload, so
`meshbay-node reload` does not have to stop a service somebody is streaming from,
and documents the drop-in for a drive outside the home, RequiresMountsFor
included.
798 tests pass; e2e.py still passes end to end. Nothing here was built or
launched: no npm, no rpmbuild.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Stage C. Identity keys are per node, so a browser and a desktop client are two
keys on one account there — and the node refused the second where it accepted
the first. Without this, an account created natively could never be opened in a
browser without an operator code per node, and "a native client must not prevent
web use" would have been dead on arrival.
Device linking (node)
---------------------
`identities` is keyed by `(user_id, pk_ed25519)` instead of `user_id` alone. The
old shape did `INSERT OR REPLACE`, so a second device overwrote the first
silently; SQLite cannot change a primary key in place, so the table is rebuilt.
Existing pins are carried over — verified against a live roster with 10 of them,
nobody re-pairs.
A new device files a request bound by `sha256(code ‖ its own keys)`, and a key
the node **already pinned** countersigns it. The hub cannot: it has stored no
user keys since 2026-08-14, which is what makes this safe to do without an
operator in the loop.
**The code never reaches the node.** It lists this account's pending requests
with their stored hashes; the approver recomputes and keeps the match. A node
offering fabricated keys would have to produce a hash over a code it has never
seen. Nothing rests on a human comparing digits — that ritual was dropped in
12.1 as "correct, unusable as the default" and must not return by the back door.
The design document had the approver look a request up *by* its hash, which is
circular: computing it needs the keys being asked about. Corrected in both.
Revocation marks rather than deletes, because a deleted row is a key the node
would happily pin again — which is the laptop somebody just reported lost. Your
last device cannot be revoked: coming back would need an operator's code.
Hub — the only change in the whole plan
---------------------------------------
`POST /v1/users/auth` signs in with a device Ed25519 key, on the same pattern as
`/v1/nodes/auth`, plus `/v1/users/devices` to register, list and retire. New
`user_devices` table with an Alembic migration, because `create_all()` is not
one.
This is **not** the key directory that was H3, and the tests say so: nothing
reads it but the hub, no group key is ever wrapped for one, and it is a
different key from the per-node identities. What it does cost is metadata — the
hub now knows how many devices an account has and when each last signed in.
Also `client.minimum` / `client.recommended` in `GET /v1/hub/version`: an
installed client meets a newer hub the day the interface ships in a package, and
that is cheap now and awkward to retrofit.
Browser
-------
The `key_changed` refusal becomes `unknown_device` and offers a linking code
instead of telling someone to find their operator. The Members panel lists this
account's devices here, approves one by code, and retires one.
773 tests pass. `e2e.py` gained a step that links a device end to end against
the live deployment — file, list, recompute, countersign, then open the group
with the new keys and no code — and it also gained `recv_type`, because a step
that assumes the next message is its own answer reads an ack left by the step
before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A design discussion on 2026-08-17 settled Phase 13 and, in doing so, changed
four things the spec states. v6 restates only those; v5 stays authoritative for
everything it does not touch, per the convention v5 itself used with v4.
What changed:
* The native shell is **Electron**, not pywebview — structural decision 18
reversed. The SPA depends on Chromium-class APIs (WebRTC, WebCrypto
X25519/Ed25519, MSE, Service Workers), so keeping Chromium keeps
transport.js, crypto.js, keyderive.js, downloads.js and sw.js *as the
client*. A system webview meant reimplementing ~2500-3000 lines. The old
"69 % reused" figure was measured against an app.js of ~2600 lines; it is
4586.
* A group's content is **several named roots**, not one directory, because
the planned video and audio libraries will not live in one folder on one
disk.
* **Device linking**: one person may hold several devices on a node,
admitted by a key the node already pinned and bound by a one-time code the
new device generates. Without it a native client is refused where a browser
is not, and an account created natively could never be opened in a browser.
* **Authorship is authenticated, not asserted** — chat senders sign, uploads
have a provable owner, and delete authorization moves from the uploading
key to the account.
And one rule v5 assumed without writing down: **group-related server state
lives on the node.** Verified for multi-root — SwarmSource carries hashes and
endpoints, no paths.
Also here: the Caddy configuration, which was a snippet in the roadmap that
would have broken the SPA (it predates /a/<hash>/ asset versioning and would
have 404ed /sw.js, silently killing streamed downloads on Firefox and Safari);
and downloads.html, which becomes a security page once a release key exists.
Phase 15 was re-read against device linking and is wrong as written: a sender
key must be per **device**, never per person, or two devices sharing a chain
produce key and nonce reuse — C1 again, one level down. senderkeys.py already
fails this silently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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USERGUIDE said an hour in five places and presented renewal as something the
reader does with curl. Both are now wrong: it is four hours, the web app renews
for itself, and the endpoint rotates — so anyone driving it by hand has to store
the refresh token that comes back, or their next call revokes the family.
Also corrects what the token's life actually bounds. It is not how long a
revocation takes: the hub reloads the account on every request and refuses a
suspended one at once, and it pushes signed revocations to nodes. What remains
is a leaked token on an account still in good standing, which is the reason to
keep the number small.
Two lessons in CLAUDE.md. A rotated refresh token has to be stored or it is
spent once. And an effect keyed on a value that used to be constant: the WebRTC
dial listed `token` among its dependencies, harmless while a token only ever
expired, fatal once the session renewed itself — it tore the connection down
mid-handshake and the node waited for ever. That and the hook declared after its
own dependency are the same shape, and worth naming as one: code that reads
correctly on its own and is wrong against the component lifecycle.
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Five lessons, and the first is the expensive one: a test that models a fix
agrees with it by construction. The buffer-ceiling test passed against a player
that still hung, because the model and the fix had the same author and the same
misunderstanding.
Also: `no-cache` only binds a browser that asks; redeploying during someone
else's test kills their session and truncates the log holding the reproduction;
`updateend` fires for `remove()`; and flow control on a media stream is a
window, not a debt.
USERGUIDE section 7 rewritten — it still described 24 segments in flight and
two transcode slots, and said "transcode" where ffmpeg does a `-c copy` remux,
which is exactly why a slot costs little and why 500 MB really does go on the
wire.
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The download-to-disk story is three mechanisms — File System Access in
Chrome, a service worker streaming a response in Firefox and Safari, a
blob as the floor — and no test in this repository exercises any of them.
test_downloads.py pins their contracts by reading the source; whether a
browser really writes to disk needs a person with a large file.
One now has: Firefox, 180 MB, written to disk rather than assembled in
the tab. That is the path worth confirming, since it is the only one
Firefox has and it was written blind. It is also not the scale it exists
for, and the guide says which rows of that table are measured and which
are still only designed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**Closing the viewer left the node working.** Nothing told it to stop:
the player dropped its handlers, which only made the browser deaf. ffmpeg
kept running and held one of the node's two transcode slots until the
credit timeout expired two minutes later — which is why the next video
answered "server busy". `stream_stop` ends it at once, and the viewer
also drops its queue, ends the MediaSource and revokes the object URL on
the way out, any of which could be holding megabytes of decrypted video.
While there: `file_chunk` replies were matched to their requests by
arrival order, which was true by luck rather than by construction. The
reply now names the file it belongs to and is matched on that and the
chunk index; a chunk nobody is waiting for is dropped instead of being
handed to whatever request happens to be oldest.
**The administration panel counted its own history.** A deleted account
is tombstoned so the connection log stays readable, and every count and
list treated that row as a user — including a group's member count, and
the member list of the group itself. They do not any more.
**Where a node is.** `endpoint_hint` is what a node believes its address
to be, learned from a STUN server and sent to us: useful for reaching it,
and a claim. The announcement that carries it is signed with the node key
over a fresh timestamp, so the address that request *arrives from* is the
address of whoever holds that key — that is now recorded on the node row
and shown in a Nodes tab, next to the hint, with the difference spelled
out. Clients get the same treatment: `webrtc_offer` is logged with the
address the hub saw when a browser starts a peer connection.
Verified against the live deployment: the node's row reads 90.112.206.172
after a restart, and in e2e a stopped stream goes quiet in one message
and the next one starts immediately instead of being refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**Removing a member.** The owner can do it from the Members tab, and it
is two halves in the order that fails safe: the node stops serving the
group key first (an operator-signed request, so a paired browser only),
then the hub drops the membership row. The other order would leave
someone able to reach a node that still serves them.
It is a membership, not an account. The user row is never written: their
other groups, their files and their pinned identity survive, because one
group's owner must not be able to erase someone from the hub. It is also
per group — a node hosting two loses them from one — and it does not take
back the key they already unwrapped, which is what rotating the GEK is
for. The confirmation and the panel both say so.
**Downloads and streaming through the disk, in both browsers.** The audit
this started as found two ways to put gigabytes in a tab.
Firefox and Safari have no File System Access API, so every download
there was collected in memory. A service worker fixes it: the page keeps
the writable half of a transferred stream, the worker answers a made-up
URL with the readable half and a Content-Disposition header, and the
browser writes it to disk as it arrives, with real backpressure. The
worker caches nothing and falls through on every request that is not one
of these downloads. A zip announces no Content-Length, since the archive
is larger than the files in it and a length we miss truncates the file.
Video was worse and affected both browsers. The node pushed ffmpeg's
whole output as fast as it was produced while the player consumed a
segment at a time, so the queue held the film — and appending all of it
hit the SourceBuffer's cap, where the handler logged the error and
dropped the segment, leaving a hole in the middle of the film with
nothing to show for it. Streaming is credit-based now, 24 segments of
256 KB in flight, verified against the live node: three credits, three
segments, then silence until more are granted. The player evicts what is
more than a minute behind the playhead and retries a refused segment
rather than dropping it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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of it
Two bugs in what shipped last, and both were mine.
Automatic mode still opened Save As, because with no folder granted the
code fell through to the file picker — while the documentation said it
would use the browser's own download folder. It does that now. Over
512 MB it still asks, since getting there means holding the file in
memory and a tab will not survive a 40 GB blob; Settings is where to stop
it asking again.
Selecting two files downloaded one. They were started without awaiting,
so each asked the browser for a save dialog at once, and a browser allows
exactly one — the rest were rejected and the errors went nowhere. They
are awaited one at a time now, which serializes the dialogs and not the
transfers: each call returns as soon as its transfer is registered.
Then the adjustments. The transfers widget offers Open on a finished
download that went into a granted folder — the bytes go to a new tab, and
that is the whole of what a page can do: no browser lets one start a
desktop application or show a file manager, so the folder half of that
request cannot be built and the guide says so.
The Files toolbar was four controls of three different heights in a row.
It is three groups now — what you can add, where you are, what you can do
with what is here — on one baseline, with icons from the set and a gap
between the dots and the word Actions. Chat comes first among the tabs
and is the one you land on. The three Discover entries in the sidebar
have icons. And a link in a chat message becomes a link: built as an
element and never as markup, http and https only, so `javascript:` is not
one message away from running here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Downloading a selection of twenty files meant twenty Save As dialogs,
which is the wrong answer for the feature that had just been built.
Settings → Downloads now offers saving automatically, and that is the
default; asking every time stays available for people who want it.
The correction worth recording: a web page cannot be given a filesystem
path and cannot read one either. There is no ~/Downloads to configure and
nothing to type, on any operating system — which is also why none of this
will need changing on Windows. What a browser grants is a handle to a
folder the user picked in a dialog, so that is what the setting keeps:
picked once, stored in IndexedDB, re-confirmed once a session because the
grant comes back as a claim rather than a permission. Where no folder has
been granted, and in Firefox and Safari where none can be, files go to
the browser's own download folder — which on most machines is the folder
that was meant all along.
Automatic saving has one risk a dialog does not: it can silently replace
a file. It does not — a taken name gets a suffix before the extension,
`clip (2).mp4`, so a download folder does not fill up with files the
system no longer recognises. That, and the default, are what
test_downloads.py pins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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per-row menus
Downloads and uploads were state inside GroupPage. Leaving a group
unmounted the component, its cleanup closed the DataChannel, and a
half-written file was all you had — which is also why only one thing
could be in flight at a time.
They live in a module-level store now. A group page hands its transport
over on the way out rather than closing it, and the last transfer using
it closes it; signing out is the one thing that cancels everything,
because those transfers are moving data on a token about to stop being
ours. The store is plain JavaScript with no browser globals, so
test_transfers.py runs it under Node and pins the parts that are timing
and lifetime rather than markup: that a cancel stops the work instead of
greying out a row, that a stalled transfer reads as stalled rather than
reporting its own historical average, and that a released transport is
closed by the last transfer and not before.
The widget by the bell shows each transfer with its rate and a cancel
button, so the Files panel no longer carries progress bars — you can
watch a 40 GB archive from the chat, or from another group.
Selection replaces the per-row menu: a Select toggle puts checkboxes on
files and folders, and ⋮ Actions acts on what is ticked. Ticks survive
walking into another folder, so a selection can span directories.
Downloads start together and run together. Videos offer Play only — View
did the same thing, which is the sort of duplication that makes people
wonder what the difference is.
Uploads had to become parallel-safe for any of this to mean anything:
their acks were matched by arrival order, so two at once credited each
other's progress. The node names the file in every ack, so they are keyed
by name now — with the same file twice refused, since the node keys its
own upload state that way too.
Two mistakes worth recording. The selection column went into the body
rows and not the header, because that edit matched nothing and I had not
made it assert; the columns were misaligned until a screenshot showed it.
And the Actions menu opened leftwards from a button at the right edge of
the toolbar, half of it off-screen.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Two things a Files panel needs and did not have.
**Removing a directory** is privileged, where creating one is not: it
acts on a name other members are using, on the operator's disk. It is
refused unless the directory is empty, and that rule is the safety
property — whatever the browser sends, this cannot destroy content. The
check runs twice, once before the challenge and once after the signature
comes back, because a file can land during the round trip. A file also
accepts its uploader's key; a directory has no uploader, so only the
operator's key will do.
**Downloading a folder** produces a zip built in the browser, written
straight to disk as the chunks arrive. An archive of a group folder is
routinely tens of gigabytes, so nothing is held: peak memory is one chunk
plus a small record per file. The node is not involved at all — it serves
the same encrypted chunks as any other download, holds no temporary
files, and cannot be asked to compress anything.
zipstream.js is store-only. Group content is video and images, already
compressed, so deflate would spend CPU on every byte to save nothing, in
the thread that is also decrypting. Sizes and CRCs go in a data
descriptor after each file because a stream cannot seek back to patch a
header, and zip64 kicks in per entry past 4 GiB and for the archive
itself. Because none of that can be checked from the Python side of the
house, test_zipstream.py runs the real module under Node and reads what
it produces with zipfile — CRCs, UTF-8 names, zip64 records and all. The
archives also pass `unzip -t`.
Firefox and Safari have no File System Access API, so there is nowhere to
stream to: the fallback builds the archive in memory and says so, with
the size, before starting rather than after failing.
One mistake worth recording: the first version of deleteDirectory passed
the node's own answer as the value to check the challenge against, which
turns the comparison into a tautology. It checks the path we asked for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Attaching a group to a node meant hand-editing node.toml with a UUID
copied from a browser URL, restarting, and knowing that gek-init exists.
Nothing in the CLI said so, and on a node reached over SSH there is no
paste buffer to carry a UUID across in the first place.
meshbay-node group add grenet --dir ~/grenet-share
The name is resolved against the operator's groups on the hub by the
daemon, which is the process holding the session. The [[groups]] block is
appended to node.toml as text rather than round-tripped through a TOML
writer: the file is hand-written and its comments explain decisions worth
keeping. The directory is created, and the command says what remains —
restart, then gek-init for that group.
It refuses a name it cannot find by printing the groups it can, with
their ids. That listing is the useful half of the answer and it was
missing everywhere: _daemon_api now renders an `available` list from any
endpoint that offers one.
The key is per group and pairing is not, which is the part that reads as
a gap until it is written down: one paired browser covers every group the
node hosts, while each group's key admits only its own members. §4 of the
user guide now says all three of those in one place.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A description could only be set the moment a group was created, so every
group made before anyone thought of one stayed blank for good. The owner
can now edit it from the group's page, and PATCH /v1/groups/{id} takes it.
That endpoint takes the description and nothing else, deliberately. The
name, the visibility and the join policy are the terms members joined on;
a private group that can quietly become public is not the group they
agreed to be in. Changing those needs a decision about who gets told, not
a field on a form — there is a test saying so.
Separately, the legacy operator key is gone. `admin_pk_ed25519` in
node.toml named the operator before the roster existed and was kept so
that an existing deployment would keep working; nothing uses it, and a
second source of node authority is not something to carry around out of
politeness. Authority is the roster, read fresh on every check.
It is removed rather than ignored: a config that still names the key gets
a warning at startup pointing at the file. Dropping it in silence would
refuse invites and file deletion with a signature error that looks like a
bug somewhere else — which is exactly how finding M3 presented.
Two tests were verifying admin operations by naming a key in the context,
which was the legacy path. They now pair an operator into a roster, the
way an operator does. The authority test anchored on the deleted function
and passed vacuously once it disappeared; it states the invariant against
the verifier and the daemon instead.
Also defined .btn-secondary, used in four places and styled in none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The connection log took the name from a join on `users`, and deletion
tombstones that row — so every record belonging to a deleted account
reported `deleted-3f9a1c`, which is the one answer that helps nobody. The
log is kept for a legal retention period precisely so it can say who did
what; losing the name at deletion kept the data and lost the point of it.
`ip_logs.username` is written as the account is erased, and stays NULL
while the account is alive, where the join is better because it cannot go
stale. The admin view prefers the stored name when there is one: the join
still answers after deletion, just with the tombstone.
Releasing the username for re-registration and keeping it in the log are
separate things, and the guide now says so.
On the node side, the pre-proof audit line records the username the
session already knew, instead of leaving the column empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Account deletion is the headline, in the user guide and in draft-v5 §6.1,
and the important half is what deletion does *not* do. It releases the
username, clears the email and password hash, drops memberships,
notifications, refresh tokens and node registrations, and refuses any
access token still inside its hour. It does not touch a node: files, the
pinned identity and the keypair bundle stay on machines the hub does not
command, which is the same sovereignty §5.5 relies on — so deleting a hub
account is not an erasure request to the operators hosting you. The IP log
survives too, attributable, for its legal retention period. The claims
table in §2 gets a row saying exactly this, adversary by adversary.
Notifications get a section: one entry per conversation rather than per
message, never one for your own message, invitations that clear when you
join, muting that lives on the hub so it works from any browser.
Then the corrections, which is most of the diff. The guide still described
a node HTTP API — `GET /index`, `GET /file/{id}`, an HLS playlist, and a
`player.js` that does not exist — with curl examples inviting the reader
to expose port 19001. That surface was removed in 0.2.0 as findings C1 and
C6, precisely because it served files outside the handshake that decides
what a peer may see. Sections 6, 7 and the API reference now describe MNP
message pairs, and the quickstart says the same in French. Also corrected:
the JWT table advertised a `pk_user` claim that no longer exists (it was
what let the token issuer decide who could delete a file), `/pubkeys` no
longer returns identity keys, and the GEK-distribution endpoints are gone
entirely rather than merely unused.
draft-v5 §5.2 had uploads landing in `.uploads/{user_id}/`; they land in
`uploads/`, chat attachments included. §6.1 now says the hub learns the
author's user_id from chat_notify — a stable identifier, and a metadata
leak worth naming rather than leaving as "by whom".
CLAUDE.md records why the deployed hub broke this week: create_all()
creates missing tables, never missing columns, so a schema change passes
every test (fresh DB per run) and never reaches production.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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USERGUIDE said registration submits your public keys "so other members can wrap
GEK bundles for you". Both halves are wrong now: registration creates an account
and nothing else, and nobody wraps anything for a key fetched from the hub. The
API reference and the register body followed the same correction.
CLAUDE.md gains the block a future session needs before touching registration or
anything shaped like a user's public key: keys are born at first contact with a
node and stay there, the hub publishes none, tokens carry no pk_user, and a
scripted signup is now a real account.
Left alone deliberately: first-review.md, docs/poc-v1*.md and poc/spike-results.md
still describe the old JWT and registration. They are records of what was true on
their date, like second-review's verdict table, and draft-v5 is what states the
present.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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One keypair was copied to every node its owner joined, so cracking the bundle on
any single node yielded the identity used on all of them: their content on other
operators' machines, and the ability to sign as them anywhere. That lateral reach
was the part of C4 worth attacking.
Each node now gets its own keypair, generated the first time its owner joins it
and left with that node alone. An operator who cracks what sits on their own disk
holds a key that is a stranger to every other node — and on their own node, one
that unlocks nothing they did not already hold: they serve the content, the index
and every byte of it by design.
Nothing changes for the user. A first contact with a node already needed that
operator's code, and the key is created in the same step; a second browser still
recovers it from the node with the passphrase alone. Two operators can also no
longer tell they host the same person by comparing keys.
BREAKING, and deliberately without a compatibility path — the deployment is wiped
for the next demo:
- users.pk_ed25519 / pk_x25519 dropped (migration a7c31f9e40b2)
- registration no longer sends or stores a key
- PUT /v1/users/me/keys and regenerateKeys() gone; rotation is now
`member unpin` plus a fresh code, decided on the machine that pinned it
- /pubkeys returns an account id and a node's linking key. It was the directory
H3 read, and nothing wraps for it any more
- the pk_user JWT claim is gone
That last one closed a live defect the inventory turned up: the node recorded
pk_user as the uploader's identity and authorized deletion against it, so a hub
issuing a token naming its own key could delete anyone's uploads on any node.
Attribution now uses the key the node itself pinned.
A simplification falls out. Registration generates nothing, so a scripted signup
is a real account: `demo.py bootstrap` takes a wiped hub and node to a working
demo with no browser, which was impossible while keys were born in one.
Also fixes, found by running it on a wiped deployment: the key handed back on a
join now belongs to the group the connection is for, not the group named in the
invitation — an operator pairs node-wide but redeems the code while opening a
group, and expects to read it.
Tests: 343, including the two that state the property — a key pinned by one node
is refused at another, and someone else's code does not admit it. Verified end to
end against a wiped hub and node: bootstrap, pair, invite, join, download,
stream, second browser, revoke.
Design: docs/per-node-identity-v1.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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