| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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USERGUIDE said an hour in five places and presented renewal as something the
reader does with curl. Both are now wrong: it is four hours, the web app renews
for itself, and the endpoint rotates — so anyone driving it by hand has to store
the refresh token that comes back, or their next call revokes the family.
Also corrects what the token's life actually bounds. It is not how long a
revocation takes: the hub reloads the account on every request and refuses a
suspended one at once, and it pushes signed revocations to nodes. What remains
is a leaked token on an account still in good standing, which is the reason to
keep the number small.
Two lessons in CLAUDE.md. A rotated refresh token has to be stored or it is
spent once. And an effect keyed on a value that used to be constant: the WebRTC
dial listed `token` among its dependencies, harmless while a token only ever
expired, fatal once the session renewed itself — it tore the connection down
mid-handshake and the node waited for ever. That and the hook declared after its
own dependency are the same shape, and worth naming as one: code that reads
correctly on its own and is wrong against the component lifecycle.
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Five lessons, and the first is the expensive one: a test that models a fix
agrees with it by construction. The buffer-ceiling test passed against a player
that still hung, because the model and the fix had the same author and the same
misunderstanding.
Also: `no-cache` only binds a browser that asks; redeploying during someone
else's test kills their session and truncates the log holding the reproduction;
`updateend` fires for `remove()`; and flow control on a media stream is a
window, not a debt.
USERGUIDE section 7 rewritten — it still described 24 segments in flight and
two transcode slots, and said "transcode" where ffmpeg does a `-c copy` remux,
which is exactly why a slot costs little and why 500 MB really does go on the
wire.
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The download-to-disk story is three mechanisms — File System Access in
Chrome, a service worker streaming a response in Firefox and Safari, a
blob as the floor — and no test in this repository exercises any of them.
test_downloads.py pins their contracts by reading the source; whether a
browser really writes to disk needs a person with a large file.
One now has: Firefox, 180 MB, written to disk rather than assembled in
the tab. That is the path worth confirming, since it is the only one
Firefox has and it was written blind. It is also not the scale it exists
for, and the guide says which rows of that table are measured and which
are still only designed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**Closing the viewer left the node working.** Nothing told it to stop:
the player dropped its handlers, which only made the browser deaf. ffmpeg
kept running and held one of the node's two transcode slots until the
credit timeout expired two minutes later — which is why the next video
answered "server busy". `stream_stop` ends it at once, and the viewer
also drops its queue, ends the MediaSource and revokes the object URL on
the way out, any of which could be holding megabytes of decrypted video.
While there: `file_chunk` replies were matched to their requests by
arrival order, which was true by luck rather than by construction. The
reply now names the file it belongs to and is matched on that and the
chunk index; a chunk nobody is waiting for is dropped instead of being
handed to whatever request happens to be oldest.
**The administration panel counted its own history.** A deleted account
is tombstoned so the connection log stays readable, and every count and
list treated that row as a user — including a group's member count, and
the member list of the group itself. They do not any more.
**Where a node is.** `endpoint_hint` is what a node believes its address
to be, learned from a STUN server and sent to us: useful for reaching it,
and a claim. The announcement that carries it is signed with the node key
over a fresh timestamp, so the address that request *arrives from* is the
address of whoever holds that key — that is now recorded on the node row
and shown in a Nodes tab, next to the hint, with the difference spelled
out. Clients get the same treatment: `webrtc_offer` is logged with the
address the hub saw when a browser starts a peer connection.
Verified against the live deployment: the node's row reads 90.112.206.172
after a restart, and in e2e a stopped stream goes quiet in one message
and the next one starts immediately instead of being refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**Removing a member.** The owner can do it from the Members tab, and it
is two halves in the order that fails safe: the node stops serving the
group key first (an operator-signed request, so a paired browser only),
then the hub drops the membership row. The other order would leave
someone able to reach a node that still serves them.
It is a membership, not an account. The user row is never written: their
other groups, their files and their pinned identity survive, because one
group's owner must not be able to erase someone from the hub. It is also
per group — a node hosting two loses them from one — and it does not take
back the key they already unwrapped, which is what rotating the GEK is
for. The confirmation and the panel both say so.
**Downloads and streaming through the disk, in both browsers.** The audit
this started as found two ways to put gigabytes in a tab.
Firefox and Safari have no File System Access API, so every download
there was collected in memory. A service worker fixes it: the page keeps
the writable half of a transferred stream, the worker answers a made-up
URL with the readable half and a Content-Disposition header, and the
browser writes it to disk as it arrives, with real backpressure. The
worker caches nothing and falls through on every request that is not one
of these downloads. A zip announces no Content-Length, since the archive
is larger than the files in it and a length we miss truncates the file.
Video was worse and affected both browsers. The node pushed ffmpeg's
whole output as fast as it was produced while the player consumed a
segment at a time, so the queue held the film — and appending all of it
hit the SourceBuffer's cap, where the handler logged the error and
dropped the segment, leaving a hole in the middle of the film with
nothing to show for it. Streaming is credit-based now, 24 segments of
256 KB in flight, verified against the live node: three credits, three
segments, then silence until more are granted. The player evicts what is
more than a minute behind the playhead and retries a refused segment
rather than dropping it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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of it
Two bugs in what shipped last, and both were mine.
Automatic mode still opened Save As, because with no folder granted the
code fell through to the file picker — while the documentation said it
would use the browser's own download folder. It does that now. Over
512 MB it still asks, since getting there means holding the file in
memory and a tab will not survive a 40 GB blob; Settings is where to stop
it asking again.
Selecting two files downloaded one. They were started without awaiting,
so each asked the browser for a save dialog at once, and a browser allows
exactly one — the rest were rejected and the errors went nowhere. They
are awaited one at a time now, which serializes the dialogs and not the
transfers: each call returns as soon as its transfer is registered.
Then the adjustments. The transfers widget offers Open on a finished
download that went into a granted folder — the bytes go to a new tab, and
that is the whole of what a page can do: no browser lets one start a
desktop application or show a file manager, so the folder half of that
request cannot be built and the guide says so.
The Files toolbar was four controls of three different heights in a row.
It is three groups now — what you can add, where you are, what you can do
with what is here — on one baseline, with icons from the set and a gap
between the dots and the word Actions. Chat comes first among the tabs
and is the one you land on. The three Discover entries in the sidebar
have icons. And a link in a chat message becomes a link: built as an
element and never as markup, http and https only, so `javascript:` is not
one message away from running here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Downloading a selection of twenty files meant twenty Save As dialogs,
which is the wrong answer for the feature that had just been built.
Settings → Downloads now offers saving automatically, and that is the
default; asking every time stays available for people who want it.
The correction worth recording: a web page cannot be given a filesystem
path and cannot read one either. There is no ~/Downloads to configure and
nothing to type, on any operating system — which is also why none of this
will need changing on Windows. What a browser grants is a handle to a
folder the user picked in a dialog, so that is what the setting keeps:
picked once, stored in IndexedDB, re-confirmed once a session because the
grant comes back as a claim rather than a permission. Where no folder has
been granted, and in Firefox and Safari where none can be, files go to
the browser's own download folder — which on most machines is the folder
that was meant all along.
Automatic saving has one risk a dialog does not: it can silently replace
a file. It does not — a taken name gets a suffix before the extension,
`clip (2).mp4`, so a download folder does not fill up with files the
system no longer recognises. That, and the default, are what
test_downloads.py pins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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per-row menus
Downloads and uploads were state inside GroupPage. Leaving a group
unmounted the component, its cleanup closed the DataChannel, and a
half-written file was all you had — which is also why only one thing
could be in flight at a time.
They live in a module-level store now. A group page hands its transport
over on the way out rather than closing it, and the last transfer using
it closes it; signing out is the one thing that cancels everything,
because those transfers are moving data on a token about to stop being
ours. The store is plain JavaScript with no browser globals, so
test_transfers.py runs it under Node and pins the parts that are timing
and lifetime rather than markup: that a cancel stops the work instead of
greying out a row, that a stalled transfer reads as stalled rather than
reporting its own historical average, and that a released transport is
closed by the last transfer and not before.
The widget by the bell shows each transfer with its rate and a cancel
button, so the Files panel no longer carries progress bars — you can
watch a 40 GB archive from the chat, or from another group.
Selection replaces the per-row menu: a Select toggle puts checkboxes on
files and folders, and ⋮ Actions acts on what is ticked. Ticks survive
walking into another folder, so a selection can span directories.
Downloads start together and run together. Videos offer Play only — View
did the same thing, which is the sort of duplication that makes people
wonder what the difference is.
Uploads had to become parallel-safe for any of this to mean anything:
their acks were matched by arrival order, so two at once credited each
other's progress. The node names the file in every ack, so they are keyed
by name now — with the same file twice refused, since the node keys its
own upload state that way too.
Two mistakes worth recording. The selection column went into the body
rows and not the header, because that edit matched nothing and I had not
made it assert; the columns were misaligned until a screenshot showed it.
And the Actions menu opened leftwards from a button at the right edge of
the toolbar, half of it off-screen.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Two things a Files panel needs and did not have.
**Removing a directory** is privileged, where creating one is not: it
acts on a name other members are using, on the operator's disk. It is
refused unless the directory is empty, and that rule is the safety
property — whatever the browser sends, this cannot destroy content. The
check runs twice, once before the challenge and once after the signature
comes back, because a file can land during the round trip. A file also
accepts its uploader's key; a directory has no uploader, so only the
operator's key will do.
**Downloading a folder** produces a zip built in the browser, written
straight to disk as the chunks arrive. An archive of a group folder is
routinely tens of gigabytes, so nothing is held: peak memory is one chunk
plus a small record per file. The node is not involved at all — it serves
the same encrypted chunks as any other download, holds no temporary
files, and cannot be asked to compress anything.
zipstream.js is store-only. Group content is video and images, already
compressed, so deflate would spend CPU on every byte to save nothing, in
the thread that is also decrypting. Sizes and CRCs go in a data
descriptor after each file because a stream cannot seek back to patch a
header, and zip64 kicks in per entry past 4 GiB and for the archive
itself. Because none of that can be checked from the Python side of the
house, test_zipstream.py runs the real module under Node and reads what
it produces with zipfile — CRCs, UTF-8 names, zip64 records and all. The
archives also pass `unzip -t`.
Firefox and Safari have no File System Access API, so there is nowhere to
stream to: the fallback builds the archive in memory and says so, with
the size, before starting rather than after failing.
One mistake worth recording: the first version of deleteDirectory passed
the node's own answer as the value to check the challenge against, which
turns the comparison into a tautology. It checks the path we asked for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Attaching a group to a node meant hand-editing node.toml with a UUID
copied from a browser URL, restarting, and knowing that gek-init exists.
Nothing in the CLI said so, and on a node reached over SSH there is no
paste buffer to carry a UUID across in the first place.
meshbay-node group add grenet --dir ~/grenet-share
The name is resolved against the operator's groups on the hub by the
daemon, which is the process holding the session. The [[groups]] block is
appended to node.toml as text rather than round-tripped through a TOML
writer: the file is hand-written and its comments explain decisions worth
keeping. The directory is created, and the command says what remains —
restart, then gek-init for that group.
It refuses a name it cannot find by printing the groups it can, with
their ids. That listing is the useful half of the answer and it was
missing everywhere: _daemon_api now renders an `available` list from any
endpoint that offers one.
The key is per group and pairing is not, which is the part that reads as
a gap until it is written down: one paired browser covers every group the
node hosts, while each group's key admits only its own members. §4 of the
user guide now says all three of those in one place.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A description could only be set the moment a group was created, so every
group made before anyone thought of one stayed blank for good. The owner
can now edit it from the group's page, and PATCH /v1/groups/{id} takes it.
That endpoint takes the description and nothing else, deliberately. The
name, the visibility and the join policy are the terms members joined on;
a private group that can quietly become public is not the group they
agreed to be in. Changing those needs a decision about who gets told, not
a field on a form — there is a test saying so.
Separately, the legacy operator key is gone. `admin_pk_ed25519` in
node.toml named the operator before the roster existed and was kept so
that an existing deployment would keep working; nothing uses it, and a
second source of node authority is not something to carry around out of
politeness. Authority is the roster, read fresh on every check.
It is removed rather than ignored: a config that still names the key gets
a warning at startup pointing at the file. Dropping it in silence would
refuse invites and file deletion with a signature error that looks like a
bug somewhere else — which is exactly how finding M3 presented.
Two tests were verifying admin operations by naming a key in the context,
which was the legacy path. They now pair an operator into a roster, the
way an operator does. The authority test anchored on the deleted function
and passed vacuously once it disappeared; it states the invariant against
the verifier and the daemon instead.
Also defined .btn-secondary, used in four places and styled in none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The connection log took the name from a join on `users`, and deletion
tombstones that row — so every record belonging to a deleted account
reported `deleted-3f9a1c`, which is the one answer that helps nobody. The
log is kept for a legal retention period precisely so it can say who did
what; losing the name at deletion kept the data and lost the point of it.
`ip_logs.username` is written as the account is erased, and stays NULL
while the account is alive, where the join is better because it cannot go
stale. The admin view prefers the stored name when there is one: the join
still answers after deletion, just with the tombstone.
Releasing the username for re-registration and keeping it in the log are
separate things, and the guide now says so.
On the node side, the pre-proof audit line records the username the
session already knew, instead of leaving the column empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Account deletion is the headline, in the user guide and in draft-v5 §6.1,
and the important half is what deletion does *not* do. It releases the
username, clears the email and password hash, drops memberships,
notifications, refresh tokens and node registrations, and refuses any
access token still inside its hour. It does not touch a node: files, the
pinned identity and the keypair bundle stay on machines the hub does not
command, which is the same sovereignty §5.5 relies on — so deleting a hub
account is not an erasure request to the operators hosting you. The IP log
survives too, attributable, for its legal retention period. The claims
table in §2 gets a row saying exactly this, adversary by adversary.
Notifications get a section: one entry per conversation rather than per
message, never one for your own message, invitations that clear when you
join, muting that lives on the hub so it works from any browser.
Then the corrections, which is most of the diff. The guide still described
a node HTTP API — `GET /index`, `GET /file/{id}`, an HLS playlist, and a
`player.js` that does not exist — with curl examples inviting the reader
to expose port 19001. That surface was removed in 0.2.0 as findings C1 and
C6, precisely because it served files outside the handshake that decides
what a peer may see. Sections 6, 7 and the API reference now describe MNP
message pairs, and the quickstart says the same in French. Also corrected:
the JWT table advertised a `pk_user` claim that no longer exists (it was
what let the token issuer decide who could delete a file), `/pubkeys` no
longer returns identity keys, and the GEK-distribution endpoints are gone
entirely rather than merely unused.
draft-v5 §5.2 had uploads landing in `.uploads/{user_id}/`; they land in
`uploads/`, chat attachments included. §6.1 now says the hub learns the
author's user_id from chat_notify — a stable identifier, and a metadata
leak worth naming rather than leaving as "by whom".
CLAUDE.md records why the deployed hub broke this week: create_all()
creates missing tables, never missing columns, so a schema change passes
every test (fresh DB per run) and never reaches production.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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USERGUIDE said registration submits your public keys "so other members can wrap
GEK bundles for you". Both halves are wrong now: registration creates an account
and nothing else, and nobody wraps anything for a key fetched from the hub. The
API reference and the register body followed the same correction.
CLAUDE.md gains the block a future session needs before touching registration or
anything shaped like a user's public key: keys are born at first contact with a
node and stay there, the hub publishes none, tokens carry no pk_user, and a
scripted signup is now a real account.
Left alone deliberately: first-review.md, docs/poc-v1*.md and poc/spike-results.md
still describe the old JWT and registration. They are records of what was true on
their date, like second-review's verdict table, and draft-v5 is what states the
present.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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One keypair was copied to every node its owner joined, so cracking the bundle on
any single node yielded the identity used on all of them: their content on other
operators' machines, and the ability to sign as them anywhere. That lateral reach
was the part of C4 worth attacking.
Each node now gets its own keypair, generated the first time its owner joins it
and left with that node alone. An operator who cracks what sits on their own disk
holds a key that is a stranger to every other node — and on their own node, one
that unlocks nothing they did not already hold: they serve the content, the index
and every byte of it by design.
Nothing changes for the user. A first contact with a node already needed that
operator's code, and the key is created in the same step; a second browser still
recovers it from the node with the passphrase alone. Two operators can also no
longer tell they host the same person by comparing keys.
BREAKING, and deliberately without a compatibility path — the deployment is wiped
for the next demo:
- users.pk_ed25519 / pk_x25519 dropped (migration a7c31f9e40b2)
- registration no longer sends or stores a key
- PUT /v1/users/me/keys and regenerateKeys() gone; rotation is now
`member unpin` plus a fresh code, decided on the machine that pinned it
- /pubkeys returns an account id and a node's linking key. It was the directory
H3 read, and nothing wraps for it any more
- the pk_user JWT claim is gone
That last one closed a live defect the inventory turned up: the node recorded
pk_user as the uploader's identity and authorized deletion against it, so a hub
issuing a token naming its own key could delete anyone's uploads on any node.
Attribution now uses the key the node itself pinned.
A simplification falls out. Registration generates nothing, so a scripted signup
is a real account: `demo.py bootstrap` takes a wiped hub and node to a working
demo with no browser, which was impossible while keys were born in one.
Also fixes, found by running it on a wiped deployment: the key handed back on a
join now belongs to the group the connection is for, not the group named in the
invitation — an operator pairs node-wide but redeems the code while opening a
group, and expects to read it.
Tests: 343, including the two that state the property — a key pinned by one node
is refused at another, and someone else's code does not admit it. Verified end to
end against a wiped hub and node: bootstrap, pair, invite, join, download,
stream, second browser, revoke.
Design: docs/per-node-identity-v1.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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draft-v5 §7 rewritten around the keypair bundle, because that is where the last
open finding actually lives. New §7.1 states the adversary (an operator holding
their own node's disk), what cracking a bundle yields (identity keys, hence
content on *other* nodes and the ability to sign as that user — not the content
they host in the clear by design), and the measured numbers rather than
adjectives: PBKDF2 241 ms vs Argon2id 88 ms natively, a GPU ceiling moving from
~8k to ~2k guesses/s, six days for a 10⁹ dictionary run, four random words
outlasting the sun. The honest summary is in there too — a factor of four on one
card, not a thousand; what it buys is the cost of scale.
§2 gains the row the table never had: **your identity keys stay yours**, ⚠️
against a malicious node operator. An operator hosts your content by design, and
that was documented; that they can also try to become *you* was not. That is the
difference between reading what they host and reading what other operators host.
§4 records that the challenge now carries `node_pk`, why (a first-time member
signs a transcript naming the node and has no GEK to complete a handshake with),
and that it is checked against the ack rather than trusted. Also that refusals
carry a code, and what `not_a_member` usually means.
§8.1 states the multi-browser property plainly — one identity across browsers,
recovered with the passphrase, no second code — together with its cost, since it
is the same mechanism as C4.
invite-pairing-v1 is no longer "a proposal": it shipped. §9bis gains the four
browser-found failures and their common thread — e2e.py is a second
implementation of the client, written in the right order by construction, so it
proves the protocol and nothing about app.js.
CLAUDE.md gets the two things a future session must not rediscover the hard way:
the KDF parameters live in three places held identical by a parity test, and an
unbounded await on the hub socket makes a node silently unreachable (three found).
second-review: C4 marked reduced, not closed. devel-phases-next: 12.2's CSP must
keep `wasm-unsafe-eval`, or the strict policy locks every user out of their keys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Argon2id memory 64 → 128 MB. Memory is the lever, not time: it caps how many
guesses a card can hold at once, so the ceiling on one high-end GPU moves from
roughly 4k to roughly 2k guesses/s and its 24 GB fits ~187 lanes instead of ~375.
Measured through the vendored build: 640 ms, against 322 ms at 64 MB.
While measuring the real cost of a sign-in, found the SPA deriving the bundle key
twice — once for the key pair kept for the session, then again inside
decryptBundle() for the local bundle. At these parameters that is 0.6 s of pure
waste. Measured now, end to end:
auth_key (PBKDF2 600k) 239 ms
bundle v1 (PBKDF2 600k) 240 ms legacy, until every bundle is upgraded
bundle v2 (Argon2id 128MB) 650 ms
-----------------------------------
sign-in 1 129 ms (889 ms once no v1 bundles remain)
Once per sign-in, and only then: reopening a group, downloading, streaming and
reloading the page all reuse the key, which lives in IndexedDB from login.
Also bounds two waits in the node's hub WebSocket, found because the node went
silent again mid-deploy. It had reconnected after the hub restart, sent its auth
frame, and waited for a reply that never came — `ws.recv()` had no timeout, so a
hub that accepts a socket and then says nothing for a few seconds while starting
up parks the task forever: node running, logging nothing, invisible to everyone.
The auth exchange now times out at 15 s, connect at 15 s, and a refused auth
retries with a fresh token instead of ending the task for good.
QE harness signs in once per account and reuses the token — several clients there
stand for several browsers of one person, and what tells them apart is which keys
they hold, not which token, while the hub quite rightly rate-limits repeated
logins from one address.
Tests: 341, plus the live workflow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Two corrections to yesterday's judgement, in the order they matter.
**The toggle is gone.** Asked to make the remote key backup optional, I shipped a
setting whose "off" position meant: no second browser, ever, and clearing your
storage destroys the account. I wrote the warning that says so without drawing
the conclusion. A control whose only effect is to break the ordinary case is not
a control, and removing an exposure by removing the feature is not a fix. Every
browser backs its keys up again, unconditionally.
**The exposure is fixed where it actually lives: the KDF.** The keypair bundle
rests on every node whose group its owner joins, protected by the passphrase
alone (finding C4). It used PBKDF2-SHA512 at 600k — compute-only, which is
exactly what a GPU eats. Measured on this machine: PBKDF2 600k costs 241 ms and
Argon2id 64 MB/t=3 costs 322 ms, near enough the same honest work, except only
one of them forces an attacker to find 64 MB per guess.
So the bundle key is now Argon2id 64 MB / t=3 / p=1, via a vendored WebAssembly
build (no external host — the CSP forbids one, and 12.2 will tighten it further).
Parameters chosen by measurement through that build: 19 MB is OWASP's floor at
118 ms, 256 MB is 1.3 s and too slow for a phone, 64 MB sits where a login should.
What this buys, stated honestly: cracking a bundle yields the owner's identity
keys, and with them content on OTHER nodes and the ability to sign as them — not
the content on the operator's own node, which they host in the clear by design.
Argon2id raises that price steeply; it does not remove it, and a weak passphrase
still loses. Hence the floor raised to 12 characters and ~60 bits in the same
breath, which can only be enforced client-side: with the password split (T1) the
hub never sees a passphrase.
Migration is automatic and invisible. Bundles carry an "MBK2" marker; the old
form is still readable, and is re-encrypted the first time a browser backs it up.
Both keys are derived at sign-in, because which one a bundle needs is only known
once it is read and the passphrase is deliberately not kept around.
Two implementations of the KDF now exist — the browser's WASM and argon2-cffi in
QE — so a parity test holds them byte-identical. A disagreement would not look
like an error; it would look like an account nobody can open.
keypair_bundle_delete stays, without a UI. It is the mechanism behind withdrawing
your data from a node, exercised end to end, and it will belong to a deliberate
"forget me on this node" action rather than a setting that quietly disables
multi-device.
Verified against the live deployment: the full workflow passes, including
recovering keys on a second client from the passphrase alone.
Tests: 341.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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draft-v5 §2: against an active hub, reading content moves from "❌ H3" to
"❌ T3 (browser) · ✅ native". The defensible sentence becomes "the hub cannot
read your content unless it ships you malicious client code" — T3 is now the only
path, it is an artifact rather than a silent directory lie, and it does not exist
for a native client. New §5.5 describes admission and key delivery, with the four
properties that carry it and the one exception (open-join groups, where the hub
can walk in the front door — a property of open joining, and the setting is read
from node.toml).
Corrected while writing it: §5.1 said the C5b fix stopped a group admin who does
not run the node from inviting, and that the redesign reverses this. It does not,
because delegation was deferred. What changed is the timing — the operator issues
a code and is then out of the loop.
devel-phases-next: 12.1 is done and NOT as written. The plan was key transparency
plus safety numbers; what shipped removes the directory read instead. Safety
numbers make substitution detectable by a human who checks, at first contact,
when there is nothing to check against. 12.2 (served-SPA integrity) is now the
highest-value item in that phase. Phase 14 marked for what landed.
second-review: H3 and M3 annotated closed at the finding, with what actually
closed them. The §7 verdict table is left intact — it is the record of an audit
on a date, and falsifying it would be worse than leaving it — with a note
pointing at draft-v5 §2 for current state.
CLAUDE.md matters most here, being loaded every session: NS4 read "admin_pk_ed25519
auto-pinned from keystore ✅ DONE", which is M3 described as a feature. Rewritten,
with the two fixes that must never be attempted (auto-pin, hub lookup).
QE/deploy/README.md: set-admin-pk retired from the walkthrough; the regression
checklist now exercises pairing, joining by code, recognition without a code, and
revocation.
USERGUIDE.md is beyond the invite work but was actively wrong: it told users to
POST GEK bundles to a hub endpoint deleted in Phase 12, and to re-wrap for every
remaining member on revocation. Both replaced with what the code does.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The invite flow fetched the invitee's pk_x25519 from the hub and wrapped the
GEK for whatever came back (app.js:1466, and gek-init did the same server-side).
The hub is the key directory, so a hub answering with its own key was handed the
group key by an honest member following the protocol exactly. No forgery, no
injection, nothing for the client to notice. That was H3.
The fix is not safety numbers. Nobody reads the directory any more:
- the node holds the GEK and wraps it itself, on every connection, for the
X25519 key the joiner signed with their Ed25519 identity in one transcript
(meshbay:join:v1), so the identity key vouches for the encryption key;
- identities are bound to accounts by a one-time code the hub never sees —
40 bits, single use, one account, bounded per connection AND node-wide;
- the node's own roster decides who may receive the key. Hub membership lets
someone reach a node; it no longer gets them anything. A hub that invents an
account and mints it a token is answered not_authorized_for_group.
Safety numbers would have made substitution detectable by a human who checks, at
the moment there is nothing to check against — first contact. Removing the lookup
makes it impossible, and costs the user one code to pass along.
M3 falls out of the same work. The daemon auto-pinned its own keystore key as
admin_pk_ed25519 while the browser signs with the user identity key, so every
privileged operation failed closed with a signature error that looked like a bug
somewhere else; the demo only worked because a deploy script overwrote the value.
Authority now comes from the roster, established locally by `operator pair`.
Asking the hub for the operator's key — the obvious-looking fix — would have let
the hub install itself as node administrator.
BREAKING: gek_bundle_store is deleted, not gated. No member hands the node key
material at all, so C5b becomes structural rather than an authorization to check.
Existing stored bundles are still served, so current deployments keep working.
Also:
- join_policy (invite|open) is read from node.toml, never from the hub — a hub
able to declare a group open would be handed its key. Unknown group ⇒ invite.
- admin signatures are verified against the roster on every check, so unpinning
takes effect without a restart. admin_pk_ed25519 stays readable as legacy.
- two C5b tests were rewritten, deliberately: they asserted that
gek_bundle_store demanded an operator signature, and the message is gone. They
now assert the stronger property. The file says not to fix these tests, so
this is the record of why they changed.
- a slice-1 bug found while writing slice 2: connect() never passed skEdB64, so
pairing would have failed at runtime with no test able to catch it.
Tests: 152 node+common here, including an end-to-end DataChannel run where a
member who has never held the group key redeems a code in the pre-proof window
and receives the key wrapped for a key only they can open.
Design: docs/invite-pairing-v1.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Every operator action lived behind a web UI on the node's own loopback
interface. For the normal deployment — a node on a server reached over SSH —
that is unusable: no browser on the host, and 11.5.3 added a per-run token that
had to be copied out of a log to get in.
status hub, node public key, daemon state, groups, admin-key pinning.
Reads the keystore directly so it works while the daemon is STOPPED,
which is exactly when it is needed: the daemon cannot stay up before
its key is linked or before a group exists.
ui prints the URL and the ssh -L line. It does not open a browser —
that was an assumption about the environment, and a wrong one.
gek-init initialises a group key through the daemon's loopback API. Same
operation as the admin UI button, no browser involved.
Also fixes a latent bug in QE/deploy/deploy-node.sh: the pkill pattern was
unanchored, so it matched any shell whose command line merely mentioned the
daemon — including the one running the script. It killed a session three times
before being pinned down. Anchored to the end of the command line.
Verified against the live deployment. grenet and cbesson both connect over
WebRTC through real NAT and can browse, download, stream, upload and chat. The
node audit log confirms the security properties in production: uploads land in
.uploads/{user_id}/ (C5a), the invite required the operator's signature over an
admin transcript (C5b, H5), the pre-proof bundle window is bounded and audited
(C4), and a non-member handshake was refused.
Docs updated: Phase 14 marked partially delivered with the reason, draft-v5 §5.3
records the two operator personas, QE/deploy/README.md documents the commands
and the remaining browser-only gaps (invite, delete).
Tests: 121 node.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5 is complete. All six critical and all seven high findings from the
second review are now closed, bounded, or deferred by explicit decision.
Updated in place rather than appended, so the document does not carry stale
"open" markers next to shipped work:
- §9 split into "closed since this document was drafted" and "still open",
with C6, 11.5.6, 11.5.8 and M8 moved across and the closing mechanism
recorded for each
- §2 claim table: node impersonation is no longer pending
- §3.1 QUIC now shows the unified handshake enforced
- §4.2 records what the QUIC binding actually turned out to be, including the
finding that a resumed TLS session carries no certificate, so the anchor
travels with the session ticket
- §4.4 states that the client pins pk_node and refuses a change
Added a scope note: with C6 closed, pinning is defence in depth, not the primary
control. A substituted node already fails the GEK proof; pinning covers the case
where an attacker holds the group key and swaps the node underneath.
H3 remains the last unfixed finding, and the document still says so.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Supersedes draft-v4, which described a system the code did not implement and
made several claims that were simply wrong — "ALL operations require the GEK
proof" (true on one of four transports), "Argon2id 256 MB" (hub only), "hub
stores no content metadata" (private file hashes were registered with it).
Written as a delta over v4: sections not restated are unchanged. Carries an
explicit rule — a claim must name the adversary it holds against — and a
per-adversary table replacing v4's informal assurances.
Records the decisions: transport (aiortc primary, QUIC retained, TCP and the
node HTTP API removed), unified handshake with mutual authentication, admin
operation transcripts, node authority over GEK storage and activation, upload
confinement, hub node-registration and signaling authorization, and the client
architecture — hub keeps serving the web SPA, native client offered alongside,
hub minimization deferred.
States plainly what is NOT true. The defensible claim is "the hub cannot read
your content unless it actively attacks you", not "unreadable by other parties,
even the hub": H3 (hub is the key directory and can substitute a key at invite
time) is open until Phase 12.1, and T3 (hub serves the SPA) is accepted
permanently by decision. Content is also readable by every group member and by
the node operator, so "end-to-end" here means client-to-node, never
client-to-client.
Corrects the v4 NAT traversal account: punch_nat() is a single UDP probe with
no STUN, no candidate gathering and no fallback, validated on one ISP. ICE is
the traversal path, including for native clients.
Open items listed with status, including C6 on the QUIC path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Baseline commit capturing in-progress Phase 12 work that was already present
in the working tree (uncommitted) before the Phase 11.5 security remediation
begins. Committed as-is, without review or modification, so that remediation
changes arrive as a separable diff.
Contents: BundleStore (P2P GEK + keypair bundles), password split
(auth_key / bundle_key), node Ed25519 auth (POST /v1/nodes/auth, node-scoped
JWT), GEK-HMAC handshake proof with DTLS channel binding, Ed25519 admin
challenge-response, node local admin UI rewrite, browser key persistence.
Not authored in this session — captured to establish a baseline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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search)
Six self-service features for the web SPA:
- Group creation UI with GEK auto-generation (AES-256-GCM ECIES)
- Member management + invite by username (GEK wrapping for invitee)
- Open group self-join flow (POST /v1/groups/{id}/join)
- File upload client→node (FILE_UPLOAD MNP type, .uploads/ staging)
- IndexedDB caching of group file indexes (instant display on revisit)
- Cross-group file search (SearchPage, pure client-side on cached indexes)
11 new tests (166 total): 8 group self-service + 3 AES GEK wrap/unwrap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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- 10.5: Notification model + CRUD API (list, mark read, mark all read)
Triggered on: group invite, role change, suspend/unsuspend
- 10.6: SettingsPage shows role, per-group notification mute (localStorage)
- 10.7: GET /v1/groups?q= search filter (ilike on name)
- 10.8: NotificationFeed on home page + bell with unread badge in navbar
- 10.10: GET /v1/hub/version endpoint for client update checks
- 8 new tests (test_notifications.py), 155 total
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Browser clients can now connect P2P to nodes behind residential NAT via
WebRTC DataChannel with ICE/STUN. Validated on SFR Port-Restricted Cone
NAT + 4G CGNAT across three scenarios (WiFi LAN, 4G IPv6, 4G IPv4 STUN).
No TURN relay needed. Hub serves only as signaling relay (<1 KB).
New files:
- webrtc_server.py: aiortc-based WebRTC transport (node side)
- signaling.py: SDP/ICE relay endpoint (hub side)
- transport.js: browser WebRTC client with msgpack framing
- webrtc-test.html: spike test page for browser→NAT→node validation
- test_webrtc_transport.py: 4 tests (handshake, file transfer, auth, guard)
- meshbay-draft-v4.md: architecture spec updated for web client
Modified:
- hub_client.py: WebRTC offer handling via hub WebSocket
- revocation.py: node_id from WS auth + webrtc_answer routing
- pyproject.toml: aiortc>=1.9 dependency
123 tests passing (117 existing + 6 new).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Implements all 8 milestones (7.0-7.7):
- 7.0: JWT carries `groups` claim; node verifies group membership at
MNP handshake (QUIC + TCP+TLS). Resolves security review C2.
- 7.1: QUIC 0-RTT session resumption via stored session tickets
(17-21ms reconnect vs 47ms cold).
- 7.2: Hub→node WebSocket signaling for NAT punch coordination
(`client_incoming`/`punch_ready`) + jti denylist push. Denylist
class blocks revoked users/jtis at handshake.
- 7.3: Multi-group daemon — one QUIC port serves N groups with
per-group GEK, shared_root, and index routing.
- 7.4: HLS streaming via QUIC (STREAM_SEGMENT message type, ffmpeg
segment extraction).
- 7.5: Sender Keys protocol for group chat (Signal Groups approach).
Each member has own sending chain key, HKDF chain ratchet, AES-256-GCM
encryption, Ed25519 signing. Resolves security review C1.
- 7.6: Chat store (SQLite via aiosqlite), CHAT_MESSAGE MNP wire type
with peer broadcast, web UI with WebSocket push.
- 7.7: Argon2id calibration CLI.
First security review included (first-review.md). 109 tests, demo-v3
validated against meshbay.org production hub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Multi-group: single QUIC port (multiplexing), group_id from JWT.
Signaling punch/connect: hub WS client_incoming/punch_ready protocol,
reduces handshake 12.7s → < 200ms. SFR Port-Restricted findings added.
Chat model: between forum and Signal — persistent, threaded, E2E,
per-group scope, push for online / pull for offline members.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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1. indexer.py: streaming blake3 (8MB chunks) instead of read_bytes().
Large files (initrd.img, ISOs, VM images) no longer load into RAM.
2. QE/demo-v1/run_node.py: call indexer.start() not initial_scan().
initial_scan() alone never starts the watchdog observer — files added
after startup were silently ignored. Added indexer.stop() on shutdown.
3. USERGUIDE.md §8: clarify symmetric vs asymmetric.
Ed25519/X25519 = asymmetric (key pairs). ChaCha20-Poly1305 and
AES-256-GCM = symmetric AEAD 256-bit (content encryption).
ChaCha20 is PRIMARY; AES-GCM is optional browser-compat variant only.
4. pyproject.toml: aioquic, websockets, aiosqlite, slowapi added to
proper package deps (were installed manually, now declared).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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meshbay-node/pyproject.toml: add aioquic>=1.0 (was commented 'v2'),
websockets>=12.0 (revocation push). Both are production code since Phase 5.
meshbay-hub/pyproject.toml: add aiosqlite (tests without PostgreSQL),
slowapi (rate limiting), websockets (revocation push), PyJWT (explicit).
transport/__init__.py: QUIC imports wrapped in try/except — node works
without aioquic (TCP+TLS + HTTP fallback). QUIC_AVAILABLE flag exported.
QUICKSTART.md: replace manual pip list with 'pip install -e' that pulls
all deps from pyproject.toml automatically. Add dependency table.
CLAUDE.md: clarify that all deps go in pyproject.toml, not manual installs.
81/81 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Root cause: certifi.where() in the Fedora venv points to
/etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/pem/tls-ca-bundle.pem which does not
exist on Ubuntu. 'python3 -m venv .venv' without --clear keeps the
Fedora certifi paths. Fix: always use --clear when recreating a venv
on a different OS.
Documented in QUICKSTART.md and CLAUDE.md.
rsync command updated to exclude .venv/ (in QE/server-state, not versioned).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pip + Python 3.14 fails with FileNotFoundError in certifi.where() on fresh
venvs (truststore bug). Fix: SSL_CERT_FILE pointing to system CA bundle.
Documented in CLAUDE.md (Python environment section) and QUICKSTART.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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CLAUDE.md: add QE/ to structure, key modules table, server state reference,
security rule updated (QE/ not keypair files), meshbay.org inventory pointer.
devel-phases.md: add milestones 6.6-6.9 (keyderive, bundle, demo scripts,
QUICKSTART rewrite). 81/81 tests.
docs/meshbay-draft-v3.md §6.1.1: new section documenting 3 key generation
strategies (Argon2id CLI, WebCrypto browser+bundle, keystore file) and the
algorithm mismatch caveat between CLI and web registration paths.
docs/USERGUIDE.md §2 Register+Login: replace "generate and persist before
registering" warning with the two clean strategies (derive_keys_from_password
for CLI, keyderive.js + keypair_bundle for browser). Login response updated
with keypair_bundle field.
hub/models.py + users.py + Alembic migration: keypair_bundle column on User,
stored at registration, returned at login (web clients only).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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keyderive.py: derive Ed25519+X25519 from username+password via Argon2id.
Same credentials → same keys on any device. Encrypt/decrypt keypair
bundle (AES-256-GCM) for hub storage (web clients).
7/7 tests. Full suite: 81/81.
keyderive.js: browser counterpart using PBKDF2-SHA512 + random keypairs
encrypted for hub storage. Avoids algorithm mismatch with Python.
hub/models.py + users.py: keypair_bundle field added to User, stored on
registration, returned in login response for web client key recovery.
QUICKSTART.md: fully rewritten. 3 operational scripts in QE/demo-v1/:
setup_demo.py — create accounts, group, distribute GEK
run_node.py — start HTTP node (watches shared/ directory)
download.py — bob login → GEK fetch → decrypt → save
All tested locally end-to-end. No invented URLs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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QUICKSTART (434 lines): 6-step guide tested against live
https://meshbay.org — demo accounts alice_test/bob_test,
real transfer of README.txt (23ms) and 1MB chunk (275ms recv,
2.4ms decrypt), exact Python commands with measured output.
USERGUIDE (785 lines): 11-section reference — architecture,
account management, group/node config, file sharing, HLS streaming,
security model, moderation/CSAM, troubleshooting, full API table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Caddyfile updated: www → 301 → meshbay.org (canonical).
Caddy auto-issued Let's Encrypt cert for www.meshbay.org in 4s.
HTTPS.md explains the setup, cert lifecycle (90-day, auto-renewed),
why 1-year certs are not recommended, DNS requirements.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Key corrections from spikes 1-6:
- JWT jti now required (prevents replay, enables revocation)
- Argon2id params updated to target 500ms (256MB memory)
- NAT order corrected: STUN before UPnP (UPnP unreliable on SFR)
- Transport: TCP+TLS v1, QUIC v2
- GEK wrapping protocol confirmed (ECIES-like, 48B opaque bundle)
- Hub API table complete with Spike 6 endpoints
- 3-package monorepo structure documented
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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3-package layout: meshbay-common (shared crypto/protocol),
meshbay-hub (FastAPI server), meshbay-node (local daemon).
Includes validated POC spikes 1-6 in poc/, architecture drafts
v1/v2 in docs/, and CLAUDE.md project conventions.
All cryptographic primitives extracted from POC into
meshbay_common/crypto.py (GEK wrap/unwrap, chunk key derivation,
keystore encryption, chunk signing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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