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The security claims table, §3.4's property 2, the protocol's stated
limits, the quickstart and the user guide's defaults now say where a
link's code differs: bound to its account only when redeemed, and held
by the hub when the inviter asks it to mail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The CLI makes both halves itself — the node's code, then the hub's
ticket bound to the address — and prints the link; a refused ticket
takes the code back, and cancel takes back both. The CLI never asks the
hub to mail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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#/invite takes the link out of the address on load and keeps it in the
tab through registration and sign-in; joining is one click, only the
ticket goes to the hub, and the code goes only to the node the link
names once it has signed its challenge. Members tab gains "Invite by
link" (shared e-mail box, pending list, cancel both halves); home page
takes a pasted link. Browser probe drives the real app, signed out and in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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group_invite_links holds sha256(ticket) and the invitee's address blind
index; redeeming grants membership to that account only. Owner-only
create/list/cancel (a node token may create, never mail), 20 outstanding
per group, optional mail written by the hub itself and capped at 10 per
sender per day (mail.invite_link_daily_cap). MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §3.4 now
carries the whole link design.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The plan was a working document; what it decided lives in
MESHBAY_DESIGN.md and MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md. Code and tests now
cite those instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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New invite kind "link": member of one group, once, never operator, not
spendable by an active member, capped at 20 per group, cancellable by
handle. Signed ops invite_link_create / invite_cancel, loopback routes,
and the known-device join path now accepts a link code. Adds the plan,
docs/invite-links.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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node_pk in handshake_challenge is now signed over the channel binding
and both nonces, so a client can check the node key before a join
rather than only at the ack. Both transports; the browser and the QUIC
client refuse a wrong signature and treat an absent one as an older node.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A "Send the invitation by e-mail" box under the Invite member field,
checked by default and stored as the invite_email preference. Unchecked,
invite-notify is never called and the hub never sees the code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The toolbar's actions on the row under the pointer, sharing one action list
with the toolbar — which keeps showing what does not apply, disabled, while
the menu leaves it out. A count only where more than one item is concerned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A native confirm() or alert() leaves the desktop client unable to type
until the window is refocused. ask.js draws both in the page; the SPA
test now bans all three browser dialogs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`ops.revoke_member` and `ops.unpin_member` log nothing to audit.db while
the MNP handlers doing the same work audit it. Parked in §15.3: a
removal from the node page or the CLI leaves a refusal with nothing to
explain it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A reconnection restarted the stream at the playhead, and that empties the
source buffer — spending the whole read-ahead at the one moment it was the
thing carrying the film. It carries on from the end of the buffer instead,
except where the buffer is short, the stream already ended, or a cast is
active: the receiver is fed from the wire and never had that buffer, so
resuming there would skip it forward by the lot.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A browser limits bytes, so a bound in seconds had to be sized for the
highest-bitrate file and every ordinary one then held a fraction of what
the same buffer would have taken. Floored at the old 90 s so nothing
pulls less than before, and walked up rather than declared. A refused
append now waits for an eviction instead of retrying on every tick.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A member row appears only when a code is consumed, so revoking someone
invited to the wrong group was refused for having no row — and the node's
refusal aborted the browser's removal before its hub half, leaving them a
member everywhere with a live code. Revoking now cancels unredeemed codes
for that group, and a node refusal no longer cancels the hub removal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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QUICKSTART Step 4 named the wrong page. Recorded in §15.3 alongside it: the
key is read from `meshbay-node status` or the desktop client and from nowhere
else, which is a decision rather than a gap — anyone linking a node is already
at a shell prompt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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media_cache held video_meta, photo_meta and thumbs; the audio tags lived
only in the in-memory IndexEntry. So every start re-read every audio file
the node serves, and until that pass landed it served an index with no
artist on any track — one the Music app cannot group. Over a real
6176-file library the pass costs 27.8s cold and 6.4s from audio_meta.
Only what the bytes decided is stored. The filename and folder fallbacks
still run live, or a renamed file would get the old name's answer; the
sibling-cover scan reads the folder, so it stays live too; and a read
that failed is not cached, or one bad read becomes permanent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The grid's unit is an album, so a track whose artist tag is empty was
drawn nowhere — while `empty` counted it and stayed false, so no message
appeared either. An untagged library rendered a toolbar over a blank
page, with every track one mode-switch away and nothing saying so.
It gets a card, the same shape the singleton folding already mints. No
cover is looked up for it, or for any album this file invented: the
release name is one the browser wrote, and the request cannot match.
music_untagged_probe.py renders the real grid and reads the page back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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_reconnectLoop re-did the handshake and nothing else, so a page kept
whatever it last saw until someone reloaded it. That is invisible until
the node restarts: it rebuilds its index from index_cache.db, which
holds no enrichment, and Music is the one app whose enrichment is
persisted nowhere — for the length of the re-read pass it serves tracks
with no artist, and the album grid drew nothing.
onReconnected was one slot the video player took on open and cleared on
close; it is a listener set now, and carries the fresh ack.
docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §15.3 records the two defects found alongside and
not fixed here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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One conflict, in §15.3's open list, and it was two changes agreeing rather than
disagreeing: this side removed the rows for the third-party search bound and the
node-announcement bound because both are now built (AV27, AV28), while the other
side kept them and added a new one. Resolved by keeping what is genuinely still
open — per-device revocation having no CLI — and leaving the two closed.
`webrtc_server.py` merged without conflict but the two sides met inside one
function: `_upload_chunk` gained the operator's `max_upload_gb` ceiling from
there and the per-group lock and `off_disk` calls from here. Read back rather
than trusted: the operator's ceiling now sits inside the critical section that
keeps chunk ordering, and the unlink beside it goes to the disk thread with
everything else.
2893 passed. The twelve `test_sticky_header.py[firefox]` setup errors are the
open Firefox on this machine, as before.
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The daemon built the defaults dict for `Roster.node_settings` by hand and
left out `max_concurrent_downloads` and `max_concurrent_uploads`. Absent
from the dict, both resolved to None, were assigned back onto the config,
and the transport skipped them — so node.toml was parsed, validated, and
then replaced by `transfers.py`'s own 8. Invisible to anyone who left the
value at 8, which is the value the template suggests.
There were three copies of that dict and they all disagreed: node_status'
was missing those two and `max_upload_gb` besides. One builder now,
`config.node_settings_defaults`, and the resolver's key list is a class
attribute the tests hold it to, along with the writer's.
1429 passed against a baseline of 1423; the two new behavioural tests fail
with the builder reverted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Found by writing the user guide against the CLI rather than against this
document. §6.7 listed a `member device` verb nobody ever wrote; §9.9 still
called several folders a Photos-only shape after app_directories gave every
application a set; §6.8 said five settings and the Node page shows eight;
§5.5 counted one transfer pool where there are three.
The per-device revocation gap is real and stays open — §15.3 names it as
the capability it is, not as a documentation error.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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QUICKSTART takes one Linux machine from downloaded packages to a working
group with a second member. USERGUIDE covers using a group and running a
node, for a reader who is not a developer. Windows stays in
PACKAGING-GUIDE.md.
Both are written from the code — the CLI, ops.py, the systemd units and
the interface catalogue — rather than from the specification, and they
state what is not built as readily as what is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Was a 4 GB constant in webrtc_server.py, the same on a small board and on
a machine holding a library. Now max_upload_gb in node.toml, on the Node
page and via `meshbay-node transfers max-size`, read from the transport
context per chunk so a change reaches an upload already running.
MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §6.4; §15.3 records a defect found beside it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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§16 opened by saying "code comments, tests and older documents cite sections
of the documents this one replaces", and closed by saying "nothing needs
editing to follow a reference". Neither holds since 20a8241: the code carries
no reference to a removed document, and that commit is precisely the editing
the second sentence said was unnecessary. Left as it was, that sentence tells
the next reader a dead reference may stay dead.
The table itself is unchanged and stays whole — every row still resolves
something. What changed is who asks: 629 commits of history that cannot be
rewritten, the superseded documents kept under docs/ (cast-smart-tv.md and
WINDOWS-PORT.md both route readers here by name), and notes held outside this
repository. The intro now says that, and states the rule the code follows
instead — cite this document and a section.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**A free-text TMDB search spends the operator's credential.** TMDB rates it, and
the automatic matching every member sees runs on the same one, so a member
holding down the search box — or a script doing it — degrades the library for
everyone and empties a quota the operator pays for. The handler had no ceiling of
any kind, where link previews beside it carry two. §6.5's standing rule is a bound
and a named adversary in the same commit; this arrived with neither.
Per member and not per connection, unlike link previews: three tabs is one
person, and a ceiling a tab can multiply is not a ceiling. Kept in the group
context, so a reconnect does not reset it — a client that drops its channel
between searches would otherwise have no ceiling at all. The node-wide window
stays too, because the two answer different questions: one keeps a member from
spending everyone's quota, the other keeps a roomful of them from doing it
together. Ten a minute each, thirty for the node — a search every six seconds,
sustained, is past what anyone types.
The refusal is an error rather than an empty list. An empty list is what "no such
film" looks like, and telling somebody their film is unknown when the node simply
declined to ask is a worse answer than the truth; `video-app.js` already puts
`detail` on screen.
**How many node keys one account may announce.** Each is a row in `nodes` plus a
row in the IP log, and the IP log is kept for a year, so an account in a loop
writes a year of storage on the operator's disk having paid only for signatures.
M8 settled whose key it is and said nothing about how many. Ten: a node is a
machine left running, and an account wanting an eleventh *identity* rather than
an eleventh machine is the case this refuses.
Counted only where a row is added. Applied to every announce it would freeze the
address of every node an account already runs the moment it reached the limit,
and a node that cannot re-announce is unreachable after its ISP renumbers it —
an outage caused by the protection. There is a test for exactly that.
Both tests are two accounts, per §13.5b: a ceiling one person can exhaust for
another is not a ceiling but a queue, and a ceiling shared between accounts would
let one member stop every other from bringing a machine online. Checked by
removing each ceiling: seven tests fail.
`test_season_and_search_requests.py` built its session without a `_user_id`,
which production guarantees — `_dispatch_message` refuses every message until the
handshake settles it. The fixture was narrower than the node, so it could not
exercise a per-member bound at all; it has one now.
Twelve `test_sticky_header.py[firefox]` setup errors in a full run here: Firefox
is open on this machine, the trap CLAUDE.md describes, and its twelve `[chrome]`
tests covering the same geometry pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`group_indexes` was an IndexedDB store holding a decrypted copy of each group's
index — every file's name, path, size, hash and uploader — written on every index
and on every delta, from three call sites.
It was the cross-group search of Phase 10b: `doSearch` read `getAllCachedIndexes`
and searched those records instead of dialling anything. On 2026-08-28 Search
began dialling the nodes, and that commit removed the reader and left the writers.
Since then the browser has gone on building a cleartext file listing that nothing
consulted, that no sign-out removed — the key database is a different one — and
that grew with every group ever opened. L7, at rest: kept code that nothing calls
does not sit still.
Drawing a group's files while its node is unreachable is the only thing such a
cache buys, and it is not wanted: a listing that cannot be opened is worse than an
honest absence. So there is nothing to read it with, and the writers go.
The store stays in the schema and is emptied instead. Dropping it needs a version
bump, a version bump is an upgrade another tab can block, and playlists share this
database — so the tidier change is the one with a failure mode. `purgeGroupIndexCache`
runs once per browser behind a flag, which clears what is already on people's
machines; a browser that refuses storage simply runs it again, which is harmless
because it is idempotent.
Three guards, each checked by reintroducing the fault: only `openDB` and the purge
may touch the store, the purge may only clear it, and the purge must actually be
called at start-up — a purge nobody calls is the same defect wearing the opposite
hat.
`test_sticky_header.py[firefox]` reports twelve setup errors in a full run here.
A Firefox instance is open on this machine, which is the trap CLAUDE.md describes;
the same twelve appear with these changes stashed, and the `[chrome]` half of the
same file, covering the same geometry, is clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A node is a machine in somebody's house, so with a handful of groups one is
always off. Search treated that as the exception and charged the reader for it.
Measured on twelve groups against a virtual clock, a live group answering in
200 ms and a dead one taking the full deadline: one node down in the first batch
put a blank page and a progress bar in front of the reader for **ten seconds**,
while two groups of that same batch had answered in two hundred milliseconds and
nine others had not been dialled at all. Four down, spread out — the shape a real
reader has — was ten seconds to the first result and **forty** to the last.
Two causes, neither of them the connection deadline. Results were drawn once a
batch was complete rather than as each arrived, so an index already in hand waited
on a node that was not answering. And the batches were sequential, so a dead group
did not merely cost its own deadline, it postponed every group behind it.
So the three is a ceiling on concurrency and never a batch — `inFlight` starts the
next group the moment one ends — and each index is drawn when it lands.
That alone is not enough, and the tests say where it stops: a ceiling still lets
silent nodes hold every place at once, and with four of twelve down the last three
live groups still waited out a deadline. So the browser remembers which groups
were silent and dials them last, which puts all eight on screen in 600 ms. The
list is advisory and rewritten from what each sweep saw: a private window, storage
that refuses, a first visit or a node that has come back all fall through to the
hub's own order, cost one sweep, and correct themselves.
The "n groups unreachable" line also waited for the sweep to finish, which is the
one moment it is no longer needed. It now appears as they are found.
First result, before and after, twelve groups: one down 10 s → 200 ms; four down
10 s → 200 ms with every reachable group on screen by 600 ms; three down and
listed first 10 s → 200 ms from the second visit on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Opening a group from the sidebar has no deadline of its own and gets the
transport's: 30 s for the DataChannel, 30 s for each request after it. Search
wrapped the same `connect()` in a flat 10 s, and that 10 s had to cover the hub
round trip, ICE gathering (capped at 4 s in transport.js), DTLS, the channel
opening and the handshake's own round trips. On a phone on 4G the budget was met
by luck rather than margin, and the same group then failed in Search while it
opened from the sidebar, against the same node. The budgets were inverted: the
phase full of round trips had a third of what one request on an open channel got.
Raising the number would have been the wrong repair. `fetchAllIndexes` fans out
three at a time and waits for the slowest of each batch, so a page of unreachable
groups costs batches x the deadline in spinner: a bigger number taxes every dead
group for the sake of the live ones.
So the deadline measures stalling. A node that is not there reports nothing and
still fails in `SEARCH_STALL_MS`, unchanged at 10 s, which is what keeps the
fan-out where it was. A node that answers ICE, then opens a channel, buys another
window at each step, up to `SEARCH_MAX_MS` — a deadline that only ever resets has
none, and a node that answers and then goes quiet would otherwise never be given
up on.
The transport reports those steps through `onConnectProgress`, set by the one
caller that imposes a deadline of its own. `connected`/`completed` is the signal
and not `checking`, because the first means a candidate pair answered and the
second means this side is still trying addresses that may all be dead. A caller's
callback cannot break the connection it is reporting on.
The tests run the shipped `connectToGroup`, lifted out as text, against a fake
clock — a real one would make each scenario a minute and blur the only thing
worth asserting, which is when the deadline fires. Dead node: 10 s. Slow but
moving: connects at 20 s where it used to fail at 10. Answers then stops: 18 s.
Progress that never finishes: the 30 s ceiling. Two dead nodes: two windows, both
transports closed. Checked against the flat deadline, which fails three of them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Both described panels the desktop client would grow of its own. §8.3 settled
that differently: one UI source means anything written for the client is
something the browser then lacks, so both were built in `static/` instead and
the client ships them.
D5 is `node-page.js` over the operator ops — status, groups, roots with eject,
plug and add, roster, peers, pairing, audit export. D6 is `create-group-page.js`,
which detects the node, provisions it, takes the group's name and roots,
initialises the key and pairs. The service unit is the one genuinely native
part, and the desktop main process already runs it: `systemctl --user` on Linux,
Task Scheduler on Windows.
Left standing in §15.2 they read as work outstanding, which is how a plan
outlives the decision that replaced it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The rest of AV9's disk half. Serving a file left the loop in the commit before
this one; two paths were still on it.
**The availability poll.** `RootSet.refresh_availability` stats every root, and
eleven call sites reached it from `async def` — the reconcile loop among them, on
a timer. On a sleeping disk that is a stall once per tick, and the stat is also
what keeps the disk awake, so a node paid spin-up for a library nobody was
reading. All eleven now go through `off_disk`, `Root.is_live` included.
**The upload write.** `open`/`write`, and the resolve, the stat, the free-name
search, the rename and the unlink around it. This one could not simply be
awaited: the handler was synchronous, so nothing could come between the
`chunk_index != state.next_index` check and the `advance` that answers it, and
that is the whole of the chunk-ordering rule. Awaiting the write opens the gap —
chunk 1 arriving while chunk 0 is in the disk thread reads a position that has
not moved and is refused as out of order, so an upload would fail on a slow disk
and nowhere else. Verified, not assumed: without the lock the new ordering test
refuses three chunks of four.
So the check, the write and the advance are one critical section again, under a
lock held **per group**. Not per session: `partial_uploads` lives in the group
context so a reconnecting client finds its upload where it left it, which means
two sessions of one member share the position of one `.part` file. Arrival order
is preserved by construction — the dispatcher creates one task per message as it
arrives, tasks start in creation order, and the lock is the first thing each one
waits on, so its waiters queue in arrival order too.
`_do_file_upload` is a coroutine now, which is why forty-two test call sites gain
an `await`. Their outcomes are unchanged, file by file, against the run before
the change.
`test_ops.py` asked which public coroutines `ops` exposes and got `off_disk`,
imported rather than defined there. It now asks for the ones written in the
module, which is what its own docstring means; all forty-three operations are
still checked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The two documents disagreed with the code they describe. §15.2 still listed
playlists and Chromecast subtitles as not built, both shipped and tested; the
protocol document's header said wire version 3.2 beside its own §13 saying 3.3,
which is §12's "a number restated away from its definition is a number that will
drift" happening to the document that states the rule.
The packaged install is no longer an open question: the artefacts have been taken
to a running hub and node on Ubuntu 26.04 (.deb), Fedora 44 (.rpm) and Windows 11
(.exe). What is left of D11 is signing the binary, which is a different question
from whether it installs.
The migration row overstated its own risk. Nothing replays the revisions behind
the first packaged release — they were development no installation ever ran — so
the exposure is the next migration, not the chain.
The disk-I/O row gains the consequence that was measured rather than reasoned: a
root waking from standby stalls the loop long enough for a client's WebRTC
connection to time out, on one node with one member. `refresh_availability` is
named beside the two chunk paths, because a stat on a sleeping disk is what wakes
it while reading nothing.
A blank line had also split §15.3's table in two.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A 1080p film is decoded by whoever watches it and re-encoded by the node
when no browser can decode the source. Both were on the CPU, and on an
Atom or Celeron mini-PC neither reaches real time — which is what
`transcode_incompatible_video` exists to refuse. This adds the mechanism
that makes refusing it unnecessary.
Node — `hwaccel.py`: VA-API on Linux, Quick Sync or NVENC on Windows,
established by encoding 1080p and reading the file back with ffprobe.
Nothing is accepted that does not produce the exact profile and level
`stream_init` announces, since the client checks that string before it
trusts a byte: an encoder that wrote another level would make the node's
own codec string a lie, and ffmpeg takes `-level 4.1` and `-level 41`
from h264_qsv without saying which it understood. Three modes per
stream — hardware decode and encode, hardware encode alone, libx264 —
demoted per source codec, because a GPU that decodes HEVC may have no
decoder for MPEG-4 Part 2 and only asking it finds out. A mode that
fails is detected on an empty stdout before `stream_init` goes out, so
the viewer sees one working stream and never an error.
Client — Chromium ships VA-API off on Linux. It is enabled where a
render node and a driver are present, then verified through
`navigator.mediaCapabilities`: a no moves to the next GL backend on the
next launch and an exhausted list drops the switches, so a renamed
feature cannot pass for a feature that is on and `--ignore-gpu-blocklist`
cannot survive on a machine it did not help. Feature lists now merge
rather than overwrite — `appendSwitch` replaces the value, and a second
caller would have silently cancelled the mDNS switch aiortc depends on.
Packaging — the drivers are weak dependencies on all four formats, so a
machine without a GPU installs exactly as before. `dpkg -i` and
`rpm -ivh` ignore weak deps; `packaging/README.md` now says so. Windows
needs no driver: the bundled ffmpeg already carries h264_qsv and
h264_nvenc, and a re-pin that dropped them would cost every low-power
Windows node its hardware encoding silently.
AMD on Windows (AMF) and macOS (VideoToolbox) are named gaps, not
oversights: neither could be tried anywhere in this project, and both
re-encode in software as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The relay forwards the node's fragments untouched, and those begin at zero
at the seek point. The player never notices because its SourceBuffer is given
`timestampOffset = start`; a receiver has no equivalent, so the cues are
shifted by `-start` before they leave, recomputed at every restart of the
relay. Sent as they are, a subtitle would be out by the whole seek.
The document is served from the relay's own port at /subs.vtt, behind the same
token as the stream and with CORS: a receiver fetches a side-loaded track with
XHR from its own origin, and without the headers it fails as a network error
with nothing on screen to say so. The URL carries a version because a track is
cached by address — changing the cues behind a fixed URL leaves the previous
language showing.
Cues that end before the stream begins are dropped rather than clamped, so a
line from before the seek cannot appear over the first frames after it.
The relay is plain Node, so the tests start it and fetch from it rather than
reading its source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UGY17EPph5LsLzePPXhUVc
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The previous fix read ffprobe's key frames and took the last one at or before
the request. It was wrong twice, and a viewer felt the difference: subtitles
went from 5 s early to 2–3 s late.
Matroska's Cues index only some keyframes, so an index seek backs off to an
indexed one that the frame list does not single out. And the landing point
moves with **which streams are mapped**, because the container is positioned
where every mapped stream has data — on the reported title, a seek to 4913.7 s
landed at 4909.863 with video alone and at 4907.236 with the second audio
track mapped beside it. The frame scan gave the first number; the stream
delivered the second; the gap was 2.65 s, and the measured audio displacement
in the served stream was 2.65 s.
So the node asks ffmpeg instead: the same seek, the same mapping, one copied
frame under `-copyts`, and the answer read back off the result. 0.06–0.07 s,
cheaper than the scan it replaces. The `-ss` argument stays at the request, so
the bytes served are exactly the ones served before — only the number naming
them changes. The probe runs after the audio track is resolved, because it
cannot be right before that is known.
An answer after the request, or further before it than any real keyframe gap,
is discarded in favour of the old label: a number wrong by seconds beats a
fabricated one.
Found by decoding the served stream and locating its first frame in the
source, which put it at 4907.213 s against an announced 4909.863 s. The test
does the same thing rather than comparing the announced number against a
second reading of the same probe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UGY17EPph5LsLzePPXhUVc
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Copied video can only start on a keyframe, so `-ss t` with `-c:v copy`
delivers the keyframe at or before `t`. The node reported `t` anyway and the
client builds `SourceBuffer.timestampOffset` out of that number, so everything
downstream believed the picture stood a few seconds further along than it did.
That was a wrong label while only the scrubber read it — it is recorded as
such, low priority, in the design document. Subtitles made it a wrong answer:
their cues carry the source's own absolute timestamps, so the mismatch put
every line on screen before it was spoken. Reported from real use on an H264
title, where seeking to 600 s, 2650 s and 5000 s lands on keyframes 0.82 s,
1.56 s and 4.64 s earlier.
The copy path now resolves the request to that keyframe, seeks to it, and
reports it. The bytes delivered do not change — ffmpeg lands on the same frame
either way — only the number that names them. The look-up reads the thirty
seconds before the request and cost 0.12–0.51 s on that title, which is the
price already costed in §15.3 and never paid. Re-encoded video is untouched:
it can begin exactly where it is asked to, and does.
Two details worth their lines. The keyframe is passed back to ffmpeg at six
decimals, because rounding a keyframe's own timestamp down puts it before the
frame it names and selects the previous one — the same fault again, smaller.
And the ffprobe window ends past the request, since an interval whose end is
the request never emits a keyframe sitting exactly on it: the resume position
is the one place a viewer asks for the same instant twice, and it would have
been answered a whole GOP early.
The test decodes the first frame served and matches it against the source
frame at the position announced, rather than comparing `start` to an expected
number — both sides of that comparison would be reading the same ffprobe and
would agree by construction.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UGY17EPph5LsLzePPXhUVc
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MSE decodes no in-band text track, so a subtitle cannot ride inside the
fragmented MP4 the player is fed. The node extracts one track whole, converts
it to WebVTT and caches it under its own hash; the client pulls that blob
through the ordinary file_req/chunk path and hangs a <track> on the video
element — the same indirection as a TMDB poster or an audio transcode, which
is what makes a film's subtitles extracted once in the life of the file rather
than once per viewing. Whole-file also makes the cues absolute, so a seek and
an audio-language change both leave the track untouched.
**The ordinal counts every subtitle stream, including the ones never listed.**
Only text codecs are offered: a bitmap track (PGS, VOBSUB — about a fifth of a
real library) has no path to WebVTT without OCR, and one extracted anyway
yields a header with no cues, which is a menu entry that shows nothing and
reports no error. Numbering the survivors of that filter would give a
PGS/SRT/SRT file the ordinals 0 and 1 for its text tracks and `-map 0:s:0`
would then extract the PGS — the same trap `AudioTrack.ordinal` exists for,
one level deeper. A fixture whose first subtitle stream cannot be decoded pins
it, and the handler checks membership of the probed list, never a range.
Additive and MINOR: the selector is drawn from `subtitle_tracks` in the node's
own `stream_init` and from no version number, so `subtitle_req` is never sent
to a peer that would not answer it. The floor stays at 3.0.
Also here: a failed extraction never touches playback, a superseded reply
cannot install its blob over a newer choice, and `_languageName` is shared
with the audio labels — lifted by both label harnesses, since a lift that
names one function stops covering the rule the moment logic moves out of it.
Tests: 9 node (tracks told apart by the words in the extracted cues, not by
tags), 10 client. Full suite green: 1545 node/common, 1252 hub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UGY17EPph5LsLzePPXhUVc
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names its parameters
`pw_version` 4: Argon2id 64 MiB, t=3, lanes=4 — RFC 9106's second recommended
setting. A v3 hash (256 MB) still verifies at its own parameters and is
rewritten at the new ones on the next sign-in, through the rehash path that
already existed.
Why not more. The verifier matters against an offline attacker holding the
database; online guessing is bounded by the sign-in lockout. That attacker pays
the client's 600 000 PBKDF2-SHA512 iterations and the hub's Argon2id per guess,
since `auth_key` is 256 bits and cannot be searched directly. Memory above
64 MiB multiplies that cost by a constant — at most 16 at 256 MB, less with
PBKDF2 counted — while the hub pays the same memory at every sign-in, one
derivation at a time. Measured on meshbay.org: 450 ms at 256 MB, 105 ms at
64 MiB, so a burst of sign-ins clears about four times faster.
Changing the current version exposed a latent lockout. `hash_password` always
used the current version's parameters, while the raw-password scheme recorded
`pw_version = 2` — harmless while versions 2 and 3 shared their parameters,
and with version 4 every legacy registration and v1→v2 rehash would have
stored a 64 MiB hash labelled 256 MB, which nothing could then verify. Seventeen
tests caught it. `hash_password` now takes the version it is hashing for.
The OpenSSL deadlock between two concurrent `lanes=4` derivations is the same at
64 MiB, so Argon2 stays on its single worker. The loop-stall test measures
against a v3 hash, because half of a 45 ms inline derivation is too close to
scheduling noise to be a reliable bound.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt
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A seek now begins picture and sound together at the keyframe, but stream_init
still reports the position that was asked for. §15.3 says what the fix costs
and why it has not been made.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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-ss before -i cannot trim copied video, which must begin on a keyframe, but
accurate_seek did trim the re-encoded audio to the exact request. Every seek
on a copied stream therefore opened with a GOP-wide hole in the audio and ran
a GOP out of sync afterwards — 9.979s on a real film with a 10s keyframe
interval. Accurate seeking is now off wherever video is copied, and stays on
where it is re-encoded, which is the only path that could already begin where
it was asked to.
Every timestamp was correct throughout, which is why nothing caught it; the
tests assert on decoded audio and on frames compared against the source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The streaming path mapped 0:a:0 unconditionally, so a dubbed film played in
whichever language was muxed first and the others were unreachable. The node
now enumerates the tracks in stream_init and honours audio_track in
stream_req; switching is the seek path, since one ffmpeg carries one track.
MNP 3.2, additive: the player draws its selector from the node's own list and
never from a version number, so an older node is never asked for a track it
would ignore. MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED does not move.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The ceiling is 1200 tracks on a library that repeats and 660 on one that
never does; the message said 1000, which would send a reader back into the
wall at 660. It says 500, measured at both ends.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A DataChannel send() throws above the max-message-size the node advertises
(aiortc: 65536), so the 1 MB body cap was unreachable and each body push
swallowed the difference in a bare catch. Cap at 62 KB after sealing, name
the playlist in the sync result, keep syncing the rest.
Measured: 1000 tracks seal to 53 276 bytes, so the ceiling is ~1200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The six MNP 3.1 ops were the only new ones never crossing a channel in a
test. Two cases on the existing aiortc harness: a round trip read back on
a second connection, and a 256 KB body. Found that the 1 MB body cap is
unreachable from a browser — docs/playlists.md §15.3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Sync moved to the shell; the Search-page gap it lists is the bug that
was fixed. And two devices converging has now been seen working.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`max-height: calc(100vh - 16px)` says how tall the menu may be and nothing
about where its bottom lands, so one opened partway down the window ran
past it and its last rows scrolled out of reach. Measure from where the
panel was placed, and re-measure when a submenu opens.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The dismiss-on-scroll listener is on the capture phase, because `scroll`
does not bubble — so it also heard the menu scrolling itself, and a long
tracklist closed the moment it was wheeled. Filter on the event's origin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Fourteen places the proposal was wrong, listed rather than edited away:
the MNP bump was 2.1 and is 3.1; the kind pattern refused the one
playlist every account has; confirm() is the house style and prompt()
is what throws; submenus expand in place; deflate is 4.5x and the
first fixture's 23x was a property of the fixture.
Adds the hazard the proposal missed entirely: two wrappers that take
two arguments and forward two, so every "add to queue" arrived as a
plain play.
The acceptance section now says what is checked and what is not —
no real daemon round trip, no two-browser convergence, no Firefox.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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One row per playlist plus a manifest, so starring a track rewrites that
playlist rather than the whole collection. blob_enc is a BLOB, not
base64 TEXT: these run to hundreds of kilobytes.
user_id comes from the session and never from the message; kind is
validated against a pattern; every cap refuses with a stated reason
rather than truncating.
Additive, so MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED does not move — a 3.0 node answers
"unknown message type" and the client writes to the next one it reaches.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The 256 KB cap contradicted its own worked example; entries were also
missing `size`/`name`, without which a stored track cannot be fetched
at all. Storage becomes a manifest plus one blob per playlist,
compressed, so starring a track no longer rewrites the collection.
Adds the UI pass that was missing: the queue verbs, the menus, and the
one real code change behind them — the player's queue can today only
be replaced, not appended to.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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