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media_cache held video_meta, photo_meta and thumbs; the audio tags lived
only in the in-memory IndexEntry. So every start re-read every audio file
the node serves, and until that pass landed it served an index with no
artist on any track — one the Music app cannot group. Over a real
6176-file library the pass costs 27.8s cold and 6.4s from audio_meta.
Only what the bytes decided is stored. The filename and folder fallbacks
still run live, or a renamed file would get the old name's answer; the
sibling-cover scan reads the folder, so it stays live too; and a read
that failed is not cached, or one bad read becomes permanent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The grid's unit is an album, so a track whose artist tag is empty was
drawn nowhere — while `empty` counted it and stayed false, so no message
appeared either. An untagged library rendered a toolbar over a blank
page, with every track one mode-switch away and nothing saying so.
It gets a card, the same shape the singleton folding already mints. No
cover is looked up for it, or for any album this file invented: the
release name is one the browser wrote, and the request cannot match.
music_untagged_probe.py renders the real grid and reads the page back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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_reconnectLoop re-did the handshake and nothing else, so a page kept
whatever it last saw until someone reloaded it. That is invisible until
the node restarts: it rebuilds its index from index_cache.db, which
holds no enrichment, and Music is the one app whose enrichment is
persisted nowhere — for the length of the re-read pass it serves tracks
with no artist, and the album grid drew nothing.
onReconnected was one slot the video player took on open and cleared on
close; it is a listener set now, and carries the fresh ack.
docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §15.3 records the two defects found alongside and
not fixed here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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One conflict, in §15.3's open list, and it was two changes agreeing rather than
disagreeing: this side removed the rows for the third-party search bound and the
node-announcement bound because both are now built (AV27, AV28), while the other
side kept them and added a new one. Resolved by keeping what is genuinely still
open — per-device revocation having no CLI — and leaving the two closed.
`webrtc_server.py` merged without conflict but the two sides met inside one
function: `_upload_chunk` gained the operator's `max_upload_gb` ceiling from
there and the per-group lock and `off_disk` calls from here. Read back rather
than trusted: the operator's ceiling now sits inside the critical section that
keeps chunk ordering, and the unlink beside it goes to the disk thread with
everything else.
2893 passed. The twelve `test_sticky_header.py[firefox]` setup errors are the
open Firefox on this machine, as before.
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The daemon built the defaults dict for `Roster.node_settings` by hand and
left out `max_concurrent_downloads` and `max_concurrent_uploads`. Absent
from the dict, both resolved to None, were assigned back onto the config,
and the transport skipped them — so node.toml was parsed, validated, and
then replaced by `transfers.py`'s own 8. Invisible to anyone who left the
value at 8, which is the value the template suggests.
There were three copies of that dict and they all disagreed: node_status'
was missing those two and `max_upload_gb` besides. One builder now,
`config.node_settings_defaults`, and the resolver's key list is a class
attribute the tests hold it to, along with the writer's.
1429 passed against a baseline of 1423; the two new behavioural tests fail
with the builder reverted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Found by writing the user guide against the CLI rather than against this
document. §6.7 listed a `member device` verb nobody ever wrote; §9.9 still
called several folders a Photos-only shape after app_directories gave every
application a set; §6.8 said five settings and the Node page shows eight;
§5.5 counted one transfer pool where there are three.
The per-device revocation gap is real and stays open — §15.3 names it as
the capability it is, not as a documentation error.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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QUICKSTART takes one Linux machine from downloaded packages to a working
group with a second member. USERGUIDE covers using a group and running a
node, for a reader who is not a developer. Windows stays in
PACKAGING-GUIDE.md.
Both are written from the code — the CLI, ops.py, the systemd units and
the interface catalogue — rather than from the specification, and they
state what is not built as readily as what is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Was a 4 GB constant in webrtc_server.py, the same on a small board and on
a machine holding a library. Now max_upload_gb in node.toml, on the Node
page and via `meshbay-node transfers max-size`, read from the transport
context per chunk so a change reaches an upload already running.
MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §6.4; §15.3 records a defect found beside it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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§16 opened by saying "code comments, tests and older documents cite sections
of the documents this one replaces", and closed by saying "nothing needs
editing to follow a reference". Neither holds since 20a8241: the code carries
no reference to a removed document, and that commit is precisely the editing
the second sentence said was unnecessary. Left as it was, that sentence tells
the next reader a dead reference may stay dead.
The table itself is unchanged and stays whole — every row still resolves
something. What changed is who asks: 629 commits of history that cannot be
rewritten, the superseded documents kept under docs/ (cast-smart-tv.md and
WINDOWS-PORT.md both route readers here by name), and notes held outside this
repository. The intro now says that, and states the rule the code follows
instead — cite this document and a section.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**A free-text TMDB search spends the operator's credential.** TMDB rates it, and
the automatic matching every member sees runs on the same one, so a member
holding down the search box — or a script doing it — degrades the library for
everyone and empties a quota the operator pays for. The handler had no ceiling of
any kind, where link previews beside it carry two. §6.5's standing rule is a bound
and a named adversary in the same commit; this arrived with neither.
Per member and not per connection, unlike link previews: three tabs is one
person, and a ceiling a tab can multiply is not a ceiling. Kept in the group
context, so a reconnect does not reset it — a client that drops its channel
between searches would otherwise have no ceiling at all. The node-wide window
stays too, because the two answer different questions: one keeps a member from
spending everyone's quota, the other keeps a roomful of them from doing it
together. Ten a minute each, thirty for the node — a search every six seconds,
sustained, is past what anyone types.
The refusal is an error rather than an empty list. An empty list is what "no such
film" looks like, and telling somebody their film is unknown when the node simply
declined to ask is a worse answer than the truth; `video-app.js` already puts
`detail` on screen.
**How many node keys one account may announce.** Each is a row in `nodes` plus a
row in the IP log, and the IP log is kept for a year, so an account in a loop
writes a year of storage on the operator's disk having paid only for signatures.
M8 settled whose key it is and said nothing about how many. Ten: a node is a
machine left running, and an account wanting an eleventh *identity* rather than
an eleventh machine is the case this refuses.
Counted only where a row is added. Applied to every announce it would freeze the
address of every node an account already runs the moment it reached the limit,
and a node that cannot re-announce is unreachable after its ISP renumbers it —
an outage caused by the protection. There is a test for exactly that.
Both tests are two accounts, per §13.5b: a ceiling one person can exhaust for
another is not a ceiling but a queue, and a ceiling shared between accounts would
let one member stop every other from bringing a machine online. Checked by
removing each ceiling: seven tests fail.
`test_season_and_search_requests.py` built its session without a `_user_id`,
which production guarantees — `_dispatch_message` refuses every message until the
handshake settles it. The fixture was narrower than the node, so it could not
exercise a per-member bound at all; it has one now.
Twelve `test_sticky_header.py[firefox]` setup errors in a full run here: Firefox
is open on this machine, the trap CLAUDE.md describes, and its twelve `[chrome]`
tests covering the same geometry pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`group_indexes` was an IndexedDB store holding a decrypted copy of each group's
index — every file's name, path, size, hash and uploader — written on every index
and on every delta, from three call sites.
It was the cross-group search of Phase 10b: `doSearch` read `getAllCachedIndexes`
and searched those records instead of dialling anything. On 2026-08-28 Search
began dialling the nodes, and that commit removed the reader and left the writers.
Since then the browser has gone on building a cleartext file listing that nothing
consulted, that no sign-out removed — the key database is a different one — and
that grew with every group ever opened. L7, at rest: kept code that nothing calls
does not sit still.
Drawing a group's files while its node is unreachable is the only thing such a
cache buys, and it is not wanted: a listing that cannot be opened is worse than an
honest absence. So there is nothing to read it with, and the writers go.
The store stays in the schema and is emptied instead. Dropping it needs a version
bump, a version bump is an upgrade another tab can block, and playlists share this
database — so the tidier change is the one with a failure mode. `purgeGroupIndexCache`
runs once per browser behind a flag, which clears what is already on people's
machines; a browser that refuses storage simply runs it again, which is harmless
because it is idempotent.
Three guards, each checked by reintroducing the fault: only `openDB` and the purge
may touch the store, the purge may only clear it, and the purge must actually be
called at start-up — a purge nobody calls is the same defect wearing the opposite
hat.
`test_sticky_header.py[firefox]` reports twelve setup errors in a full run here.
A Firefox instance is open on this machine, which is the trap CLAUDE.md describes;
the same twelve appear with these changes stashed, and the `[chrome]` half of the
same file, covering the same geometry, is clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A node is a machine in somebody's house, so with a handful of groups one is
always off. Search treated that as the exception and charged the reader for it.
Measured on twelve groups against a virtual clock, a live group answering in
200 ms and a dead one taking the full deadline: one node down in the first batch
put a blank page and a progress bar in front of the reader for **ten seconds**,
while two groups of that same batch had answered in two hundred milliseconds and
nine others had not been dialled at all. Four down, spread out — the shape a real
reader has — was ten seconds to the first result and **forty** to the last.
Two causes, neither of them the connection deadline. Results were drawn once a
batch was complete rather than as each arrived, so an index already in hand waited
on a node that was not answering. And the batches were sequential, so a dead group
did not merely cost its own deadline, it postponed every group behind it.
So the three is a ceiling on concurrency and never a batch — `inFlight` starts the
next group the moment one ends — and each index is drawn when it lands.
That alone is not enough, and the tests say where it stops: a ceiling still lets
silent nodes hold every place at once, and with four of twelve down the last three
live groups still waited out a deadline. So the browser remembers which groups
were silent and dials them last, which puts all eight on screen in 600 ms. The
list is advisory and rewritten from what each sweep saw: a private window, storage
that refuses, a first visit or a node that has come back all fall through to the
hub's own order, cost one sweep, and correct themselves.
The "n groups unreachable" line also waited for the sweep to finish, which is the
one moment it is no longer needed. It now appears as they are found.
First result, before and after, twelve groups: one down 10 s → 200 ms; four down
10 s → 200 ms with every reachable group on screen by 600 ms; three down and
listed first 10 s → 200 ms from the second visit on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Opening a group from the sidebar has no deadline of its own and gets the
transport's: 30 s for the DataChannel, 30 s for each request after it. Search
wrapped the same `connect()` in a flat 10 s, and that 10 s had to cover the hub
round trip, ICE gathering (capped at 4 s in transport.js), DTLS, the channel
opening and the handshake's own round trips. On a phone on 4G the budget was met
by luck rather than margin, and the same group then failed in Search while it
opened from the sidebar, against the same node. The budgets were inverted: the
phase full of round trips had a third of what one request on an open channel got.
Raising the number would have been the wrong repair. `fetchAllIndexes` fans out
three at a time and waits for the slowest of each batch, so a page of unreachable
groups costs batches x the deadline in spinner: a bigger number taxes every dead
group for the sake of the live ones.
So the deadline measures stalling. A node that is not there reports nothing and
still fails in `SEARCH_STALL_MS`, unchanged at 10 s, which is what keeps the
fan-out where it was. A node that answers ICE, then opens a channel, buys another
window at each step, up to `SEARCH_MAX_MS` — a deadline that only ever resets has
none, and a node that answers and then goes quiet would otherwise never be given
up on.
The transport reports those steps through `onConnectProgress`, set by the one
caller that imposes a deadline of its own. `connected`/`completed` is the signal
and not `checking`, because the first means a candidate pair answered and the
second means this side is still trying addresses that may all be dead. A caller's
callback cannot break the connection it is reporting on.
The tests run the shipped `connectToGroup`, lifted out as text, against a fake
clock — a real one would make each scenario a minute and blur the only thing
worth asserting, which is when the deadline fires. Dead node: 10 s. Slow but
moving: connects at 20 s where it used to fail at 10. Answers then stops: 18 s.
Progress that never finishes: the 30 s ceiling. Two dead nodes: two windows, both
transports closed. Checked against the flat deadline, which fails three of them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Both described panels the desktop client would grow of its own. §8.3 settled
that differently: one UI source means anything written for the client is
something the browser then lacks, so both were built in `static/` instead and
the client ships them.
D5 is `node-page.js` over the operator ops — status, groups, roots with eject,
plug and add, roster, peers, pairing, audit export. D6 is `create-group-page.js`,
which detects the node, provisions it, takes the group's name and roots,
initialises the key and pairs. The service unit is the one genuinely native
part, and the desktop main process already runs it: `systemctl --user` on Linux,
Task Scheduler on Windows.
Left standing in §15.2 they read as work outstanding, which is how a plan
outlives the decision that replaced it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The rest of AV9's disk half. Serving a file left the loop in the commit before
this one; two paths were still on it.
**The availability poll.** `RootSet.refresh_availability` stats every root, and
eleven call sites reached it from `async def` — the reconcile loop among them, on
a timer. On a sleeping disk that is a stall once per tick, and the stat is also
what keeps the disk awake, so a node paid spin-up for a library nobody was
reading. All eleven now go through `off_disk`, `Root.is_live` included.
**The upload write.** `open`/`write`, and the resolve, the stat, the free-name
search, the rename and the unlink around it. This one could not simply be
awaited: the handler was synchronous, so nothing could come between the
`chunk_index != state.next_index` check and the `advance` that answers it, and
that is the whole of the chunk-ordering rule. Awaiting the write opens the gap —
chunk 1 arriving while chunk 0 is in the disk thread reads a position that has
not moved and is refused as out of order, so an upload would fail on a slow disk
and nowhere else. Verified, not assumed: without the lock the new ordering test
refuses three chunks of four.
So the check, the write and the advance are one critical section again, under a
lock held **per group**. Not per session: `partial_uploads` lives in the group
context so a reconnecting client finds its upload where it left it, which means
two sessions of one member share the position of one `.part` file. Arrival order
is preserved by construction — the dispatcher creates one task per message as it
arrives, tasks start in creation order, and the lock is the first thing each one
waits on, so its waiters queue in arrival order too.
`_do_file_upload` is a coroutine now, which is why forty-two test call sites gain
an `await`. Their outcomes are unchanged, file by file, against the run before
the change.
`test_ops.py` asked which public coroutines `ops` exposes and got `off_disk`,
imported rather than defined there. It now asks for the ones written in the
module, which is what its own docstring means; all forty-three operations are
still checked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The two documents disagreed with the code they describe. §15.2 still listed
playlists and Chromecast subtitles as not built, both shipped and tested; the
protocol document's header said wire version 3.2 beside its own §13 saying 3.3,
which is §12's "a number restated away from its definition is a number that will
drift" happening to the document that states the rule.
The packaged install is no longer an open question: the artefacts have been taken
to a running hub and node on Ubuntu 26.04 (.deb), Fedora 44 (.rpm) and Windows 11
(.exe). What is left of D11 is signing the binary, which is a different question
from whether it installs.
The migration row overstated its own risk. Nothing replays the revisions behind
the first packaged release — they were development no installation ever ran — so
the exposure is the next migration, not the chain.
The disk-I/O row gains the consequence that was measured rather than reasoned: a
root waking from standby stalls the loop long enough for a client's WebRTC
connection to time out, on one node with one member. `refresh_availability` is
named beside the two chunk paths, because a stat on a sleeping disk is what wakes
it while reading nothing.
A blank line had also split §15.3's table in two.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A 1080p film is decoded by whoever watches it and re-encoded by the node
when no browser can decode the source. Both were on the CPU, and on an
Atom or Celeron mini-PC neither reaches real time — which is what
`transcode_incompatible_video` exists to refuse. This adds the mechanism
that makes refusing it unnecessary.
Node — `hwaccel.py`: VA-API on Linux, Quick Sync or NVENC on Windows,
established by encoding 1080p and reading the file back with ffprobe.
Nothing is accepted that does not produce the exact profile and level
`stream_init` announces, since the client checks that string before it
trusts a byte: an encoder that wrote another level would make the node's
own codec string a lie, and ffmpeg takes `-level 4.1` and `-level 41`
from h264_qsv without saying which it understood. Three modes per
stream — hardware decode and encode, hardware encode alone, libx264 —
demoted per source codec, because a GPU that decodes HEVC may have no
decoder for MPEG-4 Part 2 and only asking it finds out. A mode that
fails is detected on an empty stdout before `stream_init` goes out, so
the viewer sees one working stream and never an error.
Client — Chromium ships VA-API off on Linux. It is enabled where a
render node and a driver are present, then verified through
`navigator.mediaCapabilities`: a no moves to the next GL backend on the
next launch and an exhausted list drops the switches, so a renamed
feature cannot pass for a feature that is on and `--ignore-gpu-blocklist`
cannot survive on a machine it did not help. Feature lists now merge
rather than overwrite — `appendSwitch` replaces the value, and a second
caller would have silently cancelled the mDNS switch aiortc depends on.
Packaging — the drivers are weak dependencies on all four formats, so a
machine without a GPU installs exactly as before. `dpkg -i` and
`rpm -ivh` ignore weak deps; `packaging/README.md` now says so. Windows
needs no driver: the bundled ffmpeg already carries h264_qsv and
h264_nvenc, and a re-pin that dropped them would cost every low-power
Windows node its hardware encoding silently.
AMD on Windows (AMF) and macOS (VideoToolbox) are named gaps, not
oversights: neither could be tried anywhere in this project, and both
re-encode in software as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The relay forwards the node's fragments untouched, and those begin at zero
at the seek point. The player never notices because its SourceBuffer is given
`timestampOffset = start`; a receiver has no equivalent, so the cues are
shifted by `-start` before they leave, recomputed at every restart of the
relay. Sent as they are, a subtitle would be out by the whole seek.
The document is served from the relay's own port at /subs.vtt, behind the same
token as the stream and with CORS: a receiver fetches a side-loaded track with
XHR from its own origin, and without the headers it fails as a network error
with nothing on screen to say so. The URL carries a version because a track is
cached by address — changing the cues behind a fixed URL leaves the previous
language showing.
Cues that end before the stream begins are dropped rather than clamped, so a
line from before the seek cannot appear over the first frames after it.
The relay is plain Node, so the tests start it and fetch from it rather than
reading its source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UGY17EPph5LsLzePPXhUVc
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The previous fix read ffprobe's key frames and took the last one at or before
the request. It was wrong twice, and a viewer felt the difference: subtitles
went from 5 s early to 2–3 s late.
Matroska's Cues index only some keyframes, so an index seek backs off to an
indexed one that the frame list does not single out. And the landing point
moves with **which streams are mapped**, because the container is positioned
where every mapped stream has data — on the reported title, a seek to 4913.7 s
landed at 4909.863 with video alone and at 4907.236 with the second audio
track mapped beside it. The frame scan gave the first number; the stream
delivered the second; the gap was 2.65 s, and the measured audio displacement
in the served stream was 2.65 s.
So the node asks ffmpeg instead: the same seek, the same mapping, one copied
frame under `-copyts`, and the answer read back off the result. 0.06–0.07 s,
cheaper than the scan it replaces. The `-ss` argument stays at the request, so
the bytes served are exactly the ones served before — only the number naming
them changes. The probe runs after the audio track is resolved, because it
cannot be right before that is known.
An answer after the request, or further before it than any real keyframe gap,
is discarded in favour of the old label: a number wrong by seconds beats a
fabricated one.
Found by decoding the served stream and locating its first frame in the
source, which put it at 4907.213 s against an announced 4909.863 s. The test
does the same thing rather than comparing the announced number against a
second reading of the same probe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UGY17EPph5LsLzePPXhUVc
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Copied video can only start on a keyframe, so `-ss t` with `-c:v copy`
delivers the keyframe at or before `t`. The node reported `t` anyway and the
client builds `SourceBuffer.timestampOffset` out of that number, so everything
downstream believed the picture stood a few seconds further along than it did.
That was a wrong label while only the scrubber read it — it is recorded as
such, low priority, in the design document. Subtitles made it a wrong answer:
their cues carry the source's own absolute timestamps, so the mismatch put
every line on screen before it was spoken. Reported from real use on an H264
title, where seeking to 600 s, 2650 s and 5000 s lands on keyframes 0.82 s,
1.56 s and 4.64 s earlier.
The copy path now resolves the request to that keyframe, seeks to it, and
reports it. The bytes delivered do not change — ffmpeg lands on the same frame
either way — only the number that names them. The look-up reads the thirty
seconds before the request and cost 0.12–0.51 s on that title, which is the
price already costed in §15.3 and never paid. Re-encoded video is untouched:
it can begin exactly where it is asked to, and does.
Two details worth their lines. The keyframe is passed back to ffmpeg at six
decimals, because rounding a keyframe's own timestamp down puts it before the
frame it names and selects the previous one — the same fault again, smaller.
And the ffprobe window ends past the request, since an interval whose end is
the request never emits a keyframe sitting exactly on it: the resume position
is the one place a viewer asks for the same instant twice, and it would have
been answered a whole GOP early.
The test decodes the first frame served and matches it against the source
frame at the position announced, rather than comparing `start` to an expected
number — both sides of that comparison would be reading the same ffprobe and
would agree by construction.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UGY17EPph5LsLzePPXhUVc
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MSE decodes no in-band text track, so a subtitle cannot ride inside the
fragmented MP4 the player is fed. The node extracts one track whole, converts
it to WebVTT and caches it under its own hash; the client pulls that blob
through the ordinary file_req/chunk path and hangs a <track> on the video
element — the same indirection as a TMDB poster or an audio transcode, which
is what makes a film's subtitles extracted once in the life of the file rather
than once per viewing. Whole-file also makes the cues absolute, so a seek and
an audio-language change both leave the track untouched.
**The ordinal counts every subtitle stream, including the ones never listed.**
Only text codecs are offered: a bitmap track (PGS, VOBSUB — about a fifth of a
real library) has no path to WebVTT without OCR, and one extracted anyway
yields a header with no cues, which is a menu entry that shows nothing and
reports no error. Numbering the survivors of that filter would give a
PGS/SRT/SRT file the ordinals 0 and 1 for its text tracks and `-map 0:s:0`
would then extract the PGS — the same trap `AudioTrack.ordinal` exists for,
one level deeper. A fixture whose first subtitle stream cannot be decoded pins
it, and the handler checks membership of the probed list, never a range.
Additive and MINOR: the selector is drawn from `subtitle_tracks` in the node's
own `stream_init` and from no version number, so `subtitle_req` is never sent
to a peer that would not answer it. The floor stays at 3.0.
Also here: a failed extraction never touches playback, a superseded reply
cannot install its blob over a newer choice, and `_languageName` is shared
with the audio labels — lifted by both label harnesses, since a lift that
names one function stops covering the rule the moment logic moves out of it.
Tests: 9 node (tracks told apart by the words in the extracted cues, not by
tags), 10 client. Full suite green: 1545 node/common, 1252 hub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UGY17EPph5LsLzePPXhUVc
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names its parameters
`pw_version` 4: Argon2id 64 MiB, t=3, lanes=4 — RFC 9106's second recommended
setting. A v3 hash (256 MB) still verifies at its own parameters and is
rewritten at the new ones on the next sign-in, through the rehash path that
already existed.
Why not more. The verifier matters against an offline attacker holding the
database; online guessing is bounded by the sign-in lockout. That attacker pays
the client's 600 000 PBKDF2-SHA512 iterations and the hub's Argon2id per guess,
since `auth_key` is 256 bits and cannot be searched directly. Memory above
64 MiB multiplies that cost by a constant — at most 16 at 256 MB, less with
PBKDF2 counted — while the hub pays the same memory at every sign-in, one
derivation at a time. Measured on meshbay.org: 450 ms at 256 MB, 105 ms at
64 MiB, so a burst of sign-ins clears about four times faster.
Changing the current version exposed a latent lockout. `hash_password` always
used the current version's parameters, while the raw-password scheme recorded
`pw_version = 2` — harmless while versions 2 and 3 shared their parameters,
and with version 4 every legacy registration and v1→v2 rehash would have
stored a 64 MiB hash labelled 256 MB, which nothing could then verify. Seventeen
tests caught it. `hash_password` now takes the version it is hashing for.
The OpenSSL deadlock between two concurrent `lanes=4` derivations is the same at
64 MiB, so Argon2 stays on its single worker. The loop-stall test measures
against a v3 hash, because half of a 45 ms inline derivation is too close to
scheduling noise to be a reliable bound.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt
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A seek now begins picture and sound together at the keyframe, but stream_init
still reports the position that was asked for. §15.3 says what the fix costs
and why it has not been made.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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-ss before -i cannot trim copied video, which must begin on a keyframe, but
accurate_seek did trim the re-encoded audio to the exact request. Every seek
on a copied stream therefore opened with a GOP-wide hole in the audio and ran
a GOP out of sync afterwards — 9.979s on a real film with a 10s keyframe
interval. Accurate seeking is now off wherever video is copied, and stays on
where it is re-encoded, which is the only path that could already begin where
it was asked to.
Every timestamp was correct throughout, which is why nothing caught it; the
tests assert on decoded audio and on frames compared against the source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The streaming path mapped 0:a:0 unconditionally, so a dubbed film played in
whichever language was muxed first and the others were unreachable. The node
now enumerates the tracks in stream_init and honours audio_track in
stream_req; switching is the seek path, since one ffmpeg carries one track.
MNP 3.2, additive: the player draws its selector from the node's own list and
never from a version number, so an older node is never asked for a track it
would ignore. MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED does not move.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The ceiling is 1200 tracks on a library that repeats and 660 on one that
never does; the message said 1000, which would send a reader back into the
wall at 660. It says 500, measured at both ends.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A DataChannel send() throws above the max-message-size the node advertises
(aiortc: 65536), so the 1 MB body cap was unreachable and each body push
swallowed the difference in a bare catch. Cap at 62 KB after sealing, name
the playlist in the sync result, keep syncing the rest.
Measured: 1000 tracks seal to 53 276 bytes, so the ceiling is ~1200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The six MNP 3.1 ops were the only new ones never crossing a channel in a
test. Two cases on the existing aiortc harness: a round trip read back on
a second connection, and a 256 KB body. Found that the 1 MB body cap is
unreachable from a browser — docs/playlists.md §15.3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Sync moved to the shell; the Search-page gap it lists is the bug that
was fixed. And two devices converging has now been seen working.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`max-height: calc(100vh - 16px)` says how tall the menu may be and nothing
about where its bottom lands, so one opened partway down the window ran
past it and its last rows scrolled out of reach. Measure from where the
panel was placed, and re-measure when a submenu opens.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The dismiss-on-scroll listener is on the capture phase, because `scroll`
does not bubble — so it also heard the menu scrolling itself, and a long
tracklist closed the moment it was wheeled. Filter on the event's origin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Fourteen places the proposal was wrong, listed rather than edited away:
the MNP bump was 2.1 and is 3.1; the kind pattern refused the one
playlist every account has; confirm() is the house style and prompt()
is what throws; submenus expand in place; deflate is 4.5x and the
first fixture's 23x was a property of the fixture.
Adds the hazard the proposal missed entirely: two wrappers that take
two arguments and forward two, so every "add to queue" arrived as a
plain play.
The acceptance section now says what is checked and what is not —
no real daemon round trip, no two-browser convergence, no Firefox.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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One row per playlist plus a manifest, so starring a track rewrites that
playlist rather than the whole collection. blob_enc is a BLOB, not
base64 TEXT: these run to hundreds of kilobytes.
user_id comes from the session and never from the message; kind is
validated against a pattern; every cap refuses with a stated reason
rather than truncating.
Additive, so MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED does not move — a 3.0 node answers
"unknown message type" and the client writes to the next one it reaches.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The 256 KB cap contradicted its own worked example; entries were also
missing `size`/`name`, without which a stored track cannot be fetched
at all. Storage becomes a manifest plus one blob per playlist,
compressed, so starring a track no longer rewrites the collection.
Adds the UI pass that was missing: the queue verbs, the menus, and the
one real code change behind them — the player's queue can today only
be replaced, not appended to.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Into the folder on screen, under the Upload button's rule. A name already
there, or one the node would refuse, cancels the whole drop with a message.
Folders are recreated level by level; files go out a few at a time. The
in-flight upload guard is keyed by folder and name.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Previous/next arrows in the pinned toolbar, on group pages and in Search.
Page size is an account preference (Settings → Defaults), 50 by default,
10 to 200 in steps of 10.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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when idle
Browser idle sign-out (media playback counts as activity; not the desktop app),
refresh idle window and maximum session length, in hours. Sign-out now revokes
on the hub, and the profile has "sign out everywhere".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XuNrwLf5EFWCMHzfoEvnpm
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Existing shorter accounts keep signing in. Test usernames padded to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XuNrwLf5EFWCMHzfoEvnpm
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`search_listed` is a per-group setting on the node, changed by a signed
operator op and carried in the sealed handshake ack. Search reads it after
the handshake and stops there: no index is fetched, cached or merged, in any
of the four views, and the page says how many groups it left out. The switch
is a "Search" section in the group's settings, shown to the operator.
Absent means listed, at every layer: roster default, ack default, and the
client only drops a group on an explicit `false` — so an upgrade or an older
node removes nothing from anyone's Search.
It is a listing preference and protects nothing: the node serves the same
index to Search and to the group page and cannot tell them apart, every
member lists the group by opening it, and a client that ignores the flag
lists it in Search too. Design §9.11 says so, so it is never described as
private. The cost is one handshake per unlisted group, because only the node
knows the setting.
Search also took `nodes[0]` twice — for the index and for the pooled
connection — the defect 4cce50f fixed on the group page only. One
`connectToGroup` now walks the list the same way: a refusal about this
browser stops, `not_hosted` or a failed connection moves on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XuNrwLf5EFWCMHzfoEvnpm
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya
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One derivation is 256 MB and a quarter to half a second of CPU (240 ms here,
485 ms on meshbay.org). All eleven call sites — sign-in, registration, the two
rehashes, passphrase change, reset and account deletion — ran it inline in an
async handler, so every one stopped the whole hub for that long: no request
served, no node socket read, no offer relayed. Measured on a local hub during
eight concurrent sign-ins, the worst `/v1/health` response went from 232 ms to
10 ms; the sign-ins themselves take the same time.
It could not simply go to a thread pool. Two concurrent `lanes=4` derivations
deadlock inside OpenSSL and never return, at no CPU — reproduced on
cryptography 50.0.x / OpenSSL 4.0.x both locally and on meshbay.org, while
`lanes=1` does not. `lanes` is part of every stored hash, so it is not ours to
change, and inline on the loop two derivations could never overlap, which is
the only reason production never hung.
So `auth.hash_password_off_loop` / `verify_password_off_loop` hand the work to
a dedicated executor with exactly one worker. Not a semaphore around
`to_thread`: a cancelled request would release its permit while its thread was
still deriving, and the next derivation would start beside it. One worker also
bounds Argon2's memory to one derivation whatever the number of callers.
`test_argon2_off_loop.py` reads every module for a direct call, pins the single
worker, runs four derivations and four sign-ins concurrently to completion, and
checks the loop keeps turning during a derivation; each fails with its guard
removed. CLAUDE.md and AV9 state the rule and the trap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt
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Passphrase sign-in locks per username: after `login.max_failures` wrong
passphrases (default 4) the name is refused with `429 account_locked` and a
`Retry-After` for `login.lockout_minutes` (default 60), without the passphrase
being checked. Both numbers are instance policy an admin sets from the panel;
zero failures turns it off. The per-IP limit bounds one address, and IPv6
gives every subscriber a /64 of them — an online guess targets an account, so
the account is what is counted.
- Counted by the name as typed, existing or not, so `login` stays uniform (M1).
The key is a hash: people type passphrases into the username field.
- The attempt is taken before the check in one `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE
… WHERE … RETURNING`, so a concurrent burst gets no more than the limit.
- Sign-in, passphrase change and account deletion count on the same row; the
last had no rate limit at all.
- A lockout refuses passphrase sign-in and nothing else: sessions, renewal and
device sign-in continue, and a reset code clears it (AV26). A session learns
its own lockout from `/v1/users/me`, and the passphrase change checks it
before re-wrapping any node's bundle — the hub accepts the new passphrase
only after the nodes have it.
The SPA now shows what the hub said. `loginAndRecover` threw "Login failed:
{json}", so `email_verification_required` never matched and was never shown;
the passphrase-change form rendered no error at all in its first phase.
The unauthenticated surface, reviewed route by route:
- No `/docs`, `/redoc` or `/openapi.json`, in the code. The Caddyfile hid them
on meshbay.org only; a packaged hub behind any other proxy published all three.
- The node socket's first message must arrive within ten seconds. It is
accepted before anyone is known, and an unbounded read is a connection any
stranger holds for free.
- `/v1/relays` answers 503 behind `relay.RELAYS_ENABLED`, as federation does:
nothing in the tree calls it and two of its routes take no account.
- `test_unauthenticated_surface.py` walks every route and fails on one without
an authentication dependency that is not listed with its reason.
Verified in Chrome against a local hub: the lockout and wrong-passphrase
messages, the admin section saving both lockout and mail limits, and the
passphrase change refused while locked. Not verified in Firefox (a running
instance blocks the headless one), nor the upsert's concurrency on PostgreSQL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt
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Every MHP route answers a stated 503. `federation.FEDERATION_ENABLED` is the
only thing that decides it, applied as a dependency on the router so the six
routes that exist and any added later are covered by construction — a gate you
have to remember to write in each handler is the shape C6 is the standing
lesson about.
The protocol is not what is wrong with it. What is wrong is that nothing has
ever run it: two hubs have never completed one authenticated request between
them. AV14 was two defects in the same path — an issuer signing with a key
bound before it was loaded, naming itself after the reference deployment
whatever the instance was called, and a verifier naming no audience for the
`aud` the issuer sets, which PyJWT refuses outright. Both stood for a month
behind a green suite, and both were found by reading rather than by running,
because a second implementation of a peer proves the protocol and nothing about
two machines.
Four of the six routes carry no authentication of their own — the MHP token is
the authentication — and two of those write, a directory push and a revocation.
That is the surface being closed until somebody stands up a second hub.
A constant and not a `hub_settings` row, deliberately: a switch in the admin
panel invites an operator to turn on a feature that has never worked between
two machines, where this takes an edit, a deploy, and reading the comment above
it. `/v1/hub/info` reports the state, because the `mhp_version` beside it would
otherwise be a claim the hub does not honour.
The protocol tests open the gate for their own duration and say why; the one
that runs with the flag as it ships asserts all six routes refuse. §7.6 states
the closure, §15.2 carries federation between two hubs as not built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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§15.3 gains the items the review found and did not close, each as what it is
rather than as a plan: the packaged install that has never been installed, QUIC
serving content outside every cap it does not implement, a relay registry
nothing calls, an unmetered third-party search, disk I/O on the node's event
loop, unbounded node announcements, and a migration chain exercised on a
database it does not ship on.
They are in the design rather than in a tracker because each is a sentence about
what the system currently is, and §15.3 is where the document already keeps
those. The seven that were closed this week are in §13.5b as AV20–AV25 and in
the sections they belong to.
CLAUDE.md gains the Firefox harness, which is the other kind of entry: eleven
errors at setup that look exactly like a regression, are not, and cost a full
diagnosis to place. `HOME` isolates the profile and not snap's single instance,
so any running Firefox blocks the headless probe, `--no-remote` and
`--new-instance` do not help, and a failed run leaves a process that blocks the
next. The chrome half covers the same geometry meanwhile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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group's hosts are its members'
Two checks that were not performed, in the same shape: something true of the
public case, written so it did not apply to the rest.
**Signaling.** The membership check read `if node_group_ids:`, so an empty set
skipped it — membership, group status and the public-group gate together — and
the offer was relayed. Since AV1 made an empty claim mean "no groups" rather
than "all of my owner's", that is the *normal* registration of a node hosting
nothing: the unconfigured node left running, the machine in this register's
founding incident, and the one least able to absorb the work. Each offer makes
it allocate an RTCPeerConnection and gather ICE, 30 a minute, which is H6
restored in exactly the case AV1 made common. It is refused now. Nothing
legitimate is lost: such a node refuses the handshake anyway — `group_id` is
mandatory (M1) and a node with no group key refuses (NS8) — so this declines
work the node would decline one step later at its own expense.
**The node list.** `GET /v1/groups/{id}/nodes` checked membership only for a
public group with public groups switched off. A private one answered any
authenticated account that knew the id — which an ex-member knows for ever —
with the ids and public keys of the machines hosting it. §7.4 already stated the
property for the public case. Membership is required now unless the group is
public and public groups are on. Nothing needs the list before joining: an open
join writes the membership row first, and an invitation registers the invitee's
when the code is created, both checked before making the change.
`test_webrtc_signaling_roundtrip` had to be repaired, and is the finding
restated: it registered a node in `_connected_nodes` and never in
`_node_groups`, so it drove the relay through the hole rather than through the
door — the check it routed around was the defect. It now registers the group a
real node registers.
§7.2 and §7.3 gain the rules, the register AV24 and AV25, and
test_availability_between_members.py two cases that fail on the property
against the previous source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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A chat message is the plainest member-supplied write there is: the node stores
it in `chat.db`, where nothing expires it — retention is a manual command
(§6.6) — relays it to every other connected member, and has the hub write a
notification for every member of the group. Nothing bounded any of it. The only
ceiling was the DataChannel frame, 64 MB once the handshake is done, so one
member in a loop filled the operator's disk and saturated everyone else's
connection, and the node's answer to each message was `ack`.
Uploads, the other member-supplied write, have carried a filename allowlist,
strict chunk ordering, a no-overwrite rule and a 4 GB cap since C5a — because
somebody asked what one member costs the others on that path. Nobody had asked
it on this one.
Two bounds, for the two halves of the question: **64 KB of ciphertext** for what
one message may cost, and **60 a minute per account per group** for how often
one member may impose it. Both are checked before anything is stored or relayed;
a refusal names itself and is audited, so "why is my disk full" has an answer.
The rate is keyed by account, not by connection: a second tab does not make
anyone type faster, and keying on the session would hand a script one budget per
socket it opens.
No node-wide ceiling beside it, deliberately. The link-preview limiter has one
because a preview spends the *node's* egress and its third-party quota, which is
one shared thing; a chat message spends the sender's own group, and a node-wide
ceiling would let a busy group silence a quiet one — this same defect one level
up. The last test in the new file is that property: a member at their limit has
not spent anybody else's.
Two things stay open on purpose and are named rather than quietly done:
retention still keeps everything, because a default that deletes people's
history is not a review's call; and the composer still offers to send an
oversized message, so this is §6.4's pattern with only the node half built.
§6.6 gains the rule, §13.5b the label — AV20, with AV21–AV23 registering the
three fixes this week that closed the same kind of gap elsewhere.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`_is_node_admin()` is `self._user_id == node_user_id`, and `_user_id` is the
`sub` of a JWT the hub issued. Six node-wide controls were gated on that alone:
`node_status` — which lists every group on the machine with each root's
**absolute path** — plus `node_settings_set`, `roster_read`, `denylist_read`,
`denylist_clear` and `node_reload`.
So the answer to "are you the operator of this node" was "the hub says so",
which NS4 and M3 rule out in as many words: operator authority comes from the
node's roster and from nowhere else, and asking the hub is how the hub installs
itself as node administrator. The reach is bounded — a completed handshake also
needs the group key — but an active hub obtains one legitimately in an
open-join group, which §3.5 concedes, and from there it could read the
operator's directory layout or clear the denylist, which is the persisted
revocation H4 exists to keep.
`_operator_device()` requires both halves now: the account is the one the node
belongs to, *and* the device on this connection has proved a key the roster
holds as an operator. `device_hello` is signed over a transcript naming the
node, the group and this connection's nonce, and `operator_pks()` is rebuilt
from the roster on each call, so an unpinned browser and a revoked one are both
refused at once. The hub holds no user keys and cannot countersign a device.
Keeping the account check as well is deliberate: dropping it would widen these
node-wide controls to any paired operator of any group on the machine, which is
a separate decision. `_is_node_admin()` stays as what it is in the handshake
ack — a hint telling a client whether to offer the Node page — and says so.
Nothing changes for a paired operator: `device_hello` runs unconditionally
after the ack, and anyone using the Node page's controls is already paired,
since `root_add` and every other signed op has always verified against
`operator_pks()`. A browser that never paired now reads nothing there, which is
the state in which it could already write nothing.
test_node_status.py's fixture set the account and not the device, which is how
it went on passing; it now wires the device the way `device_hello` leaves it.
The adversary itself is in test_security_regressions.py — a token naming the
owner's account with no proved device, which the previous source answered with
`node_status_ack`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`_do_file_request` read `tr` as a boolean. Present meant "this is a leased
transfer, skip the leaseless ceiling", and nothing asked whether this node had
ever granted such a lease — `slots.touch(tr)` was called beside it and its
answer, `False` if it is not granted, was discarded. So any non-empty string
bought the whole library with no ceiling of any kind: not the per-member cap,
not the node-wide one, not the leaseless bound that exists to bound a client
claiming to be browsing. The queue held only the clients that chose to wait.
`_lease_of` decides it now, and the three answers differ on purpose:
- **granted**, and of *this* session — served, and touched so the sweeper
does not reclaim a transfer that is plainly moving. The session is checked
as well as the id, because touching another connection's lease refreshed
its idle timer.
- **queued** — refused with `lease_not_granted`, on the upload path too,
before anything reaches the operator's disk. A member reading while queued
is the cap not applying.
- **unknown** — bounded by the leaseless ceiling rather than refused. That is
also what a reconnect looks like from here, where the session's leases died
with the old connection and the client is re-opening them, and it leaves
the residual §5.5 already states: a client that lies gets that bound's
worth of files at a time, not the group. Noted once per connection so the
residual is visible rather than merely documented.
Nothing changes for the shipped client: the transfer store awaits
`lease.acquire()` before it reads a byte, so the refused case is one it never
enters. §5.5 gains a paragraph saying the node decides which of the two a
request is — the document described the accounting without ever saying it was
enforced, which is how it came not to be.
`test_lease_enforcement.py` drives the real handlers over a real index; six of
its nine cases fail against the previous source, each on the property.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`_register_uploader` walked the index for the entry it had just written, at a
moment when no such entry can exist: the file was a `.part` until the rename on
the line above, which is not indexable, and the watchdog that will index it
debounces for two seconds and then hashes. The walk matched nothing, silently,
so every uploaded file in every group was owned by nobody — and `file_delete`
refuses a caller with no admin authority when the entry records no uploader, so
a member could not delete what they had just sent. MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §5.4
grants that to any non-revoked device of the uploading account.
The record is now written when the last chunk lands (`indexer.record_upload`)
and the entry is stamped from it in `_hash_or_cached`, the one funnel every
entry passes through — initial scan, watchdog, reconcile and replug alike. It
lives in the index cache rather than on the entry alone, because the index is
rebuilt from disk at every start and an owner the node forgets on restart is a
right quietly taken away. It is validated against a live `stat()`, so whatever
later occupies that path inherits nothing; and `_rescan_root`'s carry-over no
longer copies over it, or memory would beat the durable record.
§5.4 also claimed ownership was *provable* — a transcript the uploader signs,
stored with the entry. No such signature has ever existed; `meshbay:upload:v1`
in the code is the groupbox purpose that seals the envelope. The section now
states what the code does, and the transcript is an open item in §15.3.
`test_upload_attribution.py` drives the real handler and a real indexer across
that seam. Against the previous source its two positive cases fail on the
property, not on a missing method — an upload, then a rebuild from disk, then
a different file at the same path inheriting nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`ExecStartPre` ran `alembic -c /opt/meshbay-hub/migrations/alembic.ini upgrade
head`. The build does stage that file, so the path existed and the contents
were wrong: `alembic.ini` resolves `script_location` with `%(here)s`, so the
copy pointed at `/opt/meshbay-hub/migrations/src/meshbay_hub/db/migrations` —
which nothing installs, because the migrations ship inside `meshbay_hub`, in
the shared venv.
`ExecStartPre` failing stops the unit. A hub installed from the RPM or the DEB
could not start at all, and nothing noticed because the one live deployment
was assembled by hand — the same shape as the node unit that carried `User=`
into the user unit directory.
The same `%(here)s` trap was already found once on the server, where a stray
`alembic.ini` resolved to a month-old snapshot of the tree. Twice is a trap
rather than an accident, so the fix is that the path is no longer written down
anywhere: `meshbay-hub migrate` asks the installed package where its own
migrations are, which is correct for the RPM, the DEB, a venv and a checkout.
The build stages no `alembic.ini`; the repo keeps its own for `alembic
revision` and for deploy scripts that already work.
`env.py` now prefers a URL the caller resolved over re-reading the environment
itself, so `migrate --config` connects with exactly the string the server
will — one resolution, not two that agree until they do not.
Six tests, three of which fail against the unit as it was. They read the
directives rather than the file, because searching the whole thing finds the
comment explaining a directive and calls that the directive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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