| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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The daemon line repeated the state the daemon reports ("running — running").
The state is now appended only when it says something more than "running",
such as waiting_for_hub. The QUICKSTART example is updated to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The protocol layer is LGPL-3.0-or-later in every language it exists in, so
any client may use it whatever its own licence: meshbay-common, and the files
marked with an SPDX line — keyderive.js, crypto.js, playlist-crypto.js,
transport*.js; keyring.js, transcripts.js and argon2-wasm.js on the desktop;
Kdf.kt, Keyring.kt and Transcripts.kt on Android. Everything else is
AGPL-3.0-or-later, which the RPM specs and package.json already declared
without a licence file to back them.
Two AGPL section 7 permissions:
- group applications may be under any licence when they use the interface
only through a named surface (static/licenses/APPLICATION-EXCEPTION.txt);
the reference application is 0BSD so that copying it brings no AGPL code;
- the Android application may be conveyed linked with Google Play services.
Third-party code is accounted for: THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES.txt is generated from
what a build ships (packaging/third_party_notices.py) for the deb/rpm venv and
the frozen Windows node — PyAV's wheel grafts in libx264 and libx265, which its
BSD licence does not mention — and the vendored browser libraries get their
licence texts and htm-preact.js its provenance. Wheels carry SPDX metadata,
RPMs %license, debs a DEP-5 copyright file, every Windows target LICENSE.txt.
test_licensing.py holds the line: the LGPL layer imports nothing under the
AGPL, the reference application nothing outside the application interface,
and every SPDX line is one of the known ones.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A cast button in Music's toolbar and in the music bar. With a television
chosen, each decrypted track goes to the relay with its cover — found as the
album card finds it — and plays there as music with its title, artist and
album; the bar's play, pause, seek, previous and next drive the receiver, its
clock is the receiver's, and the end of a track there moves the queue on.
A film or a photo taking the television pauses the bar; stopping the cast
carries the track on locally.
Photos and tracks now share one path: a whole file sent to the relay in
pieces (binary frames on Android, written to disk there), served at /file
with byte ranges and its cover at /cover, and loaded as what the relay says
it is. cast:image is gone; cast:chromecast:seek is new.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A cast button in Videos' toolbar, at the top of Photos, in an album's bar and
in the lightbox, in a group and in Search alike. A television chosen there is
kept for the session: a film opened plays on it with the player as its remote
from the start, and a photo opened in the lightbox is shown on it, scaled to
1920x1080, upright, as JPEG. The lightbox gains a slideshow.
The relay serves one photo at /image behind the stream's token, on the desktop
and on Android; the shell, not the page, decides that the receiver loads it as
a picture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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While a track plays, the page asks the shell to stay awake
(playback:keep-alive): on Android the cast's foreground service and
visible WebView, with a notification; on desktop a power save blocker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Shows the receiver's position with play/pause, ±30 s and a scrubber;
a seek restarts the relay where asked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Design §11.3/§11.4/§15 state what is built and what the phone found; the user
guide drops 'no Android client'; CLAUDE.md gains the package's locators and
the lessons casting from a phone taught.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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- §2 now describes who you trust in plain terms: no adversary grid, no red crosses
- adversary table, claim matrix and refused over-claims move to §13.9 for auditors
- repoint cross-references and the concordance to match
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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- split structural truths, guarantees and accepted risks into named parts
- add a focused comparison; native "detectable" -> "publicly verifiable"
- keep the full claim matrix as an auditor reference
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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node_status, node_settings_set, roster_read, denylist_read, denylist_clear,
node_reload and the signed gek_rotate, member_unpin, transfer_limits,
group_detach leave MNP 6.0; the Node page and the CLI do this work over
loopback. Their ops keep their tests, moved to the ops level.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Removes confirmFolder (addRoot, attachGroup) and the writable confirmation
added in e4f6177, with their two catalogue keys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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root_add, root_update and group_attach leave MNP: adding a directory and
switching writable/removable go through the loopback API (native dialog in
the desktop app) or the CLI. The operator's Settings tab still lists the
roots from any browser, read-only. The desktop app refuses to sign those
ops; a loopback flag change now reaches open pages (publish_roots).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The scan still runs six seconds, but the picker polls what it has found
and shows each receiver immediately. A rescan no longer has its timer
cut short by the scan it replaced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Rotation narrows rather than widens: members still connected receive the
new key, and nothing already shared changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The folder chosen in the native picker is the consent; the dialog that
followed on every group creation asked the same thing twice.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Registration refuses a name that differs from an existing one only by case;
accounts that already do keep their names, and a pending retry needs the exact
name (F-26).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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An offer's IP-log row (kept a year) was written before any check, for any
string named as a node; it is written once the offer goes to a node. The ICE
list is capped (64 candidates, 32 KiB). A node's update_groups, a database read
each, is budgeted like chat_notify and claims at most 1000 groups (F-22).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Any *.part older than a day in a writable root was deleted — a browser's
download in progress in a shared folder included. Only names carrying the
node's tag (name.<8 hex>.part) are reaped now (F-28).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A user revocation closed nothing: the denylist stopped the next connection and
left the live ones streaming and chatting. Revocations now go through one
method that closes the account's or the group's sessions (F-21).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Transitional. The Argon2 run that makes M makes A, the key MBK2 bundles were
sealed under; a session keeps it as a decrypt-only key (IndexedDB in a browser,
the key storage in the desktop app). A client meeting an MBK2 bundle opens it —
or its recovery copy — and stores the same identity as MBK3 once connected; the
desktop app reseals or withdraws it as browser access says. A session without
A asks for the passphrase once. Older formats stay refused by name. Replaces
the unpin-and-reinvite step the 0.17 flag day required on every node.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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a disk
unlock.key sits beside keystore.enc by default, so a whole disk, an image or a
home-directory backup opens the stored chat. The claims table, §4.5 and the
user guide say so and name what protects those: disk encryption, or the unlock
key on other storage (F-20).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The desktop app writes the Mark-of-the-Web on each file it saves on Windows, as
a browser does. Bidirectional controls are reserved characters in a saved name
(portable-name.js and paths.sanitize_for_download, and again in the main
process), so a name cannot display one extension and carry another. The node
refuses uploads of files Windows Explorer acts on by itself: desktop.ini,
.lnk, .url, .scf, .library-ms, .searchConnector-ms (F-19).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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128 peer sessions on the node, at most 64 per account (the hub names the
account with each offer; the node's own account is not counted). One account
plays at most half the stream slots, rounded up, and runs two subtitle
extractions at once. Frames after the handshake are 8 MiB (was 64), decoded
with per-container bounds, and a frame refused for either ends the session
instead of jamming its buffer (F-16).
Sized for the heaviest real member: twenty groups on one node, three devices
and a tab, up to 52 sessions. Measured: ~0.15 MiB and one fd per idle session.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A name an upload in flight will take is reserved; each upload writes its own
`name.<tag>.part`; the finished file is published by a hard link, which
refuses an existing target, and takes the next free name if one appeared
meanwhile — the last ack names it. Two members sending one name at once wrote
one part and published it twice; a file copied in during an upload was
replaced (F-09).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The name is resolved off the event loop and every answer checked; the socket
is then opened to that IP literal through a pinned httpcore backend, TLS still
verifying the certificate for the name, and no proxy from the environment.
A name that answers clean and then with a LAN address no longer gets a
request sent there, and a slow name no longer stalls the node (F-12).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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attach_group no longer copies join_policy and visibility from the hub's
answer: they come with the operator's request (the desktop creation form,
`group add --open`) and default to invite/private; the CLI says when the hub
lists the group otherwise. Every string written into node.toml is escaped
(toml_string) and read back through tomllib, so a group or folder name cannot
write lines of its own (F-17).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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they are
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Design §2.2-§3.7, §4, §5.6, §7.7, §8, §9.10 and the registers; protocol §7,
§7.1, §7.1a and §13; the user guide; CLAUDE.md's parity rule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Open is offered for PDFs, raster images, audio, video and plain text, typed
from the name; HTML, SVG and the rest are not opened in the hub's origin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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connect-src drops https: and wss: in both policies. Checked against Google's
reCAPTCHA test keys: in Chrome widget, token and registration unchanged; in
Firefox the widget loads; no violation reported in either.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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widens the node
node:call is replaced by named operations with checked arguments; hosting a
group, sharing an unpicked folder, key rotation, denylist clearing and a change
of node account are confirmed by a native dialog. Every channel checks its
sender, secrets:get/set/clear are gone, node:start writes the app's own hub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Each name in admin_usernames is pinned to the first active account seen
holding it (admin_pins), so a name freed by a deletion grants nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Present-tense statements of what holds, in place of before/after phrasing:
host designation (§7.2, AV32), invitations (§3.4, §7.3, AV33), the roster
check at the handshake (§5.2, protocol §6.3), the wrong-code lock (protocol
§8.3), and what the link-preview gate does and does not refuse (§6.5).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The handshake opened a session for anyone holding the group key with a hub
token naming the group; the roster was consulted only when wrapping the key
in a join. A member revoked or unpinned on the node but still a member on
the hub kept a full session with the key they already held — and was handed
the chat epoch their removal had just opened, since chat keys go to any
session. An honest client never met this (it asks for the key through
join_request every time); one that kept the key did not have to.
- After the proof, the node asks the roster and refuses with
`not_authorized_for_group` unless the account is an active member of the
group or the node's operator.
- A removal from any door — MNP, the node page, the CLI — now opens a new
chat epoch in each group the person could read, broadcasts it, and closes
every connection they hold (`ops.members._after_removal`). The CLI and the
node page did neither.
- Design §5.2, protocol §6.1, §6.3, §14.2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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unasked
- hub: a node may host a group only if its account owns it or the owner
approved that node (new `group_hosts`). Membership was the ceiling, and
every member holds the group key, so any member's node could register as a
host and be the one clients kept. A node claiming a group it may not host
is recorded as a request; the owner is notified once and approves or
refuses it (GET/POST/DELETE /v1/groups/{id}/hosts[/{node_id}]), which
takes effect on a connected node at once.
- hub: an owner adding a username creates an invitation (new
`group_invitations`), accepted or declined by the invitee
(/v1/groups/invitations, /{id}/invitation/accept|decline). Until then the
group is not listed, not dialled, not searched and not in any token.
Invitation links, open joins and group creation still make members
directly: they are the account's own act.
- hub: the MNP token names only the group it is minted for (group_id is now
required), so a node operator no longer learns a member's other groups.
- SPA: invitations on the home page; invited people and host requests in
the group's settings; the transport sends group_id. Ten catalogues.
- Browser probes for both screens, run in Chrome and Firefox.
- Design §5.2, §7.2, §7.3, AV32, AV33; protocol §6.3; user guide.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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cleanup
- node: only a wrong code counts towards the join lock, now per account
(5) as well as node-wide (20), and it is consulted only when a code is
tried. Every member reconnecting gets the group key through join_request,
so a lock checked before recognition let one member refuse it to everyone.
- node: link previews read the body as a stream and stop at the cap,
counted on decoded bytes; a declared oversized image is not read; 15 s
total deadline; image decoding off the loop. `client.get` had buffered
the whole (decompressed) response before the caps looked at it.
- hub: the daily purge of never-verified accounts detaches their IP-log
rows (keeping the name) and clears every other reference first, and each
cleanup step runs on its own. On PostgreSQL the bare DELETE violated the
ip_logs foreign key and stopped every purge behind it for good.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Every /v1/relays route answered 503 and nothing called them; no TURN
relay is needed. The proof-of-possession rule it carried stays as AV6.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The group-setting routes for app directories, chat directory, link
previews, Search listing and scan settings had no caller and no test;
those settings are signed MNP operations only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The node honours it and no interface sends it; offered alone it would
strand the next browser that signs in. Stated in both documents.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The interface reads a member's cap from transfer_state and never read the
copy on the ack. The transfer probe reads it from transfer_state too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A node serves the name its disk gave a file; the client now makes it
portable at save time (single file, zip entries, zip name) and says so
on the transfer row. Same rule as paths.sanitize_for_download, held by a
parity test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A report needs a person's account at least a day old, membership of the
public group, and fits a daily allowance per account. Past the threshold
a hash is queued and administrators are notified; blocking without
review is an instance setting, off by default. Report menu item in
public groups, Reports tab and settings in the admin panel.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A node hosting a public group syncs the hub's blocklist on every
connection (paged, node token only) and applies pushed changes. A
blocked file leaves the index and is refused (content_blocked); private
groups are untouched. The unused per-hash check route is gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Nodes registered the hashes of their public groups on the hub and nothing
ever read them back. Routes, model and node registration removed; a
migration drops swarm_sources. No node sends the hub a content hash now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Any member could make a node hold unbounded challenge requests; a
connection now keeps at most 8, 64 KiB each. root_add, group_attach,
invite_create and tmdb_config signed less than they did; their subjects
are now canonical JSON of every value (the TMDB token by SHA-256).
MNP 5.0, floor kept at 4.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Unused modules, functions, constants and client helpers with no caller,
the unreachable hub:probe IPC handler, and the CSAM hash matching.
Behaviour unchanged; the dispatch golden loses only the two removed
message types.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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serialize/deserialize had no production caller, and took with them the
per-chunk signature, the ChaCha20 cipher variant and the zstandard
dependency. Key derivations are unchanged. Docs corrected, including
design §4.3's claim that chunks are compressed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Every node the 4.0 floor admits signs its challenge, and one without a
channel binding could not complete the proof anyway, so a missing
signature is refused like a wrong one (browser and QUIC client).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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