| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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The passphrase derives two independent client-side values: auth_key (the
hub verifier) and bundle_key (AES-GCM key for the per-node identity
bundles, which live on nodes and never on the hub). Changing or
recovering a passphrase is therefore two operations — swap the hub
verifier, and re-wrap every reachable node's identity bundle.
Flow A — change a known passphrase (Profile page)
- POST /v1/users/password re-proves the current passphrase, swaps
pw_hash/salt/version, revokes every refresh token and returns a fresh
pair so the tab that made the change stays signed in.
- MeshBayTransport.rewrapAllNodes: for every group's online node, connect
with the old key, read the identity off the handshake, store it back
under the new key. Returns updated / unreachable / failed so the UI can
point at the operator-unpin fallback for the gaps. Always-shown
confirmation dialog listing reachable and unreachable groups.
Recovery key
- keyderive.js generateRecoveryKey (32 random bytes, grouped Base32) and
deriveRecoveryKey (HKDF-SHA256, domain meshbay:recovery:v1:<username>).
- Every per-node identity gets a second copy wrapped under the recovery
key: keypair_bundles.bundle_enc_recovery (node-only column, added in
_SCHEMA_KEYPAIR and via a PRAGMA-guarded ALTER for existing DBs),
carried on keypair_bundle_store / _resp. MNP 0.13 -> 0.14, additive.
- session.recoveryKey is persisted in IndexedDB (slot rk) and lazy-loaded
on connect, so a group joined in any later session still leaves a
recovery copy.
- Shown once at registration; optionally folded into the verification
e-mail as a pass-through the hub never stores or logs, with an opt-out.
- Profile -> Recovery key re-loads R and backfills every reachable node
via rewrapAllNodes in bundleKey mode (no passphrase re-entry).
Flow B — recover a lost passphrase (#/reset, linked from sign-in)
- POST /v1/users/password/reset-request {username, email}: both must be
the pair on file, checked against the blind email_hash (never
decrypted). A mismatch — wrong e-mail, unknown username, non-active
account — takes the identical no-op path (no code, no mail, same 200),
so it reveals nothing and cannot be used to spray reset mail from a
username alone. 5/min, 1-hour single-use code.
- POST /v1/users/password/reset {username, code, new_auth_key}: same
expiry / attempts / single-use checks as e-mail verification; revokes
every session and deletes every registered device key so a stored one
cannot sign back in past the reset.
- ResetPasswordPage: request code -> code + optional recovery key + new
passphrase -> reset + sign-in -> fan-out. connect() falls back to the
recovery-wrapped copy when the passphrase key cannot open bundle_enc.
Without a recovery key: sign-in is restored and each group needs the
operator-unpin fallback.
Supporting fixes (found in live testing)
- member unpin now also deletes the keypair bundle; connect() mints a
fresh identity when handed a bundle it cannot open (unless _rewrapOnly,
set by rewrapAllNodes), so a rejoin completes instead of dead-ending
before the invite-code prompt.
- A browser with no bundle key gets a passphrase prompt on the group page
instead of a "go back to the browser you registered on" message.
- RegisterPage / LoginPage / ResetPasswordPage trim the username so every
key derivation matches the hub's stored form.
Docs: docs/auth-confirm.md. Locale keys across all ten catalogues.
Tests: test_password_change, test_password_reset, test_recovery_email,
test_recovery_key, test_rewrap_fanout, test_bundle_store_recovery, plus
additions to test_admin_ops_mnp and test_webrtc_transport. Hub suite 492
passed; node suite 741 passed (the lone test_packaging_units failure is a
pre-existing RPM-spec flake, reproducible on main).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GGkxJW9br8Y9bhT8ywJ3oc
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Expose invite_ttl_hours, pair_ttl_hours, device_request_ttl_minutes,
max_concurrent_streams and transcode_incompatible_video in the Node
management panel. Changes are applied immediately via roster.db and
written back to node.toml so they survive a DB wipe. On startup,
roster overrides take precedence over node.toml defaults.
Draft v6 §2.11 documents the design; MNP gains node_settings_set /
node_settings_set_ack for the browser path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A one-click alternative to the full "Fix match" search-and-pick flow, and
reachable without SSH (`meshbay-node video rematch` clears a whole group).
- MNP 0.13: tmdb_rematch / tmdb_rematch_ack (additive — an older node
logs "unknown type", the button just does nothing). OP_TMDB_REMATCH,
signed like tmdb_override (media_cache is shared node-wide).
- media_cache.drop_tmdb_match(file_id): forgets the match AND the
override marker — deliberately stronger than clear_file_tmdb, since the
operator is explicitly asking for a fresh resolution.
- webrtc_server: _do_tmdb_rematch / _admin_exec_tmdb_rematch, dispatch +
admin-response routing, broadcasts tmdb_rematch_ack.
- transport.js: rematchTmdbMatch(fileId, signFn); 'tmdb_rematch' in the
admin-op allowlist; tmdb_rematch_ack handled like tmdb_override_ack.
- video-app.js: a "Re-match" button beside "Fix match" in the detail
modal (isNodeAdmin), then bumpMediaMetaGeneration(). video.rematch_one
key in all ten locales.
docs/mediacenter.md §10.1: V8–V13 marked done.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018BMLQjqFGCize2KtNBT79v
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Wizard (Electron):
- Auto-provisions node config (hub URL + username) from logged-in user
- node:start handles both cold start and restart of misconfigured daemon
- Waits for daemon to reach 'running', auto-links node key on hub
- probeNode accepts intermediate states for wizard progress feedback
Reset (meshbay-node reset):
- Unlinks node key from hub (DELETE /me/node_key, best-effort)
- Stops and disables daemon (systemctl --user disable --now)
- Erases ~/.config/meshbay, ~/.local/share/meshbay, ~/.local/state/meshbay
MusicBrainz contact:
- Resolved from owner's hub email instead of per-node roster config
- Removed musicbrainz_contact UI and WebRTC handshake field
- Removed set_musicbrainz_contact/musicbrainz_contact from roster
Node pairing:
- Added operator pairing banner on NodePage
- Added operator_paired flag to list_groups
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Paste an http(s) link in a group's chat and it unfurls into an OpenGraph
card — title, description, site name, and image — the way WhatsApp/Signal/
Slack do it.
The fetch is the node's, never the browser's or the hub's. The browser
cannot: a strict img-src/connect-src and CORS block it, and a direct fetch
would leak every reader's IP to the linked host on each render. The hub must
not touch group content (draft-v6 §2.5). The node already fetches third-party
metadata for the Videos and Music apps, over the same authorised path.
Flow mirrors media_meta_req: the client sends `link_preview_req {url}`, the
node replies `link_preview_resp` with the card fields (or `ok: false`), and
any OG image is stored under its blake3 in the existing media_cache thumb
store — the client then fetches it via the normal file_req path, exactly like
a poster. Nothing durable is added: the card text lives in a bounded in-memory
TTL cache on the node (draft-v6 §2.7 — enrichment on demand, the asking device
caches), and MNP goes 0.11 → 0.12 (additive: an older node logs "unknown type"
and the client shows the bare link).
Because the URL is chosen by a *member* and triggers an outbound request from
the operator's machine, `linkpreview.safe_url` is an SSRF gate: http(s) only,
no credentials, and every resolved address must be globally routable — no
loopback, private, link-local, multicast or reserved range, cloud-metadata
included. Redirects are followed by hand so each hop is re-checked. Residual,
documented in the module: DNS rebinding between the check and connect, closed
properly by pinning the checked IP — a follow-up.
Also fixes a long-standing chat annoyance the preview cards made worse:
opening the Chat tab landed a screen or two above the newest message because
the scroll-to-bottom ran before attachment thumbnails and (now) preview cards
had loaded and grown the content. A ResizeObserver keeps the view pinned to
the bottom through late content growth, and does nothing once the reader
scrolls up.
Tests: test_linkpreview.py (the SSRF gate and the OpenGraph parse, incl.
redirect re-validation and image downscaling) and test_link_preview_request.py
(reply shape, the media_cache image round-trip, the result cache).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018gKJ85aZyvEwarXMFzFEwi
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A new group application (docs/apps.md's plug-in mechanism), following the
plan in docs/photos.md. Unlike Videos/Music: several photo roots per group
instead of one (photo_roots is a set, one signed op replaces it whole),
a single album-grid view with no third-party matching step, and per-photo
info read from the file's own EXIF at index time — no metadata service,
no credential, no outbound network call at all.
Protocol (meshbay-common, MNP 0.10 -> 0.11, additive): `taken_at`/`camera`
on IndexEntry; `photo_roots`/`photo_roots_ack`; `OP_PHOTO_ROOTS`.
Node: roster.py stores photo_roots as a group_settings entry (JSON list,
same shape as enabled_apps); ops.py/webrtc_server.py validate and sign the
whole set in one op, same pattern as apps_enabled; a new PhotoEnricher
(indexer/enrich_photo.py) runs Pillow in its own small bounded pool,
separate from the video/audio pools, producing a resized thumbnail plus
the two EXIF fields — never GPS, checked by a grep-based regression test.
Client: photos-app.js — one album card per directory containing images,
a per-album photo grid, and a lightbox with next/previous (keyboard and
buttons), zoom in/out/fit/100% starting from the actual on-screen fit
percentage, and a "zip this album" button reusing files-app.js's own zip
mechanism (lifted into file-utils.js's downloadDirectory so both call the
same implementation). group-settings.js gets an add/remove multi-root
picker, distinct from Videos/Music's single-value one.
Bugs found and fixed before this ever shipped, worth keeping the story of:
- enrich_photo.py read width/height from the raw image *before* applying
EXIF orientation correction, and read DateTimeOriginal off the plain
0th-IFD Exif object — a real camera stores it in the Exif sub-IFD, which
Pillow only exposes via get_ifd(Exif). A flat, hand-built EXIF dict
round-trips through Pillow either way, which is exactly what would have
hidden both bugs; the regression test builds EXIF with piexif instead,
matching what real hardware produces.
- photos-app.js's album grouping stripped a trailing path segment from
entry.path under the assumption it still carried a filename — it
doesn't (files-app.js's own convention: e.path is already the
containing directory), so every album collapsed one level into its
parent. Found live against a real multi-folder library.
- transport.js's ADMIN_OP_TYPES allowlist (already the fix for an
identical bug on video_root/apps_enabled, see 4783d81) was missing
photo_roots: its admin_challenge matched no pending request and was
silently dropped, so saving a photo root just timed out after 30s with
no error.
- daemon.py pruned a thumbnail when its file left the index (root removed
or reconfigured) but never forgot the content hash was "already
attempted" — the same bytes reappearing under a renamed/relocated root
(an operator's real workflow) were then permanently skipped, forever,
with nothing to indicate why. Discarding the attempt alongside the
cache entry on prune is what makes pruning actually reversible.
- packages/meshbay-client's app:// protocol handler served every file
with no Cache-Control header, so Chromium was free to serve a stale
cached copy indefinitely — none of several `npm run sync-ui` + reload
cycles during development actually picked up the new code until the
renderer's disk cache was cleared by hand. Now sends Cache-Control:
no-store.
- the lightbox's zoomed image used flex centering (align-items/
justify-content: center) combined with overflow: auto — a well-known
trap where the browser centers overflowing content by shifting it, and
the leading half of that overflow (here, the top of a zoomed photo)
sits outside what the scrollport can actually reach. Reported live as
"unusable". Fixed by switching to top/left alignment once zoomed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TiZG4AuSnxHohQMpwTHTyL
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musicbay.md's original call — Music needs no root, tag reads are cheap so
just cover the whole shared tree — didn't hold up against a real messy
library: everything under every shared folder got mixed together with no
way to scope Music down to an actual music collection. This adds an
audio_root setting, symmetric to video_root in every respect: signed
operator op (audio_root/audio_root_ack, MNP bumped to 0.10), validated
against a real directory in the group's own roots before a signature is
even asked for, gates tag/cover enrichment exactly like video_root gates
ffprobe/TMDB (nothing runs until it's set, only files under it once it
is), and a set/change fires a one-off sweep of whatever the folder already
contains.
The old trigger — sweep everything the instant "music" joins enabled_apps
— is gone along with the root-less design it belonged to; setting
audio_root is now the trigger, mirroring set_video_root's
enrich_video_root_fn exactly.
Test coverage mirrors the video_root suite: policy (refuse before a
signature round trip, accept/store correctly) and the enrichment gate
itself (nothing without a root, only files under it, sweep on set).
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Tagging and covers for these two formats landed already, but neither one
decodes in any mainstream browser's <audio> element at all — a real
library scan turned up 273 such files that would show up correctly in the
Music app and then simply fail on click. This closes that gap: the node
transcodes to AAC/M4A on request (a one-shot whole-file conversion, not
live-piped like video's fMP4 segments — an audio file is small enough that
streaming it buys nothing), caches the result under its own content hash
the same way a TMDB poster or a MusicBrainz cover is cached, and serves it
back through the ordinary file_req/chunk path. That path used to assume
anything in the media cache was thumbnail-sized (single chunk, always);
generalized it to slice a cached blob the same way a real file on disk
gets sliced, since a transcoded track can be several MB.
New MNP pair (`audio_transcode_req`/`_resp`, version bump to 0.9), shares
its concurrency cap with video's transcode pool rather than getting its
own — both are real ffmpeg processes on the same node. Every other audio
format is untouched: this only fires for .wma/.mpc, the two extensions
that need it.
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Implements the node half of docs/musicbay.md against MNP 0.8:
- IndexEntry gains artist/album/track_no (reuses duration/thumb_hash/
display_title, already generic). New musicbrainz_config/_enabled and
music_meta_req/_resp message pairs, mirroring the TMDB shape.
- title_parse.parse_track_filename: track-number-prefix + title parsing,
fallback-only (embedded tags are the primary source, unlike Videos).
- indexer.enrich_audio.AudioEnricher: mutagen-based tag/embedded-cover
extraction through its own bounded pool (asyncio.to_thread, no
subprocess — no ffmpeg-shaped deadlock risk). Gated on "music" in a
group's enabled_apps rather than a video_root-style scoped folder.
- musicbrainz.py: MusicBrainzClient — no API key (unlike TMDB), just a
self-imposed ~1 req/s pace and a configurable, non-default User-Agent
contact string; inert (no calls at all) when no contact is configured,
never sends an unidentified client.
- media_cache.py: file_mbid/mbid_meta tables alongside the existing TMDB
ones, cover art reusing the thumbs table via a synthetic
musicbrainz:{mbid} id, pruned on file deletion.
- roster.py/ops.py/webrtc_server.py: musicbrainz_contact (node-wide) and
musicbrainz_enabled (per-group, from the start) as signed operator
settings, ALLOWED_APPS gains "music", _do_music_meta_request resolves
and caches a release-level MusicBrainz match per (artist, album).
- daemon.py: AudioEnricher/MusicBrainzClient wired alongside the video
ones; a group's existing library is swept when "music" is newly
enabled (no video_root equivalent — see musicbay.md §2.1).
41 new tests (musicbrainz.py against a mocked transport, admin-op policy
for both new settings, media_cache round-trip/pruning, enrich_audio
end-to-end against real ffmpeg-generated MP3s). Full suite (common +
node + hub): 1116 passed, no regressions.
Client-side (music-app.js, persistent player bar) not started yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KBi7ALLGfwcjBXt57yNMcy
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Three bugs found live testing the Videos app against a real HEVC/EAC3 show,
plus a design change requested afterward:
- Streaming always did "-c:v copy", which faithfully reports a source's real
hev1 codec string but is unplayable in a browser with no HEVC decoder
(most Chrome/Linux builds). The node now transcodes to H264 whenever the
probed codec is browser-incompatible (media_probe.py's new
BROWSER_INCOMPATIBLE_VIDEO_CODECS), with a `transcode_incompatible_video`
node.toml opt-out for operators who know their viewers already decode it.
- Dropping a whole season into an already-watched folder gave no scanning
indicator and no progress bar: IndexProgress was only ever updated by the
two bulk scan paths, never by the real-time per-file watchdog path
(_schedule_update/_debounce/_update_entry). That path now accounts a
"burst" the same way, without double-counting a file rewritten mid-debounce.
- A stray literal "0" rendered in the video detail modal when there was no
TMDB match (`meta.confidence` is 0, and `0 && x` renders "0" in JSX/htm,
not nothing) — `confident` is now a real boolean.
- Whether TMDB is used at all moves from a node-wide setting to per-group
(OP_TMDB_ENABLED/tmdb_enabled/tmdb_enabled_ack, scoped like OP_VIDEO_ROOT):
an operator running a real media-library group alongside test/demo groups
on one node wants outbound TMDB traffic for the one that needs it, not all
of them. The custom API token and query language stay node-wide, one
shared credential/cache (tmdb_config/OP_TMDB_CONFIG, unchanged reasoning).
MNP_VERSION 0.6 -> 0.7, additive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LAmyXtc6dAADsH23ydXQpY
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wizard polish
Two operator-facing fixes for a real 3-season show whose automatic TMDB
match was wrong at the show level: per-season overview/air_date tabs in the
detail modal (falling back to the show-level text when a season's own is
empty), and a "Fix match…" search-and-correct affordance that re-resolves
every file sharing the corrected show's display_title. New signed op
OP_TMDB_OVERRIDE and two read-only pairs (season_meta_req/resp,
tmdb_search_req/resp), MNP_VERSION 0.5 -> 0.6.
Also: the create-group wizard gets a spinning indexing indicator and an
app-selection step, group settings default the TMDB language to the
operator's own locale (never as a global default), and a file renamed
mid-session now re-triggers title parsing instead of being silently
skipped by the enrichment dedup guard.
Fixes two bugs found during this work: the search overlay's z-index lost
to the base video-overlay class and rendered invisibly, and season_meta's
own empty overview didn't fall back to the show-level one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LAmyXtc6dAADsH23ydXQpY
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Implements docs/mediacenter.md: a "Videos" group application built on the
existing files index rather than a separate catalogue. On the node side,
new indexer enrichment (technical probe, filename/season parsing, thumbnail
generation) runs per-file once an operator has chosen a video_root for the
group, plus a TMDB client for on-demand poster/metadata lookups (never
client-side, thumbnails delivered over the existing chunk path). On the hub
side, a new video-app.js renders a lazily-mounted poster grid or a
thumbnail-only flat list, with TMDB entirely optional per group.
Along the way: the global apps registry now drives Settings' default-tab
picker instead of a hardcoded list, and the video_root is configured from
group Settings (like uploads) rather than from Files, with the node
refusing to run any TMDB/thumbnail work until one is set.
Fixes several bugs found via live testing against a real library, notably
a race between two effects writing the same "image ready" state that could
leave a poster grid spinning forever on a same-tab revisit — see
mediacenter.md §5.4 for the full account of each one.
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reconcile, and delta sync
Indexer performance work, in four parts:
- Persistent (path, size, mtime) -> hash cache (indexer/cache.py) so a node
restart no longer re-hashes every file — measured at 23 minutes for a
114 GB library on a slow disk before this, near-instant after. Hashing
is deliberately kept sequential (max_workers=1): it was never actually
concurrent despite the pool size, and two interleaved reads seek-thrash
a spinning disk instead of going faster.
- Byte-based scan progress (IndexProgress), surfaced via the loopback
index-status route, the handshake ack, and a periodic INDEX_PROGRESS
push to connected peers — drives a progress bar in the Create Group
wizard and "add a directory" in Settings, and an animated presence dot.
Guaranteed to settle back to idle via try/finally and a final push on
the scanning->false transition.
- The reconcile backstop's directory walks now run in the executor
instead of blocking the daemon's event loop; its interval defaults to
10 min (was 60s) with adaptive backoff to 2h when nothing changes,
reset on a real change or a peer connecting, and is now a per-group
operator setting (signed op + group Settings UI).
- INDEX_DELTA wired up (protocol support existed, nothing called it):
_on_index_change now sends additions/deletions instead of rebuilding
the full entries list, coalesced over a short window so a burst of
file events produces one push, and the hub swarm registration for
public groups only (re-)registers newly added hashes.
Also fixes several bugs found while testing the above against real
libraries (a 114 GB and a 100+ GB group on a USB HDD):
- /api/reload blocked until the reload — including a brand-new group's
full initial scan — finished, which the Electron bridge's fixed 30s
call timeout turned into a hard failure on any real library. The route
now fires the reload without waiting (ops.start_reload), matching
add_root/remove_root's existing pattern; the wizard's own step order
was fixed to wait for the group to actually appear hosted before the
steps that need it (extra roots, GEK), with retries for the residual
race between that and the daemon's own bookkeeping.
- transport.js's hand-rolled msgpack codec had no case for uint64/int64
(0xcf/0xd3) and crashed decoding any message containing one — hit by
IndexProgress.scanned_bytes/total_bytes for any group over ~4.3 GB.
Verified against real msgpack-encoded bytes from the Python side.
- chat_hist_resp, and this change's own index_progress and
set_scan_settings_ack pushes, were not routed by message type and
could be handed to an unrelated pending request by the transport's
"oldest pending" fallback, stalling it until its own 30s timeout and
corrupting whatever received the wrong reply in its place.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016SF6RKNBKg9qejmoMJ9ybA
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GroupPage's 6620-line app.js carried Chat and Files wedged in directly, with
no way to add another group-level app without touching the shell itself. It
is now app.js (routing, non-group pages) plus nine focused files — apps.js
(the registry), chat-app.js, files-app.js, video-player.js, group-page.js
(the shell), group-settings.js, hub-client.js, icon.js and file-utils.js —
with docs/apps.md as the checklist for adding one (Videos/Music/Photos are
sketched there, not built).
Node side gained the matching enablement mechanism, mirroring
member_upload exactly: a roster setting, a signed apps_enabled op enforced
by _has_admin_authority, exposed in the handshake ack. Operators toggle
applications per group from Settings, which also gained a small reorder:
Invite, Pairing, Applications, Shared directories, Uploads, danger zone,
Your devices, Members.
Two bugs surfaced during the split, both missing an import across the new
file boundary and invisible to node --check or a module-load probe since
they only throw when the code path actually runs:
- group-page.js called onRefreshAuth on a stale-token handshake rejection,
but app.js never imported refreshAccessToken from hub-client.js — so a
brand new member (including a group's own creator) hit "Not a member of
this group" and the retry silently failed, throwing before it could
refresh the token.
- chat-app.js called getLocale() for message timestamps without importing
it from i18n.js. Opening Chat on a group with real messages threw mid-
render; uncaught, that appears to wedge Preact's render scheduler, so
every button on the page stopped responding until reload.
Caught the second class of bug with a proper no-undef audit across all
split files (a temporarily installed ESLint 9, since the system one is too
old to parse this codebase's syntax) rather than trusting grep. 827 tests
pass; 6 new ones cover the apps_enabled policy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016SF6RKNBKg9qejmoMJ9ybA
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Node admin panel (NodePage) now covers every CLI operation over MNP:
group attach/detach, roster, member unpin, GEK rotate, denylist, reload.
Daemon hot-loads new groups and tears down removed ones on config reload
instead of requiring a full restart. Group attach/detach via MNP or
local API triggers an automatic reload so the group is live immediately.
Fixed GroupPage hang on first visit to a newly created group: the JWT
issued at login didn't include the new group, the node rejected with
not_a_member, and the token-refresh path returned without re-triggering
the connect effect (Boolean(token) didn't change). Now bumps retryKey
after a successful refresh so the effect re-runs with the fresh token.
NodePage marks groups hosted by the node but absent from the hub with a
"not on hub" badge so stale groups are visible and easy to remove.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A group where every member may add files stays the default. Some groups want a
library the operator curates, and until now the only way to get one was to
designate no upload root at all — which refuses the operator too.
**The node enforces it; the interface merely stops offering it.** The Upload
button in the Files toolbar and the paperclip in the chat composer both
disappear, which is a courtesy to the people who are not trying. The control is
`_do_file_upload` refusing with `member_upload_off`, so a member on an old tab,
or one speaking MNP directly, gets the same answer. There is a test for each,
and the enforcement test is in the node package rather than beside the UI one so
nobody reads the hidden button as the mechanism.
**Changing it is a signed operator instruction** — `OP_MEMBER_UPLOAD`, on the
same path as removing a member. An unsigned one would let any member turn it
back on and make the setting a suggestion. The transcript's subject is `on` or
`off`: what the operator is shown before signing has to name the outcome, not
the operation.
**It lives on the node**, in a new `group_settings` table in `roster.db`. Not
the hub, which has no business deciding who may write to someone else's disk.
Not `node.toml` either: that file is hand-written and full of comments recording
decisions, `ops.py` appends to it rather than round-tripping it through a
writer, and a setting toggled from a panel must not rewrite the operator's file
or need a restart. The value is cached in the group context because the upload
path is synchronous, and the signed operation updates both — storing it without
applying it would make the panel say one thing while the node did another.
**Absent means allowed**, at every layer: no row in the table, no key in the
context, no field in `handshake_ack`. An older node and an older client both
behave exactly as before, and upgrading never silently closes a group. Each of
those three has its own test, because they fail independently.
The operator is always exempt — otherwise turning it off locks them out of their
own node with a config file and a restart as the only way back. `is_node_admin`
was being computed in two places by then and is now one function, since two
copies of "is this the operator" is how the ack and the gate come to disagree.
A change reaches everyone already connected via `member_upload_ack`, so the
button goes without a reconnection. That message is both a broadcast and the
reply to the request that caused it, which is why the client does not return
early on it.
Docs updated for a cold start: draft-v6 §2.1b and change 9, a new "Where Phase
13 stands" section in CLAUDE.md recording what is built, deployed and still
missing, the module map row, and desktop-client-v1 §10b on the Settings tab and
where group settings live.
883 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Stage C. Identity keys are per node, so a browser and a desktop client are two
keys on one account there — and the node refused the second where it accepted
the first. Without this, an account created natively could never be opened in a
browser without an operator code per node, and "a native client must not prevent
web use" would have been dead on arrival.
Device linking (node)
---------------------
`identities` is keyed by `(user_id, pk_ed25519)` instead of `user_id` alone. The
old shape did `INSERT OR REPLACE`, so a second device overwrote the first
silently; SQLite cannot change a primary key in place, so the table is rebuilt.
Existing pins are carried over — verified against a live roster with 10 of them,
nobody re-pairs.
A new device files a request bound by `sha256(code ‖ its own keys)`, and a key
the node **already pinned** countersigns it. The hub cannot: it has stored no
user keys since 2026-08-14, which is what makes this safe to do without an
operator in the loop.
**The code never reaches the node.** It lists this account's pending requests
with their stored hashes; the approver recomputes and keeps the match. A node
offering fabricated keys would have to produce a hash over a code it has never
seen. Nothing rests on a human comparing digits — that ritual was dropped in
12.1 as "correct, unusable as the default" and must not return by the back door.
The design document had the approver look a request up *by* its hash, which is
circular: computing it needs the keys being asked about. Corrected in both.
Revocation marks rather than deletes, because a deleted row is a key the node
would happily pin again — which is the laptop somebody just reported lost. Your
last device cannot be revoked: coming back would need an operator's code.
Hub — the only change in the whole plan
---------------------------------------
`POST /v1/users/auth` signs in with a device Ed25519 key, on the same pattern as
`/v1/nodes/auth`, plus `/v1/users/devices` to register, list and retire. New
`user_devices` table with an Alembic migration, because `create_all()` is not
one.
This is **not** the key directory that was H3, and the tests say so: nothing
reads it but the hub, no group key is ever wrapped for one, and it is a
different key from the per-node identities. What it does cost is metadata — the
hub now knows how many devices an account has and when each last signed in.
Also `client.minimum` / `client.recommended` in `GET /v1/hub/version`: an
installed client meets a newer hub the day the interface ships in a package, and
that is cheap now and awkward to retrofit.
Browser
-------
The `key_changed` refusal becomes `unknown_device` and offers a linking code
instead of telling someone to find their operator. The Members panel lists this
account's devices here, approves one by code, and retires one.
773 tests pass. `e2e.py` gained a step that links a device end to end against
the live deployment — file, list, recompute, countersign, then open the group
with the new keys and no code — and it also gained `recv_type`, because a step
that assumes the next message is its own answer reads an ack left by the step
before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Stage A — a group's content is a set of named roots
---------------------------------------------------
`shared_dir` becomes a list of {name, path, kind}. The name is the directory's
basename, derived once at add time and *stored*: recomputing it would
re-identify a whole library the day someone renames a folder on disk. Duplicate
names are refused case-insensitively and no root may contain another — both
compared with NFC folding, because most of these directories live on exFAT or
NTFS where `Films` and `films` are one directory.
Every index path carries its root name, in a one-root group as much as in a
five-root one. One path shape has to be got right once; two have to be kept
right for ever.
**A root that goes away freezes; it never empties.** Unmounting a volume makes
watchdog report every file under it as deleted, or presents an empty directory
to the next scan. Acting on either propagates deletions for a whole library to
every member, as though the owner had erased it. So a deletion is acted on only
once its root is confirmed readable, and availability is tracked per root — one
unplugged drive leaves the others serving. 12 tests, verified to fail against an
indexer without the check.
Events are not trusted to be complete either: ReadDirectoryChangesW drops them
under load and inotify on a FUSE mount misses changes made outside it. A
periodic reconciliation sweep is the only thing that recovers a missed event.
MNP 0.2 → 0.3 (additive). The hub needs no change: SwarmSource carries a content
hash, a node id and an endpoint — no paths, no filenames — and private groups
register nothing (H7).
Stage B — one implementation behind every front door
----------------------------------------------------
C1 and C6 were both "a second path into the node with its own weaker
handshake". Two implementations of `revoke` with two authorization checks is
that shape one size down. `meshbay_node/ops.py` holds each operation once,
takes the daemon state, and knows nothing about HTTP, argv or MNP. The loopback
API is one `_op(...)` line per endpoint; the MNP handlers call the same
functions. test_ops.py asserts the shape rather than trusting it.
Phase 14 is finished on top of it — `group list`, `gek init|rotate`, `reload`
(SIGHUP), `denylist show|clear`, `file list|rm`. **No operator action requires a
browser any more.** Plus `gek_rotate` and `member_unpin` as operator-signed MNP
operations: rotation is the half of revocation that revocation cannot do, since
the ex-member holds the current key, and the node generates the replacement
with its own CSPRNG — no key material crosses the wire, which is what the C5b
rule is actually about.
Two bugs found by running it rather than by testing it
------------------------------------------------------
GroupIndex is keyed by **content hash**, so the same bytes at two paths are one
entry — which is also why a scan reports ten files and indexes nine.
Reconciliation compared paths, so it decided the second path was a missed event
every 60 s, rewrote the entry and pushed an index update to every connected
peer. Seen in a live node's log.
`meshbay-node reload` crashed on first use with `subprocess` unimported: the
module compiles fine, which is the "syntax, not names" trap already recorded for
the SPA. test_cli_dispatch.py now walks every verb and refuses to let one be
added to the parser without an entry there.
Also corrected: protocol.py declared a second MNP_VERSION of "0.1" while the
wire carried "0.2" — harmless only because nothing imported it. And
_do_dir_create/_do_dir_delete referenced an undefined `filename` on their error
path.
740 tests pass; QE/deploy/e2e.py passes end to end against the live deployment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`get_messages` pages forward from the oldest message. That is the right shape
for "what happened since I last looked" and the wrong one for opening a
conversation, and the browser asked it for `since=0, limit=200` — so a group
with more than two hundred messages showed its first two hundred and the
exchange anyone came for was unreachable. Demonstrated on 300 messages: the
newest was simply absent from the answer.
`get_recent` and `get_before` page backwards, cursored on the row id rather than
the timestamp. Nothing makes a `time.time()` float unique, and a cursor on a
value two rows can share eventually skips a message or repeats it.
PING/PONG covers liveness on an already-open channel: a DataChannel whose peer
vanished without closing still reads as connected, and nothing noticed until a
real request hung. It is not a discovery mechanism — opening a connection to
ping costs a full ICE/DTLS handshake, measured at 0.6-7 s across two ISPs — so
presence in the group list comes from the hub's registry instead.
Both additions are backward compatible: an 0.1 peer sends no `before` and is
answered with the newest page, which is what it wanted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**Closing the viewer left the node working.** Nothing told it to stop:
the player dropped its handlers, which only made the browser deaf. ffmpeg
kept running and held one of the node's two transcode slots until the
credit timeout expired two minutes later — which is why the next video
answered "server busy". `stream_stop` ends it at once, and the viewer
also drops its queue, ends the MediaSource and revokes the object URL on
the way out, any of which could be holding megabytes of decrypted video.
While there: `file_chunk` replies were matched to their requests by
arrival order, which was true by luck rather than by construction. The
reply now names the file it belongs to and is matched on that and the
chunk index; a chunk nobody is waiting for is dropped instead of being
handed to whatever request happens to be oldest.
**The administration panel counted its own history.** A deleted account
is tombstoned so the connection log stays readable, and every count and
list treated that row as a user — including a group's member count, and
the member list of the group itself. They do not any more.
**Where a node is.** `endpoint_hint` is what a node believes its address
to be, learned from a STUN server and sent to us: useful for reaching it,
and a claim. The announcement that carries it is signed with the node key
over a fresh timestamp, so the address that request *arrives from* is the
address of whoever holds that key — that is now recorded on the node row
and shown in a Nodes tab, next to the hint, with the difference spelled
out. Clients get the same treatment: `webrtc_offer` is logged with the
address the hub saw when a browser starts a peer connection.
Verified against the live deployment: the node's row reads 90.112.206.172
after a restart, and in e2e a stopped stream goes quiet in one message
and the next one starts immediately instead of being refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**Removing a member.** The owner can do it from the Members tab, and it
is two halves in the order that fails safe: the node stops serving the
group key first (an operator-signed request, so a paired browser only),
then the hub drops the membership row. The other order would leave
someone able to reach a node that still serves them.
It is a membership, not an account. The user row is never written: their
other groups, their files and their pinned identity survive, because one
group's owner must not be able to erase someone from the hub. It is also
per group — a node hosting two loses them from one — and it does not take
back the key they already unwrapped, which is what rotating the GEK is
for. The confirmation and the panel both say so.
**Downloads and streaming through the disk, in both browsers.** The audit
this started as found two ways to put gigabytes in a tab.
Firefox and Safari have no File System Access API, so every download
there was collected in memory. A service worker fixes it: the page keeps
the writable half of a transferred stream, the worker answers a made-up
URL with the readable half and a Content-Disposition header, and the
browser writes it to disk as it arrives, with real backpressure. The
worker caches nothing and falls through on every request that is not one
of these downloads. A zip announces no Content-Length, since the archive
is larger than the files in it and a length we miss truncates the file.
Video was worse and affected both browsers. The node pushed ffmpeg's
whole output as fast as it was produced while the player consumed a
segment at a time, so the queue held the film — and appending all of it
hit the SourceBuffer's cap, where the handler logged the error and
dropped the segment, leaving a hole in the middle of the film with
nothing to show for it. Streaming is credit-based now, 24 segments of
256 KB in flight, verified against the live node: three credits, three
segments, then silence until more are granted. The player evicts what is
more than a minute behind the playhead and retries a refused segment
rather than dropping it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Two things a Files panel needs and did not have.
**Removing a directory** is privileged, where creating one is not: it
acts on a name other members are using, on the operator's disk. It is
refused unless the directory is empty, and that rule is the safety
property — whatever the browser sends, this cannot destroy content. The
check runs twice, once before the challenge and once after the signature
comes back, because a file can land during the round trip. A file also
accepts its uploader's key; a directory has no uploader, so only the
operator's key will do.
**Downloading a folder** produces a zip built in the browser, written
straight to disk as the chunks arrive. An archive of a group folder is
routinely tens of gigabytes, so nothing is held: peak memory is one chunk
plus a small record per file. The node is not involved at all — it serves
the same encrypted chunks as any other download, holds no temporary
files, and cannot be asked to compress anything.
zipstream.js is store-only. Group content is video and images, already
compressed, so deflate would spend CPU on every byte to save nothing, in
the thread that is also decrypting. Sizes and CRCs go in a data
descriptor after each file because a stream cannot seek back to patch a
header, and zip64 kicks in per entry past 4 GiB and for the archive
itself. Because none of that can be checked from the Python side of the
house, test_zipstream.py runs the real module under Node and reads what
it produces with zipfile — CRCs, UTF-8 names, zip64 records and all. The
archives also pass `unzip -t`.
Firefox and Safari have no File System Access API, so there is nowhere to
stream to: the fallback builds the archive in memory and says so, with
the size, before starting rather than after failing.
One mistake worth recording: the first version of deleteDirectory passed
the node's own answer as the value to check the challenge against, which
turns the comparison into a tautology. It checks the path we asked for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The per-user quarantine is gone. `.uploads/{user_id}/` was the fix for C5a, and
it worked, but it made the shared directory something nobody could organise:
every file landed under a uuid nobody recognises. Files now go where the member
is looking, most often the root.
What the quarantine actually bought is kept, and is now what the tests assert
rather than the location:
- an existing file is never replaced. That was the real defect — overwriting a
file also made the attacker its recorded uploader, and therefore able to
delete it through the uploader path
- the name allowlist is unchanged
- the destination is confined under the shared root
That last one is new surface: the directory arrives from the client. safe_subdir()
is the single place that decides, with two independent guards — every segment
against the name allowlist, and the resolved result under the root — because one
of them will eventually be refactored by someone who does not know why it is
there. Ten traversal cases are covered, and they fail if both guards go.
Also adds `dir_create` (any member may organise a shared directory; audited like
anything that writes to the operator's disk) and makes the node report its real
directory list in index_sync — folders were inferred from file paths, so a new
empty one, or one that had been emptied, simply did not exist as far as the UI
was concerned.
Two C5a tests changed their assertions deliberately, as C5b's did before: they
encoded the quarantine path, which is the thing being removed. The property they
existed for is asserted more directly than before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Two things the multi-browser story made obvious.
**The backup is now opt-out.** Keys are kept, encrypted with the passphrase, on
every node whose group you join — that is what lets a second browser recover
them, and it is finding C4: a PBKDF2-protected blob on other people's disks,
attackable offline at the speed of PBKDF2, which is memory-light and therefore
cheap on a GPU. Until now everybody paid that cost, including people who will
only ever use one browser and get nothing back for it.
Settings → "Use this account on other devices". Turning it off does not merely
stop future uploads: the next connection to each node withdraws what that node
already holds (new keypair_bundle_delete, which only ever deletes the caller's
own, taken from the authenticated session and never from the message). The
warning says plainly what it costs — clearing the browser then loses everything
encrypted for that account, with no recovery, which is the point of choosing it.
Default is on. Silent, unrecoverable key loss is worse for an ordinary user than
an exposure the roadmap already tracks, but that is a judgement call and it is
now visible and reversible instead of implicit.
**Passphrase floor 8 → 12 characters, plus a strength estimate** shown while
typing, with a refusal below ~60 bits. This number matters more here than in
most applications: it is what stands between a node operator and your identity
keys. It has to live in the client — with the password split (T1) the hub never
sees a password and cannot enforce anything about one — so the UI says why it
is asking, rather than nagging.
The estimator is deliberately conservative and dependency-free: character
classes and length, penalised for repetition and for the handful of patterns
everyone tries.
Verified against the live deployment: withdrawing the backup leaves a second
browser unable to recover anything, which is exactly what it promises, and
re-enabling restores it.
Tests: 338.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The invite flow fetched the invitee's pk_x25519 from the hub and wrapped the
GEK for whatever came back (app.js:1466, and gek-init did the same server-side).
The hub is the key directory, so a hub answering with its own key was handed the
group key by an honest member following the protocol exactly. No forgery, no
injection, nothing for the client to notice. That was H3.
The fix is not safety numbers. Nobody reads the directory any more:
- the node holds the GEK and wraps it itself, on every connection, for the
X25519 key the joiner signed with their Ed25519 identity in one transcript
(meshbay:join:v1), so the identity key vouches for the encryption key;
- identities are bound to accounts by a one-time code the hub never sees —
40 bits, single use, one account, bounded per connection AND node-wide;
- the node's own roster decides who may receive the key. Hub membership lets
someone reach a node; it no longer gets them anything. A hub that invents an
account and mints it a token is answered not_authorized_for_group.
Safety numbers would have made substitution detectable by a human who checks, at
the moment there is nothing to check against — first contact. Removing the lookup
makes it impossible, and costs the user one code to pass along.
M3 falls out of the same work. The daemon auto-pinned its own keystore key as
admin_pk_ed25519 while the browser signs with the user identity key, so every
privileged operation failed closed with a signature error that looked like a bug
somewhere else; the demo only worked because a deploy script overwrote the value.
Authority now comes from the roster, established locally by `operator pair`.
Asking the hub for the operator's key — the obvious-looking fix — would have let
the hub install itself as node administrator.
BREAKING: gek_bundle_store is deleted, not gated. No member hands the node key
material at all, so C5b becomes structural rather than an authorization to check.
Existing stored bundles are still served, so current deployments keep working.
Also:
- join_policy (invite|open) is read from node.toml, never from the hub — a hub
able to declare a group open would be handed its key. Unknown group ⇒ invite.
- admin signatures are verified against the roster on every check, so unpinning
takes effect without a restart. admin_pk_ed25519 stays readable as legacy.
- two C5b tests were rewritten, deliberately: they asserted that
gek_bundle_store demanded an operator signature, and the message is gone. They
now assert the stronger property. The file says not to fix these tests, so
this is the record of why they changed.
- a slice-1 bug found while writing slice 2: connect() never passed skEdB64, so
pairing would have failed at runtime with no test able to catch it.
Tests: 152 node+common here, including an end-to-end DataChannel run where a
member who has never held the group key redeems a code in the pre-proof window
and receives the key wrapped for a key only they can open.
Design: docs/invite-pairing-v1.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5 hardening batch — H7, H4, M2, M6, M7, L1, L3, L6.
H7 — private content hashes leaked to the hub. The daemon registered blake3
hashes for every group it hosted, private ones included, giving the hub a
content fingerprint of every private file and letting anyone confirm whether a
known file exists in the network. The leak was dormant only because the routes
were declared on the groups router with a full path and mounted at
/v1/groups/v1/swarm/* — the node's calls 404'd into a swallowed exception.
Fixing the path alone would have activated the leak, so both land together:
registration is gated on group visibility, the routes moved to a real
/v1/swarm router, and the lookup now requires authentication.
H4 — revocation was advisory. Group revocations were signed and broadcast by
the hub and then dropped by the node, whose handler understood only "user" and
"jti", so "suspend a group" enforced nothing. The denylist was also in-memory
only, so a restart silently un-revoked everyone. Now persisted to
data_dir/denylist.json, group targets honoured on both transports, and live
sessions for a revoked group are closed.
M2 — the node keystore, which protects the node's Ed25519 and X25519 private
keys, was still deriving at 64 MB long after the hub's password verifier moved
to 256 MB; the docs recorded the bump as done, true for the hub only. Raising
the constant alone would have made every existing keystore permanently
undecryptable, so envelopes now record the parameters they were written with
and pre-M2 files continue to open under the legacy profile.
M6 — registration inserted its audit row with a NULL user_id and then ran
UPDATE ip_logs SET user_id=<new> WHERE user_id IS NULL, claiming every
unattributed row in the table: failed logins for other usernames, concurrent
registrations. In logs retained a year for legal requests, that attributed
other people's connections to the wrong account.
M7 — X-Forwarded-For was trusted unconditionally at four call sites, so anyone
could forge the IP written to the compliance log and evade per-IP rate limits.
New netutil.client_ip honours the header only from a trusted proxy and takes
the rightmost hop (the one our proxy appended); no direct header reads remain.
L1 dead GEK_REQUEST/GEK_RESPONSE constants removed; L3 peer errors no longer
echo exception text (paths, internal state); L6 email sanity-checked instead of
accepting any string — deliberately not RFC 5322, to avoid a new dependency.
test_daemon_index_change_pushes_to_peers asserted that a PRIVATE group's hashes
are registered with the hub. Split: private asserts not-called (index push to
members still asserted), and a new test proves public groups still register.
That is the fourth pre-existing test found asserting a vulnerability as
intended behaviour, after gek auto-activation, the transport-wide chat_store
and the blind admin challenge.
Tests: 116 node, 132 hub+common. Regression suite now 43.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Baseline commit capturing in-progress Phase 12 work that was already present
in the working tree (uncommitted) before the Phase 11.5 security remediation
begins. Committed as-is, without review or modification, so that remediation
changes arrive as a separable diff.
Contents: BundleStore (P2P GEK + keypair bundles), password split
(auth_key / bundle_key), node Ed25519 auth (POST /v1/nodes/auth, node-scoped
JWT), GEK-HMAC handshake proof with DTLS channel binding, Ed25519 admin
challenge-response, node local admin UI rewrite, browser key persistence.
Not authored in this session — captured to establish a baseline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Replace download-then-play VideoPlayer with MSE (MediaSource Extensions)
streaming. Node remuxes to fMP4 via ffmpeg, probes codecs with ffprobe,
and sends encrypted segments over DataChannel. Browser decrypts and
appends to SourceBuffer — playback starts within seconds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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inline thumbnails
- Upload chunks capped at 64KB to avoid WebRTC DataChannel max-message-size
- Show cached files immediately while WebRTC connects (tabs visible during connection)
- Persist sender_name in chat store (SQLite) — no more UUID display in history
- File delete action in menu (node admin only, enforced server-side)
- FILE_DELETE / FILE_DELETE_ACK MNP message types
- Inline image thumbnails in chat attachments (download+decrypt, Signal-style)
- Member panel: "Owner" label instead of "Group admin" to avoid hub/group admin confusion
- Create group page: hint about needing a node
- Refresh index after chat file attachment upload
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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search)
Six self-service features for the web SPA:
- Group creation UI with GEK auto-generation (AES-256-GCM ECIES)
- Member management + invite by username (GEK wrapping for invitee)
- Open group self-join flow (POST /v1/groups/{id}/join)
- File upload client→node (FILE_UPLOAD MNP type, .uploads/ staging)
- IndexedDB caching of group file indexes (instant display on revisit)
- Cross-group file search (SearchPage, pure client-side on cached indexes)
11 new tests (166 total): 8 group self-service + 3 AES GEK wrap/unwrap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Complete browser-based client: Preact SPA with login, group file browser,
encrypted download, video playback, group chat, i18n, and dark/light theme.
Browser connects P2P to nodes behind residential NAT via WebRTC DataChannel
(aiortc). Hub handles signaling only — all data flows E2E.
Performance: pipelined downloads (8-chunk sliding window), binary msgpack
wire format (no base64), redundant I/O elimination. Large file downloads
stream to disk via File System Access API (showSaveFilePicker).
Validated on SFR + Orange residential NATs, Chrome + Firefox, IPv4/IPv6.
132 tests passing. Deployed to meshbay.org + Orange node.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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3-package layout: meshbay-common (shared crypto/protocol),
meshbay-hub (FastAPI server), meshbay-node (local daemon).
Includes validated POC spikes 1-6 in poc/, architecture drafts
v1/v2 in docs/, and CLAUDE.md project conventions.
All cryptographic primitives extracted from POC into
meshbay_common/crypto.py (GEK wrap/unwrap, chunk key derivation,
keystore encryption, chunk signing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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