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Phase 11.5 hardening batch — H7, H4, M2, M6, M7, L1, L3, L6.
H7 — private content hashes leaked to the hub. The daemon registered blake3
hashes for every group it hosted, private ones included, giving the hub a
content fingerprint of every private file and letting anyone confirm whether a
known file exists in the network. The leak was dormant only because the routes
were declared on the groups router with a full path and mounted at
/v1/groups/v1/swarm/* — the node's calls 404'd into a swallowed exception.
Fixing the path alone would have activated the leak, so both land together:
registration is gated on group visibility, the routes moved to a real
/v1/swarm router, and the lookup now requires authentication.
H4 — revocation was advisory. Group revocations were signed and broadcast by
the hub and then dropped by the node, whose handler understood only "user" and
"jti", so "suspend a group" enforced nothing. The denylist was also in-memory
only, so a restart silently un-revoked everyone. Now persisted to
data_dir/denylist.json, group targets honoured on both transports, and live
sessions for a revoked group are closed.
M2 — the node keystore, which protects the node's Ed25519 and X25519 private
keys, was still deriving at 64 MB long after the hub's password verifier moved
to 256 MB; the docs recorded the bump as done, true for the hub only. Raising
the constant alone would have made every existing keystore permanently
undecryptable, so envelopes now record the parameters they were written with
and pre-M2 files continue to open under the legacy profile.
M6 — registration inserted its audit row with a NULL user_id and then ran
UPDATE ip_logs SET user_id=<new> WHERE user_id IS NULL, claiming every
unattributed row in the table: failed logins for other usernames, concurrent
registrations. In logs retained a year for legal requests, that attributed
other people's connections to the wrong account.
M7 — X-Forwarded-For was trusted unconditionally at four call sites, so anyone
could forge the IP written to the compliance log and evade per-IP rate limits.
New netutil.client_ip honours the header only from a trusted proxy and takes
the rightmost hop (the one our proxy appended); no direct header reads remain.
L1 dead GEK_REQUEST/GEK_RESPONSE constants removed; L3 peer errors no longer
echo exception text (paths, internal state); L6 email sanity-checked instead of
accepting any string — deliberately not RFC 5322, to avoid a new dependency.
test_daemon_index_change_pushes_to_peers asserted that a PRIVATE group's hashes
are registered with the hub. Split: private asserts not-called (index push to
members still asserted), and a new test proves public groups still register.
That is the fourth pre-existing test found asserting a vulnerability as
intended behaviour, after gek auto-activation, the transport-wide chat_store
and the blind admin challenge.
Tests: 116 node, 132 hub+common. Regression suite now 43.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Baseline commit capturing in-progress Phase 12 work that was already present
in the working tree (uncommitted) before the Phase 11.5 security remediation
begins. Committed as-is, without review or modification, so that remediation
changes arrive as a separable diff.
Contents: BundleStore (P2P GEK + keypair bundles), password split
(auth_key / bundle_key), node Ed25519 auth (POST /v1/nodes/auth, node-scoped
JWT), GEK-HMAC handshake proof with DTLS channel binding, Ed25519 admin
challenge-response, node local admin UI rewrite, browser key persistence.
Not authored in this session — captured to establish a baseline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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search)
Six self-service features for the web SPA:
- Group creation UI with GEK auto-generation (AES-256-GCM ECIES)
- Member management + invite by username (GEK wrapping for invitee)
- Open group self-join flow (POST /v1/groups/{id}/join)
- File upload client→node (FILE_UPLOAD MNP type, .uploads/ staging)
- IndexedDB caching of group file indexes (instant display on revisit)
- Cross-group file search (SearchPage, pure client-side on cached indexes)
11 new tests (166 total): 8 group self-service + 3 AES GEK wrap/unwrap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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- 10.5: Notification model + CRUD API (list, mark read, mark all read)
Triggered on: group invite, role change, suspend/unsuspend
- 10.6: SettingsPage shows role, per-group notification mute (localStorage)
- 10.7: GET /v1/groups?q= search filter (ilike on name)
- 10.8: NotificationFeed on home page + bell with unread badge in navbar
- 10.10: GET /v1/hub/version endpoint for client update checks
- 8 new tests (test_notifications.py), 155 total
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Complete browser-based client: Preact SPA with login, group file browser,
encrypted download, video playback, group chat, i18n, and dark/light theme.
Browser connects P2P to nodes behind residential NAT via WebRTC DataChannel
(aiortc). Hub handles signaling only — all data flows E2E.
Performance: pipelined downloads (8-chunk sliding window), binary msgpack
wire format (no base64), redundant I/O elimination. Large file downloads
stream to disk via File System Access API (showSaveFilePicker).
Validated on SFR + Orange residential NATs, Chrome + Firefox, IPv4/IPv6.
132 tests passing. Deployed to meshbay.org + Orange node.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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8.1 Config-based admin authz (require_admin on all admin endpoints)
8.2 Email encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM, HKDF from hub Ed25519 key)
8.3 Refresh token rotation with family-based reuse detection
8.4 Federation persistence (HubPeer model replaces in-memory dict)
8.5 Federation token verification now async (DB-backed)
8.6 CSAM hash check wired into swarm registration flow
8.7 Rate limiting on auth endpoints (5/10/20 per minute)
8.8 Healthcheck endpoint (GET /v1/health, no auth)
8.9 IP log cleanup background task (365-day retention)
8.10 Argon2id params bumped to 256 MB (pw_version, rehash on login)
Deployed to meshbay.org — schema migrated, existing emails encrypted.
117 tests pass (29 hub, 88 common+node).
Resolves security review items S1, S2, S5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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6.1 Double Ratchet (meshbay_common/ratchet.py):
Forward secrecy, break-in recovery, out-of-order delivery.
Signal-spec KDF_RK/KDF_CK via HKDF-SHA256. 11/11 tests.
6.2 Multi-group node (config.py):
[[groups]] TOML array, per-group ports, back-compat [group].
6.3 MHP federation persistence (db/models.py FederatedGroup + SwarmSource):
receive_directory() now persists to federated_groups table.
list_public_groups() includes federated results with source attribution.
6.4 Content replication (node/replication.py + hub SwarmSource):
ContentReplicator: fetch-index, download, hash-verify, register-swarm.
Hub: POST /v1/swarm/register, GET /v1/swarm/{hash} for multi-source.
6.5 Browser private group (webcrypto.py + static/crypto.js):
AES-256-GCM variant of GEK for WebCrypto-compatible groups.
crypto.js: SubtleCrypto importGEK + deriveChunkKey + decryptChunk.
Keys distinct from ChaCha20 via :aes HKDF info suffix. 4/4 tests.
74/74 tests total.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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webapp.py: serves / (HTML SPA) and /app.js (JS client).
app.js: login, hub API calls, node HTTP API integration,
file browser, HLS video streaming via <video> tag.
groups.py: GET /v1/groups — public group listing (no auth).
Deployed on https://meshbay.org — 200 OK. 47/47 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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config.py: TOML + env var priority. auth.py: Argon2id passwords,
JWT EdDSA with jti, refresh token hashed (blake3). Routers:
hub (info/pubkey), users (register/login/refresh/pubkeys),
nodes (announce/get), groups (create/gek-bundle/gek-retrieve).
Rate limiting via slowapi. app.py factory with lifespan.
All 40 tests pass (SQLite in-memory, no PostgreSQL required).
Fix: remove tests/__init__.py to resolve namespace conflicts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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