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`Cache-Control: no-cache` requires a browser to revalidate, but it only binds
one that asks. A browser that cached app.js before that header existed applies
heuristic freshness instead — a fraction of the file's age, which for a file
dated weeks ago is days — and never asks. It then runs an old player against a
new node.
That cost most of a session. A phone kept a player without the read-ahead bound
and filled the browser's buffer ceiling at 106 MB, the exact symptom the bound
had been written to remove, for an hour after the bounded player went live. A
fix that is written, tested, deployed and served, and still not what runs, is
indistinguishable from a fix that does not work.
The whole module graph now lives under `/a/<content-hash>/`. A path prefix
rather than a query string, because relative imports inherit it: `app.js`
reaching for `./i18n.js` gets the build it was written against, and never a
mixture of two — which does not render a stale page, it fails to link. The URL
changes with the content, so those may be cached hard.
`sw.js` stays at the root. Its scope is its own path, and under the prefix it
would no longer control the pages whose downloads it exists to intercept.
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The SPA became a module graph that has to agree with itself: app.js
imports i18n.js, which imports a catalogue from locales/. Serving one of
them from cache while fetching another is not a stale page, it is a broken
one, and both directions were reproduced:
- a browser holding the previous i18n.js fails to *link* the new app.js
("does not provide an export named 'initLocale'"). That happens before
any code runs, so the fallback in the boot cannot catch it — blank page.
- the reverse pairing links and renders, but nothing calls initLocale(),
so every string comes out as its own key: nav.logout, group.tab_files.
Starlette sends only etag and last-modified, and with no explicit
freshness a browser is entitled to guess one — roughly 10% of the age
since last-modified, which is comfortably long enough to catch a deploy.
Caddy is a plain reverse proxy and adds nothing.
`no-cache` does not disable caching; it requires a conditional request,
which the existing ETag answers with a 304 and no body. Measured: 304,
0 bytes, on every static path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5 hardening batch — H7, H4, M2, M6, M7, L1, L3, L6.
H7 — private content hashes leaked to the hub. The daemon registered blake3
hashes for every group it hosted, private ones included, giving the hub a
content fingerprint of every private file and letting anyone confirm whether a
known file exists in the network. The leak was dormant only because the routes
were declared on the groups router with a full path and mounted at
/v1/groups/v1/swarm/* — the node's calls 404'd into a swallowed exception.
Fixing the path alone would have activated the leak, so both land together:
registration is gated on group visibility, the routes moved to a real
/v1/swarm router, and the lookup now requires authentication.
H4 — revocation was advisory. Group revocations were signed and broadcast by
the hub and then dropped by the node, whose handler understood only "user" and
"jti", so "suspend a group" enforced nothing. The denylist was also in-memory
only, so a restart silently un-revoked everyone. Now persisted to
data_dir/denylist.json, group targets honoured on both transports, and live
sessions for a revoked group are closed.
M2 — the node keystore, which protects the node's Ed25519 and X25519 private
keys, was still deriving at 64 MB long after the hub's password verifier moved
to 256 MB; the docs recorded the bump as done, true for the hub only. Raising
the constant alone would have made every existing keystore permanently
undecryptable, so envelopes now record the parameters they were written with
and pre-M2 files continue to open under the legacy profile.
M6 — registration inserted its audit row with a NULL user_id and then ran
UPDATE ip_logs SET user_id=<new> WHERE user_id IS NULL, claiming every
unattributed row in the table: failed logins for other usernames, concurrent
registrations. In logs retained a year for legal requests, that attributed
other people's connections to the wrong account.
M7 — X-Forwarded-For was trusted unconditionally at four call sites, so anyone
could forge the IP written to the compliance log and evade per-IP rate limits.
New netutil.client_ip honours the header only from a trusted proxy and takes
the rightmost hop (the one our proxy appended); no direct header reads remain.
L1 dead GEK_REQUEST/GEK_RESPONSE constants removed; L3 peer errors no longer
echo exception text (paths, internal state); L6 email sanity-checked instead of
accepting any string — deliberately not RFC 5322, to avoid a new dependency.
test_daemon_index_change_pushes_to_peers asserted that a PRIVATE group's hashes
are registered with the hub. Split: private asserts not-called (index push to
members still asserted), and a new test proves public groups still register.
That is the fourth pre-existing test found asserting a vulnerability as
intended behaviour, after gek auto-activation, the transport-wide chat_store
and the blind admin challenge.
Tests: 116 node, 132 hub+common. Regression suite now 43.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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- 10.5: Notification model + CRUD API (list, mark read, mark all read)
Triggered on: group invite, role change, suspend/unsuspend
- 10.6: SettingsPage shows role, per-group notification mute (localStorage)
- 10.7: GET /v1/groups?q= search filter (ilike on name)
- 10.8: NotificationFeed on home page + bell with unread badge in navbar
- 10.10: GET /v1/hub/version endpoint for client update checks
- 8 new tests (test_notifications.py), 155 total
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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- Site overlay: landing page, /about, /downloads (dark/light, responsive)
- User role column (user/moderator/admin) with config-based admin sync
- require_moderator dependency + admin API (8 endpoints: stats, users,
groups, audit logs)
- Admin SPA panel at #/admin with 5 tabs (stats, users, groups, logs,
blocklist) — visible only to moderators/admins
- SPA also served at /app/ for Caddy site overlay integration
- GET /v1/users/me returns current user role
- 15 new tests, 147 total passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Complete browser-based client: Preact SPA with login, group file browser,
encrypted download, video playback, group chat, i18n, and dark/light theme.
Browser connects P2P to nodes behind residential NAT via WebRTC DataChannel
(aiortc). Hub handles signaling only — all data flows E2E.
Performance: pipelined downloads (8-chunk sliding window), binary msgpack
wire format (no base64), redundant I/O elimination. Large file downloads
stream to disk via File System Access API (showSaveFilePicker).
Validated on SFR + Orange residential NATs, Chrome + Firefox, IPv4/IPv6.
132 tests passing. Deployed to meshbay.org + Orange node.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Browser clients can now connect P2P to nodes behind residential NAT via
WebRTC DataChannel with ICE/STUN. Validated on SFR Port-Restricted Cone
NAT + 4G CGNAT across three scenarios (WiFi LAN, 4G IPv6, 4G IPv4 STUN).
No TURN relay needed. Hub serves only as signaling relay (<1 KB).
New files:
- webrtc_server.py: aiortc-based WebRTC transport (node side)
- signaling.py: SDP/ICE relay endpoint (hub side)
- transport.js: browser WebRTC client with msgpack framing
- webrtc-test.html: spike test page for browser→NAT→node validation
- test_webrtc_transport.py: 4 tests (handshake, file transfer, auth, guard)
- meshbay-draft-v4.md: architecture spec updated for web client
Modified:
- hub_client.py: WebRTC offer handling via hub WebSocket
- revocation.py: node_id from WS auth + webrtc_answer routing
- pyproject.toml: aiortc>=1.9 dependency
123 tests passing (117 existing + 6 new).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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8.1 Config-based admin authz (require_admin on all admin endpoints)
8.2 Email encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM, HKDF from hub Ed25519 key)
8.3 Refresh token rotation with family-based reuse detection
8.4 Federation persistence (HubPeer model replaces in-memory dict)
8.5 Federation token verification now async (DB-backed)
8.6 CSAM hash check wired into swarm registration flow
8.7 Rate limiting on auth endpoints (5/10/20 per minute)
8.8 Healthcheck endpoint (GET /v1/health, no auth)
8.9 IP log cleanup background task (365-day retention)
8.10 Argon2id params bumped to 256 MB (pw_version, rehash on login)
Deployed to meshbay.org — schema migrated, existing emails encrypted.
117 tests pass (29 hub, 88 common+node).
Resolves security review items S1, S2, S5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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CSAMChecker: loads blake3 hash database from file (NCMEC/IWF format).
check_content_hash(): used before serving public content.
/v1/admin/csam/status: hash count + DB path.
/v1/admin/csam/check: admin-only hash check (no hash logged).
Hash database NOT included — hub operators must obtain access
from NCMEC (US) or IWF (EU). Instructions in csam.py header.
59/59 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Federation (MHP 0.1): /mhp/info, /mhp/directory (GET=export, POST=receive),
/mhp/revoke (propagation), /mhp/peers (admin registration).
Peer auth: JWT EdDSA signed by requesting hub's key.
Explicit peer allowlist — no auto-discovery.
Relay (5.3): /v1/relays (GET=list), /v1/relays/register (relay keepalive),
/v1/relays/approve (admin pre-approval). Relays pre-approved by admin,
then self-register with signed endpoint. Nodes query when hole punch fails.
59/59 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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DB: ContentReport + ContentBlocklist tables.
POST /v1/reports: public endpoint, auto-blocks after 2 reports.
GET /v1/blocklist/check: node sync check before serving public content.
GET /v1/blocklist: full list for node startup sync.
GET|POST|DELETE /v1/admin/blocklist: admin management.
6/6 tests. Full suite: 59/59.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Hub: /v1/nodes/ws WebSocket endpoint for persistent node connections.
/v1/admin/revoke marks user/group revoked in DB, signs JWT revocation
token (EdDSA), broadcasts to all connected nodes.
Node: RevocationSubscriber maintains WS connection, verifies
incoming revocation tokens offline (hub Ed25519 PK), adds to
local blocklist (_revoked_users/_revoked_groups sets).
53/53 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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webapp.py: serves / (HTML SPA) and /app.js (JS client).
app.js: login, hub API calls, node HTTP API integration,
file browser, HLS video streaming via <video> tag.
groups.py: GET /v1/groups — public group listing (no auth).
Deployed on https://meshbay.org — 200 OK. 47/47 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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config.py: TOML + env var priority. auth.py: Argon2id passwords,
JWT EdDSA with jti, refresh token hashed (blake3). Routers:
hub (info/pubkey), users (register/login/refresh/pubkeys),
nodes (announce/get), groups (create/gek-bundle/gek-retrieve).
Rate limiting via slowapi. app.py factory with lifespan.
All 40 tests pass (SQLite in-memory, no PostgreSQL required).
Fix: remove tests/__init__.py to resolve namespace conflicts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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3-package layout: meshbay-common (shared crypto/protocol),
meshbay-hub (FastAPI server), meshbay-node (local daemon).
Includes validated POC spikes 1-6 in poc/, architecture drafts
v1/v2 in docs/, and CLAUDE.md project conventions.
All cryptographic primitives extracted from POC into
meshbay_common/crypto.py (GEK wrap/unwrap, chunk key derivation,
keystore encryption, chunk signing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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