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Phase 11.5 — findings H1, C5a, H2, C5b, H5 (see second-review.md).
Batched together because the node-side changes share webrtc_server.py and
cannot be separated into working commits.
H1 — cross-group chat leak. chat_store, the peer registry and the display-name
cache were read from the shared transport context, and daemon.py hoisted the
FIRST group's chat store onto it. On a node hosting several groups every
group's messages went to one database, chat_history served them back to members
of every other group, and chat broadcast reached all peers regardless of group.
All three now resolve through _group_ctx().
C5a — upload confinement. Uploads landed in the shared root under a
client-chosen name and overwrote whatever was there. Any member could destroy
the operator's files, and by becoming the recorded uploader of the replaced
file could then delete it through the uploader path, bypassing the Ed25519
admin challenge. Uploads now go to a per-user quarantine (.uploads/{user_id}/),
refuse to overwrite, and enforce chunk ordering, a filename allowlist and a
size cap.
H2 — stored XSS in the node admin UI. Filenames chosen by any group member were
interpolated raw into the localhost UI, which has no authentication, so script
execution there equals control of the node admin API. Now html.escape()
throughout, textContent in the audit table, plus CSP/nosniff/no-referrer. The
CSP contains exfiltration but cannot stop injected inline script — escaping is
the fix.
C5b — group key seizure. gek_bundle_store wrote whatever any member sent and
auto-activated bundles addressed to the node operator. The operator's X25519
public key is public (the node publishes it in handshake_ack), so any member
could wrap a key of their choosing for it and take over the group, locking
every legitimate member out. Storing now requires an operator signature and
_try_activate_gek is removed: nothing arriving over MNP can set a live GEK.
H5 — unbound signing oracle. The node challenged with 32 raw random bytes and
the client signed them blind, so a signature named no operation, subject, node
or time. New meshbay_common/adminop.py defines a length-prefixed,
domain-separated transcript; both sides build it independently and the client
refuses to sign when the announced op/subject do not match its request.
BREAKING: a group admin who does not operate the node can no longer store GEK
bundles on it. Invites must be performed by the node operator.
Adds tests/test_security_regressions.py. Verified against pre-fix source via
git stash. Three pre-existing tests asserted the vulnerable behaviour as a
feature and were inverted: gek auto-activation, and the transport-wide
chat_store in test_daemon.
Tests: 109 node, 132 hub+common.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Baseline commit capturing in-progress Phase 12 work that was already present
in the working tree (uncommitted) before the Phase 11.5 security remediation
begins. Committed as-is, without review or modification, so that remediation
changes arrive as a separable diff.
Contents: BundleStore (P2P GEK + keypair bundles), password split
(auth_key / bundle_key), node Ed25519 auth (POST /v1/nodes/auth, node-scoped
JWT), GEK-HMAC handshake proof with DTLS channel binding, Ed25519 admin
challenge-response, node local admin UI rewrite, browser key persistence.
Not authored in this session — captured to establish a baseline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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