| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A node that hosts no groups sends no `group_ids` on its hub socket, and the
hub resolved the claim with `set(claimed_groups or authorized)` — so "I host
nothing" arrived as "I host every group this account belongs to", other
members' included. Such a node can serve none of them: it holds no GEK, and
its own handshake refuses them with "Group not hosted on this node".
`/v1/groups/{id}/nodes` answers in registration order and `_node_groups` is
in-memory, so which node a client was sent to depended on who reconnected
first after a hub restart. GroupPage took `nodes[0]` with no fallback. On
2026-09-11 a hub deploy at 20:14 reshuffled the registry, a second member's
unconfigured node won the race, and a group stopped opening for everyone in
it with its only real host online throughout. Any member could take one of
their groups down, by accident, by leaving an empty node running.
Four changes, because no one of them is sufficient:
- the hub never widens an absent claim, and `update_groups` goes through
the same ceiling as registration — it assigned its list verbatim, so the
bound that makes C2 hold at authentication was one message wide
- the node states the empty set rather than omitting the field
- the refusal carries `not_hosted`, so a client can tell "try the next
node" from "you, here, must do something first"
- GroupPage walks the list instead of indexing into it
The three lines involved date from 13, 20 and 23 August and each is
defensible alone. The defect is in the seam, which is where the last two
also were: a falsy empty collection must never mean "unspecified".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`video_root`, `audio_root` and `photo_roots` are gone — the messages, the
signed operations, the handlers, the `ops` wrappers, the three scalars on the
handshake ack, and the client's handlers for their acks. `app_directories`
does the same thing for every application, keyed by the app's own registry
name, and it is what the SPA has been sending.
The three were the same instruction three times, differing only in the key they
wrote and whether they carried a string or a list. That shape is what made
adding an application mean adding a message type, an op, a handler and a widget;
it also meant three validation paths, and the older ones validated nothing —
a typo was stored and then quietly matched no entry, an app showing an empty tab
with no way to tell "misconfigured" from "no files yet".
**What stays, and why.** `Roster.LEGACY_DIR_KEYS` still reads `video_root` and
friends out of `group_settings`: that is a key on an operator's disk, not on the
wire, and a node upgraded into this must find its own configuration. The Search
page still reads its own older cache keys, for the same reason — the cache
outlives a deploy. `CTX_ALIASES` keeps only `chat`, which is the one app whose
second name something still reads.
The two per-app policy test files go with the messages. What only they held —
the real challenge/response path from message to database, which no other test
exercises — is retargeted at `app_directories` in
`test_app_directories_signed.py`, and the handler's own refusals (unknown app,
malformed `directories`, nobody to authorize it) join `test_app_directories.py`.
Node and common suites 1368 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` is the version this build speaks, so `check_version`
refuses everything below it at the handshake. Every capability the client was
gating on the node's version is therefore true of every peer it can reach:
* `supportsSealedUpload` — an upload is sealed or it is not sent;
* `supportsAppOps` — one `app_directories` op, and no `setVideoRoot` /
`setAudioRoot` / `setPhotoRoots` wrappers behind it;
* `supportsTransferSlots` and `Lease._skip()` — a lease is always real, so
there is no branch where a transfer runs without one;
* `legacyNode`, the read-only shared-directories table, and the two hints
telling an operator their node is too old to configure an app.
The version the node declares is still recorded, for diagnostics. Nothing
branches on it, and the comment says so, because a field kept "just in case" is
how the branches came back last time.
`test_mnp_1_0_node_compat.py` goes with them: it existed to hold the fallbacks
in place, and holding a fallback that cannot execute is how a suite starts
lying. The two locale strings for those hints are removed from all ten
catalogues.
Hub suite 872 passed (test_sticky_header deselected — failing before this).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The group-wide `member_upload` switch is gone: the message, the signed
operation, the field on the handshake ack, the `upload` alias on every root in
the index payload, and the client's fallback path to it.
Whether a member may write has been a property of each root for a while, and
that is the model that survives: a single flag over the group cannot express
"this library is published read-only and that folder is a drop box", which is
the ordinary arrangement. What was left of the switch was a handler that logged
a deprecation and acted on nothing, and a client that read `ack.member_upload`
whenever the roots carried no `writable` — a second source for one question,
with whichever the code consulted first deciding it.
`roots.describe()` drops `upload` for the same reason: it was `writable` under
an older name, and two names for one boolean is one too many.
The paperclip now says "nowhere to write" rather than picking a root, in a group
that has none writable. That is the honest answer; the fallback picked whatever
came first and failed at send time.
Node suite 1215 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The reconnect scenario added with the fix proved the composer follows
`_setDevicePk`, and it poked that method itself at both ends. That is a
narrower claim than it reads as: it says nothing about whether a reconnect
*reaches* it, and the harness's own `Host` stands in for group-page.js, so a
green probe did not mean the page joins the two.
Both halves are real now. The scenario calls `connect()` with the arguments
`_reconnectLoop` calls it with; it stops at signaling, because there is no hub
in the harness, and the identity has to be gone by then — connect() drops it
before it touches the network. The restore is the shipped `_announceDevice`,
answered by the stand-in node with a `device_hello_ack` as `_do_device_hello`
answers it, and the key it settles on is the one the following send seals and
signs with. Three assertions check the scenario went that way rather than
through a variable set by the test.
The seam the harness cannot drive gets its own check: the wiring exists, the
prop is in `commonProps`, and the callback is set *before* `connect()` — after
it, device_hello's answer is missed and the composer starts closed. That check
first passed with the wiring deleted, on the strength of a comment naming the
callback; it matches the assignment now.
Two things the harness turned up. `do_POST` answered every path, so the offer
connect() posts to the hub was swallowed as the measurement and put the
machine's own SDP, public address included, into the probe's output — it
answers `/log` and nothing else now. And a connect() that gives up before
`await channelReady` left that promise rejected with nobody attached, so
closing the peer connection printed "Uncaught (in promise) DataChannel closed"
on every failed reconnect attempt — noise in exactly the log a freeze is read
from.
Checked against the unfixed source both ways: with the clear removed from
connect() and the wiring removed from group-page.js, three cases fail; with
them back, 15 pass. Hub and node suites 2266 passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019GXmScYB1uR29YCt74si9J
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The Chat tab froze about every other day — the textbox stopped taking clicks —
and it never recovered on its own: no timeout ends this one, only leaving the
group or restarting the client. A console dump of a session it happened in ruled
out everything it could and named nothing.
What that dump established was almost entirely negative, and that was the useful
part. No `Response timeout`, no `unsolicited`/`unrouted`/`with nothing waiting`
— so the 2026-08-30 routing defect, which produces this exact symptom for thirty
seconds, had not recurred. No `PC state: disconnected|failed`, no second ICE
cycle, no `Reconnected after N attempt(s)` — so the connection was alive and
untouched. The freeze was in the page, and no path that logs anything had run.
The composer is `disabled=${sending || cannotSend}`, and `cannotSend` was
`transport.connected && !transport.devicePk`, read off a **ref** during render.
`devicePk` is settled inside connect(), so every reconnect clears it and settles
it again; a ref changing re-renders nothing, and nothing else announced it. So
the panel went disabled on whatever unrelated re-render came next — a message
arriving — long after the identity was actually lost, and had no event that
would open it again. group-page.js never touches `status` after 'connected', and
`onReconnected` is claimed by video-player.js, so there was no second chance.
It was silent as well as sticky. `_announceDevice` had three exits that wrote
`devicePk` without a word: two early returns that left the *previous*
connection's value standing, and a reply that is not `device_hello_ack` — an
`error` reply does not throw, so the `.catch()` at the call site never saw it.
Reproduced in chat_send_probe.py, which mounts the real ChatPanel over the real
transport: with the old code, identity cleared leaves the composer open, an
arriving message latches it shut, and restoring the identity does not reopen it.
Every write to `devicePk` now goes through `_setDevicePk(pk, why)`, which logs,
traces and calls `onDeviceIdentity`; group-page holds the answer as state and
ChatPanel takes it as `deviceReady`. Defaulting that prop to `true` fails open —
a wiring mistake here must not be able to leave anyone with a dead textbox.
Two things found on the same path and fixed with it. `_send` throwing inside
_sendAndWait's executor left the pending entry and its 30s timer behind, so a
request that never reached the wire still logged a "Response timeout" half a
minute later. And the instrumentation this was meant to be diagnosed with
(3be8bd2) writes to localStorage behind ?trace=1, not to the console, so the
dump could not have carried it: the two lines that decide the composer's state
are now logged unconditionally, and MeshBayTrace gains `record` so the composer
writes into the same timeline as the channel events.
Hub suite 2264 passed, 4 skipped. chat_send_probe.py gains a `reconnect`
scenario and test_chat_send.py four cases, each checked against the unfixed
source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019GXmScYB1uR29YCt74si9J
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Stage 4 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, the flag day. Leases become compulsory
and a 2.x peer is refused at the handshake.
**The bound on leaseless reads (§3.4.1) did not exist, and it is what makes the
rest mean anything.** Browsing a group is never subject to a transfer slot —
that is an operator decision and a requirement: a member must be able to browse
a group at capacity exactly as they browse an idle one. But "not leased" cannot
mean "unbounded", or a client that simply omits `tr` transfers outside every cap
and the caps are decoration. A session may now read two distinct files at once
without a lease: one because a viewer looks at one file, two so that prefetching
the next photo stays possible. A count of files and not a byte budget, because a
RAW photo is 60-80 MB and is browsing while a 40 MB archive is a download, and
no size threshold separates them. Thumbnails, posters and cover art never reach
this check at all — they resolve out of the node's own cache.
It is a fairness control among cooperating clients, in the company of
`max_concurrent_streams`, and is not a defence against a member determined to
saturate a node's disk. That member is a member, and the answer to them is
`member revoke`.
**MNP_VERSION and MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED both move to 3.0**, on both sides. The
messages are additive; the requirement is not. An opt-in switch would leave a
leaseless branch reachable on every node, which is finding C6's lesson — a
transport that accepted a bare JWT — one feature later.
**The desktop client now checks before it connects.** The SPA is served by the
hub and picks up a new client on reload; the application ships its own
interface, so an un-updated one would sign in, list groups, and fail every
connection with `version_too_old` — a refusal in a protocol vocabulary with
nothing anyone can act on. It asks `/v1/hub/version` for `client.minimum` and
says so plainly instead. An unreachable hub is deliberately *not* "too old": a
captive portal or a closed laptop must not make starting the application
impossible.
**Every package is aligned on 0.13.0.** `meshbay-client/package.json` had
drifted to 1.0.0 while the Python packages were on 0.12.0 — invisible until
something compared those numbers, and then load-bearing: an installed client
announcing 1.0.0 sorts above a 0.13.0 minimum and walks through the gate meant
to stop it. That is stated in the code rather than left to be rediscovered; it
is acceptable exactly once, because the operator is updating every client, node
and hub by hand for this flag day. A new test fails if two packages ever
disagree again, and another fails if the hub would refuse the client the tree
builds.
Node suite 1209 passed, hub suite 861 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Stage 8 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, second half, plus the gap it exposed in
stage 7.
**Asking where to resume.** The node identifies an upload by (member,
directory, filename), so a client resuming one has to name the file — and
`transfer_open`, the obvious place to ask, travels in clear. Naming it there
would undo exactly what sealing this path bought in MNP 2.0: before it, the same
file was ciphertext leaving a node and plaintext arriving at one. So the
question is asked inside the seal that already exists, as an ordinary
`file_upload` with no bytes and `chunk_index: -1`. The node writes nothing,
creates no state, reserves no name, and answers with `resume_from` in the sealed
ack. A node that predates it refuses the index, which the client reads as "start
from the beginning" — the behaviour it had anyway — and the wait is bounded so
one that answers neither does not strand an upload.
The probe is answered after every check the write path makes, so it cannot ask
questions about a directory the caller may not write to, and it answers only
about the member who asks: otherwise one member could measure another's
progress on a file they never sent, and worse, resume it.
**Pausing an upload.** Reported: no pause button on an upload, even in the
desktop app. Stage 7 built pause around the download path — a target declares
whether it can be stopped — and an upload has no local target to ask. It was
also refused by design, since a transfer handed a lease it cannot re-create must
not be offered a button that would drop its slot for good. Uploads now ask for
their slot rather than being handed one, and say they are pausable outright: a
File is seekable and the node keeps the position. Resuming re-probes rather than
trusting the client's own memory, so it works across a reconnect too.
**And the slot they hold.** `_do_file_upload` never called `slots.touch(tr)`.
Chunks are not gated by the lease, so the file arrived — but the node reclaimed
a grant nobody appeared to be using after thirty seconds, twice, then abandoned
it, and the widget follows the lease. Measured from the journal: a 3.5 GB upload
read "waiting, 0 ahead" for a minute and a half while it was transferring. The
download twin of this was fixed on 2026-09-08; the same omission was still here,
invisible until uploads took a real lease.
`test_the_upload_itself_is_sealed` now checks every message `uploadFile` sends
rather than the first. Adding the probe put a second one in front of the one it
was written for, and it would have kept passing while guarding nothing.
Node suite 1202 passed, hub suite 850 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Steps 5 and 6 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md. The node has handed out slots
since step 2 and nothing asked for one; now the client does, and the panel shows
what is happening.
`transport.openTransfer()` returns a Lease: `acquire()` resolves when the node
grants, `release()` gives it back exactly once, and nothing else in the client
speaks to the node about slots. Whether a node hands out slots is read from the
handshake ack rather than guessed from a timeout — "no answer yet" and "this
node will never answer" are indistinguishable in time, and guessing wrong either
stalls every download or defeats the cap.
Two things exist only because a queue can lie: a watchdog re-asks when a pushed
grant does not arrive (the node is idempotent on `tr`, so asking again is free),
and a grant for a transfer the page has forgotten is handed straight back rather
than held until the node's deadline.
The slot is asked for **after** there is somewhere to write, and that ordering
is load-bearing: opening a target takes thirty seconds of streamed-download
timeouts, or as long as somebody leaves a Save As dialog open, and a grant not
taken up in time is revoked. Moving it earlier looked better and broke three
downloads into one. Pinned by a test.
The panel groups by state — running, waiting, finished — rather than re-sorting a
flat list, so a row moves only when its own state does. The ETA is withheld until
the speed window holds real measurement: a figure from the first two chunks
swings between four seconds and an hour, and people plan around the first number
they see. One live region announces state changes and not progress.
Three silent paths closed on the way: a download refused for want of a user
gesture (a browser grants one file picker per gesture, and downloading three
files is one gesture) now falls back to the streamed path, which needs none; a
click with no connection says so instead of doing nothing at all; and a queued
transfer counts as busy, so a transport is never closed under one that is
waiting for a grant that could then never arrive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Chat messages have been signed by the sending device since MNP 2.0, but a
reader had no way to know that the device belonged to the account the node
named: the signature proved *a device*, and `sender_id` was still the node's
word. This closes that for any account a client has already seen.
**What was blocking it was not effort — the evidence was not being kept.**
`_do_device_add` verified the countersignature that admits a second device and
stored only `added_by_pk`: *which* key approved, never the proof. And
`device_add_transcript` binds `nonce_node`, the approving connection's handshake
nonce, so even a stored signature was unverifiable by anyone who had not been on
that connection. `identities` gains `add_sig`, `add_nonce` and `add_ts`, added
before the migration's early return — which fires on every roster widened since
2026-08-18, i.e. all of them, so putting them inside it would have meant they
never arrived.
`group_roster_req`/`resp` relays, sealed under a new groupbox purpose and
answered to **any member of the group**, every live device of every active
member with the evidence that admitted it. The node decides nothing: it hands
over evidence and the client walks the chain from each account's root outwards
(`_verifyRoster`). That is deliberate — the node is the party the property holds
against, so it is not asked to assert trust.
Two holes the tests caught while this was being built:
- "no signature" was being treated as a trust root, so a node that writes the
roster could put any key in an account's row and have it laundered straight
into the verified set. A root is a device that names **no** countersigner.
- pinning only the verified subset at first sight raised "key changed" on
legitimate second devices whose countersignature predates this change. First
sight pins everything the node says, because that is what trust-on-first-use
means and an alarm that fires on normal events stops being read.
The property, and it must not be rounded up: **once a client has seen an
account, a node that later substitutes a key for it is detected. Nothing is
gained at first sight**, where there is nothing to compare against — the same
boundary `per-node-identity-v1.md` draws, unmoved.
The cost, stated because it is real: the roster is member-visible, so every
member learns how many devices the others hold and their public keys. It stays
inside the group, the hub is not involved, and it is scoped per group. A member
who cannot see the keys cannot check them.
User-visible surface: one notice, "this account is using a key you have not seen
before", in ten languages. Nothing else.
16 tests — 7 on the node (the evidence is stored, it verifies from the roster
alone, a fabricated device carries none, another group's members are not
disclosed), 9 running the shipped `_verifyRoster` under node against rosters
built by the shipped Python: a chain of three in any order, a signature by the
wrong key, one for another node, one for another account, and two fabricated
devices signing each other admitting nothing.
Tier 3 (operator-signed roster attestation) stays deferred, with nothing
depending on it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
|
| |\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Both sides landed a breaking MNP change and both called it 2.0, which is right:
the sealed upload, the removal of `stream_seg` and mandatory chat encryption
share one flag day. They are recorded as one version in `__init__.py` rather
than as a race between two.
The resolutions that were decisions rather than mechanics:
* **`MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` moves to "2.0".** The sealed upload alone was a
*confined* break — a 1.x peer could still connect, browse, download, stream
and chat, with only its uploads refused by `upload_not_sealed` — so the floor
deliberately stayed at "1.0". Mandatory chat encryption ends that
confinement: a 1.x peer can neither produce a sealed chat message nor read
one, so it would connect, look fine, and be unable to say anything. Refusing
it at the handshake is the honest form. The per-message `upload_not_sealed`
path is untouched and still right if the floor is ever lowered.
* **`sendChat` throws on an `error` reply**, from origin, applied to the sealed
send. It matters more after this change, not less: the node now refuses a
stale epoch, a malformed envelope and a device claim that is not the
connection's own, so there are three new ways for a message to be rejected
and none of them may look like a message that was sent.
* **`req_id` supersedes the per-type routing** this branch added for
`chat_keys_resp` and `device_hello_ack`. Both blocks are kept beside the
existing `chat_hist_resp` one, for the same stated reason — a node too old to
stamp — and their comments no longer claim to be the mechanism that closes
the class. `req_id` is.
* **`chat_send_probe.py` is rebuilt on origin's structure**, not beside it: two
scenarios, a stub that stamps `req_id`, `music_meta_req` as the older pending
request. The encrypted path is layered on — a real Ed25519 device key
generated in the page, and a `chat_keys_resp` sealed by the shipped Python,
because a payload the page built itself would prove only that the page agrees
with the page.
* **`test_reply_correlation.py` now sends a sealed message.** Its subject is
which of the two messages leaving that handler carries the id; plaintext chat
was only the fixture, and the node refuses one now.
* `groupbox` keeps both new purposes (`upload`, `chat_keys`); `protocol.py`
keeps origin's removal of `STREAM_SEGMENT` and this branch's correction of
the "Double Ratchet message" comment on `CHAT_MESSAGE`, which was wrong when
it was written and is wrong differently now.
Full suite on the merged tree: 1993 passed, 11 failed — the same 11 that fail
on a pristine checkout (2 Windows service tests, 1 apps-enabled policy, 7
transcode tests that pass in isolation, and the WebRTC invite test that hangs
on its own).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Downloads have been encrypted under a GEK-derived key since the beginning:
`file_chunk` and `stream_data` both go through `chunk_ciphertext`. Uploads
never were. `file_upload` carried the filename and the raw bytes in plain
msgpack, and `file_upload_ack` carried the name the node stored them under —
so the same file was ciphertext leaving a node and plaintext arriving at one.
There was no threat model behind that asymmetry.
Both halves now travel sealed under a third groupbox purpose,
HKDF(GEK, info="meshbay:upload:v1"). The filename, the destination folder and
the bytes are all inside the seal; only `upload_id` and `chunk_index` stay in
clear, because the node routes and orders on them before it can decrypt. This
direction seals *towards* the node — it holds the GEK for its own group — and
it opens the payload before it picks a destination or touches the disk.
What that forced, and why none of it is optional:
- `filename` was the correlation key on both sides. It cannot be: matching an
ack to its request by name would hand back exactly what the seal hides.
`upload_id` replaces it — client-drawn, opaque to the node, unique within a
connection, never an authorization input. The property it guarded (one
refusal fails one upload, not every upload in flight) is unchanged.
- Refusals can no longer quote what they refused. `No directory named 'X'`
becomes `No such directory in this group` plus the `code` that was already
there; the client knows what it sent.
- No plaintext fallback. A path that still accepts plaintext is not a sealed
path, so an unsealed `file_upload` is refused with `upload_not_sealed`.
Hardened while here, because what comes out of a seal is authenticated but not
validated — a member can seal anything: `filename` and `data` have their types
checked before any upload state is created, and `chunk_index`/`total_chunks`,
which are outside the seal by necessity, can no longer raise where a refusal
was meant.
Tests. `test_upload_sealed.py` pins the node half: nothing identifying on the
wire, tamper/wrong-key/wrong-group all refused with nothing written, and
multi-chunk reassembly unchanged. `test_upload_seal_client.py` drives the
shipped `uploadFile` over the shipped `crypto.js` under node and feeds its real
frames to the real `_do_file_upload` — the file lands intact, and the ack the
node actually produced comes back with the name it chose for a collision, which
is the half a source-reading test cannot see. Both upload purposes join the
JS/Python groupbox parity vectors.
BREAKING CHANGE: MNP 2.0. `file_upload`/`file_upload_ack` change shape on the
wire every deployed client speaks, which is MAJOR by the same rule 1.0 was —
but the break is confined to uploads. `MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` stays at "1.0", so a
1.x peer still connects, browses, downloads, streams and chats; only its
uploads are refused, with a message saying which side is old. The client checks
the node's version before sending a chunk, so neither side meets this as a
timeout. This is the version negotiation shipped in 1.0 earning its keep: 1.0
cost a flag day, 2.0 costs a refusal code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
`stream_seg` answered with an MPEG-TS segment as base64 with no encryption at
all — the one message on the content plane that never went through a
GEK-derived key. Live on both transports, answering any authenticated member.
It predates `stream_data`, which does the same job properly (`chunk_ciphertext`,
keyed per segment, AES-256-GCM) and has since Phase 12. Its only browser caller,
`fetchStreamSegment`, was defined and never once invoked — a plaintext media
endpoint with no client. Removed rather than repaired.
Gone with it: `_extract_segment` and the ffmpeg semaphore in quic_server, the
`fetch_stream_segment` QUIC client method, and `_b64decode` in transport.js,
which had no other caller.
The H6 regression test lived on this handler — it pinned `_do_stream_segment_async`
to a coroutine so `subprocess.run` could not stall the event loop for thirty
seconds per request. It is replaced by the property that outlives the handler:
no transport carries media outside an AEAD, asserted on `stream_seg` and
`data_b64` across all three transport modules. The half of H6 that survives —
the live streaming path still spawns ffmpeg — keeps its own test.
BREAKING CHANGE: `stream_seg` is no longer answered on either transport. No
shipping client sends it. Recorded as part of MNP 2.0, whose other half — the
sealed upload — carries the version bump.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
MNP carried no correlation id. A reply named its own type and nothing
else, so a client with more than one request in flight worked out which
one a message answered from the message itself — and for the replies
that name nothing it could not. `_dispatch` fell through to matching by
arrival order, which is a guess. `_sendAndWait` had the right value all
along: it keys `_pending` by `this._seqId++` and never put it on the
wire.
The guess fails asymmetrically, which is why it hid. The victim is not
the request that was answered wrongly — it is the unrelated one that now
waits out its own 30s timeout for a reply already delivered elsewhere.
Live on 2026-09-06: five `music_meta_req` sat pending for over 100
seconds behind a failing MusicBrainz, and a `device_list_result` was
handed to one of them. The composer is disabled while a send is in
flight, so a chat message whose reply went astray the same way left the
Chat tab looking frozen for thirty seconds, then unfroze on its own.
The `ack` half of this was fixed on 2026-08-30 by matching on request
type. That closed the instance and left the class open: a refusal has no
type to match on either, and `_dispatch_message`'s catch-all answers
every unforeseen failure with `{"type": "error", "detail": "Request
failed"}` — 238 of this module's 240 error sends name nothing at all.
`req_id` now rides on the request and comes back on the reply. On the
node it is published for the whole handler in a ContextVar and stamped
by `_send`: a parameter would have meant threading an argument through
all 240 send sites, and asyncio copies the context into a task, so a
handler that `_spawn`s its real work still answers under the right id.
It is never stamped on a broadcast — those answer nothing, and the
owner check in `_send` is what keeps a chat broadcast or an index push
from reaching another peer looking like a reply.
On the client, `_dispatch` resolves on `req_id` first and the
arrival-order fallback is gone the moment a node proves it stamps
(`_correlates`, armed by the handshake's own reply). The fallback stays
for an MNP 1.0 node, unchanged and no wider: there it is the only thing
there is, and removing it would leave device_list_result, join_result
and the handshake replies reaching nobody.
Two things fall out. `sendChat` refuses an `error` reply like every
other request in the file — it returned it as success, which did not
matter while a refusal reached the wrong caller anyway and would now
show a rejected message as sent. And `_group_ctx` uses `.get`: a reload
pops a removed group while sessions connected to it are open, and every
request they had left raised KeyError into that same catch-all.
Sealed index messages are the one exception to the fast path. They
cannot be handed over until they are opened, which is asynchronous while
`_dispatch` is not — resolving on the id alone gave `fetchIndex` the
envelope and skipped `onIndexSync` entirely. Caught by extending
`index_seal_probe.mjs` to stamp a reply the way a current node does,
after the hub suite passed over it: the probe built its own frames and
had never seen one.
Tests, all failing before and passing after: `test_chat_send.py` drives
the real ChatPanel over the real transport for both shapes of reply with
an older request pending (3 of its 6 are new, and the 3 for `ack` pass
either way, so it discriminates); `test_reply_correlation.py` pins the
node's half — the refusals that name nothing else, the broadcast that
must not be stamped, and a late reply from a spawned task answering
under its own id rather than the most recent request's.
Full suite: 1897 passed, same 11 pre-existing failures as before.
QUIC keeps its own dispatch and is not stamped. It is disabled by
default and no browser request reaches it, but the asymmetry is real.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dn1xYx9uT69mCB6UDvyKAN
|
| |/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Chat messages are sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key derived per group, per
epoch, per *device*, and signed over the ciphertext with the device key the
node pinned. The node relays and archives; it cannot read a message.
There is no switch. MNP goes to 2.0 and MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED moves with it, so a
1.x peer is refused at the handshake with `version_too_old` rather than
admitted and then unable to speak. An opt-in flag was designed and rejected:
every node is a test node, so it would have bought nothing and left a plaintext
branch reachable — C6's lesson one feature later. A test reads the source and
refuses any code that consults a `chat_encrypted` setting.
Not Sender Keys, and `senderkeys.py` is now documented as unused. With
distribution under the group key and a node that serves history to devices
which were not present, the node must retain each chain's earliest key, and a
chain key at iteration i yields every message key from i on by pure HKDF —
forward secrecy is zero either way. What the ratchet was left buying was
stateful client code with silent failure modes, three of them reproduced: any
member could sign as any other, a second device dropped the first's chain, and
the skipped-key cache grew without bound. The reasoning is in
docs/chat-sender-keys.md, which is the specification and the decision record.
Epochs, not rotation: the epoch key is wrapped under the group key at delivery
and never stored under it, so `gek_rotate` is a re-wrap. A group-key-derived
archive key would have made every message ever sent unreadable on the first
`member unpin`, which is the documented step after removing a member. A new
epoch opens on member revoke/unpin, device revoke and `gek_rotate`; old epochs
are kept and still delivered, so history stays readable to everyone who could
already read it, and nothing anywhere deletes one.
Three prerequisites this needed, each a live defect on its own:
* The peer registry was keyed by user_id, so one account's second device
evicted the first and the broadcast skipped recipients by account — a
person's phone never saw what they typed on their laptop.
* The handshake authenticated an account, never a device. `device_hello`
(additive, signed, refused unless the key is a live device of this account in
the node's own roster) is what lets the node refuse a member claiming
somebody else's key.
* `_admin_exec_file_delete` authorized against the exact uploading key, so
device linking had already broken deleting your own file from your other
device. It now authorizes against any non-revoked device of `uploader_id`.
Found by driving the real panel over the real transport, not by reading source:
`chat_keys_resp` was routed by arrival order and handed to an unanswered
`media_meta_req` — the original frozen-tab defect in a message type that did
not exist when that probe was written. And `_asText` had been deleted with an
unrelated helper beside it; its only caller sits inside a promise the panel
catches, so every conversation rendered empty with nothing in the console.
Existing node data is migrated by QE/migration/migrate_chat_encryption.py
(not versioned, per the QE rule), run with the node stopped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Two defects behind one report — "you cannot always click Save, you do not
notice, and it does not work".
**It did not work, for Chat, systematically.** `_dispatch` resolves an admin ack
against the pending request and returns, which is right for an op whose caller
already knows the value it chose. Chat's pane calls `transport.setChatDirectory`
itself, so nothing told `group-page` anything: the node saved it, every *other*
connected client learned it from the broadcast, and the one that asked went on
showing an unsaved-looking draft. Clicking Save again just re-sent it. Same
shape as the root-ack bug, in a different message — so the set is now
`BROADCAST_ACK_TYPES`, named for the property that makes it true, and covers
`chat_directory`, `chat_link_preview` and `app_directories`.
**You could not notice, because Save was not visibly a button.** It carried
`btn btn-small btn-secondary`, and there is no `.btn` rule in the stylesheet at
all — so it took `.btn-secondary`: no background, a transparent border, dim grey
text. Enabled it already looked like a disabled control; disabled it was the
same thing at 40% opacity. Measured on a real page: enabled is now accent on
white, disabled is grey text on a plain border, and an inert one says why
("No changes to save") rather than leaving the reader to guess what the pane
counts as a change. Videos' second Save — the TMDB one — is the same control,
because two Save buttons in one pane that do not look alike is worse than
either looking wrong.
Verified by driving the real pane in Electron through the whole cycle: inert,
pick a folder, live, save, and the node's answer coming back to disable it
again. Four earlier readings said the enabled button was transparent; all four
were taken inside python's directory-listing page, which the app never runs in
— my scaffolding, not the code.
Hub suite only: the node package is untouched by this.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
There is no `uploads/` subdirectory any more, and the client names the folder
rather than the root.
It was the last of v5's quarantine — the per-user layer went on 2026-08-14 for
the same reason — and it goes on the same grounds: a folder appearing beside
the operator's library because somebody sent a file is the node deciding how
their disk is arranged. Somebody dropping a file into the folder they are
looking at expects it to be in that folder.
**What made the quarantine worth having was never the subdirectory.** It is the
filename allowlist, the size cap, the chunk ordering and the no-overwrite rule,
and all four are untouched: an existing file is never replaced, the second
sender of IMG_1234.jpg gets a free name, and the check still sits at the write.
Letting the client choose the destination is safe for one reason and only one:
it is resolved through `RootSet.resolve()`, which refuses `..`, absolute
segments and anything whose resolved form escapes its root, symlinks included.
A member answers "which of this group's folders", never "which path on the
operator's disk" — and the test that used to assert the node chose now asserts
that, with six shapes of escape.
`direct` goes with it. Its only job was to say "no subdirectory for this root",
which is now every root, and a config flag that does nothing is worse than none.
Chat's attachment folder finally does something: the directory the operator
picks in the Chat settings pane is where attachments are written, falling back
to the first writable root while they have not chosen one, or if the one they
chose has since been made read-only or ejected — a stale choice should not
become a refusal at send time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The SPA is served by the hub, so deploying the hub puts this client in front of
every node — including the ones not updated yet. That window is the normal
state for as long as an operator takes, and for a node someone else runs it may
be indefinite. Three controls were broken across it, and the failure mode is
quiet: an unknown message type is logged by the node and never answered, so the
click produces a thirty-second wait ending in a timeout with nothing on screen
to say the node simply cannot do this.
Files' Upload button read `root.writable`, which a 1.0 node does not send — it
says `upload`, the same answer under the older name. The button disappeared on
every un-upgraded node. It reads both now, and still respects an explicit
`writable: false` rather than falling through to the legacy flag.
The per-app folder pickers spoke `app_directories`. Videos, Music and Photos
each had their own message before that and those still work, so the page
chooses by version: an operator on an older node keeps the ability they had.
`video_root` and `audio_root` hold one folder, so several are refused with a
reason rather than stored as the first and silently truncated.
Root management — writable, removable, eject, plug — has no older equivalent to
route to, so the table goes read-only with a line saying why and pointing at
the `meshbay-node root` commands. Chat's two settings are new with nothing
before them and are hidden the same way.
None of this was inferred from a payload's shape: `_checkNodeVersion` already
parsed the node's version and threw it away, and it is kept now. Coupling a
capability to whether some field happens to be present is how a flag flips
because an unrelated payload changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Each app's settings were inlined in `group-settings.js` — TMDB, MusicBrainz,
and one folder picker per app, each with its own draft state and save handler
saying the same thing about a different key. They are one file per app now,
reached through the `apps.js` registry, and the page that renders them names no
application at all: adding one is a registry entry and a settings file.
The line between the two is what makes that true. What every app has — folders
— the page does generically, through one `saveDirectories` bound to the app.
What one app alone has, its pane does itself with the transport it is handed.
An app that only needs directories touches neither `group-settings.js` nor
`group-page.js`, which is `test_app_settings_plugin.py`'s subject.
`settings-ui.js` exists because a pane importing the page that renders it is a
cycle, and ES modules answer that with a temporal-dead-zone ReferenceError at
first render — a component that silently does not appear, the fault already
recorded in CLAUDE.md about hook ordering.
The flat depth-indented `<select>` of every folder in the library becomes a
modal tree. It asks the node for nothing: the tree is derived from paths the
client already holds, so it shows exactly what the group's index contains and
adds no folder-browsing protocol. For Chat's attachment folder — the one
directory that is written to rather than read — read-only roots are greyed
out, so the node's refusal arrives before the operator picks rather than when
somebody sends a file.
Videos and Music take a list of folders. A library on two drives could not be
described before; the only recourse was pointing the app at a parent containing
both, which pulls in everything else under it. The scalar shapes survive on the
wire alone, for a node speaking MNP 1.0, and the client reads them as a
one-element list.
Two things the tests caught that I would not have:
`test_asset_versioning` — six new modules were missing from `_ASSETS`. Reached
through the registry rather than imported by name, they are exactly the files
nothing else would notice changing, and a stale one is served from cache with
no version bump.
And `node --check foo.js` does **not** reliably report a module syntax error:
it accepted `${/* ... */''}` — htm template syntax pasted into a plain object
literal — and reported success. A `.mjs` copy forces the module parser and
reports it. The suite had no syntax check at all, which is how that reached a
file; `test_spa_syntax.py` does it for every module now, and pins that the
loose path is not what it uses.
Suite: 12 failures, all pre-existing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Review of the Phase 1 commit found the RO/RW model sound but three paths
unfinished, each of which broke the flow the phase exists to deliver. Plus
29 test failures it introduced and no coverage for anything it added.
Uploads went to the wrong directory. The node read a `root` field on
file_upload that no client ever sent, so every upload landed in the first
writable root while the Files toolbar offered its button based on the root
being browsed — with two writable roots, uploading from one wrote into the
other. Files now names the root it is showing; Chat names one chosen in the
shell (an operator-configured directory arrives in Phase 2); the node refuses
an unknown name rather than falling back, and refuses read-only and ejected
roots by code.
Shared directories were unreachable on the web. The table read its roots
only from the loopback API, which resolves to "not available" in a browser,
so the section rendered for nobody there — while the Uploads controls it
replaced had worked — and the transport.updateRoot/ejectRoot/plugRoot methods
beside it were dead. MNP is now the path, loopback the fallback for a local
node with no live connection, and adding a root over MNP takes a typed path
since no web page can browse a remote disk.
Ejecting updated nobody's screen. transport.js resolves an admin ack against
the pending request and returns, which is right for every op whose caller
knows the value it chose; the root acks carry state only the node can compute,
so the operator who clicked Eject was the one client that never saw it happen.
And the ejected flag reached roster.db but was never read back, so a restart
undid it and the next scan read an empty mount point as an erased library.
Also: the member-upload endpoint answered 200 and did nothing (removed); the
wizard ignored the first root's RW switch; reload compared roots on name and
path, so editing writable in node.toml did nothing; the table had no path
column, which is the only thing separating two libraries sharing a basename;
apps_enabled normalisation differed between the two sides of a signed subject.
Tests: eject/plug, per-root upload refusal and the node.toml rewrite had no
coverage at all. test_member_upload_policy.py is replaced by
test_root_writable_policy.py — it tested a removed feature — and every
property worth keeping from it moved rather than being dropped.
Docs: draft-v6 structural decision 9 is annotated as superseded (the operator
can no longer have a directory only they may write to — a real capability
removed, flagged rather than hidden), the man page documents the root verb and
the RO/RW fields, and refactor-groups.md §7b records what the plan got wrong.
Suite: 41 failures before, 13 after — all 13 pre-existing on main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Replace the upload boolean with per-root writable/removable/ejected flags.
Backend: new ops (update_root, eject_root, plug_root), MNP 1.1 protocol
messages, live RootSet updates so API always reflects current state, CLI
root subcommand (add/remove/set/list/eject/plug).
Frontend: SharedDirectoriesTable with optimistic toggle switches, eject/plug
in Files and Settings, upload gated on root.writable, ejected-root filtering
in all media apps, updated Create Group wizard, 10-locale i18n.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
stun.services.mozilla.com no longer resolves — Mozilla shut the service
down — so every ICE gather waited out a DNS timeout on it. Removed from the
node defaults (config.py), the browser defaults (transport.js) and the Node
page's "reset to defaults" (node-page.js). Google (two endpoints) plus
Cloudflare still give two-provider coverage against a single outage, which
is the §2.12 resilience claim. draft-v6 §2.12 updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Chromium's P2P socket manager failed every STUN hostname with
ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED in a restricted-resolver environment (a Windows KVM
guest), even though its own general network stack, the OS resolver and
Node's resolver all resolved the same names -- and mapping the names to IPs
with --host-resolver-rules changed nothing, so it is not ordinary
resolution. WebRTC was left with no server-reflexive candidate.
The desktop client now resolves the STUN hostnames in the main process
(`ice:resolve-stun`, Node's dns.resolve4) and hands `transport.js` the
IP form; a name that will not resolve (the decommissioned Mozilla host) is
dropped. In a browser there is no `meshbay` bridge and the hostnames are
used unchanged -- a browser resolves them fine, so that path is untouched.
Falls back to the hostname form if the bridge call throws.
Also, scoped to win32: disable WebRtcHideLocalIpsWithMdns, so the client
publishes its real local IP instead of a `.local` name the node's ICE stack
cannot resolve across the KVM bridge. Changes nothing on Linux/macOS.
Test-env workaround, revisit before release.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`index_sync`, `index_delta` and the `handshake_ack` config payload now travel
sealed under a GEK-derived subkey (`meshbay_common/groupbox.py`, mirrored by
`sealGroup`/`openGroup` in `crypto.js`). Only `type`, `v`, `group_id` and the
ack's `node_pk`/`proof`/`sig` stay in clear — a receiver must route and
authenticate before it would trust a decryption. Verify, then decrypt.
The ack line is integrity, not confidentiality: the signed handshake transcript
names no ack field, so `is_node_admin`, `enabled_apps`, `video_root` and the
rest were authenticated by the DTLS channel alone. The index line is defence in
depth against a repeat of C1/C6 — a peer served before the handshake completes
now gets ciphertext, not filenames. Nothing against an observer, the hub, or a
member; that is the whole claim. `index_progress` stays clear (D3, counters
only). Chat is out of scope.
Failure is fatal: a payload that does not open ends the session naming the
message type — never an empty index or an empty `enabled_apps`, both of which
are legitimate states.
Version negotiation ships here too (phase 15.6, brought forward): `v` + `v_min`
on `handshake` and `handshake_challenge`, refused with `version_too_old` /
`version_too_new` / `version_unreadable`. The flag day was already being paid
for; the next breaking change now costs a refusal message.
BREAKING CHANGE: breaks the WebRTC wire every deployed client speaks. Hub and
every node must deploy together; the SPA is served by the hub, so a browser
picks up the new client on reload. See MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md §11.1a, §13.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkzbhmMmK8PqQBtGz5zCvY
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Typing a message froze the Chat tab: the composer stopped taking clicks and
keystrokes, the message never appeared, and it was there all along on the next
visit to the tab.
The node answers a chat message with a bare {"type": "ack"} -- no request id,
no type of its own -- so _dispatch had nothing to match it on and left it to
the arrival-order guess at the end of the function. That guess is wrong the
moment anything else this browser asked for is still waiting: the ack went to
*that* request, and the chat send waited out _sendAndWait's own 30s timeout.
Since the composer is disabled while a send is in flight, that reads as a
frozen tab; the node had stored the message and answered, into somebody else's
promise.
An outstanding request is the ordinary case, not a rare one. The node refuses
an unknown file_id with a bare `error`, which names no request either and so
reaches none, leaving the Videos tab's media_meta_req in _pending for the full
30s. That is the one that was live when this was found.
- `ack` is now matched by request type: chat_msg, or the keypair-bundle store
and delete, which name themselves in `detail`. A node naming neither still
has its reply placed rather than dropped.
Every line of chat-app.js is correct and every routed message in transport.js
is routed correctly -- the defect is in the seam, so tests/harness/
chat_send_probe.py drives the two together: the real ChatPanel over the real
MeshBayTransport, with only the DataChannel replaced by a stand-in answering
what the node answers. test_chat_send.py asserts against it, and with the fix
reverted all three of its tests fail on the three visible halves of the defect
-- the composer still disabled, the message absent, and the ack resolving the
unrelated request.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GFF4BL8VSKrghkSLzCrTVs
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The passphrase derives two independent client-side values: auth_key (the
hub verifier) and bundle_key (AES-GCM key for the per-node identity
bundles, which live on nodes and never on the hub). Changing or
recovering a passphrase is therefore two operations — swap the hub
verifier, and re-wrap every reachable node's identity bundle.
Flow A — change a known passphrase (Profile page)
- POST /v1/users/password re-proves the current passphrase, swaps
pw_hash/salt/version, revokes every refresh token and returns a fresh
pair so the tab that made the change stays signed in.
- MeshBayTransport.rewrapAllNodes: for every group's online node, connect
with the old key, read the identity off the handshake, store it back
under the new key. Returns updated / unreachable / failed so the UI can
point at the operator-unpin fallback for the gaps. Always-shown
confirmation dialog listing reachable and unreachable groups.
Recovery key
- keyderive.js generateRecoveryKey (32 random bytes, grouped Base32) and
deriveRecoveryKey (HKDF-SHA256, domain meshbay:recovery:v1:<username>).
- Every per-node identity gets a second copy wrapped under the recovery
key: keypair_bundles.bundle_enc_recovery (node-only column, added in
_SCHEMA_KEYPAIR and via a PRAGMA-guarded ALTER for existing DBs),
carried on keypair_bundle_store / _resp. MNP 0.13 -> 0.14, additive.
- session.recoveryKey is persisted in IndexedDB (slot rk) and lazy-loaded
on connect, so a group joined in any later session still leaves a
recovery copy.
- Shown once at registration; optionally folded into the verification
e-mail as a pass-through the hub never stores or logs, with an opt-out.
- Profile -> Recovery key re-loads R and backfills every reachable node
via rewrapAllNodes in bundleKey mode (no passphrase re-entry).
Flow B — recover a lost passphrase (#/reset, linked from sign-in)
- POST /v1/users/password/reset-request {username, email}: both must be
the pair on file, checked against the blind email_hash (never
decrypted). A mismatch — wrong e-mail, unknown username, non-active
account — takes the identical no-op path (no code, no mail, same 200),
so it reveals nothing and cannot be used to spray reset mail from a
username alone. 5/min, 1-hour single-use code.
- POST /v1/users/password/reset {username, code, new_auth_key}: same
expiry / attempts / single-use checks as e-mail verification; revokes
every session and deletes every registered device key so a stored one
cannot sign back in past the reset.
- ResetPasswordPage: request code -> code + optional recovery key + new
passphrase -> reset + sign-in -> fan-out. connect() falls back to the
recovery-wrapped copy when the passphrase key cannot open bundle_enc.
Without a recovery key: sign-in is restored and each group needs the
operator-unpin fallback.
Supporting fixes (found in live testing)
- member unpin now also deletes the keypair bundle; connect() mints a
fresh identity when handed a bundle it cannot open (unless _rewrapOnly,
set by rewrapAllNodes), so a rejoin completes instead of dead-ending
before the invite-code prompt.
- A browser with no bundle key gets a passphrase prompt on the group page
instead of a "go back to the browser you registered on" message.
- RegisterPage / LoginPage / ResetPasswordPage trim the username so every
key derivation matches the hub's stored form.
Docs: docs/auth-confirm.md. Locale keys across all ten catalogues.
Tests: test_password_change, test_password_reset, test_recovery_email,
test_recovery_key, test_rewrap_fanout, test_bundle_store_recovery, plus
additions to test_admin_ops_mnp and test_webrtc_transport. Hub suite 492
passed; node suite 741 passed (the lone test_packaging_units failure is a
pre-existing RPM-spec flake, reproducible on main).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GGkxJW9br8Y9bhT8ywJ3oc
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The WebRTC transport relied on a single Google STUN server — if it was
unreachable, ICE gathering waited the full 4s timeout. Now four public
servers are used by default (Google ×2, Cloudflare, Mozilla), configurable
via node.toml, the Node page UI, and the CLI (meshbay-node stun list|add|
remove|reset). Changes are hot-swapped on the live transport.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Expose invite_ttl_hours, pair_ttl_hours, device_request_ttl_minutes,
max_concurrent_streams and transcode_incompatible_video in the Node
management panel. Changes are applied immediately via roster.db and
written back to node.toml so they survive a DB wipe. On startup,
roster overrides take precedence over node.toml defaults.
Draft v6 §2.11 documents the design; MNP gains node_settings_set /
node_settings_set_ack for the browser path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A one-click alternative to the full "Fix match" search-and-pick flow, and
reachable without SSH (`meshbay-node video rematch` clears a whole group).
- MNP 0.13: tmdb_rematch / tmdb_rematch_ack (additive — an older node
logs "unknown type", the button just does nothing). OP_TMDB_REMATCH,
signed like tmdb_override (media_cache is shared node-wide).
- media_cache.drop_tmdb_match(file_id): forgets the match AND the
override marker — deliberately stronger than clear_file_tmdb, since the
operator is explicitly asking for a fresh resolution.
- webrtc_server: _do_tmdb_rematch / _admin_exec_tmdb_rematch, dispatch +
admin-response routing, broadcasts tmdb_rematch_ack.
- transport.js: rematchTmdbMatch(fileId, signFn); 'tmdb_rematch' in the
admin-op allowlist; tmdb_rematch_ack handled like tmdb_override_ack.
- video-app.js: a "Re-match" button beside "Fix match" in the detail
modal (isNodeAdmin), then bumpMediaMetaGeneration(). video.rematch_one
key in all ten locales.
docs/mediacenter.md §10.1: V8–V13 marked done.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018BMLQjqFGCize2KtNBT79v
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Wizard (Electron):
- Auto-provisions node config (hub URL + username) from logged-in user
- node:start handles both cold start and restart of misconfigured daemon
- Waits for daemon to reach 'running', auto-links node key on hub
- probeNode accepts intermediate states for wizard progress feedback
Reset (meshbay-node reset):
- Unlinks node key from hub (DELETE /me/node_key, best-effort)
- Stops and disables daemon (systemctl --user disable --now)
- Erases ~/.config/meshbay, ~/.local/share/meshbay, ~/.local/state/meshbay
MusicBrainz contact:
- Resolved from owner's hub email instead of per-node roster config
- Removed musicbrainz_contact UI and WebRTC handshake field
- Removed set_musicbrainz_contact/musicbrainz_contact from roster
Node pairing:
- Added operator pairing banner on NodePage
- Added operator_paired flag to list_groups
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
chat_hist_resp checked only the single oldest pending entry across all
types. When switching tabs, keyed requests (media_meta_req, file_req)
from Videos/Music/Photos stayed in _pending and were older than the
chat_hist entry, so the response was dropped and the chat appeared empty
on return. Now scans for the first chat_hist entry instead. Same fix
applied to index_sync dispatch for consistency.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Paste an http(s) link in a group's chat and it unfurls into an OpenGraph
card — title, description, site name, and image — the way WhatsApp/Signal/
Slack do it.
The fetch is the node's, never the browser's or the hub's. The browser
cannot: a strict img-src/connect-src and CORS block it, and a direct fetch
would leak every reader's IP to the linked host on each render. The hub must
not touch group content (draft-v6 §2.5). The node already fetches third-party
metadata for the Videos and Music apps, over the same authorised path.
Flow mirrors media_meta_req: the client sends `link_preview_req {url}`, the
node replies `link_preview_resp` with the card fields (or `ok: false`), and
any OG image is stored under its blake3 in the existing media_cache thumb
store — the client then fetches it via the normal file_req path, exactly like
a poster. Nothing durable is added: the card text lives in a bounded in-memory
TTL cache on the node (draft-v6 §2.7 — enrichment on demand, the asking device
caches), and MNP goes 0.11 → 0.12 (additive: an older node logs "unknown type"
and the client shows the bare link).
Because the URL is chosen by a *member* and triggers an outbound request from
the operator's machine, `linkpreview.safe_url` is an SSRF gate: http(s) only,
no credentials, and every resolved address must be globally routable — no
loopback, private, link-local, multicast or reserved range, cloud-metadata
included. Redirects are followed by hand so each hop is re-checked. Residual,
documented in the module: DNS rebinding between the check and connect, closed
properly by pinning the checked IP — a follow-up.
Also fixes a long-standing chat annoyance the preview cards made worse:
opening the Chat tab landed a screen or two above the newest message because
the scroll-to-bottom ran before attachment thumbnails and (now) preview cards
had loaded and grown the content. A ResizeObserver keeps the view pinned to
the bottom through late content growth, and does nothing once the reader
scrolls up.
Tests: test_linkpreview.py (the SSRF gate and the OpenGraph parse, incl.
redirect re-validation and image downscaling) and test_link_preview_request.py
(reply shape, the media_cache image round-trip, the result cache).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018gKJ85aZyvEwarXMFzFEwi
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Found live: every reconnect attempt failed "Signaling failed: 401 Invalid
or expired token", looping for 4+ minutes with no chance of ever
succeeding. connect() takes one token but uses it in two places — the
handshake sent to the node, and the Authorization header on the signaling
POST to the hub — and only the constructor's original `this._accessToken`
was ever used for the latter. onNeedToken correctly fetches a fresh token
for each reconnect attempt, but it only ever reached the handshake; the
signaling call kept sending whatever token the transport was constructed
with, no matter how many minutes had passed or how many attempts fetched
a new one.
connect() now updates this._accessToken on every call, reconnects included,
so both places use the same current token.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
listener leak
Confirmed live by trace: during a screen lock, every reconnect attempt
failed with "Failed to fetch" (the browser grants no network access to a
locked/backgrounded tab, no code can change that) — expected. But the
backoff timer itself was also throttled while locked: an attempt scheduled
30s out took ~3 minutes of wall clock to fire, because a backgrounded tab's
timers run only when the OS lets them. Recovery after unlocking was
correspondingly delayed rather than prompt.
Fix: an always-on visibilitychange listener (separate from the diagnostic
one, and unlike it not gated on trace mode) resolves the current backoff
wait immediately once the page is visible again, instead of waiting out
whatever of it is left. The actual reconnect this enables is fast (~1.2s in
the trace that showed the "Failed to fetch" run) — the wait was the
throttled part.
Also fixes a real bug the same trace exposed: connect() re-arms the
diagnostic visibility listener and health-ping interval on every attempt
without ever removing the previous instance's — 8 failed attempts during
one lock left 8 duplicate `visibility` trace lines per real event, and (more
than a cosmetic issue) 8 concurrent health-ping intervals once reconnected.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Found live: >5min screen lock while music played, then "Transport not
connected" at the 2nd track's end (~8min in) despite the auto-reconnect
from the previous commit. Root cause: fetchTrackBlob's own
`!transport.connected` pre-flight check ran and threw before the
already-in-progress reconnect got the few seconds it needed — it never
reached _sendAndWait, which is the only place the previous fix taught the
transport to wait.
Adds transport.waitForReconnect(), factored out of _sendAndWait's existing
gate, and calls it from fetchTrackBlob before giving up. No-op when nothing
is being reconnected, so the ordinary path is unchanged.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
in-flight streams/downloads
Confirmed live (client trace + node logs, mobile screen-lock ~5min): ICE
goes disconnected -> failed within ~10s on both ends, but the DataChannel's
readyState stays "open" throughout, so nothing failed fast — every request
just sat out its own 8s/30s timeout, matching the reported symptom (poster
spinners, blocked chat, dead new streams).
transport.js: on connectionState "failed", reject pending requests
immediately (TransportLostError) and start a self-contained reconnect loop
(capped exponential backoff, redoes the full signaling handshake — the node
already discards the old session on its own "failed"/"closed", so there is
nothing lower-level to resume). New hooks: onNeedToken (fetch a fresh JWT,
since the captured one may have expired during the outage) and
onReconnected (let a consumer resume something that was mid-flight).
file-utils.js: pipelinedDownload retries a lost chunk instead of aborting
the whole transfer — covers Files downloads, poster/thumbnail fetches, and
music-player.js's blob-based track download, all of which go through it.
video-player.js: onReconnected reissues the existing seek-to-current-time
path, which already knows how to land a new stream_init on the live
SourceBuffer without resetting playback.
Playing audio is unaffected either way — musicbay.md's design downloads a
track to a blob before playing it, so a dead transport was never a network
dependency for what is already playing.
Stays on this branch until confirmed by real-device testing.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Client (transport.js): a localStorage ring buffer of connection/ICE/
DataChannel state transitions, visibility changes, request timeouts, and
periodic health pings — enabled once via ?trace=1 (persists), read back at
any time via #mb-debug without devtools. Off by default, zero behavior
change unless enabled.
Node (webrtc_server.py): MESHBAY_WEBRTC_TRACE=1 gates ICE-state-change
logging and a per-session heartbeat (message count, seconds since last
message, ICE/connection state) every 30s.
Debugging aid for the "stuck after several minutes of mobile screen lock"
report — not a fix. Stays on this branch until confirmed useful/resolved.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
IndexEntry.path is the *folder* a file is in (indexer.py's
_virtual_dir docstring: "the directory a file appears in"), not the
file itself. GroupIndex.get_entry_by_path() treated it as if it named
one file, and every one of its four callers did too:
_do_music_meta_request, _do_media_meta_request, _do_tmdb_override, and
_admin_exec_tmdb_override. Any two files sharing a folder — an album is
one folder with many tracks, a season is one folder with many episodes
— collided: a lookup by path silently returned whichever entry the
index happened to iterate to first, regardless of which file the
client actually asked about.
Found live (2026-08-25): three unrelated albums ("High Tone - Various",
two "Le Peuple de l'Herbe" albums) all showed the same MusicBrainz
cover, because all their representative tracks happened to sit in one
"high_tone" folder alongside a track that legitimately matched that
cover. A force-reload didn't help — the bug is server-side, not a
stale client state.
Fixed by keying these four request/response pairs by `file_id` (the
entry's own content hash — already unique, already how every other
lookup in the system identifies a file) instead of `path`, both in the
wire messages (music_meta_req/resp, media_meta_req/resp, tmdb_override)
and in music-app.js/video-app.js's own hooks. GroupIndex.get_entry_by_path
is now unused and removed — GroupIndex.get_entry(file_id) already did
the right thing.
No test previously exercised either handler with two entries sharing a
folder — the only existing coverage (test_tmdb_override_policy.py) gave
each entry its own folder, so the bug never had a chance to show up.
Added that scenario there and in two new test files, all confirmed
failing against the pre-fix code before being confirmed green against
the fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013XSohfUQQiaE77qyFLgSv3
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A new group application (docs/apps.md's plug-in mechanism), following the
plan in docs/photos.md. Unlike Videos/Music: several photo roots per group
instead of one (photo_roots is a set, one signed op replaces it whole),
a single album-grid view with no third-party matching step, and per-photo
info read from the file's own EXIF at index time — no metadata service,
no credential, no outbound network call at all.
Protocol (meshbay-common, MNP 0.10 -> 0.11, additive): `taken_at`/`camera`
on IndexEntry; `photo_roots`/`photo_roots_ack`; `OP_PHOTO_ROOTS`.
Node: roster.py stores photo_roots as a group_settings entry (JSON list,
same shape as enabled_apps); ops.py/webrtc_server.py validate and sign the
whole set in one op, same pattern as apps_enabled; a new PhotoEnricher
(indexer/enrich_photo.py) runs Pillow in its own small bounded pool,
separate from the video/audio pools, producing a resized thumbnail plus
the two EXIF fields — never GPS, checked by a grep-based regression test.
Client: photos-app.js — one album card per directory containing images,
a per-album photo grid, and a lightbox with next/previous (keyboard and
buttons), zoom in/out/fit/100% starting from the actual on-screen fit
percentage, and a "zip this album" button reusing files-app.js's own zip
mechanism (lifted into file-utils.js's downloadDirectory so both call the
same implementation). group-settings.js gets an add/remove multi-root
picker, distinct from Videos/Music's single-value one.
Bugs found and fixed before this ever shipped, worth keeping the story of:
- enrich_photo.py read width/height from the raw image *before* applying
EXIF orientation correction, and read DateTimeOriginal off the plain
0th-IFD Exif object — a real camera stores it in the Exif sub-IFD, which
Pillow only exposes via get_ifd(Exif). A flat, hand-built EXIF dict
round-trips through Pillow either way, which is exactly what would have
hidden both bugs; the regression test builds EXIF with piexif instead,
matching what real hardware produces.
- photos-app.js's album grouping stripped a trailing path segment from
entry.path under the assumption it still carried a filename — it
doesn't (files-app.js's own convention: e.path is already the
containing directory), so every album collapsed one level into its
parent. Found live against a real multi-folder library.
- transport.js's ADMIN_OP_TYPES allowlist (already the fix for an
identical bug on video_root/apps_enabled, see 4783d81) was missing
photo_roots: its admin_challenge matched no pending request and was
silently dropped, so saving a photo root just timed out after 30s with
no error.
- daemon.py pruned a thumbnail when its file left the index (root removed
or reconfigured) but never forgot the content hash was "already
attempted" — the same bytes reappearing under a renamed/relocated root
(an operator's real workflow) were then permanently skipped, forever,
with nothing to indicate why. Discarding the attempt alongside the
cache entry on prune is what makes pruning actually reversible.
- packages/meshbay-client's app:// protocol handler served every file
with no Cache-Control header, so Chromium was free to serve a stale
cached copy indefinitely — none of several `npm run sync-ui` + reload
cycles during development actually picked up the new code until the
renderer's disk cache was cleared by hand. Now sends Cache-Control:
no-store.
- the lightbox's zoomed image used flex centering (align-items/
justify-content: center) combined with overflow: auto — a well-known
trap where the browser centers overflowing content by shifting it, and
the leading half of that overflow (here, the top of a zoomed photo)
sits outside what the scrollport can actually reach. Reported live as
"unusable". Fixed by switching to top/left alignment once zoomed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TiZG4AuSnxHohQMpwTHTyL
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A real report showed audio_root timing out with *nothing* logged in
between the connection handshake and the timeout — no admin_challenge, no
error, nothing. The previous fix made an unmatched admin_challenge return
silently (correctly, to stop it stealing an unrelated pending request —
see the earlier commit), but that silence is indistinguishable from "the
request never reached the node at all", which is exactly the ambiguity
blocking this investigation. An unmatched admin_challenge is now logged
(op, op_id, and the full set of currently-pending keys) instead of
dropped quietly, and setAudioRoot/_authorizeAdminOp trace both hops of
the round trip explicitly. Node-side, _do_audio_root gets a debug log at
entry — cheap, and the only way to know from server logs alone whether
the request was ever received if the client-side trail comes up empty.
Diagnostic only: no routing behavior changed from the previous fix,
verified against the same reproduction script.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Reproduced from a real report: enabling the Music app and saving its root
folder in the same Settings visit (the new merged Directories section
makes this a fast, natural back-to-back sequence) fired two signed admin
ops within milliseconds. Neither the admin_challenge reply nor the
admin_response ack two steps later was keyed by anything — both were
matched purely by "whichever request happens to be oldest pending"
(transport.js's own documented last-resort guess). apps_enabled's
challenge stole audio_root's pending slot; audio_root's own request never
received a challenge at all and just sat there until its 30s timeout.
Both hops are now keyed by op name: admin_challenge already carries `op`
from the node, and admin_response is given one client-side purely for
this (the node's _do_admin_response never reads it — only op_id and
signature). A stray admin_challenge with no matching request is dropped
outright rather than guessed at — it is never a broadcast (one
`self._send`, no peer loop, docs/webrtc_server.py), so a session with no
matching key genuinely has nothing to do with it. A domain ack (an actual
broadcast — every connected client gets audio_root_ack, not just the
requester) still falls through to the existing per-type handling when
nobody here is waiting on it, unchanged.
Verified against a standalone reproduction of the exact race (two admin
ops racing, reordered replies) — this codebase has no browser-JS test
runner to add as a real regression test, so the repro lived in a scratch
script rather than the suite.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Five related pieces of polish against the Music app and Settings, all
from the same conversation:
- Music app now requires audio_root, same as Videos requires video_root:
an empty-state message until one is set, and grouping filtered to only
what's under it (underAudioRoot, mirroring video-app.js's
underVideoRoot). Wires the new audio_root/audio_root_ack pair through
transport.js and group-page.js state the same way video_root already
flows.
- Starting one player now stops the other — opening a film closes the
music queue, starting a track closes the video modal. Both used to run
at once, found live.
- Group Settings reworked: every section but a bare form (invite,
pair-operator, approve-device) is now collapsible (CollapsibleSection);
the uploads on/off button is a real toggle switch (ToggleSwitch,
reused for TMDB/MusicBrainz's enabled switches too, each now with an
icon + status badge in its header instead of a plain checkbox row);
and shared directories, the Videos root picker, and the new Music root
picker are merged into one "Directories" section (RootFolderRow) instead
of three separate ones scattered down the page — the root pickers only
show once their app is actually enabled.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Tagging and covers for these two formats landed already, but neither one
decodes in any mainstream browser's <audio> element at all — a real
library scan turned up 273 such files that would show up correctly in the
Music app and then simply fail on click. This closes that gap: the node
transcodes to AAC/M4A on request (a one-shot whole-file conversion, not
live-piped like video's fMP4 segments — an audio file is small enough that
streaming it buys nothing), caches the result under its own content hash
the same way a TMDB poster or a MusicBrainz cover is cached, and serves it
back through the ordinary file_req/chunk path. That path used to assume
anything in the media cache was thumbnail-sized (single chunk, always);
generalized it to slice a cached blob the same way a real file on disk
gets sliced, since a transcoded track can be several MB.
New MNP pair (`audio_transcode_req`/`_resp`, version bump to 0.9), shares
its concurrency cap with video's transcode pool rather than getting its
own — both are real ffmpeg processes on the same node. Every other audio
format is untouched: this only fires for .wma/.mpc, the two extensions
that need it.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Implements the client half of docs/musicbay.md against MNP 0.8:
- music-app.js: album grid (grouped by artist -> album, from index-time
artist/album fields) or flat folder view, per-group localStorage
toggle like Videos. MusicBrainz (music_meta_req) is only looked up
when a track has no embedded cover at all — well-tagged files never
trigger a network call, unlike Videos where TMDB is unconditional.
Reuses video-app.js's MediaThumb/LazyTile (now exported) rather than
duplicating the chunk-path thumbnail decode + virtualization.
- music-player.js: the persistent player bar — queue, shuffle (Fisher-
Yates, keeps the current track in place when toggled), repeat (off/
all/one), volume (localStorage), prev/next, a one-track prefetch
cache. No MSE, no node-side streaming: a track is downloaded and
decrypted once via file-utils.js's pipelinedDownload, same chunk
pipeline Files already uses, then played from a blob URL.
- group-page.js: owns musicQueue/musicbrainzConfig state and renders
MusicPlayerBar outside the tab-switched area — deliberately, so
playback survives navigating to Chat/Files, the same reasoning the
video/preview modals are shell-owned rather than app-owned.
- apps.js: registers "music". transport.js: fetchMusicMeta (keyed by
path, same reordering-hazard fix as fetchMediaMeta),
setMusicbrainzConfig/setMusicbrainzEnabled (signed ops, mirroring
TMDB's), and the three new ack handlers. group-settings.js: a
MusicBrainz settings section (contact string, per-group toggle) —
the existing Applications checklist already picks up "music" for
free, per apps.md's own claim.
- icon.js: music/pause/skip-next/skip-prev/shuffle/repeat/volume,
drawn in the same stroked style as the existing set.
- i18n: group.tab_music, the music.* and settings_node.musicbrainz_*
keys, translated (not just copied) across all ten locales, Polish
carrying full one/few/many/other plural forms for music.n_tracks.
- webapp.py's _ASSETS, test_hook_ordering.py's STATIC_FILES and
test_transport_contracts.py's SPLIT_FILES gain the two new files.
Full suite (common + hub + node): 1116 passed, no regressions.
`npm run sync-ui` in meshbay-client confirmed both files copied.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KBi7ALLGfwcjBXt57yNMcy
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Three bugs found live testing the Videos app against a real HEVC/EAC3 show,
plus a design change requested afterward:
- Streaming always did "-c:v copy", which faithfully reports a source's real
hev1 codec string but is unplayable in a browser with no HEVC decoder
(most Chrome/Linux builds). The node now transcodes to H264 whenever the
probed codec is browser-incompatible (media_probe.py's new
BROWSER_INCOMPATIBLE_VIDEO_CODECS), with a `transcode_incompatible_video`
node.toml opt-out for operators who know their viewers already decode it.
- Dropping a whole season into an already-watched folder gave no scanning
indicator and no progress bar: IndexProgress was only ever updated by the
two bulk scan paths, never by the real-time per-file watchdog path
(_schedule_update/_debounce/_update_entry). That path now accounts a
"burst" the same way, without double-counting a file rewritten mid-debounce.
- A stray literal "0" rendered in the video detail modal when there was no
TMDB match (`meta.confidence` is 0, and `0 && x` renders "0" in JSX/htm,
not nothing) — `confident` is now a real boolean.
- Whether TMDB is used at all moves from a node-wide setting to per-group
(OP_TMDB_ENABLED/tmdb_enabled/tmdb_enabled_ack, scoped like OP_VIDEO_ROOT):
an operator running a real media-library group alongside test/demo groups
on one node wants outbound TMDB traffic for the one that needs it, not all
of them. The custom API token and query language stay node-wide, one
shared credential/cache (tmdb_config/OP_TMDB_CONFIG, unchanged reasoning).
MNP_VERSION 0.6 -> 0.7, additive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LAmyXtc6dAADsH23ydXQpY
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
wizard polish
Two operator-facing fixes for a real 3-season show whose automatic TMDB
match was wrong at the show level: per-season overview/air_date tabs in the
detail modal (falling back to the show-level text when a season's own is
empty), and a "Fix match…" search-and-correct affordance that re-resolves
every file sharing the corrected show's display_title. New signed op
OP_TMDB_OVERRIDE and two read-only pairs (season_meta_req/resp,
tmdb_search_req/resp), MNP_VERSION 0.5 -> 0.6.
Also: the create-group wizard gets a spinning indexing indicator and an
app-selection step, group settings default the TMDB language to the
operator's own locale (never as a global default), and a file renamed
mid-session now re-triggers title parsing instead of being silently
skipped by the enrichment dedup guard.
Fixes two bugs found during this work: the search overlay's z-index lost
to the base video-overlay class and rendered invisibly, and season_meta's
own empty overview didn't fall back to the show-level one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LAmyXtc6dAADsH23ydXQpY
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Implements docs/mediacenter.md: a "Videos" group application built on the
existing files index rather than a separate catalogue. On the node side,
new indexer enrichment (technical probe, filename/season parsing, thumbnail
generation) runs per-file once an operator has chosen a video_root for the
group, plus a TMDB client for on-demand poster/metadata lookups (never
client-side, thumbnails delivered over the existing chunk path). On the hub
side, a new video-app.js renders a lazily-mounted poster grid or a
thumbnail-only flat list, with TMDB entirely optional per group.
Along the way: the global apps registry now drives Settings' default-tab
picker instead of a hardcoded list, and the video_root is configured from
group Settings (like uploads) rather than from Files, with the node
refusing to run any TMDB/thumbnail work until one is set.
Fixes several bugs found via live testing against a real library, notably
a race between two effects writing the same "image ready" state that could
leave a poster grid spinning forever on a same-tab revisit — see
mediacenter.md §5.4 for the full account of each one.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
reconcile, and delta sync
Indexer performance work, in four parts:
- Persistent (path, size, mtime) -> hash cache (indexer/cache.py) so a node
restart no longer re-hashes every file — measured at 23 minutes for a
114 GB library on a slow disk before this, near-instant after. Hashing
is deliberately kept sequential (max_workers=1): it was never actually
concurrent despite the pool size, and two interleaved reads seek-thrash
a spinning disk instead of going faster.
- Byte-based scan progress (IndexProgress), surfaced via the loopback
index-status route, the handshake ack, and a periodic INDEX_PROGRESS
push to connected peers — drives a progress bar in the Create Group
wizard and "add a directory" in Settings, and an animated presence dot.
Guaranteed to settle back to idle via try/finally and a final push on
the scanning->false transition.
- The reconcile backstop's directory walks now run in the executor
instead of blocking the daemon's event loop; its interval defaults to
10 min (was 60s) with adaptive backoff to 2h when nothing changes,
reset on a real change or a peer connecting, and is now a per-group
operator setting (signed op + group Settings UI).
- INDEX_DELTA wired up (protocol support existed, nothing called it):
_on_index_change now sends additions/deletions instead of rebuilding
the full entries list, coalesced over a short window so a burst of
file events produces one push, and the hub swarm registration for
public groups only (re-)registers newly added hashes.
Also fixes several bugs found while testing the above against real
libraries (a 114 GB and a 100+ GB group on a USB HDD):
- /api/reload blocked until the reload — including a brand-new group's
full initial scan — finished, which the Electron bridge's fixed 30s
call timeout turned into a hard failure on any real library. The route
now fires the reload without waiting (ops.start_reload), matching
add_root/remove_root's existing pattern; the wizard's own step order
was fixed to wait for the group to actually appear hosted before the
steps that need it (extra roots, GEK), with retries for the residual
race between that and the daemon's own bookkeeping.
- transport.js's hand-rolled msgpack codec had no case for uint64/int64
(0xcf/0xd3) and crashed decoding any message containing one — hit by
IndexProgress.scanned_bytes/total_bytes for any group over ~4.3 GB.
Verified against real msgpack-encoded bytes from the Python side.
- chat_hist_resp, and this change's own index_progress and
set_scan_settings_ack pushes, were not routed by message type and
could be handed to an unrelated pending request by the transport's
"oldest pending" fallback, stalling it until its own 30s timeout and
corrupting whatever received the wrong reply in its place.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016SF6RKNBKg9qejmoMJ9ybA
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
GroupPage's 6620-line app.js carried Chat and Files wedged in directly, with
no way to add another group-level app without touching the shell itself. It
is now app.js (routing, non-group pages) plus nine focused files — apps.js
(the registry), chat-app.js, files-app.js, video-player.js, group-page.js
(the shell), group-settings.js, hub-client.js, icon.js and file-utils.js —
with docs/apps.md as the checklist for adding one (Videos/Music/Photos are
sketched there, not built).
Node side gained the matching enablement mechanism, mirroring
member_upload exactly: a roster setting, a signed apps_enabled op enforced
by _has_admin_authority, exposed in the handshake ack. Operators toggle
applications per group from Settings, which also gained a small reorder:
Invite, Pairing, Applications, Shared directories, Uploads, danger zone,
Your devices, Members.
Two bugs surfaced during the split, both missing an import across the new
file boundary and invisible to node --check or a module-load probe since
they only throw when the code path actually runs:
- group-page.js called onRefreshAuth on a stale-token handshake rejection,
but app.js never imported refreshAccessToken from hub-client.js — so a
brand new member (including a group's own creator) hit "Not a member of
this group" and the retry silently failed, throwing before it could
refresh the token.
- chat-app.js called getLocale() for message timestamps without importing
it from i18n.js. Opening Chat on a group with real messages threw mid-
render; uncaught, that appears to wedge Preact's render scheduler, so
every button on the page stopped responding until reload.
Caught the second class of bug with a proper no-undef audit across all
split files (a temporarily installed ESLint 9, since the system one is too
old to parse this codebase's syntax) rather than trusting grep. 827 tests
pass; 6 new ones cover the apps_enabled policy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016SF6RKNBKg9qejmoMJ9ybA
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Re-serve decrypted fMP4 video over HTTP on the LAN so a Chromecast can
play the stream. The relay runs in the Electron main process — same trust
boundary as downloads and MSE playback.
- cast-relay.js: HTTP server with BoxAccumulator (reassembles WebRTC
chunks into moof+mdat pairs), ring buffer, backpressure, finish() for
clean end-of-stream, fixed port range 19550-19553
- cast-chromecast.js: mDNS discovery (bonjour-service) + CASTV2 protocol
(castv2-client), connect/reload/disconnect lifecycle
- Seek-aware: relay restarts on every seek, Chromecast reloads new URL;
generation counter prevents stale async errors from killing active
restarts; landingPlayheadRef suppresses programmatic seeking events
- Device picker in video top bar with scan, device selection, copy-URL
fallback, and cast status indicator
- IPC bridge (main/preload/platform) for start/push/stop/finish/status/
discover/chromecastConnect/chromecastReload/chromecastDisconnect
- Phase 3 design doc for DLNA/Smart TV in docs/cast-smart-tv.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|