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Passphrase sign-in locks per username: after `login.max_failures` wrong
passphrases (default 4) the name is refused with `429 account_locked` and a
`Retry-After` for `login.lockout_minutes` (default 60), without the passphrase
being checked. Both numbers are instance policy an admin sets from the panel;
zero failures turns it off. The per-IP limit bounds one address, and IPv6
gives every subscriber a /64 of them — an online guess targets an account, so
the account is what is counted.
- Counted by the name as typed, existing or not, so `login` stays uniform (M1).
The key is a hash: people type passphrases into the username field.
- The attempt is taken before the check in one `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE
… WHERE … RETURNING`, so a concurrent burst gets no more than the limit.
- Sign-in, passphrase change and account deletion count on the same row; the
last had no rate limit at all.
- A lockout refuses passphrase sign-in and nothing else: sessions, renewal and
device sign-in continue, and a reset code clears it (AV26). A session learns
its own lockout from `/v1/users/me`, and the passphrase change checks it
before re-wrapping any node's bundle — the hub accepts the new passphrase
only after the nodes have it.
The SPA now shows what the hub said. `loginAndRecover` threw "Login failed:
{json}", so `email_verification_required` never matched and was never shown;
the passphrase-change form rendered no error at all in its first phase.
The unauthenticated surface, reviewed route by route:
- No `/docs`, `/redoc` or `/openapi.json`, in the code. The Caddyfile hid them
on meshbay.org only; a packaged hub behind any other proxy published all three.
- The node socket's first message must arrive within ten seconds. It is
accepted before anyone is known, and an unbounded read is a connection any
stranger holds for free.
- `/v1/relays` answers 503 behind `relay.RELAYS_ENABLED`, as federation does:
nothing in the tree calls it and two of its routes take no account.
- `test_unauthenticated_surface.py` walks every route and fails on one without
an authentication dependency that is not listed with its reason.
Verified in Chrome against a local hub: the lockout and wrong-passphrase
messages, the admin section saving both lockout and mail limits, and the
passphrase change refused while locked. Not verified in Firefox (a running
instance blocks the headless one), nor the upsert's concurrency on PostgreSQL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt
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group's hosts are its members'
Two checks that were not performed, in the same shape: something true of the
public case, written so it did not apply to the rest.
**Signaling.** The membership check read `if node_group_ids:`, so an empty set
skipped it — membership, group status and the public-group gate together — and
the offer was relayed. Since AV1 made an empty claim mean "no groups" rather
than "all of my owner's", that is the *normal* registration of a node hosting
nothing: the unconfigured node left running, the machine in this register's
founding incident, and the one least able to absorb the work. Each offer makes
it allocate an RTCPeerConnection and gather ICE, 30 a minute, which is H6
restored in exactly the case AV1 made common. It is refused now. Nothing
legitimate is lost: such a node refuses the handshake anyway — `group_id` is
mandatory (M1) and a node with no group key refuses (NS8) — so this declines
work the node would decline one step later at its own expense.
**The node list.** `GET /v1/groups/{id}/nodes` checked membership only for a
public group with public groups switched off. A private one answered any
authenticated account that knew the id — which an ex-member knows for ever —
with the ids and public keys of the machines hosting it. §7.4 already stated the
property for the public case. Membership is required now unless the group is
public and public groups are on. Nothing needs the list before joining: an open
join writes the membership row first, and an invitation registers the invitee's
when the code is created, both checked before making the change.
`test_webrtc_signaling_roundtrip` had to be repaired, and is the finding
restated: it registered a node in `_connected_nodes` and never in
`_node_groups`, so it drove the relay through the hole rather than through the
door — the check it routed around was the defect. It now registers the group a
real node registers.
§7.2 and §7.3 gain the rules, the register AV24 and AV25, and
test_availability_between_members.py two cases that fail on the property
against the previous source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`users.py` and `admin.py` under the availability lens. `admin.py` needed
nothing — its moderator/admin line is drawn explicitly, self-modification is
refused, and every list it serves is bounded. `users.py` had four findings and
one of them is the worst of this whole pass.
AV9 `mail._send` is `smtplib` with a ten-second timeout, called straight
from four async handlers. That wait is not one request's, it is the
instance's: nothing else served, no node socket read, no WebRTC offer
relayed, until the MTA answers. Reachable by any signed-in user at
request rate through the endpoint below. It has no symptom a test
catches — everything simply works slowly, for everyone, whenever the
mail server is having a bad day.
AV10 `PATCH /v1/users/me` is the third path that makes the hub send mail
and the only one with neither a rate limit nor a captcha, while
`register` and `password/reset-request` have both. The address is any
string the caller types and the duplicate check only rejects one
already held by an account here, so every address *not* registered on
this hub was a valid target: a relay for verification codes with the
hub's own reputation attached. A rate limit counting by IP bounds a
caller and not an inbox, so the floor under it is a cooldown per
account — the same for a reset request, whose cost also lands in a
mailbox that is not the asker's.
AV11 `default_tab:` accepted any suffix on a `{key:path}` route with an
unbounded Text value and no cap on rows: one account could write
without limit into a table shared with everyone. The suffix is a group
id, which is what the SPA writes, so it is checked as one. A key over
64 characters was also a 500 rather than a 400 — the column is
String(64), which PostgreSQL enforces and SQLite does not, so it would
have appeared in production and in no test.
AV12 `/v1/notifications` and `/v1/groups` had no upper bound on `limit` and
no floor under `offset`, while every list in `admin.py` carries
`le=200`. The group directory takes no authentication at all.
Two shapes recur and are now named in §13.5b: a limit written on one of
several equivalent paths, and a bound that counts the wrong thing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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An availability review, prompted by the group claim above: a participant
supplies input — who else bears the cost? Six answers where the cost fell on
someone other than the sender, and none of them needs an attacker.
AV3 `chat_notify` carried a `group_id` the hub believed, so any connected
node could write a notification to every member of any group on the
hub, carrying a display string of its choosing, with its account
having no relation to that group. This is the group claim again, two
hundred lines further down the same socket. Gated on what the node is
registered for, and metered: the fan-out is one write per member. The
budget expires by time rather than on disconnect, or reconnecting
would refill it and a node token is good for an hour.
AV4 A swarm source named its own `endpoint` as free text documented as
"ip:port", so an account could publish a third party's address — H6's
`peer_ip` defect, never applied here. Nothing dials a swarm source
today, which is the only reason it was not already a reflection
primitive. It is a transport and a port now, never a host, and the
number of hashes one account may claim is bounded: rows were keyed
(hash, account) with no cap at all.
AV5 `handle_webrtc_answer` resolved any pending `peer_id` from any node's
socket. The answer is the SDP a browser then connects to. That this
had not happened rested on a uuid4 being unguessable.
AV6 `relay_register` had no authentication of any kind: it compared
`pk_relay` against the approved value, which is a *public* key, so
anyone who could read it could rewrite where the hub tells nodes to
send relayed traffic. The module docstring promised signed JWTs and
`jwt` was imported and never used.
AV7 The node held unlimited peer connections and kept one that never
completed a handshake for the life of the daemon. H6 bounded what one
unauthenticated peer costs; the hub's cap is three offers in flight
per *account*, a limit on each caller and not on the machine, so an
operator's exposure grew with the size of their groups.
AV8 `invite-notify` put a request-supplied `group_name` into the subject
of an email the hub sends under its own domain, to any account, with
no rate limit. The name comes from the group row now.
The tests are two accounts each, in one file that says why: a one-member test
proves a one-member property, and every finding here needed a second person
to exist at all. Each was checked against the unfixed code. Two did not
survive that check and were rewritten — one re-enacted the disconnect path
instead of running it (hence `forget_node`), the other called the reaper
itself and would have passed with the call removed from `handle_offer`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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