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Most of these failed on Windows for reasons that had nothing to do with the
code under test, which is how real Windows defects hid among them:
- Read and write files as UTF-8, and talk to Node in UTF-8. read_text(),
write_text() and subprocess text=True use the locale codepage, cp1252 on
Windows: "é", "—" and "→" arrived as "?" or crashed, some sixty tests.
Calls to PowerShell and schtasks are left alone -- they answer in the
console codepage.
- Import ESM harness modules by file URL (as_uri): a raw "C:\..." path is not
a module specifier.
- test_cli_golden: mask the tmp path in its JSON-escaped form, spell it the
POSIX way, record on Linux, mask the protocol version (the recording had
failed everywhere since the MNP 4.0 bump) and argparse's version-dependent
quoting; point USERPROFILE at the tmp home, or `member invite` and
`operator pair` wrote their codes into the developer's profile.
- test_disk_io_off_loop: expect what a free loop can reach on the platform's
timer, 15.6 ms on Windows, not an assumed 5 ms.
- test_root_paths_are_operator_only: expect the OS's spelling of the path.
- test_audio_meta_cache: find ffprobe with shutil.which.
Node suite on Windows: 1489 passed, none failed. Hub suite: 3 failures left,
all older than this change (two SQLite concurrency tests, one transfer resume).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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spa_source.transport_files() takes the classic transport*.js scripts
from the hub's shell, in load order. Every test that read transport.js
reads them all, the Node harnesses run them joined as one scope, the
chat probe loads each, and the desktop shell must load them in order.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MNP carried no correlation id. A reply named its own type and nothing
else, so a client with more than one request in flight worked out which
one a message answered from the message itself — and for the replies
that name nothing it could not. `_dispatch` fell through to matching by
arrival order, which is a guess. `_sendAndWait` had the right value all
along: it keys `_pending` by `this._seqId++` and never put it on the
wire.
The guess fails asymmetrically, which is why it hid. The victim is not
the request that was answered wrongly — it is the unrelated one that now
waits out its own 30s timeout for a reply already delivered elsewhere.
Live on 2026-09-06: five `music_meta_req` sat pending for over 100
seconds behind a failing MusicBrainz, and a `device_list_result` was
handed to one of them. The composer is disabled while a send is in
flight, so a chat message whose reply went astray the same way left the
Chat tab looking frozen for thirty seconds, then unfroze on its own.
The `ack` half of this was fixed on 2026-08-30 by matching on request
type. That closed the instance and left the class open: a refusal has no
type to match on either, and `_dispatch_message`'s catch-all answers
every unforeseen failure with `{"type": "error", "detail": "Request
failed"}` — 238 of this module's 240 error sends name nothing at all.
`req_id` now rides on the request and comes back on the reply. On the
node it is published for the whole handler in a ContextVar and stamped
by `_send`: a parameter would have meant threading an argument through
all 240 send sites, and asyncio copies the context into a task, so a
handler that `_spawn`s its real work still answers under the right id.
It is never stamped on a broadcast — those answer nothing, and the
owner check in `_send` is what keeps a chat broadcast or an index push
from reaching another peer looking like a reply.
On the client, `_dispatch` resolves on `req_id` first and the
arrival-order fallback is gone the moment a node proves it stamps
(`_correlates`, armed by the handshake's own reply). The fallback stays
for an MNP 1.0 node, unchanged and no wider: there it is the only thing
there is, and removing it would leave device_list_result, join_result
and the handshake replies reaching nobody.
Two things fall out. `sendChat` refuses an `error` reply like every
other request in the file — it returned it as success, which did not
matter while a refusal reached the wrong caller anyway and would now
show a rejected message as sent. And `_group_ctx` uses `.get`: a reload
pops a removed group while sessions connected to it are open, and every
request they had left raised KeyError into that same catch-all.
Sealed index messages are the one exception to the fast path. They
cannot be handed over until they are opened, which is asynchronous while
`_dispatch` is not — resolving on the id alone gave `fetchIndex` the
envelope and skipped `onIndexSync` entirely. Caught by extending
`index_seal_probe.mjs` to stamp a reply the way a current node does,
after the hub suite passed over it: the probe built its own frames and
had never seen one.
Tests, all failing before and passing after: `test_chat_send.py` drives
the real ChatPanel over the real transport for both shapes of reply with
an older request pending (3 of its 6 are new, and the 3 for `ack` pass
either way, so it discriminates); `test_reply_correlation.py` pins the
node's half — the refusals that name nothing else, the broadcast that
must not be stamped, and a late reply from a spawned task answering
under its own id rather than the most recent request's.
Full suite: 1897 passed, same 11 pre-existing failures as before.
QUIC keeps its own dispatch and is not stamped. It is disabled by
default and no browser request reaches it, but the asymmetry is real.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dn1xYx9uT69mCB6UDvyKAN
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`index_sync`, `index_delta` and the `handshake_ack` config payload now travel
sealed under a GEK-derived subkey (`meshbay_common/groupbox.py`, mirrored by
`sealGroup`/`openGroup` in `crypto.js`). Only `type`, `v`, `group_id` and the
ack's `node_pk`/`proof`/`sig` stay in clear — a receiver must route and
authenticate before it would trust a decryption. Verify, then decrypt.
The ack line is integrity, not confidentiality: the signed handshake transcript
names no ack field, so `is_node_admin`, `enabled_apps`, `video_root` and the
rest were authenticated by the DTLS channel alone. The index line is defence in
depth against a repeat of C1/C6 — a peer served before the handshake completes
now gets ciphertext, not filenames. Nothing against an observer, the hub, or a
member; that is the whole claim. `index_progress` stays clear (D3, counters
only). Chat is out of scope.
Failure is fatal: a payload that does not open ends the session naming the
message type — never an empty index or an empty `enabled_apps`, both of which
are legitimate states.
Version negotiation ships here too (phase 15.6, brought forward): `v` + `v_min`
on `handshake` and `handshake_challenge`, refused with `version_too_old` /
`version_too_new` / `version_unreadable`. The flag day was already being paid
for; the next breaking change now costs a refusal message.
BREAKING CHANGE: breaks the WebRTC wire every deployed client speaks. Hub and
every node must deploy together; the SPA is served by the hub, so a browser
picks up the new client on reload. See MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md §11.1a, §13.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkzbhmMmK8PqQBtGz5zCvY
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