| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`ruff check .` had gone unrun long enough to report 568 errors, which is the
same as having no linter: the next real finding would have been invisible in the
noise. This is the 521 it fixes by itself, in 173 files, and nothing else — the
98 it cannot fix are the next commit.
What actually changed: import sorting (225), imports nobody used (87, none of
them a re-export — no `__init__.py` is touched, which was the one way this could
have broken an import elsewhere), `datetime.timezone.utc` to `datetime.UTC` (69)
and `asyncio.TimeoutError` to `TimeoutError` (18), both plain aliases on the 3.12
this project requires, `Optional[X]` to `X | None` (24), and f-strings with
nothing to interpolate (19).
Checked rather than assumed: every module in the three packages still imports,
and the suite is 2893 passed — the same count, test for test, as the merge
before it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
when idle
Browser idle sign-out (media playback counts as activity; not the desktop app),
refresh idle window and maximum session length, in hours. Sign-out now revokes
on the hub, and the profile has "sign out everywhere".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XuNrwLf5EFWCMHzfoEvnpm
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
GroupPage's 6620-line app.js carried Chat and Files wedged in directly, with
no way to add another group-level app without touching the shell itself. It
is now app.js (routing, non-group pages) plus nine focused files — apps.js
(the registry), chat-app.js, files-app.js, video-player.js, group-page.js
(the shell), group-settings.js, hub-client.js, icon.js and file-utils.js —
with docs/apps.md as the checklist for adding one (Videos/Music/Photos are
sketched there, not built).
Node side gained the matching enablement mechanism, mirroring
member_upload exactly: a roster setting, a signed apps_enabled op enforced
by _has_admin_authority, exposed in the handshake ack. Operators toggle
applications per group from Settings, which also gained a small reorder:
Invite, Pairing, Applications, Shared directories, Uploads, danger zone,
Your devices, Members.
Two bugs surfaced during the split, both missing an import across the new
file boundary and invisible to node --check or a module-load probe since
they only throw when the code path actually runs:
- group-page.js called onRefreshAuth on a stale-token handshake rejection,
but app.js never imported refreshAccessToken from hub-client.js — so a
brand new member (including a group's own creator) hit "Not a member of
this group" and the retry silently failed, throwing before it could
refresh the token.
- chat-app.js called getLocale() for message timestamps without importing
it from i18n.js. Opening Chat on a group with real messages threw mid-
render; uncaught, that appears to wedge Preact's render scheduler, so
every button on the page stopped responding until reload.
Caught the second class of bug with a proper no-undef audit across all
split files (a temporarily installed ESLint 9, since the system one is too
old to parse this codebase's syntax) rather than trusting grep. 827 tests
pass; 6 new ones cover the apps_enabled policy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016SF6RKNBKg9qejmoMJ9ybA
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Stage D, and the honest half of it.
D1 — the seam (done, and verified)
----------------------------------
`static/platform.js`. `HUB` becomes `platform.hubBase()` and the transport is
built with the same base, so one address has one source. In a browser it returns
'' and every path stays relative to the origin that served the page — the
acceptance criterion for this split was "the browser SPA behaves identically",
and it does. `platform.js` joins `_ASSETS`, or a change to it would not move the
content hash and a cached browser would never ask for it.
D2 — the shell (written, never launched)
-----------------------------------------
**There is no npm on this machine. Electron was never installed and
`packages/meshbay-client/` has not been run once.** That is stated here rather
than discovered later.
What is there: a main process serving the packaged interface over a privileged
`app://` scheme (`secure` and `standard` are not cosmetic — without them the
service worker refuses to register and streamed downloads break silently), a
preload exposing an enumerated bridge that never passes a filesystem path, a
window with `sandbox`, `contextIsolation` and no node integration, navigation
away from the package refused, and a CSP where the hub is reachable over
connect-src and is not a script source. The hub address arrives as a process
argument because `platform.hubBase()` runs before anything can await.
`test_desktop_shell.py` pins each of those by reading the source — the treatment
`test_downloads.py` already gives the three browser save paths. It catches a
property being removed and proves nothing about the application running. Two
were checked by breaking them.
The interface is *copied* into the package by `build/sync-ui.js` from the hub's
static directory, and `ui/` is gitignored: a silent fork is the only real way to
end up maintaining the interface twice.
D3 — partial
------------
The bridge, and the part worth having now: safeStorage's backend is reported
rather than assumed. On Linux it falls back to a fixed key when no keyring is
running, silently — someone who believes the OS is holding their keys is told
when it is not. The native key lifecycle belongs with D4 and needs a running
application to mean anything.
D8 — partial, and a real defect found
--------------------------------------
`meshbay-node.spec` installed the SYSTEM template — the one carrying `User=%i` —
into `%{_userunitdir}`. A user unit already runs as its owner and cannot carry
`User=`; systemd refuses the file, so the packaged unit could never have
started. Nothing noticed because nobody had built and installed the RPM.
Two units now: the template to `%{_unitdir}`, and a new `meshbay-node-user.service`
that a person enables themselves without a password — which is what lets the
desktop client install a node without asking for one. It carries ExecReload, so
`meshbay-node reload` does not have to stop a service somebody is streaming from,
and documents the drop-in for a drive outside the home, RequiresMountsFor
included.
798 tests pass; e2e.py still passes end to end. Nothing here was built or
launched: no npm, no rpmbuild.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|
|
Reported: after an hour of watching a film, every action answers "token expired
or invalid", with signing out and back in as the only way on. Reopening the tab
the next day did the same.
The access token lasts an hour and the refresh token thirty days, and nothing
used the second one. `hubFetch` reported a 401 like any other error, and
watching a film is precisely an hour in which the hub hears nothing at all,
because the video travels over WebRTC. So the token aged out with no request to
notice, and a tab reopened the next morning presented a stale token with a
perfectly good refresh token sitting beside it in localStorage.
Underneath was the reason it could not be recovered from. The hub *rotates*:
the refresh endpoint revokes the token presented, returns a replacement, and
treats a revoked one presented again as theft, revoking the whole family. The
client kept only the access token out of that response. So the refresh token was
spent on first use and the second attempt did not merely fail — it destroyed the
family. Which is exactly the reported symptom.
Renewal now happens on a margin, on returning to the tab, on mount, and on a 401
with the request replayed. Concurrent renewals share one request: two 401s
racing would otherwise present the same refresh token twice, and the hub cannot
tell that from theft, so the remedy would have been worse than the fault. A
refusal signs out cleanly rather than leaving a session that fails every call
while looking signed in.
The lifetime goes to four hours, which is not what makes long sessions work —
renewal is — but is what someone has to notice by if renewal itself breaks. An
hour was less than a feature film. Twelve was considered and declined: it widens
the window in which a leaked token cannot be turned off, and it lets the renewal
path go a whole day between uses, which is how it came to be broken here without
anyone noticing. Production sets this in its own hub.toml, so both moved.
The tests run the shipped code against a hub that enforces rotation, because a
stub that accepted the same refresh token twice would have passed against the
broken client. Checked that dropping the rotated token reproduces the revoked
family, so the guard is guarding something.
Also widens the orphan-setter rule to ignore `setX` functions declared in the
module: `setAuth` is not a hook setter, and a rule that cries wolf is one
somebody eventually silences. Verified it still catches a real orphan.
|