| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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`MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` is the version this build speaks, so `check_version`
refuses everything below it at the handshake. Every capability the client was
gating on the node's version is therefore true of every peer it can reach:
* `supportsSealedUpload` — an upload is sealed or it is not sent;
* `supportsAppOps` — one `app_directories` op, and no `setVideoRoot` /
`setAudioRoot` / `setPhotoRoots` wrappers behind it;
* `supportsTransferSlots` and `Lease._skip()` — a lease is always real, so
there is no branch where a transfer runs without one;
* `legacyNode`, the read-only shared-directories table, and the two hints
telling an operator their node is too old to configure an app.
The version the node declares is still recorded, for diagnostics. Nothing
branches on it, and the comment says so, because a field kept "just in case" is
how the branches came back last time.
`test_mnp_1_0_node_compat.py` goes with them: it existed to hold the fallbacks
in place, and holding a fallback that cannot execute is how a suite starts
lying. The two locale strings for those hints are removed from all ten
catalogues.
Hub suite 872 passed (test_sticky_header deselected — failing before this).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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Stage 8 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, second half, plus the gap it exposed in
stage 7.
**Asking where to resume.** The node identifies an upload by (member,
directory, filename), so a client resuming one has to name the file — and
`transfer_open`, the obvious place to ask, travels in clear. Naming it there
would undo exactly what sealing this path bought in MNP 2.0: before it, the same
file was ciphertext leaving a node and plaintext arriving at one. So the
question is asked inside the seal that already exists, as an ordinary
`file_upload` with no bytes and `chunk_index: -1`. The node writes nothing,
creates no state, reserves no name, and answers with `resume_from` in the sealed
ack. A node that predates it refuses the index, which the client reads as "start
from the beginning" — the behaviour it had anyway — and the wait is bounded so
one that answers neither does not strand an upload.
The probe is answered after every check the write path makes, so it cannot ask
questions about a directory the caller may not write to, and it answers only
about the member who asks: otherwise one member could measure another's
progress on a file they never sent, and worse, resume it.
**Pausing an upload.** Reported: no pause button on an upload, even in the
desktop app. Stage 7 built pause around the download path — a target declares
whether it can be stopped — and an upload has no local target to ask. It was
also refused by design, since a transfer handed a lease it cannot re-create must
not be offered a button that would drop its slot for good. Uploads now ask for
their slot rather than being handed one, and say they are pausable outright: a
File is seekable and the node keeps the position. Resuming re-probes rather than
trusting the client's own memory, so it works across a reconnect too.
**And the slot they hold.** `_do_file_upload` never called `slots.touch(tr)`.
Chunks are not gated by the lease, so the file arrived — but the node reclaimed
a grant nobody appeared to be using after thirty seconds, twice, then abandoned
it, and the widget follows the lease. Measured from the journal: a 3.5 GB upload
read "waiting, 0 ahead" for a minute and a half while it was transferring. The
download twin of this was fixed on 2026-09-08; the same omission was still here,
invisible until uploads took a real lease.
`test_the_upload_itself_is_sealed` now checks every message `uploadFile` sends
rather than the first. Adding the probe put a second one in front of the one it
was written for, and it would have kept passing while guarding nothing.
Node suite 1202 passed, hub suite 850 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Downloads have been encrypted under a GEK-derived key since the beginning:
`file_chunk` and `stream_data` both go through `chunk_ciphertext`. Uploads
never were. `file_upload` carried the filename and the raw bytes in plain
msgpack, and `file_upload_ack` carried the name the node stored them under —
so the same file was ciphertext leaving a node and plaintext arriving at one.
There was no threat model behind that asymmetry.
Both halves now travel sealed under a third groupbox purpose,
HKDF(GEK, info="meshbay:upload:v1"). The filename, the destination folder and
the bytes are all inside the seal; only `upload_id` and `chunk_index` stay in
clear, because the node routes and orders on them before it can decrypt. This
direction seals *towards* the node — it holds the GEK for its own group — and
it opens the payload before it picks a destination or touches the disk.
What that forced, and why none of it is optional:
- `filename` was the correlation key on both sides. It cannot be: matching an
ack to its request by name would hand back exactly what the seal hides.
`upload_id` replaces it — client-drawn, opaque to the node, unique within a
connection, never an authorization input. The property it guarded (one
refusal fails one upload, not every upload in flight) is unchanged.
- Refusals can no longer quote what they refused. `No directory named 'X'`
becomes `No such directory in this group` plus the `code` that was already
there; the client knows what it sent.
- No plaintext fallback. A path that still accepts plaintext is not a sealed
path, so an unsealed `file_upload` is refused with `upload_not_sealed`.
Hardened while here, because what comes out of a seal is authenticated but not
validated — a member can seal anything: `filename` and `data` have their types
checked before any upload state is created, and `chunk_index`/`total_chunks`,
which are outside the seal by necessity, can no longer raise where a refusal
was meant.
Tests. `test_upload_sealed.py` pins the node half: nothing identifying on the
wire, tamper/wrong-key/wrong-group all refused with nothing written, and
multi-chunk reassembly unchanged. `test_upload_seal_client.py` drives the
shipped `uploadFile` over the shipped `crypto.js` under node and feeds its real
frames to the real `_do_file_upload` — the file lands intact, and the ack the
node actually produced comes back with the name it chose for a collision, which
is the half a source-reading test cannot see. Both upload purposes join the
JS/Python groupbox parity vectors.
BREAKING CHANGE: MNP 2.0. `file_upload`/`file_upload_ack` change shape on the
wire every deployed client speaks, which is MAJOR by the same rule 1.0 was —
but the break is confined to uploads. `MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` stays at "1.0", so a
1.x peer still connects, browses, downloads, streams and chats; only its
uploads are refused, with a message saying which side is old. The client checks
the node's version before sending a chunk, so neither side meets this as a
timeout. This is the version negotiation shipped in 1.0 earning its keep: 1.0
cost a flag day, 2.0 costs a refusal code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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Every other test of the plugin architecture reads source for the *absence* of
app names. That proves nobody wrote a special case for Videos; it cannot prove
a genuinely new application works, because there was no new application.
This is one. It stores directories, appears as a tab, has a settings pane and
lists files, and the node has never heard its name outside a single allow-list
entry. Two files and one registry line, which is the claim
`docs/refactor-groups.md` §4.1 makes.
It ships hidden behind `?dev=1` (`dev: true` in the registry, the same opt-in
shape as transport.js's `?trace=1`). Registering it normally would put a toy
app in every operator's group; not registering it would prove nothing, since
registration is exactly what is claimed to be sufficient.
**Adding it found two places where the claim was nearly true rather than true,
and both are fixed by making the code less app-specific:**
`group-settings.js` fell back to the whole registry when a group had no
`enabled_apps` yet — which would have turned a hidden app on for everyone. It
asks `availableApps()` now.
`group-page.js` wrote out `videoDirectories` / `musicDirectories` /
`photoDirectories` by hand, so a fifth app would have needed that file edited.
It derives `<key>Directories` from the registry.
Neither was found by reading; both were found by adding the app, which is the
whole reason it exists.
Verified in a real Electron window as well as by the tests: hidden by default,
present with the flag, offered its own settings section, and listing exactly
the files under its configured folder and its subfolders — not the ones beside
it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Each app's settings were inlined in `group-settings.js` — TMDB, MusicBrainz,
and one folder picker per app, each with its own draft state and save handler
saying the same thing about a different key. They are one file per app now,
reached through the `apps.js` registry, and the page that renders them names no
application at all: adding one is a registry entry and a settings file.
The line between the two is what makes that true. What every app has — folders
— the page does generically, through one `saveDirectories` bound to the app.
What one app alone has, its pane does itself with the transport it is handed.
An app that only needs directories touches neither `group-settings.js` nor
`group-page.js`, which is `test_app_settings_plugin.py`'s subject.
`settings-ui.js` exists because a pane importing the page that renders it is a
cycle, and ES modules answer that with a temporal-dead-zone ReferenceError at
first render — a component that silently does not appear, the fault already
recorded in CLAUDE.md about hook ordering.
The flat depth-indented `<select>` of every folder in the library becomes a
modal tree. It asks the node for nothing: the tree is derived from paths the
client already holds, so it shows exactly what the group's index contains and
adds no folder-browsing protocol. For Chat's attachment folder — the one
directory that is written to rather than read — read-only roots are greyed
out, so the node's refusal arrives before the operator picks rather than when
somebody sends a file.
Videos and Music take a list of folders. A library on two drives could not be
described before; the only recourse was pointing the app at a parent containing
both, which pulls in everything else under it. The scalar shapes survive on the
wire alone, for a node speaking MNP 1.0, and the client reads them as a
one-element list.
Two things the tests caught that I would not have:
`test_asset_versioning` — six new modules were missing from `_ASSETS`. Reached
through the registry rather than imported by name, they are exactly the files
nothing else would notice changing, and a stale one is served from cache with
no version bump.
And `node --check foo.js` does **not** reliably report a module syntax error:
it accepted `${/* ... */''}` — htm template syntax pasted into a plain object
literal — and reported success. A `.mjs` copy forces the module parser and
reports it. The suite had no syntax check at all, which is how that reached a
file; `test_spa_syntax.py` does it for every module now, and pins that the
loose path is not what it uses.
Suite: 12 failures, all pre-existing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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`index_sync`, `index_delta` and the `handshake_ack` config payload now travel
sealed under a GEK-derived subkey (`meshbay_common/groupbox.py`, mirrored by
`sealGroup`/`openGroup` in `crypto.js`). Only `type`, `v`, `group_id` and the
ack's `node_pk`/`proof`/`sig` stay in clear — a receiver must route and
authenticate before it would trust a decryption. Verify, then decrypt.
The ack line is integrity, not confidentiality: the signed handshake transcript
names no ack field, so `is_node_admin`, `enabled_apps`, `video_root` and the
rest were authenticated by the DTLS channel alone. The index line is defence in
depth against a repeat of C1/C6 — a peer served before the handshake completes
now gets ciphertext, not filenames. Nothing against an observer, the hub, or a
member; that is the whole claim. `index_progress` stays clear (D3, counters
only). Chat is out of scope.
Failure is fatal: a payload that does not open ends the session naming the
message type — never an empty index or an empty `enabled_apps`, both of which
are legitimate states.
Version negotiation ships here too (phase 15.6, brought forward): `v` + `v_min`
on `handshake` and `handshake_challenge`, refused with `version_too_old` /
`version_too_new` / `version_unreadable`. The flag day was already being paid
for; the next breaking change now costs a refusal message.
BREAKING CHANGE: breaks the WebRTC wire every deployed client speaks. Hub and
every node must deploy together; the SPA is served by the hub, so a browser
picks up the new client on reload. See MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md §11.1a, §13.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkzbhmMmK8PqQBtGz5zCvY
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ExplorePage → explore-page.js (static import), LoginPage/RegisterPage/
FirstRunPage → auth-page.js (static import, LoginPage receives onLogin
as a prop), CreateGroupPage/wizard → create-group-page.js (lazy-loaded
via dynamic import(), same pattern as AdminPage/NodePage).
app.js goes from 1803 to 914 lines. webapp.py _ASSETS extended with the
three new files and the previously missing extracted pages. Test fixtures
updated to follow the moved components.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A new group application (docs/apps.md's plug-in mechanism), following the
plan in docs/photos.md. Unlike Videos/Music: several photo roots per group
instead of one (photo_roots is a set, one signed op replaces it whole),
a single album-grid view with no third-party matching step, and per-photo
info read from the file's own EXIF at index time — no metadata service,
no credential, no outbound network call at all.
Protocol (meshbay-common, MNP 0.10 -> 0.11, additive): `taken_at`/`camera`
on IndexEntry; `photo_roots`/`photo_roots_ack`; `OP_PHOTO_ROOTS`.
Node: roster.py stores photo_roots as a group_settings entry (JSON list,
same shape as enabled_apps); ops.py/webrtc_server.py validate and sign the
whole set in one op, same pattern as apps_enabled; a new PhotoEnricher
(indexer/enrich_photo.py) runs Pillow in its own small bounded pool,
separate from the video/audio pools, producing a resized thumbnail plus
the two EXIF fields — never GPS, checked by a grep-based regression test.
Client: photos-app.js — one album card per directory containing images,
a per-album photo grid, and a lightbox with next/previous (keyboard and
buttons), zoom in/out/fit/100% starting from the actual on-screen fit
percentage, and a "zip this album" button reusing files-app.js's own zip
mechanism (lifted into file-utils.js's downloadDirectory so both call the
same implementation). group-settings.js gets an add/remove multi-root
picker, distinct from Videos/Music's single-value one.
Bugs found and fixed before this ever shipped, worth keeping the story of:
- enrich_photo.py read width/height from the raw image *before* applying
EXIF orientation correction, and read DateTimeOriginal off the plain
0th-IFD Exif object — a real camera stores it in the Exif sub-IFD, which
Pillow only exposes via get_ifd(Exif). A flat, hand-built EXIF dict
round-trips through Pillow either way, which is exactly what would have
hidden both bugs; the regression test builds EXIF with piexif instead,
matching what real hardware produces.
- photos-app.js's album grouping stripped a trailing path segment from
entry.path under the assumption it still carried a filename — it
doesn't (files-app.js's own convention: e.path is already the
containing directory), so every album collapsed one level into its
parent. Found live against a real multi-folder library.
- transport.js's ADMIN_OP_TYPES allowlist (already the fix for an
identical bug on video_root/apps_enabled, see 4783d81) was missing
photo_roots: its admin_challenge matched no pending request and was
silently dropped, so saving a photo root just timed out after 30s with
no error.
- daemon.py pruned a thumbnail when its file left the index (root removed
or reconfigured) but never forgot the content hash was "already
attempted" — the same bytes reappearing under a renamed/relocated root
(an operator's real workflow) were then permanently skipped, forever,
with nothing to indicate why. Discarding the attempt alongside the
cache entry on prune is what makes pruning actually reversible.
- packages/meshbay-client's app:// protocol handler served every file
with no Cache-Control header, so Chromium was free to serve a stale
cached copy indefinitely — none of several `npm run sync-ui` + reload
cycles during development actually picked up the new code until the
renderer's disk cache was cleared by hand. Now sends Cache-Control:
no-store.
- the lightbox's zoomed image used flex centering (align-items/
justify-content: center) combined with overflow: auto — a well-known
trap where the browser centers overflowing content by shifting it, and
the leading half of that overflow (here, the top of a zoomed photo)
sits outside what the scrollport can actually reach. Reported live as
"unusable". Fixed by switching to top/left alignment once zoomed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TiZG4AuSnxHohQMpwTHTyL
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Implements the client half of docs/musicbay.md against MNP 0.8:
- music-app.js: album grid (grouped by artist -> album, from index-time
artist/album fields) or flat folder view, per-group localStorage
toggle like Videos. MusicBrainz (music_meta_req) is only looked up
when a track has no embedded cover at all — well-tagged files never
trigger a network call, unlike Videos where TMDB is unconditional.
Reuses video-app.js's MediaThumb/LazyTile (now exported) rather than
duplicating the chunk-path thumbnail decode + virtualization.
- music-player.js: the persistent player bar — queue, shuffle (Fisher-
Yates, keeps the current track in place when toggled), repeat (off/
all/one), volume (localStorage), prev/next, a one-track prefetch
cache. No MSE, no node-side streaming: a track is downloaded and
decrypted once via file-utils.js's pipelinedDownload, same chunk
pipeline Files already uses, then played from a blob URL.
- group-page.js: owns musicQueue/musicbrainzConfig state and renders
MusicPlayerBar outside the tab-switched area — deliberately, so
playback survives navigating to Chat/Files, the same reasoning the
video/preview modals are shell-owned rather than app-owned.
- apps.js: registers "music". transport.js: fetchMusicMeta (keyed by
path, same reordering-hazard fix as fetchMediaMeta),
setMusicbrainzConfig/setMusicbrainzEnabled (signed ops, mirroring
TMDB's), and the three new ack handlers. group-settings.js: a
MusicBrainz settings section (contact string, per-group toggle) —
the existing Applications checklist already picks up "music" for
free, per apps.md's own claim.
- icon.js: music/pause/skip-next/skip-prev/shuffle/repeat/volume,
drawn in the same stroked style as the existing set.
- i18n: group.tab_music, the music.* and settings_node.musicbrainz_*
keys, translated (not just copied) across all ten locales, Polish
carrying full one/few/many/other plural forms for music.n_tracks.
- webapp.py's _ASSETS, test_hook_ordering.py's STATIC_FILES and
test_transport_contracts.py's SPLIT_FILES gain the two new files.
Full suite (common + hub + node): 1116 passed, no regressions.
`npm run sync-ui` in meshbay-client confirmed both files copied.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KBi7ALLGfwcjBXt57yNMcy
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Implements docs/mediacenter.md: a "Videos" group application built on the
existing files index rather than a separate catalogue. On the node side,
new indexer enrichment (technical probe, filename/season parsing, thumbnail
generation) runs per-file once an operator has chosen a video_root for the
group, plus a TMDB client for on-demand poster/metadata lookups (never
client-side, thumbnails delivered over the existing chunk path). On the hub
side, a new video-app.js renders a lazily-mounted poster grid or a
thumbnail-only flat list, with TMDB entirely optional per group.
Along the way: the global apps registry now drives Settings' default-tab
picker instead of a hardcoded list, and the video_root is configured from
group Settings (like uploads) rather than from Files, with the node
refusing to run any TMDB/thumbnail work until one is set.
Fixes several bugs found via live testing against a real library, notably
a race between two effects writing the same "image ready" state that could
leave a poster grid spinning forever on a same-tab revisit — see
mediacenter.md §5.4 for the full account of each one.
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GroupPage's 6620-line app.js carried Chat and Files wedged in directly, with
no way to add another group-level app without touching the shell itself. It
is now app.js (routing, non-group pages) plus nine focused files — apps.js
(the registry), chat-app.js, files-app.js, video-player.js, group-page.js
(the shell), group-settings.js, hub-client.js, icon.js and file-utils.js —
with docs/apps.md as the checklist for adding one (Videos/Music/Photos are
sketched there, not built).
Node side gained the matching enablement mechanism, mirroring
member_upload exactly: a roster setting, a signed apps_enabled op enforced
by _has_admin_authority, exposed in the handshake ack. Operators toggle
applications per group from Settings, which also gained a small reorder:
Invite, Pairing, Applications, Shared directories, Uploads, danger zone,
Your devices, Members.
Two bugs surfaced during the split, both missing an import across the new
file boundary and invisible to node --check or a module-load probe since
they only throw when the code path actually runs:
- group-page.js called onRefreshAuth on a stale-token handshake rejection,
but app.js never imported refreshAccessToken from hub-client.js — so a
brand new member (including a group's own creator) hit "Not a member of
this group" and the retry silently failed, throwing before it could
refresh the token.
- chat-app.js called getLocale() for message timestamps without importing
it from i18n.js. Opening Chat on a group with real messages threw mid-
render; uncaught, that appears to wedge Preact's render scheduler, so
every button on the page stopped responding until reload.
Caught the second class of bug with a proper no-undef audit across all
split files (a temporarily installed ESLint 9, since the system one is too
old to parse this codebase's syntax) rather than trusting grep. 827 tests
pass; 6 new ones cover the apps_enabled policy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016SF6RKNBKg9qejmoMJ9ybA
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- test_transport_contracts: CreateGroupPage was refactored into a
routing wrapper; assertions now read CreateGroupFormSimple
- test_task_lifetime: _spawn now uses an _on_done wrapper instead of
a bare self._tasks.discard callback; assertion checks both parts
- test_video_buffer_ceiling: target the real updateend handler, not
the settled() utility; add awaitingInitRef to the MSE harness scope
- test_video_seek: silence debug console.log in window_leak harness
so it does not pollute the JSON output
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**The chat tab was 8px too tall, at every window size.** The panel is sized from
JS to `viewport - top - 16`, which puts its bottom 16px above the fold — but it
sits inside `.main`, which adds 24px of padding below it. Eight pixels of
document past the window, whatever the window. Measured at 700, 900 and 1200:
`scrollHeight` 708, 908, 1208.
This is the second one of these — the sign-in card was `.page-center` and
`.layout` each reserving `100vh - 52px` — so it is now measured in the suite
rather than reasoned about. `tests/harness/scroll_probe.py` renders the real
markup against the real stylesheet and **runs the real `fit()` lifted out of
`app.js`**: a copy of the formula in a test would go on passing after the
original changed, which is exactly the bug being guarded.
The fix does not encode 24 anywhere. The first pass runs as before, then the
leftover is measured and taken off, so anything added below the panel later is
absorbed the same way. Now `scrollHeight == innerHeight` at all three heights,
nothing below the fold, and the panel still fills the room it has — that last
one has its own test, because shrinking the chat to 240px would satisfy every
other assertion here and be useless.
The Settings tab was measured too and is **not** a bug: it fits at 1200px and
overflows only when its content is genuinely taller than the window.
**Group creation asked one question twice.** Visibility and admission were
separate selectors that could only ever be set together — picking Public reached
over and set the policy — and two of the four combinations are meaningless. The
API already refused public+invite with a 422, so the form could build a request
that could not succeed. Private+open was accepted and should not have been: a
group anyone may join that nobody can find is a listing with the listing
removed, since joining goes through the node and there is no link to pass
around.
So: one selector, "who can join", and the request derives the rest. The API now
refuses the other impossible pair as well, with a message that says which way to
resolve it. Six locale strings the visibility box owned are deleted rather than
left unread in ten files, and the two surviving descriptions now say what each
choice means for who can *find* the group — with the word "public" gone from the
page, nothing else would have said it, and someone would publish a group without
meaning to.
865 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Reported: after an hour of watching a film, every action answers "token expired
or invalid", with signing out and back in as the only way on. Reopening the tab
the next day did the same.
The access token lasts an hour and the refresh token thirty days, and nothing
used the second one. `hubFetch` reported a 401 like any other error, and
watching a film is precisely an hour in which the hub hears nothing at all,
because the video travels over WebRTC. So the token aged out with no request to
notice, and a tab reopened the next morning presented a stale token with a
perfectly good refresh token sitting beside it in localStorage.
Underneath was the reason it could not be recovered from. The hub *rotates*:
the refresh endpoint revokes the token presented, returns a replacement, and
treats a revoked one presented again as theft, revoking the whole family. The
client kept only the access token out of that response. So the refresh token was
spent on first use and the second attempt did not merely fail — it destroyed the
family. Which is exactly the reported symptom.
Renewal now happens on a margin, on returning to the tab, on mount, and on a 401
with the request replayed. Concurrent renewals share one request: two 401s
racing would otherwise present the same refresh token twice, and the hub cannot
tell that from theft, so the remedy would have been worse than the fault. A
refusal signs out cleanly rather than leaving a session that fails every call
while looking signed in.
The lifetime goes to four hours, which is not what makes long sessions work —
renewal is — but is what someone has to notice by if renewal itself breaks. An
hour was less than a feature film. Twelve was considered and declined: it widens
the window in which a leaked token cannot be turned off, and it lets the renewal
path go a whole day between uses, which is how it came to be broken here without
anyone noticing. Production sets this in its own hub.toml, so both moved.
The tests run the shipped code against a hub that enforces rotation, because a
stub that accepted the same refresh token twice would have passed against the
broken client. Checked that dropping the rotated token reproduces the revoked
family, so the guard is guarding something.
Also widens the orphan-setter rule to ignore `setX` functions declared in the
module: `setAuth` is not a hook setter, and a rule that cries wolf is one
somebody eventually silences. Verified it still catches a real orphan.
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Chat opens on the newest hundred messages, loads fifty older on demand with the
reading position anchored — the distance from the *bottom*, since everything
above the viewport just grew — and follows new messages only when the reader was
already at the end. Day separators, sender grouping, an unread marker, and a
jump-to-latest pill. Messages are keyed by id: index keys plus prepending makes
Preact reuse the wrong bubbles.
A presence dot per group in the sidebar, three states, each backed by something:
the hub's registry, or a connection this browser made or failed to make. Never
colour alone — red and green are the pair colour-blind readers cannot separate —
so each dot carries a title and an aria-label.
Profile is split out of Settings: identity, node link, pinned node identities and
account deletion. Mixing them put an irreversible button two scrolls under a
theme picker. The create-group page loses its centred 520 px card, which left
190 px of margin either side, and its two button panels become a radio group —
a button conveys no chosen state to a screen reader, and side by side they read
as two independent actions rather than one either/or.
The Files toolbar shows its actions as icon buttons the moment Select is on,
disabled when they do not apply rather than appearing and vanishing. On a phone
the right-hand group could not wrap and ran 130 px off the screen.
Streamed downloads no longer freeze after one chunk. `registration.active` says
a worker exists, not that this page is controlled by it — and an uncontrolled
page's requests never reach its fetch handler, so the worker took the stream and
was never asked for it, leaving `writer.write()` waiting on backpressure that
would never lift. The page now requires control and the worker confirms it
actually served the request before the sink is trusted.
Fixed on the way: `setActionsOpen` outlived the state it belonged to and threw
on every Files action; the chat scrollbar stopped short of the bottom; the
owner's row sat lower than the rest; About showed a version hardcoded two
releases ago.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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