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AuditStore.cleanup was never called, so audit.db kept every entry.
The daemon now runs it at start and daily.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XuNrwLf5EFWCMHzfoEvnpm
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`search_listed` is a per-group setting on the node, changed by a signed
operator op and carried in the sealed handshake ack. Search reads it after
the handshake and stops there: no index is fetched, cached or merged, in any
of the four views, and the page says how many groups it left out. The switch
is a "Search" section in the group's settings, shown to the operator.
Absent means listed, at every layer: roster default, ack default, and the
client only drops a group on an explicit `false` — so an upgrade or an older
node removes nothing from anyone's Search.
It is a listing preference and protects nothing: the node serves the same
index to Search and to the group page and cannot tell them apart, every
member lists the group by opening it, and a client that ignores the flag
lists it in Search too. Design §9.11 says so, so it is never described as
private. The cost is one handshake per unlisted group, because only the node
knows the setting.
Search also took `nodes[0]` twice — for the index and for the pooled
connection — the defect 4cce50f fixed on the group page only. One
`connectToGroup` now walks the list the same way: a refusal about this
browser stops, `not_hosted` or a failed connection moves on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XuNrwLf5EFWCMHzfoEvnpm
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`IndexProgress` said "scanning, this many bytes of that many" and nothing
more. A group's roots are walked one after another, so a second directory
added during a large scan showed as the bar jumping back to 0 %. It now also
carries the root being walked and its position in the roots table, the kind
of walk (scan, rescan, reconcile, watch), file counts, and the roots
waiting for the scan lock in order: queued by the initial scan, by a
retarget, and by a plug; dropped when a root is removed.
`GET /api/index-status` answers for every group at once, including a group
still in its initial scan, so a client can show indexing on any page. It
names roots: loopback only, like `current_dir`.
`index_progress` and the handshake ack gain the same counters, still naming
nothing (decision D3): the root is a position in the roots table the member
already opened from the sealed index, and the queue is a count. The pusher
keeps speaking while a root only waits for the lock.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya
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A root added from the client arrives over MNP, and _retarget_indexer
started the daemon's reload with the session's own _spawn. When that
session closed - a client reconnecting 47 s into the scan of a 900 GB
root - shutdown_tasks() cancelled the reload mid-scan, and the reload
queued behind it, without a line in the log. The new root was in
node.toml and in the indexer's set but never in the group's context; the
lock was free and nothing retried, so the node served the old roots table
for hours while reconcile hashed the whole drive as missed events. One
loopback reload fixed the live node in 9 ms.
_reload_config now runs the work in a node-owned task and awaits it
through asyncio.shield, so a caller that goes away only stops waiting; a
cancelled reload is logged. plug_root does the same for its rescan, which
drops the root's entries before walking the disk and so left the root
empty when its admin op's session closed.
The existing MNP test replaced _spawn with a list and could not cancel
anything; the new tests close the session for real and fail without this.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya
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Adding a large directory to a running group made the reload await the
scan of the new root before putting the new RootSet in the group's
context, holding _reload_lock the whole time. For the hours a large drive
takes to hash, the node served the old set:
- a file request under the new root got None from entry_abs_path and the
handler died on None.exists() without replying;
- a writable/removable toggle answered with the live table, still the
old one, so the directory vanished from the operator's settings;
- reconcile saw every file the scan had not reached as a missed event and
hashed it again on the same executor, rewriting progress under the scan.
retarget now applies the set, the roots table and the watcher first, and
with wait=False scans the added roots in the background; the daemon swaps
ctx["roots"] before calling it. A scan lock shared by the initial scan,
added-root scans and reconcile makes the reconcile loop sit out a running
scan without backing off. Every transport site that resolves an entry
answers ROOT_NOT_SERVED instead of crashing, and a delete keeps the entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T6jPTeocXA1BePekdsgPya
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asyncio keeps only a weak reference to a task, so a coroutine started with
`asyncio.ensure_future(...)` whose result is discarded can be collected while
it is still running: the loop logs "Task was destroyed but it is pending!" and
the work simply does not happen. No error reaches the caller, and what is lost
is whatever that coroutine was in the middle of.
The node already had a guard for this, written after an abandoned stream task
lost a transcode slot for good — and it read one file, `webrtc_server.py`,
because that is where the defect was found. Outside that file there were
nineteen sites: the hub's `chat_notify` (a notification for every member of a
group), the indexer's debounce (every real-time index update), eleven in
`daemon.py` including the SIGHUP reload and each enrichment pass, two in
`ops.py`, and five in the loopback API.
`meshbay_common.background.spawn()` is the one door. It holds the task, drops
it when it finishes, and logs what it raised under the coroutine's own name —
an exception in a task nobody awaits was otherwise reported by asyncio at
collection time, out of context or not at all. A peer session's `_spawn` stays
as it is: that one can also *cancel* what it holds, which a module-level holder
cannot, because a session ends and a process does not.
`test_background_tasks.py` walks every package's source and refuses a discarded
handle. It parses rather than greps, so an assignment, a comprehension or an
await is not mistaken for one, and it was checked against a deliberate
reintroduction. A guard that stops at the edge of the file where the bug was
found is a guard against that bug, not against its class.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`_register_uploader` walked the index for the entry it had just written, at a
moment when no such entry can exist: the file was a `.part` until the rename on
the line above, which is not indexable, and the watchdog that will index it
debounces for two seconds and then hashes. The walk matched nothing, silently,
so every uploaded file in every group was owned by nobody — and `file_delete`
refuses a caller with no admin authority when the entry records no uploader, so
a member could not delete what they had just sent. MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §5.4
grants that to any non-revoked device of the uploading account.
The record is now written when the last chunk lands (`indexer.record_upload`)
and the entry is stamped from it in `_hash_or_cached`, the one funnel every
entry passes through — initial scan, watchdog, reconcile and replug alike. It
lives in the index cache rather than on the entry alone, because the index is
rebuilt from disk at every start and an owner the node forgets on restart is a
right quietly taken away. It is validated against a live `stat()`, so whatever
later occupies that path inherits nothing; and `_rescan_root`'s carry-over no
longer copies over it, or memory would beat the durable record.
§5.4 also claimed ownership was *provable* — a transcript the uploader signs,
stored with the entry. No such signature has ever existed; `meshbay:upload:v1`
in the code is the groupbox purpose that seals the envelope. The section now
states what the code does, and the transcript is an open item in §15.3.
`test_upload_attribution.py` drives the real handler and a real indexer across
that seam. Against the previous source its two positive cases fail on the
property, not on a missing method — an upload, then a rebuild from disk, then
a different file at the same path inheriting nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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The ack was assembled from its own tuple of application names, a copy of the
daemon's `APP_DIR_KEYS`, and the two had drifted: the copy was missing
`helloworld`. So the reference application — the one that exists to prove a new
application needs no special-casing — was the single application whose
configured folders never reached a client, which made the plugin claim false
exactly where it is demonstrated.
Fixed by removing the copy rather than syncing it. The ack now emits whatever
`<app>_directories` the group context carries, and `_app_directories_ctx` is the
only thing that puts one there, so the two cannot disagree again. The transport
names an application in one place, `ALLOWED_APPS`, which is enforcement rather
than a directory list.
The client had the same fault one layer up: `group-page.js` read three names by
hand from the ack while the live-update path beside it was already generic. It
derives the map from the ack's own keys now, so the fix reaches the settings
pane instead of stopping at the wire.
A first attempt moved the list to `roster.py`, where directory *storage* lives,
and `test_helloworld_proves_the_plugin_claim.py` refused it: the roster, the ops,
the config and the root set must name no application at all. That test is the
architecture's own guard and it was right — the list belongs on the daemon, which
is what wires a group's context, and everything downstream is derived from it.
Two new tests, both verified to fail against the previous shape: the ack carries
an application the node names nowhere else, and the ack keeps no list of its own.
`test_the_lists_are_read_under_one_name_each` now asserts the shell names no
application rather than that it names exactly three.
Two stale comments went with it — the ack's, which described scalars removed in
07ff8b4, and the client's, which said those scalars still rode the wire for
MNP 1.0 peers that can no longer connect.
Full suite: 2258 passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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The handshake ack's app-directories entry still said "the same three answers in
one shape" and "the scalars above are derived from these and kept for MNP 1.0
clients". Neither is true since the per-app ops were folded into one: there are
no scalars above, and a 1.0 client cannot reach this code at all — the floor
moved to 3.0 with the lease flag day.
A comment that contradicts the code beside it is worse than no comment, because
one of them is wrong and the reader cannot tell which. This is the same fault
the leaseless-bound comment had, one commit earlier.
What it says instead is what is actually load-bearing: `<app>_directories` is
the only form on the wire, and `chat_directory` below is safe as a second name
for one of them because `_app_directories_ctx` derives it on every build rather
than storing it alongside — which is precisely what the removed scalars did not
do.
daemon.py had the same stale reference three lines from the code that produces
these, pointing at `video_root` for the shape a per-group signed setting takes.
Comments only; no behaviour change. Node suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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`video_root`, `audio_root` and `photo_roots` are gone — the messages, the
signed operations, the handlers, the `ops` wrappers, the three scalars on the
handshake ack, and the client's handlers for their acks. `app_directories`
does the same thing for every application, keyed by the app's own registry
name, and it is what the SPA has been sending.
The three were the same instruction three times, differing only in the key they
wrote and whether they carried a string or a list. That shape is what made
adding an application mean adding a message type, an op, a handler and a widget;
it also meant three validation paths, and the older ones validated nothing —
a typo was stored and then quietly matched no entry, an app showing an empty tab
with no way to tell "misconfigured" from "no files yet".
**What stays, and why.** `Roster.LEGACY_DIR_KEYS` still reads `video_root` and
friends out of `group_settings`: that is a key on an operator's disk, not on the
wire, and a node upgraded into this must find its own configuration. The Search
page still reads its own older cache keys, for the same reason — the cache
outlives a deploy. `CTX_ALIASES` keeps only `chat`, which is the one app whose
second name something still reads.
The two per-app policy test files go with the messages. What only they held —
the real challenge/response path from message to database, which no other test
exercises — is retargeted at `app_directories` in
`test_app_directories_signed.py`, and the handler's own refusals (unknown app,
malformed `directories`, nobody to authorize it) join `test_app_directories.py`.
Node and common suites 1368 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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Stage 8 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, first half. Two defects that are the
same defect seen from two sides.
An upload's progress lived on the session, keyed by `rel_dir/filename`. A
dropped connection threw it away and the client's next chunk was refused with
`not_started`: an upload interrupted at 99% could only be started again from
zero, on a link flaky enough to have interrupted it once. It now lives in the
group context, keyed by member as well -- a shared directory means two people
can be sending IMG_1234.jpg at the same moment and neither may inherit, or
overwrite the position of, the other's.
What the lost state left behind was a `.part` nothing would ever finish, delete
or look at again. It is not an index entry, so it is invisible to every member
and to the operator's own file list: one abandoned film is a gigabyte of their
disk, kept for ever. That leak predates this branch.
A `.part` is deleted only when **both** hold: no upload is writing it, and
nothing has been written to it for 24 hours. Waiting costs disk; being wrong
costs somebody their upload, and is not reversible -- so a read-only root is
never walked (it cannot have received an upload), an unavailable one is never
walked (an unmounted drive reporting "nothing found" is how a careless janitor
deletes a library), and a file whose mtime is in the future is left alone (a
clock that went backwards is not evidence). The reaper matches whole paths and
the state records the path it is writing, rather than both sides rebuilding one
from a root name -- two implementations of one rule whose failure mode is
deleting a live upload.
The rules are in `uploads.py`, pure logic with no asyncio and no transport, the
same shape as `transfers.py` and for the same reason.
23 cases, four of them checked against the unfixed source. Node suite 1195
passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Reported as "the slots seem hardcoded to 2": `meshbay-node transfers set 8 8`
and still only two downloads at a time. Not hardcoded — that is the *per-member*
cap, which is a group's setting and is checked before the node's, so raising the
machine's total cannot move it. But the diagnosis was right in the way that
matters: nothing could change it.
`OP_TRANSFER_LIMITS` shipped with exactly one front door, the signed MNP
handler, and nothing anywhere opened it — no client call, no CLI verb, no
loopback route. So the cap sat at its default of 2 for ever, which from outside
is indistinguishable from a constant. CLAUDE.md states the rule this missed:
operator operations are one implementation with several front doors.
- `PUT /api/groups/{id}/transfer-limits`, calling the same
`ops.set_transfer_limits` the signed handler calls;
- `meshbay-node transfers per-member <downloads> <uploads> [--group X]`;
- `transfers show` now separates the node-wide pools from the per-group
per-member caps, and marks each `[set]` or `[default]`. It printed "2 per
member" with no indication of where the 2 came from, which is half of why
this looked like a constant.
Zero is refused here as everywhere else: it is not "unlimited", and a member who
may not transfer at all is a member the operator revokes.
Verified on a live node: the cap changes, survives a daemon restart, and
`transfer_probe.py --want 6` measures 4 granted against a cap of 4 where it
measured 2 before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Step 3 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md. Step 2 built the pools with constants;
this gives them to the operator, in the two scopes they belong to.
**The pools are the machine's.** `[node] max_concurrent_downloads` and
`max_concurrent_uploads`, default 8, on the §2.11 pattern: node.toml for a
fresh install, a roster.db override for immediate effect, editable from the
Node page and from `meshbay-node transfers show|set`, applied live through the
one `set_capacity` step 1 fixed.
**The per-member cap is a group's.** How many transfers one member may run at
once here — on the node like every other group setting (not the hub, which
would have authority over someone else's disk; not node.toml, which is
hand-written and needs a restart), changed by a signed operator instruction
(`OP_TRANSFER_LIMITS`, subject "d=2,u=2" so what is signed names the outcome),
broadcast to the group, and read live by the pools.
That was the one thing step 2's shape could not express: `per_member` was a
single node-wide number. `group_limits` and `member_cap(kind, member)` make it
a lookup — the group's own value if it has one, the node's default otherwise —
and it is deliberately the only dimension that is not node-wide.
Three refusals, each with a test:
- **absent means the default (2), never "unlimited".** A group that predates
the setting coming back unlimited would leave the node-wide pool as the only
control, which is the situation slots exist to end;
- **zero is not "unlimited"**, and is not "this member may not transfer"
either: the floor is one everywhere, and the CLI says to revoke the member
instead;
- **an unreadable row reads as unset**, not as zero — the same discipline the
sealed messages follow, where a payload that does not open must never become
a default state on its own.
`handshake_ack` carries this member's own caps for this group, so the interface
can say "2 of your 2 slots are busy" instead of drawing a bare spinner. Absent
reads as "no limit known" and the hint is not drawn — never as "unlimited",
which would have the interface contradicting the node.
1164 node, 793 hub, 0 failed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Chat messages are sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key derived per group, per
epoch, per *device*, and signed over the ciphertext with the device key the
node pinned. The node relays and archives; it cannot read a message.
There is no switch. MNP goes to 2.0 and MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED moves with it, so a
1.x peer is refused at the handshake with `version_too_old` rather than
admitted and then unable to speak. An opt-in flag was designed and rejected:
every node is a test node, so it would have bought nothing and left a plaintext
branch reachable — C6's lesson one feature later. A test reads the source and
refuses any code that consults a `chat_encrypted` setting.
Not Sender Keys, and `senderkeys.py` is now documented as unused. With
distribution under the group key and a node that serves history to devices
which were not present, the node must retain each chain's earliest key, and a
chain key at iteration i yields every message key from i on by pure HKDF —
forward secrecy is zero either way. What the ratchet was left buying was
stateful client code with silent failure modes, three of them reproduced: any
member could sign as any other, a second device dropped the first's chain, and
the skipped-key cache grew without bound. The reasoning is in
docs/chat-sender-keys.md, which is the specification and the decision record.
Epochs, not rotation: the epoch key is wrapped under the group key at delivery
and never stored under it, so `gek_rotate` is a re-wrap. A group-key-derived
archive key would have made every message ever sent unreadable on the first
`member unpin`, which is the documented step after removing a member. A new
epoch opens on member revoke/unpin, device revoke and `gek_rotate`; old epochs
are kept and still delivered, so history stays readable to everyone who could
already read it, and nothing anywhere deletes one.
Three prerequisites this needed, each a live defect on its own:
* The peer registry was keyed by user_id, so one account's second device
evicted the first and the broadcast skipped recipients by account — a
person's phone never saw what they typed on their laptop.
* The handshake authenticated an account, never a device. `device_hello`
(additive, signed, refused unless the key is a live device of this account in
the node's own roster) is what lets the node refuse a member claiming
somebody else's key.
* `_admin_exec_file_delete` authorized against the exact uploading key, so
device linking had already broken deleting your own file from your other
device. It now authorizes against any non-revoked device of `uploader_id`.
Found by driving the real panel over the real transport, not by reading source:
`chat_keys_resp` was routed by arrival order and handed to an unanswered
`media_meta_req` — the original frozen-tab defect in a message type that did
not exist when that probe was written. And `_asText` had been deleted with an
unrelated helper beside it; its only caller sits inside a promise the panel
catches, so every conversation rendered empty with nothing in the console.
Existing node data is migrated by QE/migration/migrate_chat_encryption.py
(not versioned, per the QE rule), run with the node stopped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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Reported live: a removable root ejected from Files and plugged back in
returned with its files and without its albums. Music showed "no music
found" and stayed there through a force reload — the loss was on the
node, not in the client.
`plug_root` drops the root's entries and rescans, which is right; the
drive may have changed while it was away. What comes back is a bare
IndexEntry: `_hash_or_cached` fills id/name/path/size/type and nothing
else. Every enrichment field goes with the old object, and the Music tag
fields are cached nowhere by design (enrich_audio.py re-reads them so a
rename can re-derive the filename fallback), so re-enrichment is the only
way back.
Two gates then made sure it never ran:
* enrichment is scheduled for `delta.additions`, and ejecting broadcasts
nothing, so `_last_broadcast_snapshot` still held those ids — the
rebuilt entries diffed as updates, not additions;
* `_enrich_new_*_entries` skips anything in `_enriched_attempted`, which
is only discarded for `delta.deletions` — and dropping and rescanning
inside one call broadcasts no deletion either.
A restart cleared both, since an empty snapshot makes every entry an
addition. Nothing short of one did.
The indexer now records the ids it rebuilt and the daemon drains them at
broadcast time: their "already attempted" mark is discarded and they
rejoin the entries offered to the three enrichment passes. Not
Music-specific — Videos lost durations and titles and Photos lost
thumbnails the same way; Music is just where an untagged file has no
album to file itself under, so the app goes empty rather than plain.
`reconcile()` does the same drop-and-rescan when a root reappears on its
own, so a USB drive that fell off and re-mounted hit this with nobody
touching the UI. Covered too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Caught in review, and the review was right. The previous commit documented the
flag as deprecated so that `--help` and the man page would agree. That solved
the wrong problem: the flag contradicts the model this whole refactor exists to
establish, and the coherent answer was to delete it.
It wrote `upload_dir` into a *brand-new* `[[groups]]` block, and
`GroupConfig.__post_init__` reads that key by forcing every other root
read-only and appending that path as the one writable one. So
`group add --dir X --writable --upload-dir Y` silently made X read-only — two
mechanisms deciding which directories accept uploads, one of them invisible, in
a group created after the model that replaced it.
Gone from the CLI, from `ops.attach_group`, from the loopback API and from the
MNP `group_attach` payload, which now carries `writable` instead. The *read*
path in `config.py` is deliberately untouched: an existing node.toml using
`upload_dir` must keep working, and that is the only legitimate use left. The
man page says so under the config key, and no longer lists an option.
The test that guarded the deprecation wording now guards its absence — and
earned itself immediately by finding a `group add` usage string still offering
the flag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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`member upload` reached the generic usage line for the other `member` verbs —
"usage: meshbay-node member upload <username>" — which advertises a removed
feature and sends the operator looking for a username it would then reject. It
names `root set --writable` now, and the man page carries the same. Three lines
between an operator finding the replacement and concluding the CLI is broken.
`--upload-dir` still works, so an existing script keeps working, but its help
and the man page say it is the old spelling and name what replaced it.
The Windows pass (§4.4) is what can be checked from here, made checkable:
drive letters and UNC through `as_posix()` into TOML, a drive root having no
basename to derive a name from — sharing a whole drive is ordinary there — and
a case-insensitive collision, which on NTFS and exFAT is one directory indexed
as two roots. `PureWindowsPath` throughout, for the reason the backslash test
earlier this branch got wrong.
What it cannot check is written down rather than glossed: ReadDirectoryChangesW
dropping events, MAX_PATH, and whether an eject actually lets a drive be
removed. §7d says so, along with two things the plan never considered — the
RO/RW asymmetry in `_do_dir_delete`, and `index_delta` carrying roots but not
`dirs`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Every other test of the plugin architecture reads source for the *absence* of
app names. That proves nobody wrote a special case for Videos; it cannot prove
a genuinely new application works, because there was no new application.
This is one. It stores directories, appears as a tab, has a settings pane and
lists files, and the node has never heard its name outside a single allow-list
entry. Two files and one registry line, which is the claim
`docs/refactor-groups.md` §4.1 makes.
It ships hidden behind `?dev=1` (`dev: true` in the registry, the same opt-in
shape as transport.js's `?trace=1`). Registering it normally would put a toy
app in every operator's group; not registering it would prove nothing, since
registration is exactly what is claimed to be sufficient.
**Adding it found two places where the claim was nearly true rather than true,
and both are fixed by making the code less app-specific:**
`group-settings.js` fell back to the whole registry when a group had no
`enabled_apps` yet — which would have turned a hidden app on for everyone. It
asks `availableApps()` now.
`group-page.js` wrote out `videoDirectories` / `musicDirectories` /
`photoDirectories` by hand, so a fifth app would have needed that file edited.
It derives `<key>Directories` from the registry.
Neither was found by reading; both were found by adding the app, which is the
whole reason it exists.
Verified in a real Electron window as well as by the tests: hidden by default,
present with the flag, offered its own settings section, and listing exactly
the files under its configured folder and its subfolders — not the ones beside
it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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The directory table travelled on `index_sync` alone — a *full* index, which the
node only ever sends on request. Every ongoing change went out as an
`index_delta`, which carried files and nothing else. So the message that says
"something changed" was the one message that could not say a root had.
The acks hid it: `root_add_ack` and friends broadcast the new table to whoever
is connected, so the common cases looked right. What that could not cover was
the operator's own client, where the ack landed and was then overwritten — the
table calls `onRefreshIndex` after an add, that fetch returns the set from
*before* the node's reload (fire-and-forget, because a rescan is minutes on a
real library), and `applyIndex` writes it over what the ack had just delivered.
The new directory appeared for one paint and vanished.
Two halves. `index_delta` now carries the roots table, sealed with the rest and
identical to `index_sync`'s — additive, so a 1.0 client sees a field it does not
read. And the table no longer refreshes the index after a root change: the ack
gives it the new set immediately, and the delta the node pushes when the scan
finishes gives it again, along with the files.
The test that pins it uses an *eject* as its case, because an eject changes no
file at all — the entries freeze — so its delta is empty of additions,
deletions and updates. Without the table it says literally nothing, which is
how a library disappearing from under a group went unannounced to everyone but
whoever pressed the button.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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`video_root` (a string), `audio_root` (a string) and `photo_roots` (a list)
said the same thing three ways: three roster accessors, three ops, three MNP
messages, three admin-op subjects. They become `set_app_directories(app_key,
paths)` and its single-directory wrapper, stored under `<app>_directories` and
keyed by the app's registry name — so an application can be added without
touching this layer, which is the whole claim of the plugin architecture.
The three old names still work. Their MNP messages are handled, and the roster
falls back to the old key when the new one is unset, so a node upgraded into
this keeps working with no migration step — the plan called for a script, and
a script nobody runs on the machine where it matters is worse than a fallback.
Two things are new rather than moved:
The paths are validated. The setters this replaces accepted anything, so a
typo — or a path left behind when a root was removed — was stored happily and
then matched no entry, leaving an app showing an empty tab with nothing to
distinguish "misconfigured" from "no files yet". Deliberately not
`RootSet.resolve()`: that also refuses a currently-unavailable root, and an
operator must be able to point an app at a library on a drive they ejected.
The legacy scalar is derived, never stored. `video_root` still rides on the
handshake ack for MNP 1.0 clients; kept as a second stored value it would
drift from the list within one run, which reads as "it works after a restart".
Also here: chat's own two settings (a directory, which must be on a read-write
root because it is a destination rather than a view, and a link-preview switch
gating the unfurl path — checked before the cache, or turning it off would
still serve every preview already fetched), the `app_directories`,
`chat_directory` and `chat_link_preview` MNP messages, the plural
`<app>_directories` on the handshake ack, and `music` as the app's one
identifier where storage said `audio` and the registry said `music`.
The Music enricher now resolves a boundary per configured directory rather
than one for the group: with several, a single boundary is wrong for all but
one of them, and for Music that is the difference between reading a folder as
an artist and reading it as a release.
Suite: 11 failures, all pre-existing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Review of the Phase 1 commit found the RO/RW model sound but three paths
unfinished, each of which broke the flow the phase exists to deliver. Plus
29 test failures it introduced and no coverage for anything it added.
Uploads went to the wrong directory. The node read a `root` field on
file_upload that no client ever sent, so every upload landed in the first
writable root while the Files toolbar offered its button based on the root
being browsed — with two writable roots, uploading from one wrote into the
other. Files now names the root it is showing; Chat names one chosen in the
shell (an operator-configured directory arrives in Phase 2); the node refuses
an unknown name rather than falling back, and refuses read-only and ejected
roots by code.
Shared directories were unreachable on the web. The table read its roots
only from the loopback API, which resolves to "not available" in a browser,
so the section rendered for nobody there — while the Uploads controls it
replaced had worked — and the transport.updateRoot/ejectRoot/plugRoot methods
beside it were dead. MNP is now the path, loopback the fallback for a local
node with no live connection, and adding a root over MNP takes a typed path
since no web page can browse a remote disk.
Ejecting updated nobody's screen. transport.js resolves an admin ack against
the pending request and returns, which is right for every op whose caller
knows the value it chose; the root acks carry state only the node can compute,
so the operator who clicked Eject was the one client that never saw it happen.
And the ejected flag reached roster.db but was never read back, so a restart
undid it and the next scan read an empty mount point as an erased library.
Also: the member-upload endpoint answered 200 and did nothing (removed); the
wizard ignored the first root's RW switch; reload compared roots on name and
path, so editing writable in node.toml did nothing; the table had no path
column, which is the only thing separating two libraries sharing a basename;
apps_enabled normalisation differed between the two sides of a signed subject.
Tests: eject/plug, per-root upload refusal and the node.toml rewrite had no
coverage at all. test_member_upload_policy.py is replaced by
test_root_writable_policy.py — it tested a removed feature — and every
property worth keeping from it moved rather than being dropped.
Docs: draft-v6 structural decision 9 is annotated as superseded (the operator
can no longer have a directory only they may write to — a real capability
removed, flagged rather than hidden), the man page documents the root verb and
the RO/RW fields, and refactor-groups.md §7b records what the plan got wrong.
Suite: 41 failures before, 13 after — all 13 pre-existing on main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Replace the upload boolean with per-root writable/removable/ejected flags.
Backend: new ops (update_root, eject_root, plug_root), MNP 1.1 protocol
messages, live RootSet updates so API always reflects current state, CLI
root subcommand (add/remove/set/list/eject/plug).
Frontend: SharedDirectoriesTable with optimistic toggle switches, eject/plug
in Files and Settings, upload gated on root.writable, ejected-root filtering
in all media apps, updated Create Group wizard, 10-locale i18n.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Windows-only changes, all found by actually running the previous session's
work rather than by review alone:
- CTRL_CLOSE_EVENT/LOGOFF/SHUTDOWN handler (platform.py, ctypes
SetConsoleCtrlHandler) so closing a console window, signing off, or a
system shutdown runs the daemon's real _shutdown() instead of Windows
just ending the process — closing WebRTC sessions and any in-flight
ffmpeg transcode instead of orphaning it. `taskkill /F` itself stays
uncatchable (like SIGKILL), so autostart_run() now spawns with
CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP instead of DETACHED_PROCESS and autostart_end()
tries CTRL_BREAK_EVENT against the recorded pid first, falling back to
the hard kill only if that doesn't stop it in time.
- Replaced the Node page's two independent autostart/service-mode toggles
with one "start automatically" select (off / at sign-in / as a
background service). The old pair let both be active at once — starting
the daemon twice, at boot and at sign-in — and their layout broke
wrapping inside .node-service's flex row. The new control always removes
whichever mechanism is active before installing the target; platform.py's
service_install() does the same on the CLI side. The "background
service" option disables itself (with a hint pointing at the CLI) when
running unpackaged, since service-mode.ps1/service.ps1/firewall.ps1 all
assume an installed build's layout — verified live rather than assumed
by actually running those scripts unelevated.
- findNodeBinary() no longer bakes a stray \r into resolved paths. Found by
rebooting after enabling per-user autostart: where.exe listed two
matches, and stdout.trim().split('\n')[0] only strips the whole string's
ends, leaving line one's own trailing \r attached — which landed inside
the Startup .vbs's quoted path and broke it with "Unterminated string
constant" at boot. Fixed by splitting on \r?\n and trimming every line.
- Dependency audit for the Windows installer (docs/WINDOWS-PORT.md): no
VC++ Redistributable needed, confirmed by inspecting the built
node-runtime's actual import table rather than assuming. New
docs/windows-build.md: a concise clone-to-installer build guide.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The per-user Startup-folder launcher (W3) only ever runs after this user
signs in. A real Windows Service would start earlier, but under
LocalSystem/NetworkService -- accounts with no normal profile, so
%LOCALAPPDATA%\meshbay\ (config, keystore, data) would not exist for it.
Relocating storage to make that work is real surgery, deliberately not
done here.
Instead: a Scheduled Task, created once with admin rights, that runs AS
THIS USER at boot without needing them to sign in first.
`schtasks /create ... /ru <user> /rp ""` with no `/it` registers an S4U
(Service For User) logon -- no password stored anywhere, and unlike
LocalSystem it loads this account's own profile, so config_dir()/
data_dir() need zero changes. The cost: S4U carries no network credential,
which the node never needed -- everything it touches is local disk plus
outbound internet. Creating the task needs admin (a boot trigger touches
system-wide scheduler state, the same reason /sc onlogon needed it);
querying/starting/stopping an existing one does not -- Task Scheduler
grants the owning user that much itself, which is what lets the Node
page's Start/Stop/Restart drive it with no further UAC prompts.
meshbay_node/platform.py
service_install/_remove/_status/_run/_end -- mirrors autostart_* but
for the Scheduled Task; TASK_NAME moved here (was decorative before)
meshbay_node/daemon.py
new `service install|remove|start|stop|status` verb; restart-daemon and
reset now check for the service task too
packaging/win/service.ps1
the installer-side equivalent (extraResource); status/run/end never
self-elevate -- only install/remove do, exactly matching what
Task Scheduler itself requires
packaging/win/service-mode.ps1
ONE elevated helper running service.ps1 + firewall.ps1 together, so
choosing service mode costs exactly one UAC prompt, not two
build/installer.nsh
the install-time choice: "run as a background service?" (one
elevation, both jobs) vs the existing per-user + separate firewall
question. Checked first, unelevated, so re-running setup with
everything already configured asks nothing. Uninstall offers the
matching one-elevation cleanup, default No.
src/main.js
winServiceTaskStatus/Run/End, wired into node:installed,
node:service-status/-stop/-restart and node:start: when the Scheduled
Task exists, drive it; otherwise fall back to the existing per-user
spawn/kill path. This is the hard requirement -- Start/Stop/Restart
from the Node page must work in either mode.
node-page.js / locales
a hint explaining why the per-user autostart toggle is absent when
service mode is active (info.mode from the backend, no new field to
gate on -- it just isn't sent in that case)
package.json: 0.1.0 -> 1.0.0.
Verified: electron-builder compiles the new NSIS choice logic and ships
all three scripts; service.ps1's S4U install fails cleanly (Access
denied) when run unelevated, and its status/run/end never touch "runas".
Cannot verify the elevated success path myself (no admin in this
session) -- that needs a real UAC click. Node suite 843 pass / 25 skip;
test_packaging_win.py pins the one-elevation property, the S4U flags,
and that main.js actually checks the service task in all three handlers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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default.env was empty in every build, for three independent reasons:
1. build-node.sh read QE/node.env, which does not exist. Even pointed at the
real file it would have failed: its `grep MESHBAY_TMDB_DEFAULT_TOKEN=`
cannot match QE/tmdb.txt, which is a free-form note, not KEY=VALUE.
2. Nothing consumed default.env. packaging/README.md and build-node.sh both
claimed `meshbay-node init` copies it to <config>/node.env; grep found the
name in exactly two places, the README and the script that writes it. No
code implemented the copy, and `EnvironmentFile=-` hid the absence.
3. build-win.ps1 had no env handling at all, so Windows was empty for a
different reason than Linux.
Now: the build extracts the v4 read token -- tmdb.py sends `Authorization:
Bearer`, so it is the JWT, not the 32-char v3 key beside it in the same file --
matching KEY=VALUE first and then by shape, from MESHBAY_TMDB_TOKEN,
MESHBAY_TMDB_TOKEN_FILE, QE/node.env, QE/tmdb.txt. It writes default.env 0600
and *fails the build* if no token resolves; MESHBAY_ALLOW_NO_TMDB=1 opts out.
An empty default.env is invisible until a user opens Videos and finds no
metadata, which is how this shipped empty on two platforms at once.
platform.py gains packaged_default_env()/install_node_env()/load_node_env().
init copies the packaged file once, never overwriting an existing node.env,
and the daemon loads node.env itself at startup: systemd does this on Linux
via EnvironmentFile, but Windows autostart is a Startup-folder .vbs with no
equivalent. Already-set variables always win.
Also fixes an UnboundLocalError in main(): `config_dir` was assigned at the
top of the init branch, which made it function-local for all of main(), while
the reset branch calls `config_dir()` as the imported function. init returns
before that line, so `meshbay-node reset` could only ever raise. The local is
now cfg_dir.
Verified end to end on Linux: token baked (239 chars), init writes
<config>/node.env 0600 with it. The PowerShell half is written but unrun --
no pwsh on this machine.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DtfG7z6wHWj8RKHCvxQtY1
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The Linux node runs under `systemctl --user`. Windows has no per-user
equivalent that works without elevation: `schtasks /create /sc ONLOGON`
(even `/rl LIMITED /it`) fails with "Access is denied" for a non-admin
user, because a logon trigger touches machine-wide scheduler state.
So autostart is a `.vbs` in the per-user Startup folder instead:
CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run Chr(34) & "<exe>" & Chr(34), 0, False
wscript runs it at every sign-in, hidden (0) and non-blocking. No admin,
no console window, no new dependency. Verified end to end: the launcher
brings the daemon up with no window and it answers its loopback API.
node/platform.py
autostart_install/remove/status — write / delete / detect the launcher
autostart_run/end — start now (DETACHED|NO_WINDOW) / taskkill
_node_exe — PATH, then next to sys.executable, then argv[0]
node/daemon.py
new `autostart install|remove|start|stop|status` verb
reload (win32) -> POST /api/reload on the loopback API
restart-daemon (win32) -> autostart_end + autostart_run
reset (win32) -> also removes the launcher
client/main.js, preload.js
node:autostart handler + winAutostart* helpers (kept in step with platform.py)
node:service-status (win32) probes the daemon; stop/restart/start use
taskkill + a detached, windowless spawn
Tests: 8 autostart cases in test_platform.py (mocked sys.platform, APPDATA
pointed at tmp); `autostart status` added to the CLI dispatch sweep. Full
meshbay-node suite green on Windows (784 passed / 34 skipped).
Still open: no CTRL_CLOSE_EVENT handler, so a bare taskkill / window close
does not run _shutdown() (SetConsoleCtrlHandler, follow-up). Service mode
(pywin32/NSSM) stays Phase 2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Verified end to end: a live browser peer on Windows connecting to a Windows
node — handshake, index sync, file download and an ffmpeg-transcoded video
stream all work on the ProactorEventLoop. aiortc only hangs on it in the
same-process loopback the tests use, which the repo-root conftest already
handles for the suite.
So the daemon no longer forces the SelectorEventLoop: that fixed
aiortc-in-one-process but broke ffmpeg (no subprocess support on a Windows
SelectorEventLoop). `use_compatible_event_loop()` becomes
`configure_event_loop()` — a no-op unless MESHBAY_NODE_EVENT_LOOP=selector
is set explicitly, as an escape hatch that probably never needs pulling.
This drops the planned "move ffmpeg off the asyncio loop" work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Found by running the daemon on Windows for the first time:
- `meshbay-node init` wrote `unlock_file = "C:\Users\..."`, and
attach_group / add_root write `path = "C:\..."` — a raw Windows path in a
TOML basic string is a parse error (`\U`, `\a`, ... are escape sequences),
so the config would not load. All now write `Path(...).as_posix()`;
pathlib reads the forward-slash form fine on Windows.
- any `print()` carrying a `->` arrow or em dash (the CLI help and messages
are full of them) raised UnicodeEncodeError on a cp1252 console and took
the command down. New `platform.force_utf8_stdio()` reconfigures
stdout/stderr to UTF-8, called at the top of `main()`.
Verified on Windows: init writes parseable LF node.toml, the keystore
Argon2-decrypts, the loopback control API binds 127.0.0.1, and
`_update_node_toml` reads a CRLF file and rewrites it LF-only with its
standalone comments intact. Two regression tests added in test_ops.py.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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node.toml, the keystore envelope, the unlock key, the loopback UI token,
pairing/invite code files and the denylist were all read and written with
the platform default encoding and newline translation. On Windows that is
cp1252 + CRLF: a node.toml or keystore holding any non-ASCII byte failed to
load, and ops.py's line-based node.toml editor round-tripped CRLF in and
LF out.
Every read is now `encoding="utf-8"`; every write is `encoding="utf-8",
newline="\n"` so the files stay LF whatever the OS. No-op where the locale
was already UTF-8.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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aiortc's ICE stack does not run on Windows' default ProactorEventLoop -- a
DataChannel handshake never completes. `platform.use_compatible_event_loop()`
switches to the SelectorEventLoop on win32, called at the top of `main()`
before `asyncio.run()`. No-op off Windows.
Known cost, for when the node runs on Windows: the SelectorEventLoop cannot
spawn subprocesses, so ffmpeg streaming (asyncio.create_subprocess_exec in
webrtc_server.py) needs a thread-based runner there. Tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Platform directories, signal handling, chmod guards, ffmpeg discovery,
and platform-conditional CLI messages — all testable on Linux.
See docs/WINDOWS-PORT.md §5 for the plan these implement.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`index_sync`, `index_delta` and the `handshake_ack` config payload now travel
sealed under a GEK-derived subkey (`meshbay_common/groupbox.py`, mirrored by
`sealGroup`/`openGroup` in `crypto.js`). Only `type`, `v`, `group_id` and the
ack's `node_pk`/`proof`/`sig` stay in clear — a receiver must route and
authenticate before it would trust a decryption. Verify, then decrypt.
The ack line is integrity, not confidentiality: the signed handshake transcript
names no ack field, so `is_node_admin`, `enabled_apps`, `video_root` and the
rest were authenticated by the DTLS channel alone. The index line is defence in
depth against a repeat of C1/C6 — a peer served before the handshake completes
now gets ciphertext, not filenames. Nothing against an observer, the hub, or a
member; that is the whole claim. `index_progress` stays clear (D3, counters
only). Chat is out of scope.
Failure is fatal: a payload that does not open ends the session naming the
message type — never an empty index or an empty `enabled_apps`, both of which
are legitimate states.
Version negotiation ships here too (phase 15.6, brought forward): `v` + `v_min`
on `handshake` and `handshake_challenge`, refused with `version_too_old` /
`version_too_new` / `version_unreadable`. The flag day was already being paid
for; the next breaking change now costs a refusal message.
BREAKING CHANGE: breaks the WebRTC wire every deployed client speaks. Hub and
every node must deploy together; the SPA is served by the hub, so a browser
picks up the new client on reload. See MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md §11.1a, §13.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkzbhmMmK8PqQBtGz5zCvY
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Reported live: after installing the .deb, systemd printed "Warning: The
unit file, source configuration file or drop-ins of meshbay-node.service
changed on disk. Run 'systemctl --user daemon-reload' to reload units."
Both postinst scripts (deb and rpm) already run a daemon-reload, but only
for the system manager — they run as root, and the unit that changed is
the *user* unit (packaging/systemd/meshbay-node-user.service), owned by
each signed-in person's own user manager, a different process root
cannot reach. Iterating over logged-in users from postinst was
considered and rejected: fragile (depends on machined and each user's
session bus), and root has no business doing a user's job.
`_systemctl_user` — the one place `reload` and `restart-daemon` already
shell out to systemd — now reloads the user manager first, under the
correct privilege, right before the verb that would otherwise act on a
stale unit. Best-effort and unchecked, like the postinst's own
daemon-reload: a reload the manager did not need must never block what
the operator asked for, and systemd still reports a genuine failure from
the verb itself.
Does not touch the postinst scripts. On a package upgrade the warning
can still appear once, before the next reload/restart-daemon (or a login,
which starts a fresh user manager that reads the current file); this
closes it from the CLI's own lifecycle commands rather than reaching
into every session from root.
test_lifecycle_commands_delegate_to_systemctl_user now expects the
daemon-reload call ahead of the verb — checked failing against the
previous code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AbwJDbNTkiRUh7HTWEoyss
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The QUIC MNP listener was started unconditionally whenever aioquic was
importable — but nothing speaks QUIC: the browser and desktop clients
use WebRTC, QuicChunkClient has no production caller, and the hub-less
`group://` sidecar (D9) is unbuilt. So on every node it was an open
UDP port with no client and no working NAT traversal (`punch_nat()`
is a direct-connection helper, not a traversal stack).
daemon startup now gates QuicChunkServer on
`self._config.node.quic_enabled` (default False; `MESHBAY_QUIC_ENABLED`
overrides). The generated node.toml templates (config.py, the CLI, the
desktop client) carry the line, commented for what it is.
Removes the exposure the third review's M2 lives on until a QUIC
client exists; the parity fix for the handlers themselves is the next
commit.
Third security review, finding M2 (mitigation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pG75yGK3NthNfyjH74omG
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Remove the node daemon's server-rendered admin UI (GET / and /audit, the
_render_* helpers and inline templates) and the `meshbay-node ui` CLI verb.
The loopback control API stays; it is now JSON only, ruff-clean, and 453
lines (was 1074). Also drop three never-wired endpoints (/api/config,
/api/chat/history, /ws/chat, plus broadcast_chat) and the pointless
18000/tcp firewall profiles.
The desktop client's Node page (static/node-page.js) takes over what the
dashboard showed, reorganised into six tabs (Overview, Groups, Roster,
Peers, Audit, Settings):
- Overview: version, node id, QUIC port, hub, index-cache maintenance
- Roster: node-wide view with unpin
- Peers and Audit: auto-load on open, no Load button
- Audit: real usernames and group names (resolved from the roster and
node.toml), Previous/Next pagination newest-first, Export CSV of every
matching row
- Settings: node settings, STUN, ICE, denylist, then Unlink from hub
Backend: audit.get_entries gains `offset`; /api/audit and /api/peers
resolve ids to names via a new _display_names helper; CSP tightened to
default-src 'none' now that no HTML is served. draft-v6 sections 2.11 and
2.12 corrected -- the Node page uses the loopback API, not MNP.
One capability is intentionally dropped: browser-based admin on a headless
server. The CLI covers every operation there.
See docs/refactor-node-ui.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MQCaZnde4Bjjdu84dhSuF5
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aiortc's connection_kwargs() keeps only the first STUN URI from
RTCConfiguration.iceServers ("only a single STUN server is supported"),
and aioice.ice.Connection has a single stun_server field. So the node's
four default STUN servers -- and anything added on the Node page or with
`meshbay-node stun add` -- collapsed to stun:stun.l.google.com:19302. When
that one server was slow or unreachable from the node, ICE gathering
(get_component_candidates, timeout=5) burned its full 5 s with no
server-reflexive candidate, adding seconds to every browser connection.
The multi-server fallback of draft-v6 s2.12 was configuration only.
transport/stun_multi patches aioice.ice.server_reflexive_candidate (same
monkey-patch technique ice_filter.py uses on get_host_addresses) so a
single ICE gather races the STUN binding request against every configured
server on the one bound socket and takes the first answer. One reachable
server anywhere in the list now yields a reflexive candidate in one RTT.
- daemon: install_stun_multi() alongside install_ice_filter()
- ops.set_node_settings: push the list to stun_multi.set_servers() so the
CLI / Node-page hot-swap takes effect without a restart
- webrtc_server.handle_offer: log ICE gather time and srflx count
- test_stun_multi.py: fan-out, first-answer-wins, all-fail, empty-list
fallback, DNS failure
Verified end to end with a real RTCPeerConnection: with a black-hole STUN
server first in the list, gathering still completes in ~0.07 s with full
srflx candidates (previously a 5 s stall).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BSsQhfxEAhwi4nqc4hASmq
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The ice_interfaces setting (auto-exclude vs explicit whitelist) is now
editable from the Node page, persisted via the settings API and roster,
and hot-swapped at runtime by re-installing the aioice filter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The WebRTC transport relied on a single Google STUN server — if it was
unreachable, ICE gathering waited the full 4s timeout. Now four public
servers are used by default (Google ×2, Cloudflare, Mozilla), configurable
via node.toml, the Node page UI, and the CLI (meshbay-node stun list|add|
remove|reset). Changes are hot-swapped on the live transport.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Expose invite_ttl_hours, pair_ttl_hours, device_request_ttl_minutes,
max_concurrent_streams and transcode_incompatible_video in the Node
management panel. Changes are applied immediately via roster.db and
written back to node.toml so they survive a DB wipe. On startup,
roster overrides take precedence over node.toml defaults.
Draft v6 §2.11 documents the design; MNP gains node_settings_set /
node_settings_set_ack for the browser path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A batch of wrong poster-grid matches found live on a real library
(2026-08-29): a two-volume film's second part matched the first; a
numbered sequel matched a same-year making-of documentary; several
entries of one franchise matched a single early entry whose localized
TMDB title is the franchise name; one matched nothing. One mechanism:
_tmdb_search returned the first candidate query whose title-similarity
ratio merely cleared 0.6, before alternative_title / the Roman-numeral
variant was ever tried.
Matching:
- title_parse: fold guessit's volume/part number back into display_title
so the parts of a multi-part film stay distinct in the query, the card
and the override.
- _tmdb_search: keep a strong PASS 1 fast path (ratio >= 0.85, one
request), otherwise score every candidate query and pick the best. A
year-exact rescue lifts a sub-0.6 top hit to the confidence floor only
when TMDB's own year-filtered result lands exactly on the filename's
year. No local re-ranking of any single result list; no tmdb.py change.
Fix match / rematch:
- _admin_exec_tmdb_override: a movie override touches its own file only
(guessit gives a whole franchise one display_title); a show override
still fans out. Corrected files are marked in media_cache.tmdb_override.
- media_cache: tmdb_override table; clear_file_tmdb / clear_tmdb_matches
drop auto-resolved matches while sparing manual corrections.
- ops.rematch_video + `meshbay-node video rematch` (loopback endpoint +
CLI verb): re-resolve a group's video matches after a matcher fix.
file_tmdb is keyed by content hash and otherwise only pruned on
deletion, so nothing dislodged a cached match before.
- a rename now drops the stale auto match too (daemon
_reenrich_renamed_video_entries).
UI:
- VideoDetailModal shows the source filename and resolved TMDB id; an
unmatched poster gets a badge (3 new video.* i18n keys x 10 locales).
So a wrong match can actually be identified before hitting Fix match.
docs/mediacenter.md 10.1 records this and the V8-V13 follow-up backlog
(show-branch ladder, year-aware _best_match, wider sequel_variants, the
0.6-0.85 extra calls, movie grid merge, per-card rematch).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018BMLQjqFGCize2KtNBT79v
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VPN/virtual adapters
aioice sends STUN binding requests from every IPv4 interface and waits up
to 5 seconds for all to complete. On a machine with Tailscale (wt0), the
STUN request never gets a response, adding a fixed 5-second penalty to
every WebRTC connection — measured at 6 s total (vs 1-2 s without it).
Auto-exclude virtual/VPN adapters (tailscale, virbr, docker, veth, podman,
cni) and CGNAT-range IPs (100.64.0.0/10). Operator can override with
ice_interfaces in node.toml [node] section for explicit control.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Wizard (Electron):
- Auto-provisions node config (hub URL + username) from logged-in user
- node:start handles both cold start and restart of misconfigured daemon
- Waits for daemon to reach 'running', auto-links node key on hub
- probeNode accepts intermediate states for wizard progress feedback
Reset (meshbay-node reset):
- Unlinks node key from hub (DELETE /me/node_key, best-effort)
- Stops and disables daemon (systemctl --user disable --now)
- Erases ~/.config/meshbay, ~/.local/share/meshbay, ~/.local/state/meshbay
MusicBrainz contact:
- Resolved from owner's hub email instead of per-node roster config
- Removed musicbrainz_contact UI and WebRTC handshake field
- Removed set_musicbrainz_contact/musicbrainz_contact from roster
Node pairing:
- Added operator pairing banner on NodePage
- Added operator_paired flag to list_groups
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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An operator routinely shares the same physical folder into more than one
group (a music library, a Séries drive) — IndexCache used to be opened
once per group (data_dir/{group_id}/index_cache.db), so the second group
to reference an already-fully-hashed multi-terabyte folder paid the same
full content read the first one did. IndexCache itself carried no
group_id in its schema; only daemon.py's wiring did. Now one instance,
opened once at startup (data_dir/index_cache.db), shared by every group's
DirectoryIndexer.
Confirmed against a real deployment (2026-08-25/26): a group sharing an
already-indexed folder with an existing group indexes it instantly, with
zero rehashing.
Also fixes a related cross-group correctness gap found during this work:
media_cache.db (thumbnails, TMDB/MusicBrainz metadata — already node-wide,
untouched by this change) was pruned for a file the moment it left *one*
group's index, even if another group's index still held the same content
hash — forcing a redundant re-fetch/re-probe/re-thumbnail for a group that
never actually lost anything. Prune now runs only once no group's index
references the file_id any more.
Adds a node admin UI action ("Maintenance" card, prune-index-cache) to
drop cache rows that no longer belong to any group's roots — skips
anything under a root that is merely temporarily unavailable (indexer.py's
"a root that goes away freezes, never empties" rule extends to this
cache too, or a reconnected drive would pay a full rehash for no reason).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013XSohfUQQiaE77qyFLgSv3
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A new group application (docs/apps.md's plug-in mechanism), following the
plan in docs/photos.md. Unlike Videos/Music: several photo roots per group
instead of one (photo_roots is a set, one signed op replaces it whole),
a single album-grid view with no third-party matching step, and per-photo
info read from the file's own EXIF at index time — no metadata service,
no credential, no outbound network call at all.
Protocol (meshbay-common, MNP 0.10 -> 0.11, additive): `taken_at`/`camera`
on IndexEntry; `photo_roots`/`photo_roots_ack`; `OP_PHOTO_ROOTS`.
Node: roster.py stores photo_roots as a group_settings entry (JSON list,
same shape as enabled_apps); ops.py/webrtc_server.py validate and sign the
whole set in one op, same pattern as apps_enabled; a new PhotoEnricher
(indexer/enrich_photo.py) runs Pillow in its own small bounded pool,
separate from the video/audio pools, producing a resized thumbnail plus
the two EXIF fields — never GPS, checked by a grep-based regression test.
Client: photos-app.js — one album card per directory containing images,
a per-album photo grid, and a lightbox with next/previous (keyboard and
buttons), zoom in/out/fit/100% starting from the actual on-screen fit
percentage, and a "zip this album" button reusing files-app.js's own zip
mechanism (lifted into file-utils.js's downloadDirectory so both call the
same implementation). group-settings.js gets an add/remove multi-root
picker, distinct from Videos/Music's single-value one.
Bugs found and fixed before this ever shipped, worth keeping the story of:
- enrich_photo.py read width/height from the raw image *before* applying
EXIF orientation correction, and read DateTimeOriginal off the plain
0th-IFD Exif object — a real camera stores it in the Exif sub-IFD, which
Pillow only exposes via get_ifd(Exif). A flat, hand-built EXIF dict
round-trips through Pillow either way, which is exactly what would have
hidden both bugs; the regression test builds EXIF with piexif instead,
matching what real hardware produces.
- photos-app.js's album grouping stripped a trailing path segment from
entry.path under the assumption it still carried a filename — it
doesn't (files-app.js's own convention: e.path is already the
containing directory), so every album collapsed one level into its
parent. Found live against a real multi-folder library.
- transport.js's ADMIN_OP_TYPES allowlist (already the fix for an
identical bug on video_root/apps_enabled, see 4783d81) was missing
photo_roots: its admin_challenge matched no pending request and was
silently dropped, so saving a photo root just timed out after 30s with
no error.
- daemon.py pruned a thumbnail when its file left the index (root removed
or reconfigured) but never forgot the content hash was "already
attempted" — the same bytes reappearing under a renamed/relocated root
(an operator's real workflow) were then permanently skipped, forever,
with nothing to indicate why. Discarding the attempt alongside the
cache entry on prune is what makes pruning actually reversible.
- packages/meshbay-client's app:// protocol handler served every file
with no Cache-Control header, so Chromium was free to serve a stale
cached copy indefinitely — none of several `npm run sync-ui` + reload
cycles during development actually picked up the new code until the
renderer's disk cache was cleared by hand. Now sends Cache-Control:
no-store.
- the lightbox's zoomed image used flex centering (align-items/
justify-content: center) combined with overflow: auto — a well-known
trap where the browser centers overflowing content by shifting it, and
the leading half of that overflow (here, the top of a zoomed photo)
sits outside what the scrollport can actually reach. Reported live as
"unusable". Fixed by switching to top/left alignment once zoomed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TiZG4AuSnxHohQMpwTHTyL
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Major finding: entry.id is a content hash, so the exact same physical
file — the same MP3, byte-for-byte — indexed into two different groups
(a shared library reused across several demo/test groups, or genuinely
the same folder shared into two groups) produces the *same id* in both.
_enriched_attempted was a single flat set of bare ids shared across every
group this node hosts. The moment one group's copy got enriched, every
other group's otherwise-identical copy read as "already attempted" and
was skipped forever — nothing else ever revisits an id once it's in this
set. That group's Music tab (or Videos tab, same bug, same set) showed
every affected file at duration 0 with no artist/album/thumbnail,
permanently, no matter how long you waited or how many times you
reloaded — group A having been enriched first was enough to silently
starve every later group of the same content.
Now keyed by (group_id, entry.id) throughout — the enrichment gate, the
sweep, and the rename re-enrichment path, for both video and audio (they
already shared the one set, and the collision risk is identical for
both). New regression test constructs two groups with byte-identical
audio content and confirms both enrich independently.
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musicbay.md's original call — Music needs no root, tag reads are cheap so
just cover the whole shared tree — didn't hold up against a real messy
library: everything under every shared folder got mixed together with no
way to scope Music down to an actual music collection. This adds an
audio_root setting, symmetric to video_root in every respect: signed
operator op (audio_root/audio_root_ack, MNP bumped to 0.10), validated
against a real directory in the group's own roots before a signature is
even asked for, gates tag/cover enrichment exactly like video_root gates
ffprobe/TMDB (nothing runs until it's set, only files under it once it
is), and a set/change fires a one-off sweep of whatever the folder already
contains.
The old trigger — sweep everything the instant "music" joins enabled_apps
— is gone along with the root-less design it belonged to; setting
audio_root is now the trigger, mirroring set_video_root's
enrich_video_root_fn exactly.
Test coverage mirrors the video_root suite: policy (refuse before a
signature round trip, accept/store correctly) and the enrichment gate
itself (nothing without a root, only files under it, sweep on set).
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Music grouping was measured against a real ~5700-file library and came
back worse than a plain file listing. Root cause: the artist/album
ancestor walk always climbed exactly two levels (parent = album,
grandparent = artist) with no idea where the group's own shared root
was. Any file in a flat top-level folder — common here: bare
`Artist/track.mp3`, no album subfolder at all — had its "grandparent"
resolve to the root directory's own name, so the artist got replaced
by the share's name. Measured: 289 of 5664 tracks across 41 real,
unrelated artists (Ben Harper, Dire Straits, Jimi Hendrix, Janis
Joplin, ...) collapsed into one fake artist this way — the single
biggest bucket in the whole library, ahead of every real one.
- `_artist_album_from_ancestors` now takes the entry's own root
boundary (daemon.py resolves it via `RootSet.split`) and refuses to
read it as a name. A file sitting in a top-level folder — genuinely
ambiguous, artist or a standalone album/compilation — is handled by
`_split_top_level_folder`: split on "Artist - Album" when the
(cleaned) folder name has that shape, otherwise the whole name
becomes the artist alone, the more common real case here.
- `_clean_tag` treats known tagger placeholders ("No Artist", a French
tool's "Nouvel artiste (334)") as absent rather than a real value —
they were just as truthy as a real name and were locking out the
fallback that would have done better. "Various Artists" is kept, a
real compilation credit rather than a placeholder.
- A `title` tag that's the bare filename copied verbatim (track number
included — found live on a whole CD-single) is stripped through the
same prefix rule the filename parser already used
(`title_parse.strip_track_prefix`), since a tag normally wins over
the parsed title.
- Cover art: only 11% of a 400-file sample had embedded art (expected
for this era of rip), but 267 loose cover images sit beside the
tracks across the library (Windows Media Player's `Folder.jpg`/
`AlbumArt_{guid}_*.jpg`, manual `cover.jpg`) and were never looked
at. `_find_sibling_cover` checks the track's own folder before
giving up — measured coverage 11% -> 26% on the same library, zero
network calls.
`_enriched_attempted` is in-memory and resets on restart, so a node
restart is enough to re-run enrichment over an already-scanned library
with the fixed logic — no rescan flag, no cache to clear by hand.
22 tests in test_enrich_audio.py (11 new), including the exact
regression case end to end through the real pool. Full suite: 1129
passed, no regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KBi7ALLGfwcjBXt57yNMcy
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Implements the node half of docs/musicbay.md against MNP 0.8:
- IndexEntry gains artist/album/track_no (reuses duration/thumb_hash/
display_title, already generic). New musicbrainz_config/_enabled and
music_meta_req/_resp message pairs, mirroring the TMDB shape.
- title_parse.parse_track_filename: track-number-prefix + title parsing,
fallback-only (embedded tags are the primary source, unlike Videos).
- indexer.enrich_audio.AudioEnricher: mutagen-based tag/embedded-cover
extraction through its own bounded pool (asyncio.to_thread, no
subprocess — no ffmpeg-shaped deadlock risk). Gated on "music" in a
group's enabled_apps rather than a video_root-style scoped folder.
- musicbrainz.py: MusicBrainzClient — no API key (unlike TMDB), just a
self-imposed ~1 req/s pace and a configurable, non-default User-Agent
contact string; inert (no calls at all) when no contact is configured,
never sends an unidentified client.
- media_cache.py: file_mbid/mbid_meta tables alongside the existing TMDB
ones, cover art reusing the thumbs table via a synthetic
musicbrainz:{mbid} id, pruned on file deletion.
- roster.py/ops.py/webrtc_server.py: musicbrainz_contact (node-wide) and
musicbrainz_enabled (per-group, from the start) as signed operator
settings, ALLOWED_APPS gains "music", _do_music_meta_request resolves
and caches a release-level MusicBrainz match per (artist, album).
- daemon.py: AudioEnricher/MusicBrainzClient wired alongside the video
ones; a group's existing library is swept when "music" is newly
enabled (no video_root equivalent — see musicbay.md §2.1).
41 new tests (musicbrainz.py against a mocked transport, admin-op policy
for both new settings, media_cache round-trip/pruning, enrich_audio
end-to-end against real ffmpeg-generated MP3s). Full suite (common +
node + hub): 1116 passed, no regressions.
Client-side (music-app.js, persistent player bar) not started yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KBi7ALLGfwcjBXt57yNMcy
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Three bugs found live testing the Videos app against a real HEVC/EAC3 show,
plus a design change requested afterward:
- Streaming always did "-c:v copy", which faithfully reports a source's real
hev1 codec string but is unplayable in a browser with no HEVC decoder
(most Chrome/Linux builds). The node now transcodes to H264 whenever the
probed codec is browser-incompatible (media_probe.py's new
BROWSER_INCOMPATIBLE_VIDEO_CODECS), with a `transcode_incompatible_video`
node.toml opt-out for operators who know their viewers already decode it.
- Dropping a whole season into an already-watched folder gave no scanning
indicator and no progress bar: IndexProgress was only ever updated by the
two bulk scan paths, never by the real-time per-file watchdog path
(_schedule_update/_debounce/_update_entry). That path now accounts a
"burst" the same way, without double-counting a file rewritten mid-debounce.
- A stray literal "0" rendered in the video detail modal when there was no
TMDB match (`meta.confidence` is 0, and `0 && x` renders "0" in JSX/htm,
not nothing) — `confident` is now a real boolean.
- Whether TMDB is used at all moves from a node-wide setting to per-group
(OP_TMDB_ENABLED/tmdb_enabled/tmdb_enabled_ack, scoped like OP_VIDEO_ROOT):
an operator running a real media-library group alongside test/demo groups
on one node wants outbound TMDB traffic for the one that needs it, not all
of them. The custom API token and query language stay node-wide, one
shared credential/cache (tmdb_config/OP_TMDB_CONFIG, unchanged reasoning).
MNP_VERSION 0.6 -> 0.7, additive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LAmyXtc6dAADsH23ydXQpY
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