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Attaching a group to a node meant hand-editing node.toml with a UUID
copied from a browser URL, restarting, and knowing that gek-init exists.
Nothing in the CLI said so, and on a node reached over SSH there is no
paste buffer to carry a UUID across in the first place.
meshbay-node group add grenet --dir ~/grenet-share
The name is resolved against the operator's groups on the hub by the
daemon, which is the process holding the session. The [[groups]] block is
appended to node.toml as text rather than round-tripped through a TOML
writer: the file is hand-written and its comments explain decisions worth
keeping. The directory is created, and the command says what remains —
restart, then gek-init for that group.
It refuses a name it cannot find by printing the groups it can, with
their ids. That listing is the useful half of the answer and it was
missing everywhere: _daemon_api now renders an `available` list from any
endpoint that offers one.
The key is per group and pairing is not, which is the part that reads as
a gap until it is written down: one paired browser covers every group the
node hosts, while each group's key admits only its own members. §4 of the
user guide now says all three of those in one place.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Both found by deploying the thing and running the workflow end to end. Neither
was reachable from the test suite, for the same reason in each case: the tests
knew something a real client cannot.
1. A first-time joiner had no way to learn node_pk.
join_request signs a transcript naming the node, and the node key was only
sent in handshake_ack — which an invited member cannot reach, having no GEK to
prove. joinGroup() therefore threw "handshake incomplete" and the browser path
for an invited member was broken. Every test built the transcript from a node
key it already had, so nothing noticed.
The challenge now carries node_pk. It is unverified at that point and never a
substitute for the ack: the ack still proves possession and signs the
transcript, the client checks the two values match and refuses a peer that
changed identity mid-handshake, and TOFU pinning is unchanged. A wrong value
only makes our own verification fail.
test_invite_then_join_delivers_the_gek now takes the key from the challenge
instead of from sk_node, so it proves a real client can learn it.
2. The roster pinned everyone without a name.
`_do_join_request` took the username from the session, which takes it from the
JWT — and the hub puts no username claim in a token. So identities were pinned
with an empty name and `member revoke <name>` could never match: the live node
answered "known: , ,". Invitations now carry the name (new invites.username
column, with a migration for the roster DBs already out there), and the CLI
resolves a name through the daemon: its own roster first, the hub as fallback
for identities pinned before this.
The harness that found them is QE/deploy/e2e.py — gitignored with the rest of
QE/, so it is not in this commit. It does the SPA's job in Python against the
live deployment: hub login, WebRTC via hub signaling, the unified handshake,
joining with a code, index, chunk download and MSE segments.
Verified against meshbay.org and the local node: an account registered from
scratch is invited by code, receives the group key wrapped for a key it proved it
holds, downloads and decrypts a file, streams 5 encrypted fMP4 segments,
reconnects with no code, and is refused after `member revoke`. The node audit log
shows invite_create → join_pinned(via=code) → gek_wrapped → handshake, then
join_no_gek once revoked.
Tests: 232 node+common.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A node admits people from its own roster, and until now a headless operator had
no way to put anyone on it: pairing worked from the CLI, everything else needed a
browser on a machine that does not have one. Absorbs milestones 14.3/14.4.
member list who is admitted, role, status, when and how pinned
member invite <username> one-time code; the node wraps the key when they
connect, so nobody has to be online then
member revoke <username> stop serving them the key
member unpin <username> forget the pin so they can pair again after a reset
All of it goes through the daemon's loopback API with the per-run session token
(11.5.3) — _daemon_api() in daemon.py, which also replaced three hand-rolled
urllib blocks. `status` deliberately still reads the keystore, config and roster
directly, so it works while the daemon is stopped.
Two things the commands say out loud, because getting them wrong is silent:
- revoke ends by telling the operator to rotate the key. The ex-member stops
receiving it on their next connection, but they hold the current one, and
"revoked" reads like it took the key back.
- revoke/unpin refuse a username the roster does not know instead of acting on
nobody. A typo must not look like success.
Code lifetimes now differ by what the act is: 7 days for an invitation, which
crosses a human conversation and gets answered whenever someone reads their
messages, and 24 h for operator pairing, which is typed during the SSH session
that printed it. Both configurable ([node] invite_ttl_hours, pair_ttl_hours). A
day was long enough for the second and not for the first — a code that dies over
a weekend means finding a browser to issue another one.
The roster is also in the local admin UI, escaped: usernames come from the hub
and land on the page that can re-key groups and read the audit log, so H2's rule
covers them exactly as it covers filenames.
Verified by driving the real CLI against a stub daemon over a socket, which is
how the "known: <nothing>" bug in the not-found path turned up.
Tests: 89 node here (roster, endpoints, CLI routing, TTL config).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The invite flow fetched the invitee's pk_x25519 from the hub and wrapped the
GEK for whatever came back (app.js:1466, and gek-init did the same server-side).
The hub is the key directory, so a hub answering with its own key was handed the
group key by an honest member following the protocol exactly. No forgery, no
injection, nothing for the client to notice. That was H3.
The fix is not safety numbers. Nobody reads the directory any more:
- the node holds the GEK and wraps it itself, on every connection, for the
X25519 key the joiner signed with their Ed25519 identity in one transcript
(meshbay:join:v1), so the identity key vouches for the encryption key;
- identities are bound to accounts by a one-time code the hub never sees —
40 bits, single use, one account, bounded per connection AND node-wide;
- the node's own roster decides who may receive the key. Hub membership lets
someone reach a node; it no longer gets them anything. A hub that invents an
account and mints it a token is answered not_authorized_for_group.
Safety numbers would have made substitution detectable by a human who checks, at
the moment there is nothing to check against — first contact. Removing the lookup
makes it impossible, and costs the user one code to pass along.
M3 falls out of the same work. The daemon auto-pinned its own keystore key as
admin_pk_ed25519 while the browser signs with the user identity key, so every
privileged operation failed closed with a signature error that looked like a bug
somewhere else; the demo only worked because a deploy script overwrote the value.
Authority now comes from the roster, established locally by `operator pair`.
Asking the hub for the operator's key — the obvious-looking fix — would have let
the hub install itself as node administrator.
BREAKING: gek_bundle_store is deleted, not gated. No member hands the node key
material at all, so C5b becomes structural rather than an authorization to check.
Existing stored bundles are still served, so current deployments keep working.
Also:
- join_policy (invite|open) is read from node.toml, never from the hub — a hub
able to declare a group open would be handed its key. Unknown group ⇒ invite.
- admin signatures are verified against the roster on every check, so unpinning
takes effect without a restart. admin_pk_ed25519 stays readable as legacy.
- two C5b tests were rewritten, deliberately: they asserted that
gek_bundle_store demanded an operator signature, and the message is gone. They
now assert the stronger property. The file says not to fix these tests, so
this is the record of why they changed.
- a slice-1 bug found while writing slice 2: connect() never passed skEdB64, so
pairing would have failed at runtime with no test able to catch it.
Tests: 152 node+common here, including an end-to-end DataChannel run where a
member who has never held the group key redeems a code in the pre-proof window
and receives the key wrapped for a key only they can open.
Design: docs/invite-pairing-v1.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5 — findings H6, C4 (partial), and milestone 11.5.3.
H6 — resource exhaustion. Several paths let one peer degrade or stall a node:
* the DataChannel frame limit was a flat 64 MB applied BEFORE authentication,
so an unauthenticated peer could announce a huge frame and dribble bytes
into it. Unauthenticated peers now get 64 KB; the large budget is granted
only after the GEK proof, where it is needed for uploads.
* _do_stream_segment ran subprocess.run(..., timeout=30) directly in the event
loop, stalling the entire daemon — every peer, every group — for up to
thirty seconds per request. Now async, with a timeout and process kill.
* ffmpeg was spawned per stream request with no cap. Both streaming paths now
share a transport-wide semaphore.
* POST /v1/nodes/{id}/webrtc/offer was reachable by any authenticated user for
any node, with no membership check and no rate limit, making the target node
allocate an aiortc PeerConnection and gather ICE on demand — remote resource
exhaustion against a third party's machine. Now rate limited, capped per
user, SDP size bounded, and the caller must share an active group with the
node. That also closes the H4 gap where signaling ignored group status.
* POST /v1/nodes/{id}/incoming took peer_ip verbatim, so any user could make an
arbitrary node emit UDP packets to an address of their choosing. The probe
target must now match the caller's own source address.
C4 (partial) — the pre-proof bundle window. GEK and keypair bundle fetches are
served before the GEK proof by necessity: the client needs its wrapped bundle in
order to compute the proof. That window is a disclosure surface a hub can reach
by forging a JWT. Bounded to 4 fetches per session and audited as
"pre_proof_fetch". The real fix is removing remote keypair bundles entirely,
which belongs to the native client (Phase 13.3).
11.5.3 — the node admin UI was unauthenticated because it binds loopback. But
any local process can reach it, and so can a page in the operator's browser via
DNS rebinding — and this API re-initialises group keys and reads the audit log.
H2 showed script execution there equals full control. Now gated by a per-run
token, printed at startup, accepted as ?t= or X-MeshBay-Token.
One test needed rewriting rather than adding: the first version asserted
"subprocess.run(" was absent from the source, which also matched the comment
documenting the old behaviour. It now parses the AST and checks the property.
Tests: 121 node, 142 hub+common. Regression suite 47 node + 10 hub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5 — findings H1, C5a, H2, C5b, H5 (see second-review.md).
Batched together because the node-side changes share webrtc_server.py and
cannot be separated into working commits.
H1 — cross-group chat leak. chat_store, the peer registry and the display-name
cache were read from the shared transport context, and daemon.py hoisted the
FIRST group's chat store onto it. On a node hosting several groups every
group's messages went to one database, chat_history served them back to members
of every other group, and chat broadcast reached all peers regardless of group.
All three now resolve through _group_ctx().
C5a — upload confinement. Uploads landed in the shared root under a
client-chosen name and overwrote whatever was there. Any member could destroy
the operator's files, and by becoming the recorded uploader of the replaced
file could then delete it through the uploader path, bypassing the Ed25519
admin challenge. Uploads now go to a per-user quarantine (.uploads/{user_id}/),
refuse to overwrite, and enforce chunk ordering, a filename allowlist and a
size cap.
H2 — stored XSS in the node admin UI. Filenames chosen by any group member were
interpolated raw into the localhost UI, which has no authentication, so script
execution there equals control of the node admin API. Now html.escape()
throughout, textContent in the audit table, plus CSP/nosniff/no-referrer. The
CSP contains exfiltration but cannot stop injected inline script — escaping is
the fix.
C5b — group key seizure. gek_bundle_store wrote whatever any member sent and
auto-activated bundles addressed to the node operator. The operator's X25519
public key is public (the node publishes it in handshake_ack), so any member
could wrap a key of their choosing for it and take over the group, locking
every legitimate member out. Storing now requires an operator signature and
_try_activate_gek is removed: nothing arriving over MNP can set a live GEK.
H5 — unbound signing oracle. The node challenged with 32 raw random bytes and
the client signed them blind, so a signature named no operation, subject, node
or time. New meshbay_common/adminop.py defines a length-prefixed,
domain-separated transcript; both sides build it independently and the client
refuses to sign when the announced op/subject do not match its request.
BREAKING: a group admin who does not operate the node can no longer store GEK
bundles on it. Invites must be performed by the node operator.
Adds tests/test_security_regressions.py. Verified against pre-fix source via
git stash. Three pre-existing tests asserted the vulnerable behaviour as a
feature and were inverted: gek auto-activation, and the transport-wide
chat_store in test_daemon.
Tests: 109 node, 132 hub+common.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5.A — findings C1 and C6 (see second-review.md).
C1: the per-group HTTP file API bound 0.0.0.0 for every configured group,
private ones included, and served two endpoints with no authentication at all:
GET /index (full Mesh Group Index) and GET /file/{id} (raw plaintext file via
FileResponse). Anyone able to reach the port — LAN, forwarded port, permissive
IPv6 — read every private file. This bypassed the entire GEK-proof and node
sovereignty layer. Deleted rather than patched: it duplicated MNP without any
of its controls.
C6: the TCP+TLS chunk server accepted a bare JWT with no GEK proof, leaving a
second non-compliant handshake path. Deleted; QUIC remains and will be brought
to parity with WebRTC by the unified handshake in 11.5.4.
Transport decision recorded in transport/__init__.py: WebRTC/ICE is primary for
browser and native clients (the only NAT traversal validated here — 2 ISPs,
IPv4 STUN + IPv6, 4G CGNAT); QUIC is kept for LAN, port-forwarded and hub-less
group:// access. punch_nat() is a direct-connection helper, not a traversal
stack.
Also removed server_ssl_context()/client_ssl_context() from tls_cert.py (no
remaining callers) and a dead import of the former in quic_server.py.
generate_self_signed_cert() stays: QUIC uses it, and the certificate hash is
the intended channel-binding anchor for 11.5.6, since QUIC has no DTLS
fingerprint to bind the GEK proof to.
BREAKING CHANGE: node.toml keys `port` and `http_port` are gone. Regenerate
config with `meshbay-node init`. Env var MESHBAY_PORT -> MESHBAY_QUIC_PORT.
Tests: 198 passed (209 - 7 test_http_server - 4 test_transport). No other test
changed status. Net -1300 lines.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Baseline commit capturing in-progress Phase 12 work that was already present
in the working tree (uncommitted) before the Phase 11.5 security remediation
begins. Committed as-is, without review or modification, so that remediation
changes arrive as a separable diff.
Contents: BundleStore (P2P GEK + keypair bundles), password split
(auth_key / bundle_key), node Ed25519 auth (POST /v1/nodes/auth, node-scoped
JWT), GEK-HMAC handshake proof with DTLS channel binding, Ed25519 admin
challenge-response, node local admin UI rewrite, browser key persistence.
Not authored in this session — captured to establish a baseline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Add SQLite audit store for legal compliance (LCEN/DSA): logs user IP,
actions (handshake, file download/upload/delete, stream, chat), and
timestamps. Retention: 1 year, with cleanup method.
WebRTC transport now logs all user actions to the audit store with
remote IP extraction from the ICE transport.
Local web UI rewritten as a proper admin dashboard:
- Stats cards (groups, files, peers)
- Connected peers table with IP, username, group, state
- Group cards with file listings and shared directory info
- Audit log page with event/user filtering
- Dark theme, responsive, auto-refresh
- JSON API: /api/status, /api/groups, /api/peers, /api/audit, /api/config
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Implements all 8 milestones (7.0-7.7):
- 7.0: JWT carries `groups` claim; node verifies group membership at
MNP handshake (QUIC + TCP+TLS). Resolves security review C2.
- 7.1: QUIC 0-RTT session resumption via stored session tickets
(17-21ms reconnect vs 47ms cold).
- 7.2: Hub→node WebSocket signaling for NAT punch coordination
(`client_incoming`/`punch_ready`) + jti denylist push. Denylist
class blocks revoked users/jtis at handshake.
- 7.3: Multi-group daemon — one QUIC port serves N groups with
per-group GEK, shared_root, and index routing.
- 7.4: HLS streaming via QUIC (STREAM_SEGMENT message type, ffmpeg
segment extraction).
- 7.5: Sender Keys protocol for group chat (Signal Groups approach).
Each member has own sending chain key, HKDF chain ratchet, AES-256-GCM
encryption, Ed25519 signing. Resolves security review C1.
- 7.6: Chat store (SQLite via aiosqlite), CHAT_MESSAGE MNP wire type
with peer broadcast, web UI with WebSocket push.
- 7.7: Argon2id calibration CLI.
First security review included (first-review.md). 109 tests, demo-v3
validated against meshbay.org production hub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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config.py: TOML + env var overrides, sane defaults.
daemon.py: full startup sequence (keystore→hub→GEK→indexer→
server→UI), SIGINT/SIGTERM shutdown, calibrate-argon2 command.
ui/app.py: FastAPI on localhost:18000, status+files JSON API,
HTML status page (auto-refresh 10s). All bound to 127.0.0.1.
Full suite: 29/29 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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3-package layout: meshbay-common (shared crypto/protocol),
meshbay-hub (FastAPI server), meshbay-node (local daemon).
Includes validated POC spikes 1-6 in poc/, architecture drafts
v1/v2 in docs/, and CLAUDE.md project conventions.
All cryptographic primitives extracted from POC into
meshbay_common/crypto.py (GEK wrap/unwrap, chunk key derivation,
keystore encryption, chunk signing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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